The President to the Secretary of the Treasury
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.
The President to the War Shinning Administrator
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please come to Quebec without delay.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
Twentieth Day, Tuesday, September 12, 1944
Restricted
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I then told the group in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Church ill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise. (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Talks During the Day With the Secretary
Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan’s being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.
Discussion During the Day With Cadogan
I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon … [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it, he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word “terrific.” He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Völkischer Beobachter (September 13, 1944)
Die Konferenz in Quebec
vb. Wien, 12. September –
Wie im August 1943 treffen sich auch diesmal Roosevelt und Churchill in Quebec. Wurde dieser Tagungsort wiedergewählt, weil man Kanada, das dieser Krieg entscheidend der Saugkraft des großen Nachbarn ausgesetzt hat, auch von London aus bereits als eine Art Niemandsland zwischen Empire und USA ansieht? 1943 fanden freilich die abschließenden Gespräche in Washington statt. Es spielte die Bitte Badoglios um Waffenstillstand hinein. Man rechnete im Lager der Westmächte schon mit baldigem Kriegsende und wollte sich vor den erstrebten Besprechungen mit den Sowjets auf eine gemeinsame Marschlinie einigen.
Die Konferenzen von Moskau und Teheran haben dann allerdings gezeigt, wer im Kreise der drei großen Räuber den Ton angab. Briten und Yankees wurden völlig an die Wand gespielt, sie durften nur die salbungsvollen Deklamationen über Freiheit, Toleranz und ähnliche Deckworte für den „Frieden durch Gewalt“ liefern, erhielten „gemeinsame Entscheidung der europäischen Fragen“ versprochen und mußten sich den Termin für die Invasion diktieren lassen. Stalin verlangte sie, um seine Verbündeten machtmäßig anderweitig festzulegen, weil er sie durch den Pazifikkrieg noch nicht genügend gebunden fand. Wie er dann zu verfahren gedachte, hat sich inzwischen erwiesen.
Die gefügigen Partner Moskaus werden sich in Quebec mit der Lage auseinanderzusetzen haben, die nun besonders auf dem Balkan entstanden ist und dort, wie schon in Polen, im Zeichen einer sichtbaren Ausdehnung des bolschewistischen Machtbereiches und damit der Unterjochung all der kleinen Nationen steht, die England und die USA den Sowjets ausgeliefert haben.
An der zweiten Konferenz in Quebec nehmen die Sowjets nicht teil. Stalin ließ Roosevelt und Churchill mitteilen, er sei jetzt durch die Ereignisse an der Ostfront zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um Zeit für derartige Besprechungen erübrigen zu können. Aber auch die Tschungking-chinesen sind einstweilen in Quebec nicht vertreten, obwohl dort einer der wichtigsten Programmpunkte der Krieg im fernen Osten ist. Roosevelt sieht sich schon aus innenpolitischen Gründen veranlasst, von Churchill eine bindende Zusäge für die britische Beteiligung an diesem Kampf mit allen verfügbaren Kräften zu erhalten, und die englische Presse beeilt sich demgemäß, zu versichern, daß den Briten diese Aufgabe nicht weniger am Herzen liege wie Roosevelt die Kriegführung in Europa.
Was den Kampf an der Westfront betrifft, so entspricht die publizistische Behandlung dieser Frage in der englisch-amerikanischen Presse anlässlich der Quebec-Konferenz mehr dem agitatorischen Bedürfnis, bereits einen Sieg vorwegzunehmen als der wirklichen Lage, die im Zeichen der sich ständig verstärkenden deutschen Abwehr und der wachsenden Schwierigkeiten steht, die sich für die Fortführung der anglo-amerikanischen Operationen ergeben. Es besteht Grund zu der Annahme, daß jetzt Roosevelt und Churchill angesichts der unermesslichen Verluste, womit sie im weiteren Verlauf des Sturmlaufes gegen die deutsche Front zu rechnen haben, eine politische Offensive ins Auge fassen werden, um nach dem Beispiel Wilsons im Jahre 1918 sich den Sieg durch Hintertüren zu erschleichen. Sie wissen genau, daß Deutschland in naher Zukunft gewichtige Trümpfe auszuspielen hat und daß für sie alles daran hängt, zu einer vorzeitigen Beendigung eines Kampfes zu gelangen, dessen Gewinnung durch Waffengewalt immer fragwürdiger werden muß.
Das deutsche Volk sieht einem Wiederaufleben der Pläne von 1943 mit dem Bewusstsein feiner unbeugsamen Moral entgegen. Es erblickt in solchen Versuchen am untauglichen Objekt nur den Beweis dafür, daß der Gegner Umwege wählen muß, weil er am Ort der militärischen Entscheidung nicht mehr mit einem Erfolg rechnen kann. Nicht nur die Erinnerung an den Betrug und Wortbruch von 1918 stärkt es in seinem Willen, diesen Kampf für Freiheit und Leben bis zum Sieg durchzufechten, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Vernichtungspläne des Feindes, die dem Krieg das Wesen eines Ringens um Sein oder Nichtsein geben und uns eine Verknechtung zudenken, die in der Geschichte nicht ihresgleichen hätte. Alle Versuche, uns von dieser Kernfrage abzulenken und uns den Blick für die Absichten zu trüben, die unsere Gegner hegen, werden völlig ins Leere stoßen und nur dazu beitragen, unsere Entschlossenheit zum Einsatz aller Kraft für die Verteidigung des deutschen Lebens zu steigern.
vb.
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Ambassador Winant’s telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12 reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department’s note: with British and American zones left in blank) and the administration of greater Berlin.
CH
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Subject: ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BRITISH-ARGENTINE MEAT NEGOTIATIONS
I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.
I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.
In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long-term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the “divide and conquer” tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.
CH
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:45 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Brown | General Ismay | |
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves |
McFarland minutes
September 13, 1944, 11:45 a.m.
Top secret
The Prime Minister, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Tehran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Tehran.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said “that future historians would say that the period since Tehran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine.”
The President said that no little of the credit for the conception of DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an overall population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.
Turning to Italy, the Prime Minister said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then, the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.
General Marshall said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known.
The Prime Minister emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy, we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LSTs now engaged in DRAGOON, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would be after she took it.
The Prime Minister then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.
In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.
There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.
The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Roosevelt’s statement is recorded as follows: “The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted.”
The Prime Minister , continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command.
As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.
There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First, we should do DRACULA, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our keyword should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.
The President thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.
It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.
In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose, our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this bypassing technique which had been employed with considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to bypass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.
The Prime Minister suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned, he did not favor the bypassing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?
Admiral King replied that these garrisons would be strangulated and must ultimately perish.
The Prime Minister said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Tehran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.
The President referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.
Sir Charles Portal said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.
The Prime Minister asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.
The President said his thought was to use it in any way possible.
Admiral King said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The question was being actively studied.
The Prime Minister asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.
Admiral King replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.
The Prime Minister said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.
The President replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.
General Marshall said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes – now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya, they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?
Sir Charles Portal replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.
The British minutes have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:
The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan.
The President observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German makeup and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.
The Prime Minister said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.
In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.
The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to CSA
Moscow, 13 September 1944
Top secret
To AGWar for General Marshall information to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from Deane TopSec MX 20947.
Copy sent direct to Eisenhower.
Simultaneously with the receipt of your OCTAGON 10 dated 12 September I received information from USSTAF that the project was scheduled for today, September 13. The British and American Ambassadors and I saw Mr. Molotov who arranged for approval to be given by the Red Army General Staff. General Spaatz was informed of approval and as a result the mission is now scheduled for September 14. I shall await word from General Spaatz as to whether this one mission completes the project or if he proposes to send representatives to Moscow to work out a plan for continued support. I do not believe it is necessary for representatives to come here since all details of plan should be worked out in London. Really, all that is necessary here is Soviet approval which the British and American missions can attempt to secure here once they have been informed of the plan.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President and the Secretary of State
Moscow, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Priority
Top secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
Cable Nr 122231 WH 63 from Mr. Hull regarding aid to the insurgents in Warsaw reached me only late tonight. On the basis of an earlier message received by the Military Mission from General Spaatz I spoke to Molotov last night regarding an operation by our Air Force which Molotov approved after telephoning to Red Army General Staff. Today General Deane talked to an officer of Red Army General Staff inquiring what the Soviets intended to do on their own account. He replied that the Red Army had nothing planned. General Deane and head of British Military Mission will jointly approach Red Army General Staff tomorrow to press for the carrying out by the Red Army of the promise of the Soviet Government to render assistance itself. I will see Molotov if a satisfactory answer is not obtained.
The President’s Special Assistant to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Dear Mr. President: I have had several talks with General O’Dwyer, Crowley and the State Department relative to the Italian business. The attached memo supplements the statement which you have with you on Italy.
It seems to me that there are great advantages to be accrued to us if you can take the initiative and get Churchill’s approval to a course of action which you would announce publicly.
The machinery for getting quick action relative to immediate relief and the purchase of material for economic rehabilitation is available. The Italians can pay for all of the goods to be bought in this country, other than emergency relief supplies, out of funds which would accrue to them from our soldiers’ pay.
The Prisoner of War business, I think, should be cleared up just as soon as possible and, of equal importance, is the obvious necessity of amending the Armistice terms.
HLH
[Attachment]
Memorandum prepared in the Department of State
[Undated] Confidential and personalMemorandum for Mr. Hopkins, the White House
I refer to Mr. Jones’ conversation with you Monday morning, September 11.
American policy toward Italy is based upon our desire to see that nation return to political and economic independence and stability as quickly as possible. We do not believe that Italy will contribute to an orderly and peaceful Europe if it is subject to any one of its more powerful neighbors. This Government has specifically assured the Italian people the right to choose the form of government they may desire when they are in a position to exercise that right. Political independence for Italy, free from foreign domination, would seem to be implicit in this pledge.
The economic wellbeing of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states. The economic dependence of one state upon another is not conducive to such wellbeing and may ultimately have undesirable political implications. Furthermore, since the United States is bearing the major share of the civilian supply quota for Italy, it is sound American policy to help Italy again become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date.
In the immediate future increased civilian supplies, principally foodstuffs, are essential to prevent further deterioration in Italian public health and morale in the ever-increasing portions of liberated Italy. The three principal problems to be solved are:
- Available shipping to carry supplies from this country.
- Internal transportation to distribute it to the various populated centers.
- Method of payment.
A specific and sufficient allocation of shipping for civilian supplies should be obtained from the War Department or other United States agency.
Two thousand trucks are needed for the distribution of supplies for civilians in the present liberated area. Army trucks within the theater should be made available to the extent possible (not convenient) by the Supreme Allied Command. Once hostilities have ceased, a sufficient number of United States Army trucks and tractors in the theater could be made available for this purpose until the internal transportation system can be rehabilitated at least in a basic sense.
When the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to this country, is made available to the Italian Government, almost all the foreign exchange required for the purchase of civilian supplies in this country will be provided. (It is believed that this proposal is at present on the President’s desk, having received British concurrence, and could be put into effect immediately if approved.) Limited UNRRA participation in the medical field and in assistance to displaced persons of Italian nationality up to $50,000,000 is essential to supplement the civilian supply program mentioned above. Every effort therefore should be made to assure that agreement to this proposal is given at the UNRRA conference in Montreal this month.
As to the second phase of Italy’s economic problems, we should now make possible the primary rehabilitation of its agriculture and essential industries in order that the Italian nation can begin to be self-supporting again. Hence the Italian supply program should not be limited, as it has been so far, to consumers’ goods but should make available fertilizer, seeds, spare parts and essential raw materials to permit the resumption of Italian production for the nation’s basic consumers’ needs. This will require not only a sufficient shipping allocation but sufficient funds to finance such a program even on a limited scale. The United States’ funds to be made available to the Italian Government from troop pay, immigration remittances, et cetera, will probably not cover such an undertaking in addition to the consumers goods which must be purchased over the next year for immediate consumption by the population. The following additional methods of financing might prove feasible.
The War Department could continue its present practice of certifying Lend-Lease funds, on the basis of military necessity, to finance a civilian supply program of minimum subsistence. This would provide for the principal portion of the importation of consumers’, goods, and the foreign exchange available to the Italian Government from troop pay, et cetera, would then be sufficient to finance a basic rehabilitation program for Italian agriculture and industry.
Private Italian assets in this country, estimated roughly at $74,000,000, could be taken over by the Italian Government and used as security for an Italian Government loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of basic rehabilitation supplies.
On the political side it is desirable to clarify our relations with Italy, which has been a co-belligerent with the United Nations in the war against Germany for almost a year. During that time the Italian Government – Armed Forces and people – have cooperated sincerely and to the best of their limited resources in the common fight. They have “worked their passage” to a considerable extent. The United States and Great Britain could revise Italian Armistice terms which have been rendered largely obsolete by the course of events, or we could conclude a preliminary peace treaty with Italy, terminating the state of war existing between it and the United Nations, postponing for future settlement the more complicated issues of territorial dispositions and reparations.
Specific steps should meanwhile be undertaken immediately to support the representative and liberal Italian Government and to encourage the various democratic groups in Italy who are working for the regeneration of their country. These might include:
The removal from prisoner-of-war status of Italian soldiers in the British Empire, North Africa, Italy and this country and their return to regular military status under Italian Command with ultimate authority for their disposition and use resting in the Allied Theater Commander or respective British and American military authorities. It is an anomalous situation, to say the least, that while Italian divisions are fighting with the United Nations on the Italian front and Italian resources are being employed to the fullest extent in the common struggle against Germany, we continue to hold Italian prisoners of war not only abroad but in Italy itself. The non-combat services which they are now performing in these areas could be performed as effectively if they had the status of Italian soldiers under Italian command. A solution of this problem would be a concrete and important gesture of support to the present Italian Government.
The acceptance of Italian technical representatives by the various United Nations to handle financial and economic problems and to resume the protection of Italian interests in the various United Nations which is still being performed by third powers.
Italian participation in the various international organizations, such as the ILO, UNRRA, Food and Agricultural Organization, Financial and Monetary Conference, et cetera. Italy also desires to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, this without reference to membership in the United Nations.
Resumption of United States’ participation in the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome until such time as it is superseded or absorbed by the proposed Food and Agricultural Organization.
A copy of a memorandum which was prepared in this office for the President’s use in Quebec is attached for your information.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
According to the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant, Roosevelt had asked Churchill, who had been very glum, how he would like to have the steel business of Europe for twenty or thirty years, and Churchill had “seemed much excited over the possibility.”
At one of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings on September 13, a suggestion was made that Fiorello La Guardia should go to Italy as the President’s representative and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission.
SACMED to CCS
Caserta, 13 September 1944
Confidential
Priority
FX 24540 to AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ Com Zone Main and SHAEF for information signed Wilson cite fhcos. This is Naf 778.
Subject is guidance on economic policy for Italy.
As battle line in Italy moves north and the operational phase in large portions of occupied territory is terminated, I feel that approach to problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation must be re-examined. While purely military considerations remain predominant in the forward areas, problems associated with civil administration, particularly of an economic character, raise general questions on which I, in my capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission, require guidance.
During the active operational phase, activities of an economic character conducted by the Allied Control Commission and other agencies in Italy under my command of necessity have been directly related to support of military operations. Supplies have been imported and distributed to the civilian population in order to minimize disease and prevent unrest, and efforts toward economic rehabilitation have had the primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of utilizing Italy’s resources for the war effort and producing in Italy goods which would otherwise have had to be imported.
In the light of the changed operational situation the limited directives which have governed seem no longer to be adequate. The Armistice agreement, under which the Allied Control Commission operates, contains no commitment to the Italian people as to any measure of material assistance. However, there has arisen in Italy the expectation, if not the assumption, presumably by reason of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, that an additional measure of assistance and relief to the civil population would be forthcoming. Public utterances in both countries have tended to support this view. Moreover, if the two governments continue at this stage to consider only what is required in the interest of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring one of their own long-term interests, i.e., the establishment of a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. Notwithstanding this fact the standard of military necessity still obtains and in the provision of supply is being strictly adhered to. For example, a clothing programme was submitted in June (Lac airgram 32) based on the estimated essential needs of the population this winter, but also having regard to the anti-inflationary effects of an increased supply of consumer goods. I am now asked, however, (Cal 738) to certify that this clothing is the minimum requirement to prevent disease and unrest which would prejudice military operations. As another example, not of great importance in itself but indicating the type of question which is now arising, in response to a requisition of paper essential for proper keeping of Italian tax records, it is asked (Cal 566) whether the paper is necessary “to control and manage the civil population.”
For the foregoing reasons I request that directives which govern the provision of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation be reexamined and that, if the policy of the governments is to furnish aid to Italy beyond that required by strict military necessity of the Allied Forces, the standards applicable to that aid be revised. In particular I request that I be informed:
a. To what extent, if any, I may take into account factors tending toward inflation, and to what degree I am responsible for measures to counter these tendencies.
b. To what extent, if any, is it desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out and if any rehabilitation is intended what industries should be given precedence?
c. Within the limitations of available shipping, to what extent, if any, are exports to be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade developed?
If my revised directive gives me responsibilities in the economic field broader than those now existing, I may require additional personnel of suitable technical training and experience, presumably drawn more from civil than military ranks. I am, as I have already indicated, prepared to accept qualified civilian experts in major proportion in the Allied Control Commission as soon as they are available.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Handy | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 13, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 172nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
General Marshall drew attention to his statement recorded in the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes. He requested that this should be amended to read: “… the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 172nd Meeting. The detailed record was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject to later minor amendments.
Control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/4)
Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time fully to study the proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard to certain small details.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the following day.
Machinery for coordination of U.S.-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/4)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures “A” and “B” to CCS 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.
Report on the enemy situation in the Pacific (CCS 643/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the enemy situation in the Pacific–Far East (CCS 643/1).
General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676).
Strategy for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417/8)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/8. There was, however, one point he would like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements allowed.
Sir John Dill explained that supplies would be required for British forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the operations were not yet fully approved.
Admiral Leahy said that he quite appreciated the points made by Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the existing paper.
Sir Alan Brooke said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against Japan were not included in the program outlined in CCS 417/8 and that requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support of these forces would be put forward at a later date.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted the proposals in CCS 417/8 as a basis for planning.
b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind.
c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against Japan would be notified as soon as possible.
Basic policies for the “OCTAGON” Conference (CCS 654/8)
Admiral Leahy said that it seemed to him that the U.S. and British proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6i of CCS 654 were very similar.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British wording “inescapable commitments” was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided.
Admiral King suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: “having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6i of CCS 654:
Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.
Future operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 677/1)
Admiral Leahy explained that with regard to paragraph 2b of the U.S. draft of the message to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording “for planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” was more appropriate than “for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” since the operation was not yet approved and might, in fact, never take place.
General Marshall explained that the words “major units” in paragraph 1a had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous day.
Admiral Leahy pointed out that in the U.S. draft the date on which General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since a decision had to be reached by the 15th, it would be safer to call for the report on the 10th.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the U.S. draft was acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean the draft message in Enclosure “B” to CCS 677/1. (Subsequently dispatched as Fan 415.)
Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit photographs to be taken at that time.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 520/4 (OCTAGON)
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe following the establishment of Allied forces on the continent
| References: | a. CCS 150th Mtg., Item 5 |
| b. CCS 520 Series | |
| c. CCS 304/13 | |
| d. CCS 172d Mtg., Item 10 |
While not accepting all points in CCS 520/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with the establishment of control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
In the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the directive proposed in the Annex to CCS 520/3 is in several respects inadequate, and therefore they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and dispatch a revised directive as set forth in the Enclosure.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/27
British participation in the war against Japan
The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting.
The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance of the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/28 (OCTAGON)
Directive to SACSEA
We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now despatch the following directive to Admiral Mountbatten.
Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command
Your primary object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, adequate protection of which is essential throughout.
The following are approved operations:
a) The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route;
b) Operation DRACULA.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15 March.
If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 675/1
A combined memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to March 1945
The Representatives of United States and British military services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172nd Meeting of 12 September.
A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
[Enclosure]
Top secret
Combined memorandum on troop movements covering the period October 1944 to March 1945
Assumptions
The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:
a. That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation DRACULA.
b. No further U.S. troops need be transported to European theaters.
If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1 above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon.
Statement of the problem
The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop shipping for DRACULA on U.S. and British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.
Facts bearing on the problem
The buildup of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India prior to 1 March 1945.
It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve virtually the entire British trooping lift.
This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only the two Queens on this run. However, in the event of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove necessary to withdraw one or both of the Queens from the Atlantic service.
A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S. cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S. withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.
The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two “General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean shipping.
Discussion
- Effect on British movement up to approximately mid-March
a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom.
b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages.
c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.
d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000.
- Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately end of March
a. U.S. shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops per month from Europe to the United States in British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will be:
| 1 Oct 44 | 2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 | 1,535,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe | 1,225,000 |
b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000 troops monthly would result in the following European position:
| 1 Oct 44 | 2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 | 1,805,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe | 955,000 |
In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months.
c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible.
Conclusion
Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until shipping priorities have been established as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not possible to present more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 678
Planning date for the end of the war against Japan
The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated date for the end of the war against Japan:
a. The redeployment of forces against Japan.
b. The planning of production.
c. The allocation of manpower.
The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a planning date two years after the defeat of Germany.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 13, 1944)
He knew about the invasion –
Super-secret of the war kept by a sergeant major!
Canadian finds vital paper in Citadel after last Roosevelt-Churchill conference
Québec, Canada (UP) –
Military authorities admitted today that a mere sergeant major of the Canadian Army shared with the Allied High Command what was for months the super-secret of the war – the plans for the invasion of Normandy.
The hero of this drama was Sgt. Maj. Émile Couture, a French-Canadian, whose job it was to issue stationery at last year’s Québec Conference of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.
Imbued with the French sense of economy, he was making an inspection of the conference quarters at the conclusion of the meeting to collect unused paper. In one of the rooms of the Chateau Frontenac, then as now the working and residential headquarters for the Anglo-American military staffs, Couture found an interesting memorandum.
The moment he read it, he was transported from his prosaic role of a garrison wheelhorse into the inner councils of the high and mighty. Couture gasped. It was in black and white – the alternative dates for the invasion of Normandy, the number of troops to be employed, how they would be transported in so many ships and how they would be supported from the air and sea.
The operational outline for the boldest, most difficult campaign of the war, was in HIS hands – a sergeant major!
Couture jammed the paper into an envelope and made with all haste to Canadian Army District Headquarters at the Citadel. There, an officer examined them. He uttered the French equivalent of “Wow!”
Given British medals
Couture and an officer were taken secretly to Washington. There in the inner sanctum of the top strategists – perhaps the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff – they turned over the paper and took a solemn oath of secrecy.
Couture discovered the memorandum in the conference room of the chiefs of staff. It was said to have belonged to an American general. There was a report that the general had been relieved of his duties but there was no one in authority here who knew anything about it.
For his scrupulous observance of the oath, Sgt. Maj. Couture received the Medal of the British Empire. The officer, Maj. C. E. Gerney, was also decorated.
‘Better not talk!’
L’Action Catholique, one of Canada’s most influential newspapers, first revealed the story of Couture’s secret. The public relations officers of the local military district confirmed it.
Today Sgt. Maj. Couture was not available for interviews. Explained an officer:
If he talks, he’ll be tossed in the guardhouse and the key will be thrown away.
Roosevelt reports –
Québec plans tied in with Russia, China
Pacific commander is being debated
Québec, Canada (UP) –
President Roosevelt stressed today that the war plans being worked out in conferences here with Prime Minister Winston Churchill are being coordinated with those of all the Allies, “particularly the Chinese and the Russians.”
From the Citadel, where the President, the Prime Minister and their combined chiefs of staff are in “Victory Conference,” Mr. Roosevelt authorized Stephen T. Early, his secretary, to say in the President’s name:
This is a conference to get the best we can out of the combined British and United States war efforts in the Pacific and in Europe. We are working in consonance with the situation in China, the Pacific and in Europe, coordinating our efforts and those of our Allies, particularly the Chinese and the Russians.
Super-command studied
The statement tied in with the basic Pacific theme of the meeting and discussions on establishment of a new super-command to direct the final assaults on the Jap homeland.
Mr. Roosevelt was believed to be urging the selection of a U.S. naval officer – probably either Adm. Ernest J. King (commander of the U.S. Fleet) or Adm. Chester W. Nimitz (now the top commander in the Central Pacific) to head such a new command.
Mr. Early at a news conference said he had no information on the command situation.
Land is on hand
Also fitting in with the Pacific theme of this meeting was the announcement that RAdm. Emory S. Land, head of the U.S. Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration, would join the meeting in a day or so. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. is also coming here from Washington.
The manner in which the President described the overall purposes of the conference here opened new fields of speculation on the question of whether the Pacific allies expect Russian help in finishing off Japan.
Mr. Roosevelt’s mention of Europe made clear that the talks here are not confined to the Pacific, but involve a broader view of the war. There was, however, no way of telling whether the coordination with Russia to which he referred involved only the climactic phase of the war in Europe, or extended also to the war in the Pacific.
End this weekend
Mr. Early said he expected the Anglo-American war talks to conclude this weekend, but he was not specific as to a day. The “Victory Conference” probably will end with a joint statement by the President and the Prime Minister.
Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill were together until a late hour last night and started their conferences again at 11:30 this morning, sitting down in the broad-windowed “map room” of the President’s overlooking the St. Lawrence and examining the war plans submitted by their staff chiefs.
The question of top command was the leading issue of the conference.
British favor MacArthur
Officials said the British were inclined to favor Gen. Douglas MacArthur for the post of Supreme Commander and there was some support for him in the American staff, too. But the President was understood to want a Navy man.
The top post is certain to go to an American because most of the power brought against Japan will be American – although Britain will send more ships, men and planes to the Far East when Germany is whipped, and China’s manpower will be armed increasingly.
Underlying the command question is that of whether the main drive against Japan is to be keyed to naval or to land operations. And there again Mr. Roosevelt was believed to side with the Navy view.
Stilwell to be prominent
Obviously, the ultimate destruction of Japanese power at home and in Asia will require great use of land and air as well as naval and amphibious forces. MacArthur is assured of a continuing prominent place. Mr. Roosevelt will be able to fulfill his promise to return to the Philippines. That may occur soon, and MacArthur probably will go on from there.
Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell’s forces in China will play an increasingly important role when more supplies can be delivered to them. And the British, with their special interests in recapturing Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong, will be in there.
But the prospect now is that these operations will be keyed to a massive seaborne assault – probably to the China coast and then northward.
Perhaps bearing significantly on the decisions being made here was the announcement in Washington that Mr. Roosevelt had nominated Adm. Nimitz to be a full admiral in his own right. Adm. Nimitz now holds the rank only by virtue of his command of the Pacific Fleet. Such nominations usually presage a change in command for the man involved.
Simms: Stalin absence complicates Québec talks
Our war with Japs hinges on Russia
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
Québec, Canada –
The absence of the Soviet Union from the Roosevelt-Churchill conference here complicates the job tremendously. It is like planning the invasion of France without knowing whether or not we could use Britain as a base of operations.
Of course, this is not Russia’s fault. On the contrary, it would have been folly for her to attack Japan while fighting for her life 5,000 miles away against Germany. and to have permitted us to use her Siberian bases would have been tantamount to a declaration of war against Nippon.
But the war in Europe is now drawing to a close. Russia therefore may soon regain her freedom of action in Asia before the Pacific and Far Eastern plans now being made here can be put into practice.
What bases to use?
In any plan of campaign against Japan, the first problem is how to get at her. We have to decide whether to attack her from aircraft carriers or from land bases. If land bases, the question is, what bases? Outside Siberia, Japan holds all the nearby bases and before we can use them, we must capture them.
Thus, the planning of our invasion of Europe was comparatively simple Britain was at hand as an ideal base.
If we could use the maritime provinces of Siberia similarly in our war against the other end of the Axis, the calculations here at Québec would be immensely simplified. Vladivostok is only 600 miles from Tokyo. Siberia envelops Manchuria, which is vital to the Japanese war efforts, on three sides. With Russia in – if only because we could use Siberian bases – the war in the Pacific would be shortened by months at least and innumerable lives saved.
Situation is anomalous
Another irony of the situation here is that today at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, Russia, Britain and America are putting the finishing touches on a tentative plan for world security against post-war aggression. The Big Four, including China, have agreed to the use of force, if necessary, to check outlaw states. For Russia to refuse to help stop the Japanese aggression now, once Nazi Germany is knocked out, would just about rob the Dumbarton Oaks formula of its validity.
Thus, while Marshal Stalin is absent from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting here, Russia cannot be left out of the picture. She will remain the big question mark hovering over the conference.
It is hardly too much to say that were Germany to surrender soon, and allow Russia to change her policy in Asia, most of the military planning here would at once become obsolete. That is, unless two alternate sets of plans are drawn up.
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, 4:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Miss Tully |
The memorandum below was prepared by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. Since this memorandum does not indicate that White himself was present, it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
Mrs. Roosevelt asked the Secretary to tea. As soon as he arrived he was ushered in to the President. Miss Tully was also present. (When he came in, the President turned to Fala, his dog, and said, “Say hello to your Uncle Henry.”)
The President said that in his conversation with Churchill, Churchill had been very glum. The President said that he had asked Churchill: “How would you like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years?” The President said that Churchill seemed much excited over the possibility.
The President said to the Secretary: “I have asked you to come up here so that you could talk to the Prof. [Lord Cher well].” He said that they were doing shipping that night and therefore were to have Admiral Land but added, “You might as well come too.” The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor and the President replied, “You can talk about anything you want.” The Secretary inquired: “Anything?,” and the President said, “Well, let me look at that book.” [The book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on Germany prepared in the Treasury which the Secretary had given to him in Washington.] The President went over the whole section and said, “I wouldn’t discuss with him the question of the zones to be occupied by our armies. That’s a military question. Nor would I discuss the question of partitioning as that’s a political question. But you can talk about the fact that we are thinking of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar, including the Kiel Canal. If Holland has a lot of land inundated by Germany we can give her a piece of Western Germany as compensation.”
The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: “I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter.” (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he (the Secretary) gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany.)
The President said, “Don’t worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.” As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, “Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.” [The book he referred to was the book I described above.]
740.0011 PW/9-1344: Telegram
The Chargé near the Dutch Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State
London, September 13, 1944
Confidential
US urgent
niact
Neter 17. From Schoenfeld.
Foreign Minister van Kleffens requests following message be sent to the President. He has asked this mission to serve as channel of transmission since Netherlands Government has no direct code communication with Quebec.
On learning that Pacific strategy will be discussed at Quebec conference Netherlands Government request in view of their vital interest in that question that following statement with regard to operations in Japanese occupied territory be transmitted to the President. Same statement is being sent to Mr. Churchill through British Foreign Office. Minister for Colonies van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich are proceeding [to] America. Netherlands Government trust President and Prime Minister will find it possible to give them an opportunity to elucidate Netherlands point of view. (Statement begins)
Success of main strategy against Japan in severing communications between Japan and occupied area covering Burma, Malaya, Philippines, British Borneo and NEI will cut off Japanese forces in that area from arms and munitions but will not compel them to surrender or to withdraw supposing this to be possible. Area as a whole has sufficient food and other materials and facilities for maintenance and it may be assumed that Japanese forces have sufficient stocks of arms and munitions. Experience points to probability that Japanese stay on for irregular warfare even after defeat or surrender Japan. Facts in recovered territory in the area show that isolated Japanese forces become more ferocious and destructive as isolation becomes more irremediable. If liberation occupied areas is delayed suffering and destruction of large populations will increase beyond all measure and prisoners of war and internees can be considered lost. Since voluntary evacuation of the area by Japanese forces cannot be expected active liberation as soon as possible seems urgent both from this point of view and with regard to future rehabilitation. This action should primarily be directed towards most important territories with most civilized and numerous population and greatest economic value. Among these Java seems to offer best base for further operations because of central situation, sufficient food production and accommodation, ample skilled and unskilled labour, well developed system of roads and harbours, good airbases and healthy mountain regions for rehabilitation. Even in case of widespread destruction repairs for Allied operational purposes are easiest to effect in Java. The occupation of Java would deprive the Japanese of their main regional source of supplies and labour.