America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

1193

Allen: Patton’s men need pretzels to go with German beer

By Gracie Allen

Los Angeles, California – (Sept. 11)
Don’t forget to mail those Christmas presents to boys overseas between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15.

One woman I know, whose boy is with Gen. Patton, is sending her son a box of pretzels.

She figures by the time he gets the pretzels, he’ll be where there’s plenty of beer.

Sometimes I wonder if this wave of optimism that’s sweeping the country is good or bad.

For example, one California plant has already started reconversion to peacetime industry. They’re making electric irons – 20,000 a week.

It’s true the country’s pants need pressing, but it’s also a perfect time to be caught with them down.

1194

93 airliners ordered by three companies

Douglas Aircraft gets $50 million contract

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1195

In Washington –
Nazi cartels feared as possible spark for new world war

Major economic conflict forecast as end of fighting; Germans’ Argentine links cited

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1196

Senators to get peace proposal

Chinese to attend next conference

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1197

Steele: China’s ordeal

By A. T. Steele

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1198

Maj. de Seversky: ‘Big battles’

By Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky

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1199

Kaiser pledges support of war plant conversion

Absolutely essential to keep factories going to create needed jobs, he says
By Robert C. Elliott, Scripps-Howard staff writer

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1200

americavotes1944

Nye charges plot to ‘buy’ defeat

Veteran sought as foe, he says

Washington (UP) –
Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND) charged today that Joseph B. Keenan, former Assistant Attorney General, offered a disabled veteran of World War I $110,000 to run against him for the Republican senatorial nomination this year.

The offer, Mr. Nye charged in a Senate speech, was made in the presence of another North Dakota Senator whom he did not identify.

North Dakota’s other Senator is Republican William Langer, long a bitter foe of Me. Nye in North Dakota politics.

Mr. Nye said the offer was made Sept. 14, 1943, when the disabled veteran, Fay Dewitt of Minot, North Dakota, was in Washington en route to a national convention of disabled American war veterans.

Mr. Langer told the Senate, however, that:

The statement that J. B. Keenan ever offered anyone a single dollar to defeat the Senator from North Dakota is completely false.

Visited with Senator

Mr. Nye said Mr. Dewitt and Charles Gray of Bismarck, North Dakota, visited that day with “one of their Senators in his office.” During the conversation, Mr. Nye continued, if was said that Mr. Dewitt was affiliated, with the Masons, Elks, American Legions, Veterans of Foreign Wars and Disabled War Veterans.

The Senator, Mr. Nye said, requested that he be permitted to hold Mr. Dewitt’s membership cards for a few hours, promising to return them that evening to Mr. Dewitt’s rooms.

That evening, according to Mr. Nye, the Senator went to the hotel bringing with him a “Mr. McSheehan” or a “Mr. Keenan” who, Mr. Nye said, was “Joseph B. Keenan, native of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, resident of Cleveland, Ohio, who under Attorney General Cummings [former Attorney General Homer S. Cummings] became first Assistant Attorney General.”

‘White House connections’

Mr. Nye said Mr. Keenan, when asked his interest as a Democrat in the Republican senatorial race, said he was “a Democrat with White House connections interested in seeing Senator Nye’s defeat.”

Mr. Keenan, Mr. Nye said, offered to finance the Dewitt campaign to the extent of $110,000, of which $10,000 was to be paid on the spot.

Mr. Dewitt and his companions – who, besides Mr. Gray, included Neal E. Williams (a special Assistant Attorney General of North Dakota), Andy Nomland, Oscar Winters, and Howard Shirley (all of Grand Forks) – “administered a verbal lashing to the proposition to buy a candidate for the Senate,” Mr. Nye said.

1201

Millett: Modernized kitchens are menace to traditions

Miss Millett begs designers to be thoughtful of family memories
By Ruth Millett

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1202

Doubleheaders pile up on Pirates

Cards can clinch flag by beating local club three of four games

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1203

Address parcels on one side only

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1204

americavotes1944

Networks harvest millions in campaign time

Political figures are staggering
By Si Steinhauser

Some years ago, a Pittsburgh man set aside a fund of $11 million to be spent in philanthropic endeavors while he is still alive. He is still living and seeing his money at work. The boss assigned me to ask him why he gave his millions away. His answer was quite simple:

I made that money selling dehydrated potatoes to the government for shipment overseas. It doesn’t belong to me, so I’m giving it back to the people to whom it belongs.

Yesterday we asked one of the nice young women in our office to tabulate the cost of an all-network political broadcast by President Roosevelt or Governor Dewey from Standard Rate and Data, the Bible or cost book of radio. She added up the cost of a single half hour at $50,781. Since they usually talk longer, the rate may double. If each candidate spoke only a half hour on 10 broadcasts someone would pay the networks a minimum of $1 million for radio time. That figure may be doubled by talks by vice-presidential and other candidates and single station broadcasts by state, county and municipal candidates across the country will probably add another million to network and local station treasuries.

We couldn’t ask all of the people who contribute this money to campaign treasuries why they so it so we asked our associate editor and political authority, Kermit McFarland, and he gave us quite as simple an answer as the philanthropist: “Because they want to see the man to whose campaign fund they contribute elected.”

We’re naïve about politics but there must be more than that to it. Spending $2 million to get a man a $75,000 (Mr. Roosevelt cut his pay to $25,000) job doesn’t add up.

If you like comparative figures, NBC charges $15,646 for a half hour of night time, CBS asks $15,225, the Blue Network $11,869 and Mutual $8,041.

Suppose Mr. Roosevelt were to speak on all networks and a single local station decided not to carry his talk but to substitute a local candidate’s talk or even a talk by say, Mr. Dewey, who might be in town that night.

“You go ahead and suppose Steinhauser,” said a station manager. “We could do a thing like that but we wouldn’t dare.”

Stations discussed editorial and political policies last year and decided to keep hands off because the present outmoded radio law provides that if a station gives time to one side of a controversy it must give equal time and facilities to the other side.

So say the broadcasters, according to the law, if we took time to say “We’re for Roosevelt” we would have to add “And we’re also for Dewey.”

1205

U.S. State Department (September 12, 1944)

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt The Earl of Athlone Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Mrs. Roosevelt Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone
Admiral Leahy Prime Minister Churchill
General Marshall Mrs. Churchill
Admiral King Field Marshal Brooke
General Arnold Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill

Arnold gives the following information which apparently pertains to the dinner meeting on September 12:

That night, at a dinner with the Governor General, the question of aid to Poland came up. Several messages [had] arrived from the Russians and from Harriman relating to Polish patriots in Warsaw. General Marshall and I talked this over at length. For some time, it had been apparent that if some help was not given to the Polish patriots in Warsaw, they would be exterminated…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

It gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill, and the President something serious to think about. Could we help the Poles in Warsaw, even though we wanted to? That rather large problem was never completely solved…

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During that dinner the Prime Minister came out with new ideas about winning the war. At that particular moment he thought it a matter of vital British interest that we (including the RAF) get more planes, ships, and soldiers into the final battle of Japan as soon as we could. I told him the question of putting planes in there wasn’t quite that simple. There were not enough land masses in the Pacific Ocean to use the heavy bombers we would have available from Europe when that phase of the war was over. As a matter of fact, if we could use 1500 out of the 3500 we had in the ETO, we would be very, very lucky. Certainly, we would much rather have the B-29s, with their longer range and their heavier bomb load than we would the B-17, the B-24, the Lancaster, or the Halifax…

1206

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 12, 1944

My Dear Friend, Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives à la Russe, and bringing them into the area of UNRRA as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.

The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.

A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Land. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.

Some of the Boniface I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander’s battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.

Yours always,
W

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 12, 1944

My Dear Friend, Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:

  • Wednesday, 13th – Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.
  • Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th – their further discussions.
  • They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.

It would probably be in conformity with, your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.

I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced, I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.

One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? – in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.

Yours always,
W

1207

The President to the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, 12 September 1944

Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.

The President to the War Shinning Administrator

Quebec, 12 September 1944

Please come to Quebec without delay.

1208

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State

Twentieth Day, Tuesday, September 12, 1944
Restricted

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I then told the group in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Church ill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise. (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)

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Talks During the Day With the Secretary
Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan’s being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.

Discussion During the Day With Cadogan
I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon … [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. …

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Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it, he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word “terrific.” He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.

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1209

Völkischer Beobachter (September 13, 1944)

Wie der Feind die Lage sieht –
Briten erwarten härteste Kämpfe

Drei unbehagliche Tatsachen für den Gegner

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1210

Die andere Seite sagt:
‚Der deutsche Wille stärker denn je‘

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1211

Die Konferenz in Quebec

vb. Wien, 12. September –
Wie im August 1943 treffen sich auch diesmal Roosevelt und Churchill in Quebec. Wurde dieser Tagungsort wiedergewählt, weil man Kanada, das dieser Krieg entscheidend der Saugkraft des großen Nachbarn ausgesetzt hat, auch von London aus bereits als eine Art Niemandsland zwischen Empire und USA ansieht? 1943 fanden freilich die abschließenden Gespräche in Washington statt. Es spielte die Bitte Badoglios um Waffenstillstand hinein. Man rechnete im Lager der Westmächte schon mit baldigem Kriegsende und wollte sich vor den erstrebten Besprechungen mit den Sowjets auf eine gemeinsame Marschlinie einigen.

Die Konferenzen von Moskau und Teheran haben dann allerdings gezeigt, wer im Kreise der drei großen Räuber den Ton angab. Briten und Yankees wurden völlig an die Wand gespielt, sie durften nur die salbungsvollen Deklamationen über Freiheit, Toleranz und ähnliche Deckworte für den „Frieden durch Gewalt“ liefern, erhielten „gemeinsame Entscheidung der europäischen Fragen“ versprochen und mußten sich den Termin für die Invasion diktieren lassen. Stalin verlangte sie, um seine Verbündeten machtmäßig anderweitig festzulegen, weil er sie durch den Pazifikkrieg noch nicht genügend gebunden fand. Wie er dann zu verfahren gedachte, hat sich inzwischen erwiesen.

Die gefügigen Partner Moskaus werden sich in Quebec mit der Lage auseinanderzusetzen haben, die nun besonders auf dem Balkan entstanden ist und dort, wie schon in Polen, im Zeichen einer sichtbaren Ausdehnung des bolschewistischen Machtbereiches und damit der Unterjochung all der kleinen Nationen steht, die England und die USA den Sowjets ausgeliefert haben.

An der zweiten Konferenz in Quebec nehmen die Sowjets nicht teil. Stalin ließ Roosevelt und Churchill mitteilen, er sei jetzt durch die Ereignisse an der Ostfront zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um Zeit für derartige Besprechungen erübrigen zu können. Aber auch die Tschungking-chinesen sind einstweilen in Quebec nicht vertreten, obwohl dort einer der wichtigsten Programmpunkte der Krieg im fernen Osten ist. Roosevelt sieht sich schon aus innenpolitischen Gründen veranlasst, von Churchill eine bindende Zusäge für die britische Beteiligung an diesem Kampf mit allen verfügbaren Kräften zu erhalten, und die englische Presse beeilt sich demgemäß, zu versichern, daß den Briten diese Aufgabe nicht weniger am Herzen liege wie Roosevelt die Kriegführung in Europa.

Was den Kampf an der Westfront betrifft, so entspricht die publizistische Behandlung dieser Frage in der englisch-amerikanischen Presse anlässlich der Quebec-Konferenz mehr dem agitatorischen Bedürfnis, bereits einen Sieg vorwegzunehmen als der wirklichen Lage, die im Zeichen der sich ständig verstärkenden deutschen Abwehr und der wachsenden Schwierigkeiten steht, die sich für die Fortführung der anglo-amerikanischen Operationen ergeben. Es besteht Grund zu der Annahme, daß jetzt Roosevelt und Churchill angesichts der unermesslichen Verluste, womit sie im weiteren Verlauf des Sturmlaufes gegen die deutsche Front zu rechnen haben, eine politische Offensive ins Auge fassen werden, um nach dem Beispiel Wilsons im Jahre 1918 sich den Sieg durch Hintertüren zu erschleichen. Sie wissen genau, daß Deutschland in naher Zukunft gewichtige Trümpfe auszuspielen hat und daß für sie alles daran hängt, zu einer vorzeitigen Beendigung eines Kampfes zu gelangen, dessen Gewinnung durch Waffengewalt immer fragwürdiger werden muß.

Das deutsche Volk sieht einem Wiederaufleben der Pläne von 1943 mit dem Bewusstsein feiner unbeugsamen Moral entgegen. Es erblickt in solchen Versuchen am untauglichen Objekt nur den Beweis dafür, daß der Gegner Umwege wählen muß, weil er am Ort der militärischen Entscheidung nicht mehr mit einem Erfolg rechnen kann. Nicht nur die Erinnerung an den Betrug und Wortbruch von 1918 stärkt es in seinem Willen, diesen Kampf für Freiheit und Leben bis zum Sieg durchzufechten, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Vernichtungspläne des Feindes, die dem Krieg das Wesen eines Ringens um Sein oder Nichtsein geben und uns eine Verknechtung zudenken, die in der Geschichte nicht ihresgleichen hätte. Alle Versuche, uns von dieser Kernfrage abzulenken und uns den Blick für die Absichten zu trüben, die unsere Gegner hegen, werden völlig ins Leere stoßen und nur dazu beitragen, unsere Entschlossenheit zum Einsatz aller Kraft für die Verteidigung des deutschen Lebens zu steigern.

vb.

1212

Deutsche Gegenangriffe am Maas-Schelde-Kanal

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