Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

[NormanStewart]

SACMED to CCS

Caserta, 13 September 1944
Confidential
Priority

FX 24540 to AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ Com Zone Main and SHAEF for information signed Wilson cite fhcos. This is Naf 778.

Subject is guidance on economic policy for Italy.

As battle line in Italy moves north and the operational phase in large portions of occupied territory is terminated, I feel that approach to problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation must be re-examined. While purely military considerations remain predominant in the forward areas, problems associated with civil administration, particularly of an economic character, raise general questions on which I, in my capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission, require guidance.

During the active operational phase, activities of an economic character conducted by the Allied Control Commission and other agencies in Italy under my command of necessity have been directly related to support of military operations. Supplies have been imported and distributed to the civilian population in order to minimize disease and prevent unrest, and efforts toward economic rehabilitation have had the primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of utilizing Italy’s resources for the war effort and producing in Italy goods which would otherwise have had to be imported.

In the light of the changed operational situation the limited directives which have governed seem no longer to be adequate. The Armistice agreement, under which the Allied Control Commission operates, contains no commitment to the Italian people as to any measure of material assistance. However, there has arisen in Italy the expectation, if not the assumption, presumably by reason of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, that an additional measure of assistance and relief to the civil population would be forthcoming. Public utterances in both countries have tended to support this view. Moreover, if the two governments continue at this stage to consider only what is required in the interest of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring one of their own long-term interests, i.e., the establishment of a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. Notwithstanding this fact the standard of military necessity still obtains and in the provision of supply is being strictly adhered to. For example, a clothing programme was submitted in June (Lac airgram 32) based on the estimated essential needs of the population this winter, but also having regard to the anti-inflationary effects of an increased supply of consumer goods. I am now asked, however, (Cal 738) to certify that this clothing is the minimum requirement to prevent disease and unrest which would prejudice military operations. As another example, not of great importance in itself but indicating the type of question which is now arising, in response to a requisition of paper essential for proper keeping of Italian tax records, it is asked (Cal 566) whether the paper is necessary “to control and manage the civil population.”

For the foregoing reasons I request that directives which govern the provision of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation be reexamined and that, if the policy of the governments is to furnish aid to Italy beyond that required by strict military necessity of the Allied Forces, the standards applicable to that aid be revised. In particular I request that I be informed:

a. To what extent, if any, I may take into account factors tending toward inflation, and to what degree I am responsible for measures to counter these tendencies.

b. To what extent, if any, is it desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out and if any rehabilitation is intended what industries should be given precedence?

c. Within the limitations of available shipping, to what extent, if any, are exports to be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade developed?

If my revised directive gives me responsibilities in the economic field broader than those now existing, I may require additional personnel of suitable technical training and experience, presumably drawn more from civil than military ranks. I am, as I have already indicated, prepared to accept qualified civilian experts in major proportion in the Allied Control Commission as soon as they are available.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		Field Marshal Brooke
General Marshall		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold		Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell		General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson		Admiral Noble
Rear Admiral Cooke		Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral McCormick		Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Handy		Major General Laycock
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Hollis
Captain Graves		Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
		Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 13, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of the minutes of the 172nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

General Marshall drew attention to his statement recorded in the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes. He requested that this should be amended to read: “… the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 172nd Meeting. The detailed record was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject to later minor amendments.

Control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/4)

Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time fully to study the proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard to certain small details.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

Machinery for coordination of U.S.-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures “A” and “B” to CCS 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.

Report on the enemy situation in the Pacific (CCS 643/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the enemy situation in the Pacific–Far East (CCS 643/1).

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676).

Strategy for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417/8)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/8. There was, however, one point he would like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements allowed.

Sir John Dill explained that supplies would be required for British forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the operations were not yet fully approved.

Admiral Leahy said that he quite appreciated the points made by Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the existing paper.

Sir Alan Brooke said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against Japan were not included in the program outlined in CCS 417/8 and that requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support of these forces would be put forward at a later date.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted the proposals in CCS 417/8 as a basis for planning.

b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind.

c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against Japan would be notified as soon as possible.

Basic policies for the “OCTAGON” Conference (CCS 654/8)

Admiral Leahy said that it seemed to him that the U.S. and British proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6i of CCS 654 were very similar.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British wording “inescapable commitments” was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided.

Admiral King suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: “having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments.”

Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6i of CCS 654:

Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.

Future operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 677/1)

Admiral Leahy explained that with regard to paragraph 2b of the U.S. draft of the message to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording “for planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” was more appropriate than “for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” since the operation was not yet approved and might, in fact, never take place.

General Marshall explained that the words “major units” in paragraph 1a had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous day.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that in the U.S. draft the date on which General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since a decision had to be reached by the 15th, it would be safer to call for the report on the 10th.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the U.S. draft was acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean the draft message in Enclosure “B” to CCS 677/1. (Subsequently dispatched as Fan 415.)

Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit photographs to be taken at that time.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 520/4 (OCTAGON)

Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe following the establishment of Allied forces on the continent

References:	a. CCS 150th Mtg., Item 5
	b. CCS 520 Series
	c. CCS 304/13
	d. CCS 172d Mtg., Item 10

While not accepting all points in CCS 520/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with the establishment of control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the directive proposed in the Annex to CCS 520/3 is in several respects inadequate, and therefore they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and dispatch a revised directive as set forth in the Enclosure.

---

Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/27

British participation in the war against Japan

The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting.

The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance of the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/28 (OCTAGON)

Directive to SACSEA

We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now despatch the following directive to Admiral Mountbatten.

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command

Your primary object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, adequate protection of which is essential throughout.

The following are approved operations:
a) The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route;
b) Operation DRACULA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15 March.

If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

[NormanStewart]

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 675/1

A combined memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to March 1945

The Representatives of United States and British military services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172nd Meeting of 12 September.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]
Top secret

Combined memorandum on troop movements covering the period October 1944 to March 1945

Assumptions
The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:
a. That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation DRACULA.
b. No further U.S. troops need be transported to European theaters.

If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1 above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon.

Statement of the problem
The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop shipping for DRACULA on U.S. and British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.

Facts bearing on the problem
The buildup of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India prior to 1 March 1945.

It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve virtually the entire British trooping lift.

This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only the two Queens on this run. However, in the event of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove necessary to withdraw one or both of the Queens from the Atlantic service.

A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S. cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S. withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.

The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two “General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean shipping.

Discussion

1. Effect on British movement up to approximately mid-March

a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom.

b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages.

c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.

d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000.

2. Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately end of March

a. U.S. shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops per month from Europe to the United States in British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will be:

1 Oct 44	2,760,000
1 Apr 45	1,535,000
6 months withdrawals from Europe	1,225,000

b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000 troops monthly would result in the following European position:

1 Oct 44	2,760,000
1 Apr 45	1,805,000
6 months withdrawals from Europe	955,000

In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months.

c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible.

Conclusion
Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until shipping priorities have been established as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not possible to present more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 678

Planning date for the end of the war against Japan

The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated date for the end of the war against Japan:
a. The redeployment of forces against Japan.
b. The planning of production.
c. The allocation of manpower.

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a planning date two years after the defeat of Germany.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (September 13, 1944)

He knew about the invasion –
Super-secret of the war kept by a sergeant major!

Canadian finds vital paper in Citadel after last Roosevelt-Churchill conference

Québec, Canada (UP) –
Military authorities admitted today that a mere sergeant major of the Canadian Army shared with the Allied High Command what was for months the super-secret of the war – the plans for the invasion of Normandy.

The hero of this drama was Sgt. Maj. Émile Couture, a French-Canadian, whose job it was to issue stationery at last year’s Québec Conference of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

Imbued with the French sense of economy, he was making an inspection of the conference quarters at the conclusion of the meeting to collect unused paper. In one of the rooms of the Chateau Frontenac, then as now the working and residential headquarters for the Anglo-American military staffs, Couture found an interesting memorandum.

The moment he read it, he was transported from his prosaic role of a garrison wheelhorse into the inner councils of the high and mighty. Couture gasped. It was in black and white – the alternative dates for the invasion of Normandy, the number of troops to be employed, how they would be transported in so many ships and how they would be supported from the air and sea.

The operational outline for the boldest, most difficult campaign of the war, was in HIS hands – a sergeant major!

Couture jammed the paper into an envelope and made with all haste to Canadian Army District Headquarters at the Citadel. There, an officer examined them. He uttered the French equivalent of “Wow!”

Given British medals

Couture and an officer were taken secretly to Washington. There in the inner sanctum of the top strategists – perhaps the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff – they turned over the paper and took a solemn oath of secrecy.

Couture discovered the memorandum in the conference room of the chiefs of staff. It was said to have belonged to an American general. There was a report that the general had been relieved of his duties but there was no one in authority here who knew anything about it.

For his scrupulous observance of the oath, Sgt. Maj. Couture received the Medal of the British Empire. The officer, Maj. C. E. Gerney, was also decorated.

‘Better not talk!’

L’Action Catholique, one of Canada’s most influential newspapers, first revealed the story of Couture’s secret. The public relations officers of the local military district confirmed it.

Today Sgt. Maj. Couture was not available for interviews. Explained an officer:

If he talks, he’ll be tossed in the guardhouse and the key will be thrown away.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt reports –
Québec plans tied in with Russia, China

Pacific commander is being debated

Québec, Canada (UP) –
President Roosevelt stressed today that the war plans being worked out in conferences here with Prime Minister Winston Churchill are being coordinated with those of all the Allies, “particularly the Chinese and the Russians.”

From the Citadel, where the President, the Prime Minister and their combined chiefs of staff are in “Victory Conference,” Mr. Roosevelt authorized Stephen T. Early, his secretary, to say in the President’s name:

This is a conference to get the best we can out of the combined British and United States war efforts in the Pacific and in Europe. We are working in consonance with the situation in China, the Pacific and in Europe, coordinating our efforts and those of our Allies, particularly the Chinese and the Russians.

Super-command studied

The statement tied in with the basic Pacific theme of the meeting and discussions on establishment of a new super-command to direct the final assaults on the Jap homeland.

Mr. Roosevelt was believed to be urging the selection of a U.S. naval officer – probably either Adm. Ernest J. King (commander of the U.S. Fleet) or Adm. Chester W. Nimitz (now the top commander in the Central Pacific) to head such a new command.

Mr. Early at a news conference said he had no information on the command situation.

Land is on hand

Also fitting in with the Pacific theme of this meeting was the announcement that RAdm. Emory S. Land, head of the U.S. Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration, would join the meeting in a day or so. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. is also coming here from Washington.

The manner in which the President described the overall purposes of the conference here opened new fields of speculation on the question of whether the Pacific allies expect Russian help in finishing off Japan.

Mr. Roosevelt’s mention of Europe made clear that the talks here are not confined to the Pacific, but involve a broader view of the war. There was, however, no way of telling whether the coordination with Russia to which he referred involved only the climactic phase of the war in Europe, or extended also to the war in the Pacific.

End this weekend

Mr. Early said he expected the Anglo-American war talks to conclude this weekend, but he was not specific as to a day. The “Victory Conference” probably will end with a joint statement by the President and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill were together until a late hour last night and started their conferences again at 11:30 this morning, sitting down in the broad-windowed “map room” of the President’s overlooking the St. Lawrence and examining the war plans submitted by their staff chiefs.

The question of top command was the leading issue of the conference.

British favor MacArthur

Officials said the British were inclined to favor Gen. Douglas MacArthur for the post of Supreme Commander and there was some support for him in the American staff, too. But the President was understood to want a Navy man.

The top post is certain to go to an American because most of the power brought against Japan will be American – although Britain will send more ships, men and planes to the Far East when Germany is whipped, and China’s manpower will be armed increasingly.

Underlying the command question is that of whether the main drive against Japan is to be keyed to naval or to land operations. And there again Mr. Roosevelt was believed to side with the Navy view.

Stilwell to be prominent

Obviously, the ultimate destruction of Japanese power at home and in Asia will require great use of land and air as well as naval and amphibious forces. MacArthur is assured of a continuing prominent place. Mr. Roosevelt will be able to fulfill his promise to return to the Philippines. That may occur soon, and MacArthur probably will go on from there.

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell’s forces in China will play an increasingly important role when more supplies can be delivered to them. And the British, with their special interests in recapturing Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong, will be in there.

But the prospect now is that these operations will be keyed to a massive seaborne assault – probably to the China coast and then northward.

Perhaps bearing significantly on the decisions being made here was the announcement in Washington that Mr. Roosevelt had nominated Adm. Nimitz to be a full admiral in his own right. Adm. Nimitz now holds the rank only by virtue of his command of the Pacific Fleet. Such nominations usually presage a change in command for the man involved.

[NormanStewart]

Simms: Stalin absence complicates Québec talks

Our war with Japs hinges on Russia
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Québec, Canada –
The absence of the Soviet Union from the Roosevelt-Churchill conference here complicates the job tremendously. It is like planning the invasion of France without knowing whether or not we could use Britain as a base of operations.

Of course, this is not Russia’s fault. On the contrary, it would have been folly for her to attack Japan while fighting for her life 5,000 miles away against Germany. and to have permitted us to use her Siberian bases would have been tantamount to a declaration of war against Nippon.

But the war in Europe is now drawing to a close. Russia therefore may soon regain her freedom of action in Asia before the Pacific and Far Eastern plans now being made here can be put into practice.

What bases to use?

In any plan of campaign against Japan, the first problem is how to get at her. We have to decide whether to attack her from aircraft carriers or from land bases. If land bases, the question is, what bases? Outside Siberia, Japan holds all the nearby bases and before we can use them, we must capture them.

Thus, the planning of our invasion of Europe was comparatively simple Britain was at hand as an ideal base.

If we could use the maritime provinces of Siberia similarly in our war against the other end of the Axis, the calculations here at Québec would be immensely simplified. Vladivostok is only 600 miles from Tokyo. Siberia envelops Manchuria, which is vital to the Japanese war efforts, on three sides. With Russia in – if only because we could use Siberian bases – the war in the Pacific would be shortened by months at least and innumerable lives saved.

Situation is anomalous

Another irony of the situation here is that today at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, Russia, Britain and America are putting the finishing touches on a tentative plan for world security against post-war aggression. The Big Four, including China, have agreed to the use of force, if necessary, to check outlaw states. For Russia to refuse to help stop the Japanese aggression now, once Nazi Germany is knocked out, would just about rob the Dumbarton Oaks formula of its validity.

Thus, while Marshal Stalin is absent from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting here, Russia cannot be left out of the picture. She will remain the big question mark hovering over the conference.

It is hardly too much to say that were Germany to surrender soon, and allow Russia to change her policy in Asia, most of the military planning here would at once become obsolete. That is, unless two alternate sets of plans are drawn up.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)

Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, 4:00 p.m.

	Present
	President Roosevelt
	Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
	Miss Tully

The memorandum below was prepared by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. Since this memorandum does not indicate that White himself was present, it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):

Mrs. Roosevelt asked the Secretary to tea. As soon as he arrived he was ushered in to the President. Miss Tully was also present. (When he came in, the President turned to Fala, his dog, and said, “Say hello to your Uncle Henry.”)

The President said that in his conversation with Churchill, Churchill had been very glum. The President said that he had asked Churchill: “How would you like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years?” The President said that Churchill seemed much excited over the possibility.

The President said to the Secretary: “I have asked you to come up here so that you could talk to the Prof. [Lord Cher well].” He said that they were doing shipping that night and therefore were to have Admiral Land but added, “You might as well come too.” The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor and the President replied, “You can talk about anything you want.” The Secretary inquired: “Anything?,” and the President said, “Well, let me look at that book.” [The book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on Germany prepared in the Treasury which the Secretary had given to him in Washington.] The President went over the whole section and said, “I wouldn’t discuss with him the question of the zones to be occupied by our armies. That’s a military question. Nor would I discuss the question of partitioning as that’s a political question. But you can talk about the fact that we are thinking of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar, including the Kiel Canal. If Holland has a lot of land inundated by Germany we can give her a piece of Western Germany as compensation.”

The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: “I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter.” (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he (the Secretary) gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany.)

The President said, “Don’t worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.” As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, “Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.” [The book he referred to was the book I described above.]

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 PW/9-1344: Telegram

The Chargé near the Dutch Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State

London, September 13, 1944
Confidential
US urgent
niact

Neter 17. From Schoenfeld.

Foreign Minister van Kleffens requests following message be sent to the President. He has asked this mission to serve as channel of transmission since Netherlands Government has no direct code communication with Quebec.

On learning that Pacific strategy will be discussed at Quebec conference Netherlands Government request in view of their vital interest in that question that following statement with regard to operations in Japanese occupied territory be transmitted to the President. Same statement is being sent to Mr. Churchill through British Foreign Office. Minister for Colonies van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich are proceeding [to] America. Netherlands Government trust President and Prime Minister will find it possible to give them an opportunity to elucidate Netherlands point of view. (Statement begins)

Success of main strategy against Japan in severing communications between Japan and occupied area covering Burma, Malaya, Philippines, British Borneo and NEI will cut off Japanese forces in that area from arms and munitions but will not compel them to surrender or to withdraw supposing this to be possible. Area as a whole has sufficient food and other materials and facilities for maintenance and it may be assumed that Japanese forces have sufficient stocks of arms and munitions. Experience points to probability that Japanese stay on for irregular warfare even after defeat or surrender Japan. Facts in recovered territory in the area show that isolated Japanese forces become more ferocious and destructive as isolation becomes more irremediable. If liberation occupied areas is delayed suffering and destruction of large populations will increase beyond all measure and prisoners of war and internees can be considered lost. Since voluntary evacuation of the area by Japanese forces cannot be expected active liberation as soon as possible seems urgent both from this point of view and with regard to future rehabilitation. This action should primarily be directed towards most important territories with most civilized and numerous population and greatest economic value. Among these Java seems to offer best base for further operations because of central situation, sufficient food production and accommodation, ample skilled and unskilled labour, well developed system of roads and harbours, good airbases and healthy mountain regions for rehabilitation. Even in case of widespread destruction repairs for Allied operational purposes are easiest to effect in Java. The occupation of Java would deprive the Japanese of their main regional source of supplies and labour.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau		Lord Cherwell
Admiral Leahy		Minister of War Transport Leathers
Vice Admiral Land		Lord Moran
Vice Admiral McIntire

Leahy noted in his diary:

The subjects discussed at dinner were generally international politics, economics and shipping; and the peace terms that should be imposed upon Germany when that country surrenders to the Allies.

Moran’s diary account is considerably fuller:

… How to prevent another war with Germany was the only subject of conversation. The Americans were all for drastic action, maintaining that Germany should not be allowed ships or the yards in which to build them; what they needed could be carried in our ships. Morgenthau wanted to close down the Ruhr to help British exports, especially steel. The P.M. was against this. He did not seem happy about all this toughness.

“I’m all for disarming Germany,” he said, “but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.”

I thought he had done when he growled: “I agree with Burke. You cannot indict a whole nation.”

If the P.M. was vague about what ought to be done with Germany, he was at least quite clear what should not be done. He kept saying: “At any rate, what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals, but don’t carry on the business for years.”

Morgenthau asked the P.M. how he could prevent Britain starving when her exports had fallen so low that she would be unable to pay for imports. The P.M. had no satisfactory answer. His thoughts seemed to go back to the House of Commons and what he knew of the English people. In five years’ time, when passions would have died down, people, he said, would not stand for repressive measures. He harped on the necessity for disarmament. At that point one of the Americans intervened: he thought that Germany should be made to return to a pastoral state, she ought to have a lower standard of living. During all this wild talk only the P.M. seemed to have his feet on the ground. The President mostly listened; once he remarked that a factory which made steel furniture could be turned overnight to war production.

After three hours’ discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the Prime Minister. The Prof., however, sided with the Americans. At last Roosevelt said: “Let the Prof, go into our plans with Morgenthau.”

On September 20, 1944, Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson that at this dinner meeting Churchill was violently opposed to the policy on Germany which was presented to him. He quoted Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought to Quebec to discuss such a scheme and as stating that it would mean that England would be chained to a dead body, i.e., Germany.

Morgenthau, writing of the September 13 dinner meeting three years later, recalled that Churchill had been irascible and vitriolic when, at Roosevelt’s request, Morgenthau had explained the Treasury proposal. Churchill, he said, turned loose “the full flood of his rhetoric, sarcasm and violence”, stating that he looked on the Treasury plan “as he would on chaining himself to a dead German.” Roosevelt, Morgenthau recalled, sat by, saying very little.

The most detailed description of the dinner conversation which has been found was written by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. No source on the meeting (including White’s memorandum itself) states that White was present, and it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, in the period between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):

Though shipping was supposed to have been the subject for discussion the subject of shipping was not mentioned the entire evening except briefly when the question was raised as to the advisability of taking away all of Germany’s shipping.

The discussion quickly turned to Germany. Churchill (apparently without reference to anything said previously) said something along the line of “What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without first discussing them with me? I intend to get into the matter myself.”

The President said he had asked Secretary Morgenthau to come up for the purpose of discussing Germany and that he (Morgenthau) was to talk to Cherwell the following day.

Churchill asked: “Why don’t we discuss Germany now?” The President then asked the Secretary to explain the program he had in mind for Germany. The Secretary described that part of the Treasury proposal dealing with the Ruhr, Churchill indicated that he was strongly opposed to such a program. He said that all that was necessary was to eliminate the production of armament. To do what the Treasury suggested was “unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary.” Churchill didn’t believe that it would be very much of an aid to the United Kingdom even if the United Kingdom did get the steel business that formerly went to Germany.

Admiral Land, on the other hand, wholly supported Secretary Morgenthau’s proposal, thumping vigorously on the table to emphasize his remark. Admiral Land told the Secretary after the dinner that the President had been talking with him more or less along those lines for a long time but this was the first time that he (Admiral Land) had a chance to say what he felt. He had long been waiting for the opportunity and, encouraged by the Secretary’s statement, he had vigorously expressed himself.

When the question arose about taking away German ships, Churchill was opposed. Admiral Land said, “Why not? It is no more cruel to take away ships than their steel plants.”

Churchill said at one point: “If you [the United States] do not do something for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy gold and do business largely within the Empire.” Lord Cherwell pooh poohed this idea of the Prime Minister’s.

Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill. Admiral Leahy thought the only way to assure peace in the future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly Russia if she behaves herself to “crack down” on any country which stepped over the boundary line of any other country.

The President said very little in reply to Churchill’s views. Secretary Morgenthau several times interjected into Churchill’s comments that his program did not recommend that Germany be permitted to starve as seemed to be the implication in Churchill’s remark.

At another point when discussing the need for an international police air force Churchill said that the United States, United Kingdom and Russia would have to rotate the job “as our air people get dirty when they associate with the Russians.”

At one point in the discussion Churchill said to the President: “Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?”

The conversation then got on to India and stayed on India for about an hour. Churchill talked rather angrily at length about the difficulties the British were confronted with in administering India and on the lack of understanding in the United States about the Indian problem. He spoke of the high birth rate, the high death rate, the ignorance and the carelessness of the Indian people to poverty, disease, etc. Churchill said, “I will give the United States half of India to administer and we will take the other half and we will see who does better with each other’s half.”

However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Tehran had said: “Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.”

Lord Cherwell seemed to be in sympathy with the Secretary’s point of view. Later when talking it over with him he said that he didn’t think that Churchill at all got the major point the Secretary was trying to make. The Secretary asked him if he didn’t think the real difficulty with Churchill was that he wanted a strong Germany to stand between “the white cliffs of Dover” and Communist Russia. Cherwell agreed that that was it. Lord Leathers of the Shipping Board apparently disagreed with the Secretary’s point of view.

On leaving, Lord Cherwell said that he expected to talk with the Secretary about lend-lease assistance for the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Secretary told him that he had been asked by the President to come to talk about Germany but after [that?] he would be glad to discuss lend-lease aid the following morning after they had had their conversation about Germany.

The Secretary had an opportunity to tell the President that he believed the Russians were holding back on their cooperation with the United States because they were suspicious of the American and British attitude toward Germany. Russia feared we and the British were going to try to make a soft peace with Germany and build her up as a possible future counterweight against Russia. The President replied, You are right, and I want you to read a telegram I just received from Harriman.” Admiral Leahy later gave the Secretary the telegram which Harriman sent to Harry Hopkins urging the President to call him (Harriman) home to report on the trend in Russia on non-cooperation with the United States.

[NormanStewart]

Log of the President’s Visit to Canada

Wednesday, September 13

At 11:45 a.m., the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, Captain E. D. Graves, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, General Ismay, Major General Hollis, Major General Lay cock) came to the Citadel for a plenary meeting with the President and Prime Minister Churchill. The President’s Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, was also in attendance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported the results of their conferences to date and their schedule for further meetings. The President and the Prime Minister made informal comments about some of the decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs and outlined various measures that they wished to have studied and made the subject of further reports.

The President and Prime Minister Churchill lunched together at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill had lunch at Spencerwood as guests of Lady Fiset.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Construction Corps, USN (Retired), Chairman of the War Shipping Administration, arrived in Quebec during the afternoon. Admiral Land was accompanied by Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Mr. John Maclay, Mr. Granville Conway and Mr. Richard Bissen [Bissell?]. Secretary Morgenthau was accompanied by Mr. Harry D. White. The President conferred with Secretary Morgenthau at length after his arrival.

The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully and Miss Thompson had tea together in the President’s quarters at 5:00 p.m.

At 7:00 p.m., speaking from the Chateau Frontenac, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill made a broadcast to the people of Canada.

8:00 p.m.: Dinner at the Citadel – The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cherwell, Lord Moran, Lord Leathers, Admiral Land, Admiral Leahy, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral Mclntire. Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 p.m. The President retired shortly afterwards.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King held a reception at the Chateau Frontenac this evening for members of the Conference delegations. Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, the Lieutenant-Governor and Lady Fiset were also in the receiving line.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (September 14, 1944)

USA muss den Gürtel enger schnallen

Von unserem Berichterstatter in Portugal

b. Lissabon, 13. September –
In einem Kommentar zu den vielfachen Problemen, womit sich Roosevelt und Churchill erneut in Quebec befassen müssen, meint der Korrespondent Lewis Sebring von der New York Herald Tribune, große Teile des nordamerikanischen Volkes lebten in der Vorstellung, daß der Krieg weit eher zu Ende gehe, als es wirklich der Fall sein werde.

Aber nur militärische Schein Autoritäten wagten ein Kriegsende in Europa noch in diesem Jahr Voraussagen. (Churchill wollte bekanntlich nach seiner im Juni auf der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in London gemachten Prophezeiung schon Mitte Oktober als Sieger in Berlin einziehen. Schriftleitung.) Er, Sebring, sei kein militärischer Fachmann, aber er habe persönlich das Urteil eines hohen nordamerikanischen Generalstabsoffiziers gehört. Es lautete: Wenn die Alliierten den Krieg in Europa 1944 nicht siegreich beenden können, wird eine neue Lage entstehen, deren Entwicklung und Ende nicht vorauszusagen ist.

In diesem Urteil spiegelt sich die Überlegung wider, daß der nordamerikanisch-englische Angriff auf die normannische Küste und die nachfolgende Frankreichoffensive mit einem Materialvorrat unternommen wurden, der das Ergebnis einer mehr als zweijährigen Produktion der anglo-amerikanischen Rüstungsindustrie darstellt. Wenn trotz dieser zeitweiligen Überlegenheit an Waffen die Entscheidung gegen Deutschland nicht erzwungen werden kann, so entsteht logischerweise eine neue Situation für die Alliierten, weil nach dem Verbrauch ihrer angesammelten Mengen an Panzern, Flugzeugen, Kanonen, Tanks, Waffen, Treibstoff und dem Ausfall ihrer besten Kampfdivisionen die Initiative automatisch an Deutschland fallen muß, das in der Zeit der feindlichen Offensive seinerseits alles für einen eigenen Angriff vorbereitet.

Damit ist eines der Konferenzprobleme von Quebec gegeben.

Wie wir zuverlässig erfahren, ist sowohl Roosevelt als auch Churchill von dem Ergebnis der Frankreichoffensive weder militärisch noch politisch befriedigt. Die deutsche Absetzstrategie verhinderte die vorgesehene Vernichtung der im Westen kämpfenden deutschen Divisionen, wodurch die Zeittafel von Teheran mit ihrem Schlussstück in Zeitnot gerät. Wenn sich im Oktober herausstellt, daß das Teheran-Schema nicht aufgeht, muß ein neuer Plan an seine Stelle gesetzt werden. Deshalb ist auch vorgesehen, die Beschlüsse Roosevelts und Churchills über den europäischen Krieg im Anschluss an Quebec genau wie 1943 auf einer neuen Konferenz mit Stalin zu besprechen.

Daraus geht hervor, daß gewisse Informationen aus London und Washington nicht zutreffen können, daß in Quebec lediglich die Zukunft des Pazifikkrieges erörtert werden soll. Es läge keine Veranlassung vor, darüber mit Stalin zu konferieren, weil die Sowjetunion theoretisch in diesem Kriege lediglich interessierter Zuschauer ist. In Bezug auf den Pazifikkrieg erinnert Sebring, der dort zweieinhalb Jahre als Kriegskorrespondent für die New York Herald Tribune tätig war, an folgende Zeitspannen:

Nach dem japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbour brauchten die Nordamerikaner acht Monate, um ihrerseits mit ihrer ersten Marinedivision Guadalcanal angreifen zu können. Seitdem sind mehr als zwei Jahre vergangen, während denen weitere Vorstöße der Nordamerikaner stattfanden. Trotzdem, so meint der nordamerikanische Journalist weiter, ständen die US-Truppen immer noch an den äußersten Rändern des japanischen Reichs. Eine Entscheidung im pazifischen Krieg könne nur nach Rückeroberung von Niederländisch-Indien und nach dem Eindringen in das japanische Mutterland selbst errungen werden. Der Aufbau einer Streitmacht für diese ungeheure Aufgabe bedinge Zeit. Die offizielle Meinung im Hauptquartier des Admirals Leahy Und des Generals MacArthur gehe dahin, daß dafür mindestens ein Jahr notwendig ist.

Sebring, der Einblick in die Planungen der beiden genannten US-Kommandeure hat, schreibt: „Niemand, der nicht persönlich mit den Plänen für eine pazifische Offensive vertraut ist, kann sich eine Vorstellung von den hinter der Bühne vorgehenden Dingen machen. Die Vorbereitungen für den europäischen Feldzug dauerten zwei Jahre, und der Pazifik ist ein noch schwierigeres Gebiet, weil größere Entfernungen in Rechnung gestellt werden müssen. Wir werden weiter japanische Außenposten angreifen und dabei kleine Erfolge erzielen die von schreienden Schlagzeilen in den Zeitungen, begeisterten Radiokommentaren und einem gefährlichen Überoptimismus begleitet werden. Aber ich selbst habe strategische Pläne gesehen, an deren Spitze das Jahr 1946 stand, und ich zweifle keinen Augenblick daran, daß es weitere Pläne gibt, die mit der Jahreszahl 1947 beginnen.

Die Nachschübe, die für eine große Offensive im Pazifik nötig sind, gehen über alles hinaus, was sich die Amerikaner zu Hause vorstellen. Der Aufbau einer solchen Offensive wird das ganze Jahr 1945 beanspruchen. Vielleicht können wir Ende 1945 oder Anfang 1946 einige ernsthafte Angriffe beginnen. Aber niemand, der die Tatsachen kennt und sich die Mühe macht, über sie nachzudenken, kann optimistisch in Bezug auf das Kriegsende sein. Amerika muß seinen Gürtel noch beträchtlich enger schnallen, ehe dieses Ende in Sicht ist.

[NormanStewart]

Begleitmusik zur Quebec-Konferenz –
Getarnter Vernichtungswille

Lissabon, 13. September –
Angesichts der wachsenden Erkenntnis in England und den USA, daß Deutschland nicht zu überrennen ist, mehren sich die Zeichen eines großangelegten Versuchs, sich ähnlich wie 1918 den Sieg auf betrügerische Weise zu erschleichen. Einzelne Publizisten, wie jetzt der britische Wirtschaftler Sir Walter Leyton im News Chronicle, entfernen sich deshalb von den Hasstiraden eines Vansittart, um mit sanfteren Tönen das deutsche Volk ins Verderben zu locken. Aber nur der Ton ist milder, in der Sache bleibt das Ziel Deutschlands Vernichtung.

Nach den Erfahrungen mit dem Wilson-Betrug von 1918 gibt es allerdings wohl kaum einen Menschen in Deutschland, der nicht sogleich sieht, welches Spiel in Wirklichkeit von unseren Feinden auch dann getrieben wird, wenn man sich befleißigt, den Ton zu mäßigen. Begleitmusik zur Quebec-Konferenz!

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (September 14, 1944)

The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt

Moscow, September 14, 1944
[Translation]

I have received your message regarding the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks.

I also hope that these important discussions may end successfully. This may be of serious significance for the further strengthening of cooperation of our countries and for the whole cause of future peace and security.

I must say that for the success of the activities of the International Security Organization, of great significance will be the order of voting in the Council, having in mind the importance that the Council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the Council, who have the statute [status?] of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise, will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Tehran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, the unanimity of agreement of four powers necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future.

Such a unanimity proposes [presupposes?], of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which often hinder an actually objective attitude toward the USSR And the other nations also should weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about.

I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find a harmonious solution of this question as well.

[NormanStewart]

Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 10:00 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau		Lord Cherwell
Mr. White		Mr. MacDougall

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant

[Undated]

This was the meeting which the President had suggested the Secretary have with Lord Cherwell. Lord Cherwell had asked to bring along Mr. MacDougall.

The Secretary asked Cherwell which of the two subjects before them for discussion would he like to take up first. Cherwell replied that he would like to take up the lend-lease program first since he thought that would be simpler to dispose of than the question of policy toward Germany. Cherwell went into some detail on the need for getting to work quickly on a lend-lease program for England during the period after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. He outlined British views of what would be appropriate for England to receive in the way of lend-lease aid. He described England’s need for increasing her exports and relaxing on the home working front. He expressed the view that a cut of 27 percent in our lend-lease to the British Empire would appear reasonable to the British. In general, he repeated the gist of what was in the memorandum of the State Department to the President.

When he got through, the Secretary said that he had heard all that before from the Exchequer and others when he was in England. He then told Cherwell about his conversation with the Exchequer and with the President and said that it was now up to Churchill. If Churchill thought that the idea of forming a committee to handle the whole problem was a good one, it was up to Churchill to suggest it to the President.

The Secretary also said that he didn’t like the approach of determining the amount of lend-lease aid that Britain was to get that Cherwell presented. In his (the Secretary’s) opinion, the question should be approached from the point of view of just how much munitions the British need in the role that they are to play in the Pacific. The Secretary thought that food shipments could be handled all right but he felt that commercial goods could not appropriately go into exports.

In any case, the Secretary stressed the need for its being handled by a joint committee of British and Americans. Cherwell liked the idea of the committee and asked whether the Secretary would head it up. The Secretary replied that he didn’t know; that that was up to the President. The Secretary told Cherwell that the President had given him (Morgenthau) for his comment a memorandum prepared by the State Department and that the President might want somebody from State Department or possibly the Treasury to head up the committee. Cherwell suggested that White and MacDougall attempt to draft a directive setting up such a committee so that if the Prime Minister and the President did agree on the idea, they might get it out then and there. The Secretary agreed.

The Secretary then took up the question of Germany. He handed Cherwell the book on Germany to read and explained that it was compiled on a day’s notice. Cherwell read hurriedly through the first part and expressed skepticism as to whether Organized Labor in the United States would approve a program so drastic in character. Secretary Morgenthau thought that it would. Cherwell commented that he didn’t understand why Churchill had taken so contrary a position on the program the evening before. He (Cherwell) was surprised at Churchill’s attitude and thought possibly that it was due to the fact that Churchill did not wholly understand what the Secretary was driving at.

The Secretary told Cherwell that Secretary Hull was in general agreement with the views expressed by the Treasury and that he was of the opinion that Eden would be likewise. He said that the question came down to a choice of: “Do you want a strong Germany and a weak England or a weak Germany and a strong England?” The Secretary said that he preferred to rely on a strong England and a weak Germany.

Cherwell thought that the proposal could be dressed up in a way to be more attractive to the Prime Minister and the Secretary said that he would be very glad to have Cherwell try it.

After the Secretary and Cherwell left to see the President and Churchill to report on the morning’s conversation, I talked at length with MacDougall on the merits of the Treasury’s proposed program and MacDougall appeared to be in agreement. Later MacDougall, a Mr. Weeks of the British Government, and I met to draft the directive suggested by Cherwell.

When the Secretary returned with Cherwell from the President and the Prime Minister, he reported that both Churchill and the President had liked the idea of creating a committee. They wanted to set up one on an informal and ad hoc basis, to formalize it after the election.

The Secretary told me after the others had gone that when it came to the question of who should be the chairman of the joint committee that Churchill had said, “Plow about Harry Hopkins?” But the President had replied, “No, I want Morgenthau to be chairman.”

H. D. WHITE

[NormanStewart]

The Under Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 14, 1944
Top secret

For immediate personal attention of the President.

Yesterday Ambassador Gromyko notified me and Cadogan that he had received his instructions on the question of voting in the council. He said that his Government maintained its insistence upon the inviolability of the principle of the unanimity of the four great powers. He said that he had made a number of other concessions but that there was no possibility of his being authorized to give in on this point.

Yesterday afternoon and evening we worked hard with the British and Russians devising a compromise formula which would provide that in all procedures concerning pacific settlement of disputes, the votes of all members of the council parties to such disputes should not be counted but that in procedures concerned with enforcement action decisions by the council must be on the basis of the concurrence of members having permanent seats on the council, including parties to the dispute.

Gromyko is tentatively sounding out his government on this new formula. Mr. Hull is considering the matter carefully. May we have your views as promptly as possible?

All other developments have been reported to you in my daily progress reports.

ES
Under Secretary of State

[NormanStewart]

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Treasury

Washington, 14 September 1944

Status of French lend lease negotiations on September 14.

The French have been told that the basic question of the scope and time limit of the Lend Lease Agreement has been placed before the President for decision.

The State Department and FEA have agreed on a draft (6th draft, dated September 11) of a lend lease agreement which permits:

a) Long life industrial reconstruction goods to go to the French under long term credits (Section 3c of the Lend Lease Act). This provision permits requisitions to be accepted by FEA until at least the end of the war with Japan and provides that the requisitions once accepted would be filled regardless of the end of the war with Japan. This would obviously enable a large scale program of reconstruction for France. (Monnet has a program ready of $2 billion for which he proposes to have requisitions placed immediately.)

b) The agreement permits giving the French on a straight Lend Lease basis, short-lived industrial goods and materials purportedly for French war production until at least the end of the war with Japan.

Secretary Hull has sent a memorandum to the President through Harry Hopkins pointing out:

a) This draft lend lease agreement goes beyond the July 15 memorandum which the President approved.

b) This memorandum proposes that the possibility of excessive leniency in the administration be controlled by requiring FEA to submit to someone in the White House all programs and proposals for lend lease assistance before requisitions are accepted by FEA.

This memorandum to the President is now before the President at Quebec for his approval. State Department has not given us a copy of this memorandum although the State Department promised to clear this memorandum with us before it went to the President.

As you know the original memorandum which went to the President during the French negotiations on July 15 was designed to limit lend lease to France to the end of hostilities in Europe. Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department have definitely stated that French industrial production will be of no help in fighting the war in Europe and that the help which a reconstructed French industry will give to us in fighting the war with Japan can be “put in your right eye.”

The importance of the phrase which will limit the scope of the program to the end of the war is that the immediate set of requisitions for aid will be much greater in volume under the prospect of a long war against Japan than it would be under the certainty of a short war in Europe.

The argument used to justify broadening the scope of the Lend Lease Agreement is that we should give the fullest discretion possible to the President. This argument has no basis in fact. The President already has all the discretion he needs under the Lend Lease Act. If after the war in Europe comes to an end, the President feels that France is making a contribution to the war in the Pacific or should for other reasons be entitled to reconstruction under Lend Lease, he can enter into a new agreement at that time. The only additional “discretion” gained by signing the agreement, as recommended by State and FEA, and immediately making large supply commitments thereunder, is to present Congress and the public with a fait accompli when the war in Europe is over. If the Congress should cut off Lend Lease following the end of hostilities in Europe, any attempt to rely on large requisitions placed under a previously existing agreement with the French (having no relation to the war in Europe) as permitting the reconstruction of France would be politically impossible and highly undesirable.

As we see it, the broadened scope of the memorandum will have the following effects:

a) Since the French have already been presented with a memorandum limiting the scope of lend lease to hostilities in Europe, the change to permit lend lease at least until the end of the war with Japan will obviously lead the French to believe that the President has agreed to a reconstruction program for France. This is particularly true in the light of informal commitments which have been made to the French by various people in FEA and State to this effect. It follows that this will be construed by the French as being a major political victory arising from their strategy of playing one department of the United States Government against another on financial questions.

b) Although the program being presented to the President provides for approval by the White House of the implementation of this agreement, it is obvious that the White House is not and should not be placed in a position to police detailed supply programs. The door will be wide open for reconstructing France under the Lend Lease Act without understandings as to the role of France in the future of Europe and of the world, and particularly of French participation in the war against Japan.

In conclusion, quite contrary to the avowed purpose of the proposal to give discretion to the President, its practical effect will be to tie his hands with respect to our dealings with the French at the termination of the war in Europe much more than would otherwise be the case.

DAN BELL

[NormanStewart]

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Quebec, September 14, 1944

My Dear Friend, I understand that we are meeting at 11:30 about Stage 2. Dick Law arrived here late last night, and I wonder whether I might bring him at 11 o’clock with or without Anthony, to discuss the application of UNRRA to Italy. He tells me that a compromise proposal would get through whereby 50 million dollars of UNRRA would be available for Italy. I consider this should be an essential part of our friendly gesture to Italy.

If agreeable then, I will turn up at 11.

Yours always,
W