Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

The Under Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret

Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution. You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.

C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

Decisions with, respect to the following matters should be taken by blank majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:

a. All decisions coming under section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”

b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.

c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.

d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.

Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by blank majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.

All other decisions should be taken by blank majority vote.

The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.

In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.

Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?

ES
Under Secretary of State

Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about noon

Present
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Morgenthau had a few minutes of private conversation with Roosevelt, immediately before the latter’s meeting with Churchill, on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Cherwell
Sir Alexander Cadogan

From the Morgenthau Diary:

I met at 12:00 today with Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We took up the question of the Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II. The President read the thing through very carefully, and the only suggestion he made was that where it read, “Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported,” he included the words, “or sold.” Lord Cherwell said that they do sell all of their Lend-Lease; that is, all of the nonmilitary Lend-Lease, and the President then added the words also “for profit.”

Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.

Then Churchill, turning to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, “Where are the minutes on this matter of the Ruhr?” and according to our agreement we said that we didn’t have them. The reason we didn’t have them was because I felt, when I read the minutes which Lord Cherwell had written, that it presented much too weak a case, and I thought that we could get Churchill to go much further. He seemed quite put out that we didn’t have the minutes of the previous meeting, and the President said that the reason we didn’t have them was because Henry interspersed the previous discussion with too many dirty stories, and that sort of broke the ice. So Churchill broke in and said, “Well, I’ll restate it,” which he did, and he did it very forcefully and very clearly. Then he suggested that Lord Cherwell and I withdraw and try to do a job on dictating it, which we did. It only took us a few minutes, and we came back up to the room where they were meeting and just calmly walked in. When Churchill read our very short memorandum, he said, “No, this isn’t what I want.” Then he started to talk and dictate to us, and I said, “I don’t know what the rules of the game are, but is there any reason why we can’t have a stenographer present? Then you could dictate directly to her.” He said, “By all means,” and Cherwell went out and got Churchill’s secretary, and she came in and he began to dictate. He dictated the memorandum, which finally stood just the way he dictated it. He dictates extremely well because he is accustomed to doing it when he is writing his books.

While Churchill was dictating, he used the memorandum which I had dictated as a sort of a text.

Roosevelt’s important contribution, while Churchill was dictating, was that when he got talking about the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries, Roosevelt had him insert the very important words “in Germany.” What Roosevelt meant was – because it came up later – that he didn’t have in mind just the Ruhr and the Saar, but he had in mind entire Germany, and that the matter we were talking about, namely, the ease with which metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war, does not only apply to the Ruhr and the Saar, but the whole of Germany, which of course is terribly important.

When Churchill got through, Eden seemed quite shocked at what he heard, and he turned to Churchill and said, “You can’t do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the work[s] in London which are quite different.” Then Churchill and Eden seemed to have quite a bit of argument about it. Roosevelt took no part in it, and I took a small part and kept throwing things in. Churchill’s main argument was what this meant in the way of trade; they would get the export trade of Germany. So Eden said, “How do you know what it is or where it is?” and Churchill answered him quite testily, “Well, we will get it where-ever it is.” I was quite amazed and shocked at Eden’s attitude; in fact, it was so different from the way he talked when we were in London. Finally Churchill said, “Now I hope, Anthony, you’re not going to do anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.” Then he said this, “After all, the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.” Churchill got quite nasty with Eden, and I understand from the President that all the rest of the day Eden was not at all helpful. The President was quite disappointed.

Eden describes his participation in the meeting as follows:

… On the morning of September 15th, I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the [Morgenthau] plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.

I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President’s.

According to Cadogan, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the question of voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization at midday on September 15 and again in the middle of the afternoon. Stettinius’ memorandum of his conversation with Cadogan on September 16 records:

… He said that while Eden understood these matters clearly, Churchill had not yet studied them and [he] feared that neither Churchill nor the President had a complete understanding of what was involved. I inquired if he knew whether the President had had my message before him when this was discussed, and he said that the President had had no papers before him and did not refer to any. He said the question had come up at midday yesterday and had been discussed again in the middle of the afternoon. He did not indicate which person had taken the initiative. He indicated that the President had not been definite in his views on the matter one way or the other.…

Roosevelt, however, sent a message to Stettinius stating that neither Churchill nor he was inclined to approve the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had transmitted to Quebec.

Roosevelt and Churchill initialed two separate papers on lend-lease: (1) the summary of their discussion on September 14, and (2) a shorter paper on the establishment of a committee to deal with lend-lease questions.

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 15, 1944

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should, be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon’s proposals for dealing with the major war criminals, and to concert with him a list of names.

OK

F D R

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 14, 1944

We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend/Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a Joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question with the following membership:

Chairman: [blank]

American Members: British Members:
Secretary Morgenthau [blank]
Under-Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Leo Crowley

The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid in munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendations.

Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective Governments, the appropriate departments of each Government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend/Lease Aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.

In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14, 1944.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

The President to the Under Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944

Memorandum from the President for the Under Secretary of State.

Neither the Prime Minister nor I are inclined to approve the proposed amendment.

My thought has been that this amendment or a general reference to the subject should be mentioned in the agreement as having been discussed but without reaching any agreement or decision, thus leaving it up to the meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, is afraid that this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they would know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations’ meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us on some other point.

That is about the only information I can give you. Cadogan will return Monday, I think, and he can give you any further news.

I think we should keep on trying but if we cannot agree on this or any other point, I am inclined to favor either not mentioning disagreement or putting disagreements under a general statement that certain points have not been agreed on. I am still greatly in favor of a reference to the United Nations for discussion as soon as possible.

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.

W S C

16.9
F D R

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, September 15, 1944
Draft 1. HMJr. dictated this.

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they would permit Russia and any other of our Allies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut down, and that these two districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they would not start up again.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part of a programme looking forward to diverting Germany into largely an agricultural country.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

The President to the Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret

Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of State.

After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of post-war plans regarding industries has been worked out as per the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.

I think that I have also worked out the locations of the occupying forces.

I am going to leave here Saturday evening and go to Hyde Park where I will be joined Monday morning by the Prime Minister and his wife for a couple of days.

Morgenthau-Cherwell luncheon meeting, about 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Law
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, early afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Mackenzie King apparently came to the Citadel for the purpose of asking Roosevelt and Churchill to accept honorary degrees from McGill University. The rest of the conversation is described as follows in Mackenzie King’s notes:

… Churchill … then spoke to the President about our participation in the war in the Pacific; of our desire to be in the Northern part and have our forces to serve in North Pacific; also our wish to have our Chiefs of Staff have a talk with his. The President replied: Mackenzie and I had a talk together on that, last night. That is all understood.

The President then said something about the Kuriles needing a good deal of patrolling, also Northern China, probably requiring Japs to be driven out later. When he stressed that he would have his divisions leave Seattle, and that Canadian forces could leave Vancouver, Churchill referred again to naval forces coming through the Panama Canal into the Pacific.… I did not want to leave matters to just the North and indicated that we were prepared to operate in the central area as well. Churchill also indicated that we were prepared to go as far South as Burma.

Churchill said it would not do to have our Canadians fighting in the Tropics…

The President’s Special Assistant to the President’s Secretary

Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret
MR-out-412

Personal and secret to Miss Grace Tully from Harry Hopkins.

I sent to the President memorandum entitled French Lend Lease Agreement and dated September 11 from the State Department. FEA and State Department are anxious to know whether the President has initialed it.

Could you help me get an answer on this tomorrow?

HARRY HOPKINS

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany as between United States and British forces. The agreement assigned the south western zone of occupation in Germany to United States forces and the northwestern zone to British forces; changed the boundary between the two zones by transferring the province of Hessen-Nassau and Oberhessen from the northwestern to the southwestern zone and by transferring an area west of the Rhine comprising Saarland, the Palatinate, and Rheinhessen from the southwestern to the northwestern zone; and provided that United States forces would have access “through the western and northwestern seaports” and rites of passage through the British zone of occupation.

Which was a bit hehind time because the provisional goverment was:

1 Like

The Pittsburgh Press (September 15, 1944)

Are they going someplace else?
Roosevelt-Churchill war talks in Québec are in closing stages

Spokesman indicates parley may continue elsewhere; Eden joins discussions

Québec, Canada (UP) –
Official spokesmen of the Roosevelt-Churchill war talks said today the conference here has moved into its closing stages, but indicated the President and the Prime Minister might continue their discussions elsewhere.

White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said the President and the Prime Minister will finish their work by noon tomorrow, then added this would “conclude their conferences in Québec.”

Reports leaped at this indication of another meeting as contained in Mr. Early’s emphasis of the words “in Québec.”

“Does this mean,” one reporter asked, “the Prime Minister will go to Washington for further conferences?”

“I can’t answer that,” Mr. Early replied.

Eden joins parley

Robin Cruikshank, British spokesman, was similarly reticent about discussing Mr. Churchill’s plans beyond noon tomorrow.

Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, were at the Citadel today to talk primarily with Mr. Churchill. They were with Mr. Churchill and the President last night until a late hour.

Plans for Germany

Peace terms for Germany obviously were the most pressing problem in which Mr., Eden was involved in talks with Mr. Churchill and the President. But a backlog of other problems was building up.

Mr. Eden was believed to have brought with him a new summary of activities of the European Advisory Commission which is dealing with the detailed planning for post-war Germany.

Following his talks here with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden is expected to hurry back to London with their latest views – and orders.

Command setup set for Pacific

Québec, Canada (UP) –
A new U.S. command setup, dominantly Navy and geared to the Pacific war plans being formulated at the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences here, is expected to be announced soon.

Decisions on the command setup have already been made, White House Secretary Stephen T. Early said, but what the command setup will be has not been revealed. Nor is there any official information as to the British part in it, if any.

More integration seen

Recent developments, together with information from usually reliable sources, permits this picture to be drawn:

The present likelihood is that there will be no super-command of all Allied forces for the whole Pacific and Asiatic theaters. Rather the outlook is for more efficient integration of certain of the present command areas.

Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, one of the President’s advisers here, is expected to relinquish his other post of Chief of Naval Operations and to move to a Pacific base for a more active role as fleet commander. Adm. King had been assigned the dual jobs shortly after the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor. But many functions of the Naval Operations office were subsequently transferred to the jurisdiction of the fleet commander’s organization.

The information here is that the Naval Operations post will be turned over to Adm. Frederick J. Horne, now Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Use of British units seen

Adm. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet commander, may move to an advanced Pacific base, closer to the scene of operations, moving ever nearer the Japanese homeland.

Since the British Navy is expected to take a part in the Pacific campaign, its fleet units may be attached to Adm. Nimitz’s fleet, rather than operate as an independent force.

Some British units have operated with the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the past as integral elements of the American force. But this was done largely for training and indoctrination in U.S. naval tactics adapted to the special needs of the Pacific.

Screenshot 2022-06-20 213810

Simms: Polish-Soviet settlement hinted in Eden’s arrival

With impending collapse of Germany, ticklish issue can’t be avoided longer
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Québec, Canada –
With the arrival here of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, there is talk of a settlement of the ticklish, if not dangerous, quarrel between Poland and Russia.

With the impending collapse of Germany, European boundary problems become acute, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Russia has staked out expansive territorial and political claims. Thus far, Britain and America have shied away from such questions, preferring to cross those bridges as they come.

But the Polish issue can no longer be avoided. She is an ally. If she is to lose half her territory and her political independence to appease an ally, it may knock post-war world collaboration into a cocked hat.

In Washington recently, I learned that the Polish government in London was willing to meet Moscow more than halfway.

Up to the present, Moscow’s attitude toward Warsaw has been frigid.

Russia ever refused aid to Gen. Bor’s Polish Patriots, fighting in Warsaw. The British and Poles had to fly all the way from Britain to drop supplies for Gen. Bor. Russia, with airfields 10 minutes from Warsaw, refused to do anything.

It is a reasonable assumption that Mr. Eden came to give Mr. Churchill and the President a fill-in on important developments since Mr. Churchill’s departure. He may have brought news that the end of the war in Europe is nearer than was thought, and perhaps to urge upon the “Big Two” a new and early meeting of the “Big Three” – a meeting with Marshal Stalin.


Background of news –
Québec now and in 1943

By Bertram Benedict

The first conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Québec was held a little more than a year ago, from Aug. 17 to Aug. 24, 1943. There were rumors that the conference would produce a notable declaration like the Atlantic Charter, which had come out of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the high seas two years before, or like the “unconditional surrender” demand which had come out of the Casablanca Conference in the previous January, but the 1943 Québec Conference produced nothing of the sort.

The joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement issued at the close of the conference said merely that military operations all over the world, including the war against Japan, had been surveyed. Decisions had been made, but could not be disclosed. It had been resolved to hold another Anglo-American conference before the end of the year, “in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia.” Russia would be fully informed of the decisions reached as to the war against Germany and Italy.

The President’s address at Ottawa following the conference was in the nature of a “peptalk,” telling the world that Germany was about to be defeated.

Invitation denied by Moscow

In 1943, as in 1944, Soviet Russia was not represented. President Roosevelt was understood to say that Marshal Stalin had been invited to come. Thereupon Moscow denied flatly that any such invitation had been received.

While the conference met, Soviet publications continued to criticize the United States and Great Britain for not opening a real second front. The magazine War and the Working Class explained that the Québec Conference was all right as an Anglo-American parley, but said that the real need was for a tripartite Soviet-Anglo-American conference soon in Moscow.

The 1943 Québec Conference met amid fears that Russia would insist on playing a lone hand. There were rumors that Germany had offered Moscow a separate peace.

Several weeks before the 1943 Québec Conference met, Mussolini had been deposed in Italy, and Gen. Badoglio had been named Italian Premier. There was confusion as to Gen. de Gaulle’s status. After the conference adjourned, the United States recognized Gen. de Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation as the “administrative authority” of the French overseas territories actually under the committee’s control.

Action on war fronts

While the conference was meeting, the conquest of Sicily was completed. American and Canadian forces occupied Kiska, from which the Japanese had departed unscathed. There was hard fighting on New Guinea. In the east, the Russian advance retook Kharkov.

Goebbels told the German people over the radio that a new secret weapon was under construction which would soon give them relief from Allied air raids.

At Québec in 1943, President Roosevelt made public his executive orders allowing the War Manpower Commission to withdraw draft deferment from recalcitrant strikers and allowing union dues to be placed in escrow in any plant taken over by the government.

The War Labor Board took jurisdiction of the wage dispute in the anthracite mines. The Board also ordered Montgomery Ward to enforce a maintenance of union membership clause. Under Secretary of State Welles was said to be on the point of resigning. Mrs. Roosevelt was in New Zealand.

U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)

Roosevelt conversation with the Archduke Otto of Austria, 5:00 p.m.

Present
President Roosevelt
Archduke Otto

Roosevelt had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:

Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect, and “we don’t know much about it.” Immediately following this he remarked “that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.” This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.

The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:

HUNGARY. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.

RUSSIA. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally – although he said a little later that he was “untrustworthy” and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine) – the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power – naturally short of war.

POLAND. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.

AUSTRIA. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)

VATICAN. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

YUGOSLAVIA. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very bad shape.

MISCELLANEOUS. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium. – In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands. – Is very angry at Argentina. – Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all. – Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.

Morgenthau-Leahy conversation, about 5:00 p.m.

Present
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
Admiral Leahy
Miss Tully

Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:

While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the USA should go into. In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go, and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar, he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out.