Maj. Williams: National air policy
By Maj. Al Williams
…
Background of news –
Wage decision coming up
By Blair Moody
Washington –
The proposal of War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes that labor return to a 40-hour week in civilian plants after the defeat of Germany adds another difficult factor to the wage issues which confront President Roosevelt in the midst of the presidential campaign.
With the question of breaking the “Little Steel” formula and thus shifting the base of his whole stabilization program shortly coming up before the War Labor Board, Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion that hours must be reemployment in the reconversion period would on the basis of present hourly rates involves a 30 percent reduction in “take-home” pay for hundreds of thousands of workers.
One of the principal reasons no action has been taken so far to increase the “15 percent over 1941” maximum hourly raise allowed by the “Little Steel” formula, despite the fact that the cost of living has admittedly gone up at least 25 percent, officials say, is that the actual earnings of most workers, when overtime is included, have risen much more than living costs.
Let workers take the loss?
But if eight “overtime hours” are chopped off, many workers will go back to 40 hours’ pay instead of receiving the equivalent of 52. The issue, officials point out, then will be whether to let the workers absorb this loss, or to raise their hourly pay to compensate for it.
The matter of costs and prices of products sold to the public, which Mr. Byrnes says will in many cases have to be higher, and other inflationary factors, will be involved in this decision.
Informed officials predict that the entire wage issue will be given a thorough public airing before the War Labor Board before Nov. 7. When the tensely awaited panel report in the steel case formally gets to the WLB it will take its place beside previous panel reports “finding facts” on requests for more money for auto and packing house workers of the CIO and several cases from the AFL.
In all of these, the fact-finding bodies point out that no substantial blanket raises can be granted now without changing the whole wage stabilization policy.
Decision up to Roosevelt
The steel panel’s report will set up clearly the fact that a discrepancy of approximately 15 percent exists between wage and price movements, and the President is the only man who can settle it.
Before the WLB decides to recommend a change in the wage formula, if it does, it will call a public hearing, where all the big guns of both unions and industry certainly would be aligned in a memorable economic debate with sharp political overtones. Of course, the WLB could decide to quash the whole idea, and hold no hearing. But in that case, a parade of union officials to the White House would be likely.
If it holds a public hearing and decides the “Little Steel” rate is no longer fair to labor, the WLB then will make a recommendation to the President. This procedure will take some weeks, but whether the board’s action, if any, reaches the President’s desk before election in the end may depend on whether it is planned that way.
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Like all presidential candidates –
Stokes: Dewey visits Wild West and meets an Indian chief
But he scorns Coolidge, Smith precedent and passes up chance to don war bonnet
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
Valentine, Nebraska –
Every presidential candidate must have his day or two in a Wild West atmosphere.
He must mingle with Indians adorned in headdress and painted faces, with cowboys in gay silk shorts, with ranchers stiff and uncomfortable in store clothes which last from year to year with only occasional wear, for they do not deign to replenish them, even though in this neighborhood they now casually flash great rolls of folding money.
The Indians were on hand to welcome Governor Dewey when his train rolled into this little town in Nebraska’s sand hills. A solemn rank of Sioux on horseback, looking ghastly and fierce from the colors splashed across their wizened faces, for most of them were old. The cowboys were there, too, to escort the Republican candidate and his wife in a parade through the center of town.
He plays it straight
Then his car and those of his party were turned across the rolling plains to the ranch of former Governor Sam McKelvie 20 miles away, where the Governor and Mrs. Dewey were guests overnight.
Governor Dewey took it all straight like a New Yorker and a gentleman, with none of the pretensions of the dude rancher. And he took it all smiling, amiable and properly inquisitive.
He did not don Indian headdress, as another New Yorker, Al Smith, once did, in mingling with the Blackfeet in Montana. He did not put on a cowboy hat or get into chaps and spurs as Cal Coolidge did some years ago in South Dakota, making a sight in the moving pictures, mincing anxiously down the steps, that was better for laughs than anything Charlie Chaplin ever did.
Meets Indian chief
Governor Dewey, of course, being a politician, could not avoid a chat with an Indian chieftain. Spotted Crow was supplied for this purpose by local Republicans. He pledged his support to the Republican candidate, as some chief always does for one candidate or the other every four years.
Spotted Crow expressed the opinion that Republicans would treat the Indians better than the Democrats, for all that Secretary Harold Ickes and Indian Commissioner John Collier have been able to do.
The Governor took part in the ceremony of digging up the barbecued beef, which had been cooking for hours underground, but he refused to pose for photographers in this role.
No points needed
He stood in line afterward with Mrs. Dewey, in a big tent to have his plate filled with the succulent meat, potato salad, coleslaw and potato chips. It was utility beef no ration points – it was explained.
Even miles away from the big world outside, the Governor gave careful attention to politics, conferring by the hour with delegations from Nebraska, South Dakota and Wyoming, listening to complaints against the New Deal on behalf of the cattlemen who, from evidence of those there, are doing nicely and achieving rotund figures.
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Close contest in presidential race foreseen
Both parties feel trend is favorable
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer
Washington (UP) –
The best bet as the political campaign accelerates today is that the presidential election will be a close contest for popular votes.
Political events in Maine, Texas and Ohio variously comforted Democrats and Republicans but without producing conclusive evidence of a national trend either way.
Maine’s jump-the-gun state election yesterday gave the Republican gubernatorial candidate 73 percent of the vote and a plurality of 80,000, the largest in recent state records. Democrats will find some offset in the fact that only 185,000 or so voters of approximately 350,000 registrants went to the polls. But the returns seem to make the state safe for Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the GOP presidential candidate.
If these indications of a close contest are accurate, Mr. Dewey should run better this year than Wendell L. Willkie ran in 1940. Mr. Roosevelt beat Mr. Willkie by 27,243,000 votes to 22,304,000. In 1936, he took GOP candidate Alf M. Landon, 27,576,000 to 16,679,000 votes. Mr. Hoover lost to Mr. Roosevelt in 1932 by 15,761,000 to 22,821,000.
Plan seeks end to Texas revolt
Dallas, Texas (UP) –
Pro-Roosevelt forces turned today to the legal aspects of a plan under which normally Democratic Texas would be assured that presidential electors on the November ballot will cast the state’s 23 votes for President Roosevelt and his vice-presidential running mate, Harry S. Truman.
A three-point plan, advanced by Democratic National Committeeman Myron Blalock of Marshall, was still in the committee rooms as fourth-term backers called to order the Texas State Convention over which they had gained complete control in a stormy session last night.
The Blalock plan, drawn up in anticipation of a lawsuit to be filed by anti-Roosevelt forces within the party, called for:
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The resolutions committee to have the convention revoke the instructions of the May 23 Texas Convention and instruct party electors to vote for the Democratic nominees for President and Vice President.
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Place the names of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman on the ballot instead of the names of electors. This is permissible under Texas law.
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Prepare an amended list of electors for filing in case it is needed.
Overton wins easily in Louisiana election
New Orleans, Louisiana (UP) –
U.S. Senator John H. Overton of Alexandria won renomination in yesterday’s Louisiana Democratic primary election, unofficial returns showed today.
Mr. Overton was conceded election when New Orleans radio station owner E. A. Stephens, who had been Mr. Overton’s chief opponent, admitted defeat.
Latest figures gave Mr. Overton a total of 134,953 votes, Mr. Stephens 57,427, Lake Charles attorney Griffin T. Hawkins 14,836, and New Orleans businessman Charles S. Gerth 6,582.
Holding a clear majority of more than 56,000, Mr. Overton won his renomination without a runoff.
Dewey hails vote in Maine as trend
Valentine, Nebraska (UP) –
Governor Thomas E. Dewey relaxed today at the halfway mark on his transcontinental campaign tour, exuding the most confidence since his nomination in June that he will win the presidential election in November.
There were two major encouraging factors:
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Optimistic reports from Midwestern Republican leaders on the outlook in Iowa, Nebraska and South Dakota.
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Returns from Maine’s state election showing what Mr. Dewey described as “the greatest Republican landslide in the history of the state.”
Enjoys news and rest
Mr. Dewey obviously enjoyed the encouraging news, as well as his period of relaxation at the 12,000-acre by-the-way ranch of former Governor Samuel R. McKelvie, Western manager of the New York Governor’s presidential campaign.
It was evident when he walked briskly out on the lawn late yesterday afternoon and announced to the assembled correspondents: “Gentlemen, I have a story for you.”
He had just finished a long telephone conversation with Republican National Chairman Herbert Brownell Jr., during which he received the results of the Maine election in which the Republican Party won the gubernatorial and Congressional races.
Pointing out that Republican candidates polled more than 70 percent of the total vote, an increase of seven percent over 1940, Mr. Dewey said it was proof that “the marked Republican trend is continuing at an accelerating pace.”
Foresees GOP Congress
Mr. Dewey said:
The people of Maine have demonstrated the rising confidence in the leadership of the Republican Party which I have found evidenced every place as I came across the country.
It is becoming clear that the people have decided, not only for their states but in the national government as well, that the peace and prosperity of the United States and the world will be better served by the election of a new and competent administration and that they propose to elect a Republican Congress to work with the new administration.
That will being a new and refreshing harmony between the executive and legislature branches of government which we so long have needed and which is so essential to the solution of the problems we will face next January.
Plan to keep men in service denied
Washington (UP) –
An administration spokesman and an official of the Selective Service System today denied charges by Thomas E. Dewey that the administration planned to keep men in the armed services after the war until they could find jobs.
House Democratic Leader John W. McCormack (D-MA) said the Republican presidential candidate’s charges were “ridiculous and untrue” and were made for “political advantage.”
Col. Francis B. Keesling of Selective Service told a House Military Affairs subcommittee yesterday that there is no intention of keeping men in the Armed Forces longer than military necessity requires. He added the hope that Selective Service could be kept out of politics.
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
Los Angeles, California –
These presidential election polls certainly are confusing.
First a poll comes out that says Mr. Dewey will absolutely win. Then they bring out a poll that says Mr. Roosevelt will absolutely win.
My goodness, what if we wind up with the Roosevelts and Deweys both in the White House?
On second thought, that’s a very nice picture – the two families sitting around the fireside and chatting.
No, I guess the Deweys don’t exactly care for fireside chats. But it might work out, anyway. The men folks could take turns running the country and the women folks could take turns running the house.
Of course, Mrs. Dewey might get a little upset the first time Mrs. Roosevelt telephoned to say she would be three months late for dinner.
Eligible veterans get full school tuition
…
G.I. Joe gets own radio Purple Heart shows
Hope and Crosby to be advisers
By Si Steinhauser
…
Witness tells Congressional group –
U.S.-German cartels kept us from helping England and Canada
Agreements ‘circumvented English blockade’ and saw war secrets go to firms in Germany
By Charles B. Degges, United Press staff writer
…
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, 4:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Miss Tully |
The memorandum below was prepared by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. Since this memorandum does not indicate that White himself was present, it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
Mrs. Roosevelt asked the Secretary to tea. As soon as he arrived he was ushered in to the President. Miss Tully was also present. (When he came in, the President turned to Fala, his dog, and said, “Say hello to your Uncle Henry.”)
The President said that in his conversation with Churchill, Churchill had been very glum. The President said that he had asked Churchill: “How would you like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years?” The President said that Churchill seemed much excited over the possibility.
The President said to the Secretary: “I have asked you to come up here so that you could talk to the Prof. [Lord Cher well].” He said that they were doing shipping that night and therefore were to have Admiral Land but added, “You might as well come too.” The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor and the President replied, “You can talk about anything you want.” The Secretary inquired: “Anything?,” and the President said, “Well, let me look at that book.” [The book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on Germany prepared in the Treasury which the Secretary had given to him in Washington.] The President went over the whole section and said, “I wouldn’t discuss with him the question of the zones to be occupied by our armies. That’s a military question. Nor would I discuss the question of partitioning as that’s a political question. But you can talk about the fact that we are thinking of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar, including the Kiel Canal. If Holland has a lot of land inundated by Germany we can give her a piece of Western Germany as compensation.”
The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: “I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter.” (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he (the Secretary) gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany.)
The President said, “Don’t worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.” As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, “Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.” [The book he referred to was the book I described above.]
740.0011 PW/9-1344: Telegram
The Chargé near the Dutch Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State
London, September 13, 1944
Confidential
US urgent
niact
Neter 17. From Schoenfeld.
Foreign Minister van Kleffens requests following message be sent to the President. He has asked this mission to serve as channel of transmission since Netherlands Government has no direct code communication with Quebec.
On learning that Pacific strategy will be discussed at Quebec conference Netherlands Government request in view of their vital interest in that question that following statement with regard to operations in Japanese occupied territory be transmitted to the President. Same statement is being sent to Mr. Churchill through British Foreign Office. Minister for Colonies van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich are proceeding [to] America. Netherlands Government trust President and Prime Minister will find it possible to give them an opportunity to elucidate Netherlands point of view. (Statement begins)
Success of main strategy against Japan in severing communications between Japan and occupied area covering Burma, Malaya, Philippines, British Borneo and NEI will cut off Japanese forces in that area from arms and munitions but will not compel them to surrender or to withdraw supposing this to be possible. Area as a whole has sufficient food and other materials and facilities for maintenance and it may be assumed that Japanese forces have sufficient stocks of arms and munitions. Experience points to probability that Japanese stay on for irregular warfare even after defeat or surrender Japan. Facts in recovered territory in the area show that isolated Japanese forces become more ferocious and destructive as isolation becomes more irremediable. If liberation occupied areas is delayed suffering and destruction of large populations will increase beyond all measure and prisoners of war and internees can be considered lost. Since voluntary evacuation of the area by Japanese forces cannot be expected active liberation as soon as possible seems urgent both from this point of view and with regard to future rehabilitation. This action should primarily be directed towards most important territories with most civilized and numerous population and greatest economic value. Among these Java seems to offer best base for further operations because of central situation, sufficient food production and accommodation, ample skilled and unskilled labour, well developed system of roads and harbours, good airbases and healthy mountain regions for rehabilitation. Even in case of widespread destruction repairs for Allied operational purposes are easiest to effect in Java. The occupation of Java would deprive the Japanese of their main regional source of supplies and labour.
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Admiral Leahy | Minister of War Transport Leathers | |
| Vice Admiral Land | Lord Moran | |
| Vice Admiral McIntire |
Leahy noted in his diary:
The subjects discussed at dinner were generally international politics, economics and shipping; and the peace terms that should be imposed upon Germany when that country surrenders to the Allies.
Moran’s diary account is considerably fuller:
… How to prevent another war with Germany was the only subject of conversation. The Americans were all for drastic action, maintaining that Germany should not be allowed ships or the yards in which to build them; what they needed could be carried in our ships. Morgenthau wanted to close down the Ruhr to help British exports, especially steel. The P.M. was against this. He did not seem happy about all this toughness.
“I’m all for disarming Germany,” he said, “but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.”
I thought he had done when he growled: “I agree with Burke. You cannot indict a whole nation.”
If the P.M. was vague about what ought to be done with Germany, he was at least quite clear what should not be done. He kept saying: “At any rate, what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals, but don’t carry on the business for years.”
Morgenthau asked the P.M. how he could prevent Britain starving when her exports had fallen so low that she would be unable to pay for imports. The P.M. had no satisfactory answer. His thoughts seemed to go back to the House of Commons and what he knew of the English people. In five years’ time, when passions would have died down, people, he said, would not stand for repressive measures. He harped on the necessity for disarmament. At that point one of the Americans intervened: he thought that Germany should be made to return to a pastoral state, she ought to have a lower standard of living. During all this wild talk only the P.M. seemed to have his feet on the ground. The President mostly listened; once he remarked that a factory which made steel furniture could be turned overnight to war production.
After three hours’ discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the Prime Minister. The Prof., however, sided with the Americans. At last Roosevelt said: “Let the Prof, go into our plans with Morgenthau.”
On September 20, 1944, Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson that at this dinner meeting Churchill was violently opposed to the policy on Germany which was presented to him. He quoted Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought to Quebec to discuss such a scheme and as stating that it would mean that England would be chained to a dead body, i.e., Germany.
Morgenthau, writing of the September 13 dinner meeting three years later, recalled that Churchill had been irascible and vitriolic when, at Roosevelt’s request, Morgenthau had explained the Treasury proposal. Churchill, he said, turned loose “the full flood of his rhetoric, sarcasm and violence”, stating that he looked on the Treasury plan “as he would on chaining himself to a dead German.” Roosevelt, Morgenthau recalled, sat by, saying very little.
The most detailed description of the dinner conversation which has been found was written by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. No source on the meeting (including White’s memorandum itself) states that White was present, and it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, in the period between September 13 and the date on which White’s memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date “9/25/44” at the end (presumably the date of typing):
Though shipping was supposed to have been the subject for discussion the subject of shipping was not mentioned the entire evening except briefly when the question was raised as to the advisability of taking away all of Germany’s shipping.
The discussion quickly turned to Germany. Churchill (apparently without reference to anything said previously) said something along the line of “What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without first discussing them with me? I intend to get into the matter myself.”
The President said he had asked Secretary Morgenthau to come up for the purpose of discussing Germany and that he (Morgenthau) was to talk to Cherwell the following day.
Churchill asked: “Why don’t we discuss Germany now?” The President then asked the Secretary to explain the program he had in mind for Germany. The Secretary described that part of the Treasury proposal dealing with the Ruhr, Churchill indicated that he was strongly opposed to such a program. He said that all that was necessary was to eliminate the production of armament. To do what the Treasury suggested was “unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary.” Churchill didn’t believe that it would be very much of an aid to the United Kingdom even if the United Kingdom did get the steel business that formerly went to Germany.
Admiral Land, on the other hand, wholly supported Secretary Morgenthau’s proposal, thumping vigorously on the table to emphasize his remark. Admiral Land told the Secretary after the dinner that the President had been talking with him more or less along those lines for a long time but this was the first time that he (Admiral Land) had a chance to say what he felt. He had long been waiting for the opportunity and, encouraged by the Secretary’s statement, he had vigorously expressed himself.
When the question arose about taking away German ships, Churchill was opposed. Admiral Land said, “Why not? It is no more cruel to take away ships than their steel plants.”
Churchill said at one point: “If you [the United States] do not do something for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy gold and do business largely within the Empire.” Lord Cherwell pooh poohed this idea of the Prime Minister’s.
Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury’s program and to side with Churchill. Admiral Leahy thought the only way to assure peace in the future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly Russia if she behaves herself to “crack down” on any country which stepped over the boundary line of any other country.
The President said very little in reply to Churchill’s views. Secretary Morgenthau several times interjected into Churchill’s comments that his program did not recommend that Germany be permitted to starve as seemed to be the implication in Churchill’s remark.
At another point when discussing the need for an international police air force Churchill said that the United States, United Kingdom and Russia would have to rotate the job “as our air people get dirty when they associate with the Russians.”
At one point in the discussion Churchill said to the President: “Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?”
The conversation then got on to India and stayed on India for about an hour. Churchill talked rather angrily at length about the difficulties the British were confronted with in administering India and on the lack of understanding in the United States about the Indian problem. He spoke of the high birth rate, the high death rate, the ignorance and the carelessness of the Indian people to poverty, disease, etc. Churchill said, “I will give the United States half of India to administer and we will take the other half and we will see who does better with each other’s half.”
However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Tehran had said: “Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.”
Lord Cherwell seemed to be in sympathy with the Secretary’s point of view. Later when talking it over with him he said that he didn’t think that Churchill at all got the major point the Secretary was trying to make. The Secretary asked him if he didn’t think the real difficulty with Churchill was that he wanted a strong Germany to stand between “the white cliffs of Dover” and Communist Russia. Cherwell agreed that that was it. Lord Leathers of the Shipping Board apparently disagreed with the Secretary’s point of view.
On leaving, Lord Cherwell said that he expected to talk with the Secretary about lend-lease assistance for the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Secretary told him that he had been asked by the President to come to talk about Germany but after [that?] he would be glad to discuss lend-lease aid the following morning after they had had their conversation about Germany.
The Secretary had an opportunity to tell the President that he believed the Russians were holding back on their cooperation with the United States because they were suspicious of the American and British attitude toward Germany. Russia feared we and the British were going to try to make a soft peace with Germany and build her up as a possible future counterweight against Russia. The President replied, You are right, and I want you to read a telegram I just received from Harriman.” Admiral Leahy later gave the Secretary the telegram which Harriman sent to Harry Hopkins urging the President to call him (Harriman) home to report on the trend in Russia on non-cooperation with the United States.
Log of the President’s Visit to Canada
Wednesday, September 13
At 11:45 a.m., the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, Captain E. D. Graves, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, General Ismay, Major General Hollis, Major General Lay cock) came to the Citadel for a plenary meeting with the President and Prime Minister Churchill. The President’s Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, was also in attendance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported the results of their conferences to date and their schedule for further meetings. The President and the Prime Minister made informal comments about some of the decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs and outlined various measures that they wished to have studied and made the subject of further reports.
The President and Prime Minister Churchill lunched together at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill had lunch at Spencerwood as guests of Lady Fiset.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. and Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Construction Corps, USN (Retired), Chairman of the War Shipping Administration, arrived in Quebec during the afternoon. Admiral Land was accompanied by Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Mr. John Maclay, Mr. Granville Conway and Mr. Richard Bissen [Bissell?]. Secretary Morgenthau was accompanied by Mr. Harry D. White. The President conferred with Secretary Morgenthau at length after his arrival.
The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully and Miss Thompson had tea together in the President’s quarters at 5:00 p.m.
At 7:00 p.m., speaking from the Chateau Frontenac, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill made a broadcast to the people of Canada.
8:00 p.m.: Dinner at the Citadel – The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cherwell, Lord Moran, Lord Leathers, Admiral Land, Admiral Leahy, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral Mclntire. Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 p.m. The President retired shortly afterwards.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King held a reception at the Chateau Frontenac this evening for members of the Conference delegations. Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, the Lieutenant-Governor and Lady Fiset were also in the receiving line.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State
Twenty-first Day, Wednesday, September 13, 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meeting with Mr. Hull
As soon as the Joint Steering Committee ended, I immediately went to Mr. Hull’s office to report to him the serious development of the morning. He immediately grasped the great significance of it and took it very well. He thinks we should take our American group into our confidence on the question and direct our efforts toward trying to save the document by some formula which would result in this question being referred to the general conference where the pressure on the Soviets might be so great that they would have to change their position. He suggested a recess for the Chinese discussions but I explained that the Soviets were also adamant on that. He suggested that we try to handle the question by stating very general principles only.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Talk with Ambassador Gromyko
I called Gromyko on the phone about 4:30 and suggested to him that the Formulations Group get together immediately to try to find some solution to the voting question problem. He agreed to send Sobolev to such a meeting.
The Formulations Group convened promptly and continued in session for several hours. They worked out an informal compromise solution which would allow a great power a veto in case of enforcement action but not in the pacific settlement of disputes. The representatives of all three countries in the Formulations Group seemed to feel that this formula was satisfactory.
Miscellany
During the day I addressed a memorandum to the Secretary asking for definite instructions with regard to the provision with respect to a qualification for non-permanent members for the Council, which the British are fighting for so strongly. The provision is “due regard being paid to the contribution of members of the organization toward the maintenance of international peace and security and toward the other purposes of the organization.”
It was interesting to receive a cable from Harriman saying that the British colleague in Moscow had not received instructions to see Molotov relative to attempting to persuade him to have the Soviets reverse their position on voting. Cadogan had told me several times that such instructions would be sent to Clark Kerr. Apparently, the Foreign Office in London has not acted on his recommendation.
500.CC/9–1744
Compromise proposal drafted by the Formulation Group
Washington, September 13, 1944
Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions with respect to the following matters should be taken by ___________ majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:
a. All decisions coming under Section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”
b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.
c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.
d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.
Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by ______ majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.
All other decisions should be taken by ________ majority vote.
Völkischer Beobachter (September 14, 1944)
Der Verlauf der Kämpfe in Belgien –
Entscheiden wird die letzte Schlacht
‚Ein Wille mehr und das Unheil ist gebannt!‘
…
USA muss den Gürtel enger schnallen
Von unserem Berichterstatter in Portugal
b. Lissabon, 13. September –
In einem Kommentar zu den vielfachen Problemen, womit sich Roosevelt und Churchill erneut in Quebec befassen müssen, meint der Korrespondent Lewis Sebring von der New York Herald Tribune, große Teile des nordamerikanischen Volkes lebten in der Vorstellung, daß der Krieg weit eher zu Ende gehe, als es wirklich der Fall sein werde.
Aber nur militärische Schein Autoritäten wagten ein Kriegsende in Europa noch in diesem Jahr Voraussagen. (Churchill wollte bekanntlich nach seiner im Juni auf der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in London gemachten Prophezeiung schon Mitte Oktober als Sieger in Berlin einziehen. Schriftleitung.) Er, Sebring, sei kein militärischer Fachmann, aber er habe persönlich das Urteil eines hohen nordamerikanischen Generalstabsoffiziers gehört. Es lautete: Wenn die Alliierten den Krieg in Europa 1944 nicht siegreich beenden können, wird eine neue Lage entstehen, deren Entwicklung und Ende nicht vorauszusagen ist.
In diesem Urteil spiegelt sich die Überlegung wider, daß der nordamerikanisch-englische Angriff auf die normannische Küste und die nachfolgende Frankreichoffensive mit einem Materialvorrat unternommen wurden, der das Ergebnis einer mehr als zweijährigen Produktion der anglo-amerikanischen Rüstungsindustrie darstellt. Wenn trotz dieser zeitweiligen Überlegenheit an Waffen die Entscheidung gegen Deutschland nicht erzwungen werden kann, so entsteht logischerweise eine neue Situation für die Alliierten, weil nach dem Verbrauch ihrer angesammelten Mengen an Panzern, Flugzeugen, Kanonen, Tanks, Waffen, Treibstoff und dem Ausfall ihrer besten Kampfdivisionen die Initiative automatisch an Deutschland fallen muß, das in der Zeit der feindlichen Offensive seinerseits alles für einen eigenen Angriff vorbereitet.
Damit ist eines der Konferenzprobleme von Quebec gegeben.
Wie wir zuverlässig erfahren, ist sowohl Roosevelt als auch Churchill von dem Ergebnis der Frankreichoffensive weder militärisch noch politisch befriedigt. Die deutsche Absetzstrategie verhinderte die vorgesehene Vernichtung der im Westen kämpfenden deutschen Divisionen, wodurch die Zeittafel von Teheran mit ihrem Schlussstück in Zeitnot gerät. Wenn sich im Oktober herausstellt, daß das Teheran-Schema nicht aufgeht, muß ein neuer Plan an seine Stelle gesetzt werden. Deshalb ist auch vorgesehen, die Beschlüsse Roosevelts und Churchills über den europäischen Krieg im Anschluss an Quebec genau wie 1943 auf einer neuen Konferenz mit Stalin zu besprechen.
Daraus geht hervor, daß gewisse Informationen aus London und Washington nicht zutreffen können, daß in Quebec lediglich die Zukunft des Pazifikkrieges erörtert werden soll. Es läge keine Veranlassung vor, darüber mit Stalin zu konferieren, weil die Sowjetunion theoretisch in diesem Kriege lediglich interessierter Zuschauer ist. In Bezug auf den Pazifikkrieg erinnert Sebring, der dort zweieinhalb Jahre als Kriegskorrespondent für die New York Herald Tribune tätig war, an folgende Zeitspannen:
Nach dem japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbour brauchten die Nordamerikaner acht Monate, um ihrerseits mit ihrer ersten Marinedivision Guadalcanal angreifen zu können. Seitdem sind mehr als zwei Jahre vergangen, während denen weitere Vorstöße der Nordamerikaner stattfanden. Trotzdem, so meint der nordamerikanische Journalist weiter, ständen die US-Truppen immer noch an den äußersten Rändern des japanischen Reichs. Eine Entscheidung im pazifischen Krieg könne nur nach Rückeroberung von Niederländisch-Indien und nach dem Eindringen in das japanische Mutterland selbst errungen werden. Der Aufbau einer Streitmacht für diese ungeheure Aufgabe bedinge Zeit. Die offizielle Meinung im Hauptquartier des Admirals Leahy Und des Generals MacArthur gehe dahin, daß dafür mindestens ein Jahr notwendig ist.
Sebring, der Einblick in die Planungen der beiden genannten US-Kommandeure hat, schreibt: „Niemand, der nicht persönlich mit den Plänen für eine pazifische Offensive vertraut ist, kann sich eine Vorstellung von den hinter der Bühne vorgehenden Dingen machen. Die Vorbereitungen für den europäischen Feldzug dauerten zwei Jahre, und der Pazifik ist ein noch schwierigeres Gebiet, weil größere Entfernungen in Rechnung gestellt werden müssen. Wir werden weiter japanische Außenposten angreifen und dabei kleine Erfolge erzielen die von schreienden Schlagzeilen in den Zeitungen, begeisterten Radiokommentaren und einem gefährlichen Überoptimismus begleitet werden. Aber ich selbst habe strategische Pläne gesehen, an deren Spitze das Jahr 1946 stand, und ich zweifle keinen Augenblick daran, daß es weitere Pläne gibt, die mit der Jahreszahl 1947 beginnen.
Die Nachschübe, die für eine große Offensive im Pazifik nötig sind, gehen über alles hinaus, was sich die Amerikaner zu Hause vorstellen. Der Aufbau einer solchen Offensive wird das ganze Jahr 1945 beanspruchen. Vielleicht können wir Ende 1945 oder Anfang 1946 einige ernsthafte Angriffe beginnen. Aber niemand, der die Tatsachen kennt und sich die Mühe macht, über sie nachzudenken, kann optimistisch in Bezug auf das Kriegsende sein. Amerika muß seinen Gürtel noch beträchtlich enger schnallen, ehe dieses Ende in Sicht ist.