Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

82

Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 15, 1944, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of the minutes of the 174th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend an alteration to the conclusion of Item 5 of the minutes. It was suggested that this should read:

Agreed to recommend that for planning production and for allocation of manpower the date for the end of the war against Japan…

Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.

Continuing, Admiral Leahy said there was one other alteration which should be made in the final sentence to General Arnold’s statement in Item 6. The number of B-29s which had been diverted to tankers should read 20 and not 40.

Sir Charles Portal said that on page 7 of the minutes his statement, as to the date on which the ground echelons for the aircraft from Europe for use in the war against Japan would have to be taken out, should read “by” December and not “in” December.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to amend the conclusion to Item 5 of CCS 174th Meeting to read as follows:

Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

b. Approved the conclusions of the 174th Meeting as amended above. The detailed record of the meeting was approved subject to the amendments agreed during discussion and to later minor amendments.

Final report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed and accepted certain amendments to the report.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as amended in discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 680/1).

Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” (CCS 681; 681/1)

Admiral Leahy suggested the insertion in the draft letter to Marshal Stalin in CCS 681 of a final paragraph (paragraph 6) to read: “Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.”

Sir Alan Brooke accepted this amendment.

With reference to the two draft messages to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in CCS 681/1, Sir Alan Brooke said that on balance he preferred the shorter draft in Enclosure “B.”

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had certain deletions to suggest to the longer draft in Enclosure “A” which he would like to put forward.

Admiral Leahy read out these suggestions.

Sir Alan Brooke said that these amendments were acceptable.

Continuing, Admiral Leahy proposed that a new sentence should be added to the draft in Enclosure “A” to read as follows: “We have agreed on future operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.”

Sir Alan Brooke said that this amendment was acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, approved draft messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reporting the results of the OCTAGON Conference. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 681/2.)

Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe (CCS 679)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in CCS 679 was acceptable. He would like the words “the combined shipping authorities” inserted after the words “Combined Military Transportation Committee” in paragraph 3.

Admiral Leahy accepted this amendment.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 679 subject to insertion in the third line of paragraph 3 of the words “combined shipping authorities” after the word “Committee.”

Combined personnel movement problem arising the first year after the defeat of Germany (CCS 675/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by Lord Leathers and General Somervell indicating the magnitude of the combined shipping movements which might be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Lord Leathers had explained to him that the paper was designed merely to show the magnitude of the problem rather than to give entirely accurate figures.

General Somervell confirmed that this was the case.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS 675/2.

Operation “HIGHBALL” (CCS 682)

Sir Charles Portal and Sir Andrew Cunningham gave a description of Operation HIGHBALL. They undertook to send the United States a film on this operation.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That Operation HIGHBALL would be available in the Eastern Theater at the end of November 1944.

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff would send an informational film and technical data to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Release to the press of information on “MULBERRY” (Scaf 79)

Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested that information with regard to MULBERRY should be released to the press. General Eisenhower was not, however, prepared to make such a release unless he was instructed to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral King said that base facilities in the Pacific were limited and it might well be that MULBERRY would be required in that theater, in which case it would be obviously disadvantageous if the Japanese were informed as to their potentialities.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with Admiral King that if there was any chance of using them in the Pacific it was far wiser to release nothing to the press on MULBERRY for the present.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in view of the potentialities of MULBERRY for the war against Japan he agreed that security on these should be retained.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that security implications affecting other theaters precluded the release of information on MULBERRY.

Possible statement to be made to the press by the President and Prime Minister

General Marshall suggested that there might be advantages in a statement being made, possibly by the President and Prime Minister, to the effect that the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of Japan. This was a fact and issued to the press should help to undermine Japanese morale.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that General Ismay would prepare a suitable statement for consideration.

Progress of the campaign in the Pacific

Admiral King outlined the extremely successful operations recently undertaken by Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 38 and the Fifth Air Force against the Japanese in the Leyte area, where some 500 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed. In view of the success of these operations it had been decided, after consultation with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, to advance the date of subsequently planned operations by about two months.

General Marshall said that he felt that the success of recent operations, particularly against the Japanese air, and the decision to advance the dates for future operations would have a decisive effect on what the Japanese could do in Burma.

General Arnold pointed out that the Japanese Air Force was no longer fighting with the will to win. The pilots lacked determination and even in the Philippines it seemed that the Japanese Air Force had neither the will nor the wherewithal to act offensively.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of Admiral King’s remarks on the progress of the campaign in the Pacific.

Hour of next meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed tentatively to meet at 1000 on Saturday, 16 September.

83

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 684

“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater

We have noted the request from General Wilson in his telegram (Medcos 181) for a firm directive on his responsibilities for RANKIN in the Mediterranean.

We ask that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to the immediate dispatch of the enclosed message to General Wilson.

Enclosure

CCS to SACMED

Top secret

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.
Reference Medcos 153 and 181.

Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations should proceed on the following basis.

Areas of occupation
You should plan to seize immediate control of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as follows:

a) Austria with four divisions and small tactical air force. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 410 and Fan 411.

b) Greece with approximately a division of British troops and small air forces. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 409.

c) The Dodecanese with approximately 2,400 men.

d) Venezia Giulia with approximately one division.

It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Romania.

It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria.

It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after prior agreement with the Russians.

Availability of forces
In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you should bear the following considerations in mind:
a) As stated in Cosmed 127, United States forces will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

b) It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion forces as early as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle East until after discussion with Dominion Governments, which is being initiated forthwith.

c) The four British Indian divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations.

d) French and Italian divisions will not be used.

e) The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph 2 above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies.

All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e., the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later.

84

The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Forces in Europe

Moscow, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Priority

MX 20970. To USSTAF for General Spaatz information copies to AGWar for General Arnold and Escom for General Walsh from Deane. Copy sent direct to Walsh.

Soviet Government informed British Government that they were prepared to cooperate with British and Americans in organizing aid to Warsaw provided this aid is rendered in accordance with a prearranged plan.

General Marshall has directed me and the President has directed Mr. Harriman to assist in working out a plan with the Russians and British. Burrows and I informed the Red Army General Staff that we wish to meet with them at once to work out a plan in which all three countries participate. So far there has been no Soviet reply. With the Red Army in Praga, the battle for Warsaw is reaching its critical and conclusive stages. In all probability American participation in relief of Polish insurgents will be limited to Frantic 7; however, both the Ambassador and I feel that it would be a great mistake to start reduction of Escom bases until the Warsaw situation has been clarified. It may develop that an additional American dropping mission will be a critical necessity and if so the facilities in Russia should remain available. The Ambassador feels that politically we would be in a most disadvantageous position if we had made additional missions impossible before the battle for Warsaw is decided or if we even gave the Russians the impression that we had abandoned the insurgents in Warsaw by initiating preparations to reduce Escom such as ordering trains.

In view of the above recommend that no firm date be set at this time for Escom reduction.

85

Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

Admiral Leahy, I send you herewith a draft which I suggest we might send to the President and Prime Minister on the idea that General Marshall put forward at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting this morning.

Will you let me know if you approve and I will send a copy to the Prime Minister at once: but naturally I should be grateful for any amendments or improvements that you think necessary.

H. L. ISMAY

[Enclosure]

Draft minute to the President and Prime Minister

Quebec, 15.9.44

The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to place on record that the main difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for the deployment against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. In colloquial language, it was a case of “standing room only,” even before the curtain rang up on the Conference.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not included any recommendation on this subject in their Final Report, but they submit that it would have an excellent effect on world opinion in general, and a correspondingly depressing effect on Japan, if the above ideas, clothed in your own language, were included in a communiqué about the Conference (if one is issued), and, also, at the Press Conference which will be held on its conclusion.

86

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and the British Minister of War Transport

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 675/2

Memorandum by the U.S. transportation, British movement, and combined shipping authorities

The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.

The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.

Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.

It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix “A”

Analysis of the combined personnel movement problem
Subsequent to a 1 October defeat of Germany and for 1 year thereafter

British U.S.
1. Operational Requirements
a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October. — 693,000
b. Buildup from U.S. for war against Japan. — 826,000
c. Redeployment for war against Japan. 1,052,000 804,000
d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to b and/or c. 385,000 213,000
e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas. 265,000 10,000
f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan. 150,000 280,000
g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships. 250,000 768,000
Subtotal 2,102,000 3,594,000
2. Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement
a. British and U.S. Forces. 678,000 1,720,000
b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel. 251,000 28,000
Subtotal 929,000 1,748,000
3. Prisoners of War
a. Allied prisoners of war. 53,000 102,000
b. Enemy prisoners of war. 466,000 243,000
Subtotal 519,000 345,000
4. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SERVICES 3,550,000 5,687,000 
Appendix “B”

Total availability of personnel shipping by categories (as of 1 Oct 1944)

British U.S.
Categories No. of Ships Capacity No. of Ships Capacity
1. Ocean Going 84 302,000 220 492,000
2. Limited Capability
(a) Indian Ocean type 31 48,000 — —
(b) Miscellaneous 6 6,000 45 35,000
Subtotal 37 54,000 45 35,000
TOTAL TROOPSHIP LIFT 121 356,000 265 527,000
NOTES: British U.S.
1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current CCS rates 376,000 708,000
2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each.
3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels.
4. Lift of LSIs and APAs is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit.
5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements.
6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships.
87

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 681/1 (OCTAGON)

Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of “OCTAGON”

The two enclosed draft messages, differing in the degree of detail included, are circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

Enclosure “A”
Top secret

Draft message from the President and the Prime Minister to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

  • First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

  • Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. The detailed operations will involve overland and airborne advances by the British from Imphal to seize Kalewa, thence the Yeu-Monywa area with exploitation toward Mandalay. At the same time, the Chinese, British and American forces now in the Myitkyina area will push on to Indaw-Katha-Bhamo, thence toward Mongmit-Mogok. Concurrently, your Chinese armies now engaged west of the Salween should drive vigorously toward Hsenwi and Lashio. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

  • Third: Without prejudice to the North Burma operations to protect the air ferry line and establish overland communications, Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to continue planning and preparations for a large scale amphibious and airborne operation in South Burma to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

Enclosure “B”

Draft message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang

September 1944
Top secret

From Naval Aide to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by Aettsna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Top Secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded a short conference at Quebec and hasten to inform you of the broad conclusions we have reached.

We have agreed that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment, and that to achieve this ultimately we may well have to invade Japan itself.

We have agreed that in the west our object should be the recapture of Burma at the earliest date. We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of operations in Upper Burma in order to secure the air supply route, including the air staging posts at Myitkyina, and to open overland communications with you. It is therefore intended to pursue with the utmost vigor the present operations in Upper Burma. Reinforcements, including airborne forces, are being dispatched.

In addition, we are planning a major amphibious operation to take place in the Bay of Bengal next year. The date when it can be carried out will depend on the time when we find it possible to release the necessary resources from the European Theater.

88

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 682

Operation “HIGHBALL”

The American Chiefs of Staff are asked to take note that Operation HIGHBALL will be available in the Eastern Theatre at the end of November 1944.

89

Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 11:00 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell
Mr. White

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant

[Undated]

Cherwell had a draft of a memorandum summarizing a conversation of the previous day with Churchill and the President on the subject of a policy toward Germany. This was the memorandum which they were to give to Churchill. The Secretary felt that the memorandum went too far in the wrong direction. He said he thought it represented “two steps backwards.” The Secretary said they ought to begin where Churchill left off and go forward. In the first conversation Churchill had been shocked by the proposal but on the following day he seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy. The memorandum ought to take that for granted. Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Secretary thought that rather than present too inadequate a memorandum they ought to go back that afternoon and raise the question again with Churchill and the President and write the memorandum on the conversation that will have taken place that afternoon rather than on the previous day.

The Secretary then spoke to Cherwell about Brand. He told him that he hadn’t wanted him to come to Washington to represent the British Treasury in the first place but that when he did come he gave him a chance, and that he was not helping England by his behavior. The Secretary mentioned Playfair and White suggested Opie or Keynes as possible Treasury representatives.

H. D. WHITE

90

The Under Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret

Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution. You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.

C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

Decisions with, respect to the following matters should be taken by blank majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:

a. All decisions coming under section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”

b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.

c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.

d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.

Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by blank majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.

All other decisions should be taken by blank majority vote.

The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.

In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.

Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?

ES
Under Secretary of State

91

Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about noon

Present
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Morgenthau had a few minutes of private conversation with Roosevelt, immediately before the latter’s meeting with Churchill, on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany.

92

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Cherwell
Sir Alexander Cadogan

From the Morgenthau Diary:

I met at 12:00 today with Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We took up the question of the Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II. The President read the thing through very carefully, and the only suggestion he made was that where it read, “Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported,” he included the words, “or sold.” Lord Cherwell said that they do sell all of their Lend-Lease; that is, all of the nonmilitary Lend-Lease, and the President then added the words also “for profit.”

Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.

Then Churchill, turning to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, “Where are the minutes on this matter of the Ruhr?” and according to our agreement we said that we didn’t have them. The reason we didn’t have them was because I felt, when I read the minutes which Lord Cherwell had written, that it presented much too weak a case, and I thought that we could get Churchill to go much further. He seemed quite put out that we didn’t have the minutes of the previous meeting, and the President said that the reason we didn’t have them was because Henry interspersed the previous discussion with too many dirty stories, and that sort of broke the ice. So Churchill broke in and said, “Well, I’ll restate it,” which he did, and he did it very forcefully and very clearly. Then he suggested that Lord Cherwell and I withdraw and try to do a job on dictating it, which we did. It only took us a few minutes, and we came back up to the room where they were meeting and just calmly walked in. When Churchill read our very short memorandum, he said, “No, this isn’t what I want.” Then he started to talk and dictate to us, and I said, “I don’t know what the rules of the game are, but is there any reason why we can’t have a stenographer present? Then you could dictate directly to her.” He said, “By all means,” and Cherwell went out and got Churchill’s secretary, and she came in and he began to dictate. He dictated the memorandum, which finally stood just the way he dictated it. He dictates extremely well because he is accustomed to doing it when he is writing his books.

While Churchill was dictating, he used the memorandum which I had dictated as a sort of a text.

Roosevelt’s important contribution, while Churchill was dictating, was that when he got talking about the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries, Roosevelt had him insert the very important words “in Germany.” What Roosevelt meant was – because it came up later – that he didn’t have in mind just the Ruhr and the Saar, but he had in mind entire Germany, and that the matter we were talking about, namely, the ease with which metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war, does not only apply to the Ruhr and the Saar, but the whole of Germany, which of course is terribly important.

When Churchill got through, Eden seemed quite shocked at what he heard, and he turned to Churchill and said, “You can’t do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the work[s] in London which are quite different.” Then Churchill and Eden seemed to have quite a bit of argument about it. Roosevelt took no part in it, and I took a small part and kept throwing things in. Churchill’s main argument was what this meant in the way of trade; they would get the export trade of Germany. So Eden said, “How do you know what it is or where it is?” and Churchill answered him quite testily, “Well, we will get it where-ever it is.” I was quite amazed and shocked at Eden’s attitude; in fact, it was so different from the way he talked when we were in London. Finally Churchill said, “Now I hope, Anthony, you’re not going to do anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.” Then he said this, “After all, the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.” Churchill got quite nasty with Eden, and I understand from the President that all the rest of the day Eden was not at all helpful. The President was quite disappointed.

Eden describes his participation in the meeting as follows:

… On the morning of September 15th, I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the [Morgenthau] plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.

I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President’s.

According to Cadogan, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the question of voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization at midday on September 15 and again in the middle of the afternoon. Stettinius’ memorandum of his conversation with Cadogan on September 16 records:

… He said that while Eden understood these matters clearly, Churchill had not yet studied them and [he] feared that neither Churchill nor the President had a complete understanding of what was involved. I inquired if he knew whether the President had had my message before him when this was discussed, and he said that the President had had no papers before him and did not refer to any. He said the question had come up at midday yesterday and had been discussed again in the middle of the afternoon. He did not indicate which person had taken the initiative. He indicated that the President had not been definite in his views on the matter one way or the other.…

Roosevelt, however, sent a message to Stettinius stating that neither Churchill nor he was inclined to approve the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had transmitted to Quebec.

Roosevelt and Churchill initialed two separate papers on lend-lease: (1) the summary of their discussion on September 14, and (2) a shorter paper on the establishment of a committee to deal with lend-lease questions.

93

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 15, 1944

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should, be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

94

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon’s proposals for dealing with the major war criminals, and to concert with him a list of names.

OK

F D R

95

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 14, 1944

We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend/Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a Joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question with the following membership:

Chairman: [blank]

American Members: British Members:
Secretary Morgenthau [blank]
Under-Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Leo Crowley

The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid in munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendations.

Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective Governments, the appropriate departments of each Government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend/Lease Aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.

In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14, 1944.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

96

The President to the Under Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944

Memorandum from the President for the Under Secretary of State.

Neither the Prime Minister nor I are inclined to approve the proposed amendment.

My thought has been that this amendment or a general reference to the subject should be mentioned in the agreement as having been discussed but without reaching any agreement or decision, thus leaving it up to the meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, is afraid that this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they would know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations’ meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us on some other point.

That is about the only information I can give you. Cadogan will return Monday, I think, and he can give you any further news.

I think we should keep on trying but if we cannot agree on this or any other point, I am inclined to favor either not mentioning disagreement or putting disagreements under a general statement that certain points have not been agreed on. I am still greatly in favor of a reference to the United Nations for discussion as soon as possible.

97

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.

W S C

16.9
F D R

98

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, September 15, 1944
Draft 1. HMJr. dictated this.

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they would permit Russia and any other of our Allies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut down, and that these two districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they would not start up again.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part of a programme looking forward to diverting Germany into largely an agricultural country.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

99

The President to the Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret

Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of State.

After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of post-war plans regarding industries has been worked out as per the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.

I think that I have also worked out the locations of the occupying forces.

I am going to leave here Saturday evening and go to Hyde Park where I will be joined Monday morning by the Prime Minister and his wife for a couple of days.

100

Morgenthau-Cherwell luncheon meeting, about 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Law
Sir Alexander Cadogan
101

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, early afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Mackenzie King apparently came to the Citadel for the purpose of asking Roosevelt and Churchill to accept honorary degrees from McGill University. The rest of the conversation is described as follows in Mackenzie King’s notes:

… Churchill … then spoke to the President about our participation in the war in the Pacific; of our desire to be in the Northern part and have our forces to serve in North Pacific; also our wish to have our Chiefs of Staff have a talk with his. The President replied: Mackenzie and I had a talk together on that, last night. That is all understood.

The President then said something about the Kuriles needing a good deal of patrolling, also Northern China, probably requiring Japs to be driven out later. When he stressed that he would have his divisions leave Seattle, and that Canadian forces could leave Vancouver, Churchill referred again to naval forces coming through the Panama Canal into the Pacific.… I did not want to leave matters to just the North and indicated that we were prepared to operate in the central area as well. Churchill also indicated that we were prepared to go as far South as Burma.

Churchill said it would not do to have our Canadians fighting in the Tropics…