Völkischer Beobachter (September 14, 1944)
Der Verlauf der Kämpfe in Belgien –
Entscheiden wird die letzte Schlacht
‚Ein Wille mehr und das Unheil ist gebannt!‘
…
Der Verlauf der Kämpfe in Belgien –
USA muss den Gürtel enger schnallen
Von unserem Berichterstatter in Portugal
b. Lissabon, 13. September –
In einem Kommentar zu den vielfachen Problemen, womit sich Roosevelt und Churchill erneut in Quebec befassen müssen, meint der Korrespondent Lewis Sebring von der New York Herald Tribune, große Teile des nordamerikanischen Volkes lebten in der Vorstellung, daß der Krieg weit eher zu Ende gehe, als es wirklich der Fall sein werde.
Aber nur militärische Schein Autoritäten wagten ein Kriegsende in Europa noch in diesem Jahr Voraussagen. (Churchill wollte bekanntlich nach seiner im Juni auf der amerikanischen Gesandtschaft in London gemachten Prophezeiung schon Mitte Oktober als Sieger in Berlin einziehen. Schriftleitung.) Er, Sebring, sei kein militärischer Fachmann, aber er habe persönlich das Urteil eines hohen nordamerikanischen Generalstabsoffiziers gehört. Es lautete: Wenn die Alliierten den Krieg in Europa 1944 nicht siegreich beenden können, wird eine neue Lage entstehen, deren Entwicklung und Ende nicht vorauszusagen ist.
In diesem Urteil spiegelt sich die Überlegung wider, daß der nordamerikanisch-englische Angriff auf die normannische Küste und die nachfolgende Frankreichoffensive mit einem Materialvorrat unternommen wurden, der das Ergebnis einer mehr als zweijährigen Produktion der anglo-amerikanischen Rüstungsindustrie darstellt. Wenn trotz dieser zeitweiligen Überlegenheit an Waffen die Entscheidung gegen Deutschland nicht erzwungen werden kann, so entsteht logischerweise eine neue Situation für die Alliierten, weil nach dem Verbrauch ihrer angesammelten Mengen an Panzern, Flugzeugen, Kanonen, Tanks, Waffen, Treibstoff und dem Ausfall ihrer besten Kampfdivisionen die Initiative automatisch an Deutschland fallen muß, das in der Zeit der feindlichen Offensive seinerseits alles für einen eigenen Angriff vorbereitet.
Damit ist eines der Konferenzprobleme von Quebec gegeben.
Wie wir zuverlässig erfahren, ist sowohl Roosevelt als auch Churchill von dem Ergebnis der Frankreichoffensive weder militärisch noch politisch befriedigt. Die deutsche Absetzstrategie verhinderte die vorgesehene Vernichtung der im Westen kämpfenden deutschen Divisionen, wodurch die Zeittafel von Teheran mit ihrem Schlussstück in Zeitnot gerät. Wenn sich im Oktober herausstellt, daß das Teheran-Schema nicht aufgeht, muß ein neuer Plan an seine Stelle gesetzt werden. Deshalb ist auch vorgesehen, die Beschlüsse Roosevelts und Churchills über den europäischen Krieg im Anschluss an Quebec genau wie 1943 auf einer neuen Konferenz mit Stalin zu besprechen.
Daraus geht hervor, daß gewisse Informationen aus London und Washington nicht zutreffen können, daß in Quebec lediglich die Zukunft des Pazifikkrieges erörtert werden soll. Es läge keine Veranlassung vor, darüber mit Stalin zu konferieren, weil die Sowjetunion theoretisch in diesem Kriege lediglich interessierter Zuschauer ist. In Bezug auf den Pazifikkrieg erinnert Sebring, der dort zweieinhalb Jahre als Kriegskorrespondent für die New York Herald Tribune tätig war, an folgende Zeitspannen:
Nach dem japanischen Angriff auf Pearl Harbour brauchten die Nordamerikaner acht Monate, um ihrerseits mit ihrer ersten Marinedivision Guadalcanal angreifen zu können. Seitdem sind mehr als zwei Jahre vergangen, während denen weitere Vorstöße der Nordamerikaner stattfanden. Trotzdem, so meint der nordamerikanische Journalist weiter, ständen die US-Truppen immer noch an den äußersten Rändern des japanischen Reichs. Eine Entscheidung im pazifischen Krieg könne nur nach Rückeroberung von Niederländisch-Indien und nach dem Eindringen in das japanische Mutterland selbst errungen werden. Der Aufbau einer Streitmacht für diese ungeheure Aufgabe bedinge Zeit. Die offizielle Meinung im Hauptquartier des Admirals Leahy Und des Generals MacArthur gehe dahin, daß dafür mindestens ein Jahr notwendig ist.
Sebring, der Einblick in die Planungen der beiden genannten US-Kommandeure hat, schreibt: „Niemand, der nicht persönlich mit den Plänen für eine pazifische Offensive vertraut ist, kann sich eine Vorstellung von den hinter der Bühne vorgehenden Dingen machen. Die Vorbereitungen für den europäischen Feldzug dauerten zwei Jahre, und der Pazifik ist ein noch schwierigeres Gebiet, weil größere Entfernungen in Rechnung gestellt werden müssen. Wir werden weiter japanische Außenposten angreifen und dabei kleine Erfolge erzielen die von schreienden Schlagzeilen in den Zeitungen, begeisterten Radiokommentaren und einem gefährlichen Überoptimismus begleitet werden. Aber ich selbst habe strategische Pläne gesehen, an deren Spitze das Jahr 1946 stand, und ich zweifle keinen Augenblick daran, daß es weitere Pläne gibt, die mit der Jahreszahl 1947 beginnen.
Die Nachschübe, die für eine große Offensive im Pazifik nötig sind, gehen über alles hinaus, was sich die Amerikaner zu Hause vorstellen. Der Aufbau einer solchen Offensive wird das ganze Jahr 1945 beanspruchen. Vielleicht können wir Ende 1945 oder Anfang 1946 einige ernsthafte Angriffe beginnen. Aber niemand, der die Tatsachen kennt und sich die Mühe macht, über sie nachzudenken, kann optimistisch in Bezug auf das Kriegsende sein. Amerika muß seinen Gürtel noch beträchtlich enger schnallen, ehe dieses Ende in Sicht ist.
Begleitmusik zur Quebec-Konferenz –
Getarnter Vernichtungswille
Lissabon, 13. September –
Angesichts der wachsenden Erkenntnis in England und den USA, daß Deutschland nicht zu überrennen ist, mehren sich die Zeichen eines großangelegten Versuchs, sich ähnlich wie 1918 den Sieg auf betrügerische Weise zu erschleichen. Einzelne Publizisten, wie jetzt der britische Wirtschaftler Sir Walter Leyton im News Chronicle, entfernen sich deshalb von den Hasstiraden eines Vansittart, um mit sanfteren Tönen das deutsche Volk ins Verderben zu locken. Aber nur der Ton ist milder, in der Sache bleibt das Ziel Deutschlands Vernichtung.
Nach den Erfahrungen mit dem Wilson-Betrug von 1918 gibt es allerdings wohl kaum einen Menschen in Deutschland, der nicht sogleich sieht, welches Spiel in Wirklichkeit von unseren Feinden auch dann getrieben wird, wenn man sich befleißigt, den Ton zu mäßigen. Begleitmusik zur Quebec-Konferenz!
Führer HQ (September 14, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Im Westen brachten unsere Truppen südlich Dünkirchen sowie nördlich Brügge und Gent britische Angriffe zum Scheitern. Feindliche Brückenköpfe über den Albert- und Maas-Schelde-Kanal wurden im Gegenangriff beseitigt oder weiter eingeengt. Zwischen Maastricht und der Reichsgrenze im Raum von Eupen leisten unsere Truppen dem nordamerikanischen Großangriff erbitterten Widerstand. Ein aus Aachen hinaus nach Südwesten geführter Gegenangriff warf den Feind wieder zurück. Bei diesen Kämpfen wurde eine größere Anzahl feindlicher Panzer und Sturmgeschütze abgeschossen.
Auch in Nord Luxemburg und im Nordteil des Brückenkopfes von Metz verliefen eigene Gegenangriffe erfolgreich. Beiderseits Nancy ist der Feind mit stärkeren Kräften über die Mosel im Vordringen nach Osten. Südöstlich Nancy wurde er an der Meurthe und am Südrand von Lunéville abgefangen.
Die von allen Seiten angegriffene Besatzung von Neufchâteau hat sich den Weg nach Osten im Angriff wieder freigekämpft. Die Stadt selbst wurde dem Feind überlassen, der auch südwestlich Mirecourt weiter vordringt. Unsere Sicherungskräfte wichen im Raum südöstlich Langres bis zum oberen Doubs langsam vor starkem feindlichem Druck nach Norden aus. Bei den harten Kämpfen um Vesoul waren die Verluste der 7. amerikanischen Armee besonders schwer.
Der erbitterte Abwehrkampf unserer Stützpunkte und befestigten Häfen an der Kanal- und Atlantikküste geht weiter. Die Besatzungen von Calais und Boulogne wiesen mehrere feindliche Angriffe blutig ab. Im Festungsbereich von Brest kämpfen die massierten Artilleriefeuer und rollenden Luftangriffen ausgesetzten Verteidiger, vorbildlich auch durch Heeresartillerie unterstützt, weiter in unerschütterter Pflichterfüllung. Sie wiesen im Westabschnitt mehrere Angriffe in sofortigem Gegenstoß ab. Die Besatzung unserer Stützpunkte an der Girondmündung warf angreifenden Feind unter erheblichen Verlusten für ihn wieder zurück.
In Italien scheiterten nördlich Lucca und Pistoia feindliche Vorstöße ebenso wie starke, von Schlachtfliegern unterstützte Angriffe gegen unsere Truppen nordöstlich Florenz. Im Ostteil der Front dehnte der Feind seine Großangriffe auf weitere Abschnitte aus. Trotz starker Artillerie- und Schlachtfliegerunterstützung blieben sie fast überall in unserem Abwehrfeuer liegen. Kleine Einbrüche wurden abgeriegelt.
Im Südteil von Siebenbürgen wiesen deutsche und ungarische Truppen Angriffe der Sowjets und rumänischer Einheiten ab. Zur Verkürzung der Front wurde der Südteil des Szekler Zipfels planmäßig und vom Feind ungehindert geräumt.
In den Einbruchsstellen bei Sanok und Krosno trat unsere Abwehr den fortgesetzt angreifenden Sowjets weiter erfolgreich entgegen.
Östlich Warschau stieß der Feind aus seiner Einbruchsstelle nach Praga hinein, wo erbitterte Straßenkämpfe entbrannten. Nordöstlich Praga wehrten Truppen der Waffen-SS und ungarische Verbände sämtliche Angriffe der Bolschewisten erfolgreich ab und vernichteten 45 Panzer. Nordwestlich Lomscha sind harte Kämpfe um einen eigenen Narewbrückenkopf im Gange.
In Estland scheiterten südlich des Wirzsees zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe unter hohen blutigen Verlusten für die Sowjets.
In Finnland versuchte der Feind auch gestern wieder, unsere Absetzbewegungen zu hemmen. Er wurde durch Gegenangriffe zurückgeworfen.
Feindliche Bomber- und Jagdfliegerverbände griffen gestern Westen und Süden des Reiches bis nach Mitteldeutschland hinein an. Terrorangriffe richteten sich vor allem gegen die Städte Stuttgart, Darmstadt, Osnabrück und Auschwitz. In der Nacht warfen einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge Bomben auf Berlin. Luftverteidigungskräfte vernichteten 81 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, darunter 58 viermotorige Bomber.
In den harten Kämpfen nordöstlich Warschau hat sich die königlich ungarische 1. Kavalleriedivision unter Führung von Generalmajor Ibranyi durch Standfestigkeit und schneidig geführte Gegenstöße besonders ausgezeichnet.
Bei den Kämpfen in den Ostkarpaten haben sich die 5. und die 7. Kompanie des Grenadierregiments 97 unter Führung von Leutnant Lübben und Oberleutnant Erb hervorragend bewährt – Der königlich ungarische Oberleutnant Brambring in einem ungarischen Grenzjägerbataillon hat sich durch besondere Tapferkeit hervorgetan.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 14, 1944)
Communiqué No. 159
On the Channel Coast, mopping-up continues. Allied troops have taken a strongpoint in the vicinity of NIEUPORT-BAINS.
In northeastern BELGIUM we have enlarged our bridgeheads over the ALBERT CANAL at GHEEL and to the southeast more enemy counterattacks against our bridgeheads brought no result. Mopping-up in the area of HECHTEL has been completed and elements have reached the ESCAUT CANAL.
Other Allied troops, after crossing the ALBERT CANAL have pushed on to cross the DUTCH FRONTIER. The frontier has also been crossed further south near MAASTRICHT.
In LUXEMBOURG, our forces have made gains in the area northeast of the capital.
The bridgehead over the MOSELLE River continues to be strengthened in face of heavy enemy resistance and we now hold high ground in one area on the west bank.
In BRITTANY, progress is being made at BREST against stubborn defenses which included small arms, mortars, machine guns and some artillery. A fort about two miles east of the town has been taken. Fighter-bombers supported yesterday’s attack.
Attacks on the SIEGFRIED LINE and against strong points near NANCY and METZ were made yesterday by fighter-bombers. Other fighter-bombers hit rail targets in the NANCY area, destroying and damaging a number of locomotives and railway trucks.
Communications and transportation targets on railways and waterways of HOLLAND were bombed and strafed by medium, light, and fighter-bombers. Hits were scored on the causeway between WALCHEREN and SOUTH BEVELAND. Fortified positions at BOULOGNE were targets for other medium and light bombers.
Coastal aircraft attacked an enemy convoy in the anchorage off DEN HELDER Tuesday night. Five vessels were left on fire and a sixth apparently sinking. Shore installations were also hit. Other formations attacked shipping between the HOOK of HOLLAND and AMELAND. Two coastal aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (September 14, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 116
Carrier aircraft of the Pacific Fleet swept over the Central Philippines and inflicted crippling damage on enemy air forces shipping and ground installations during a three-day strike, September 11 to 13 (West Longitude Date). More complete information shows that the following damage was done to the enemy on Panay, Cebu, Negros and Leyte Islands.
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED: 156 shot down in combat and 277 destroyed on the ground. This is a revision of planes previously announced lost by the enemy in the Central Philippines. As of sundown on September 13, 501 enemy aircraft had been destroyed in the Philippines by our carrier aircraft.
SHIPS SUNK: Two large cargo vessels, one medium transport, two destroyer escorts, 35 small ships.
SHIPS DAMAGED: Five cargo vessels, one medium oiler, 36 small ships, two motor torpedo boats, many sampans. These ship losses are in addition to those previously reported.
DAMAGE TO GROUND INSTALLATIONS: Several airfields were bombed and strafed by our planes. Oil storage facilities, ammunition dumps, warehouses, barracks and buildings were set afire.
Enemy air opposition the first day was considerable and was reinforced during the first night so that its strength on the second day was also formidable. Enemy planes rose to intercept our aircraft, but no attempts were made to attack our surface ships. On the third day, enemy airpower was nonexistent and anti-aircraft fire was meager. Our losses in planes and flight personnel were relatively light.
Carrier aircraft hit enemy positions at Angaur, Peleliu and Ngesebus Islands in the Palau Group on September 12 with 90 tons of bombs and 165 rockets. Damage was inflicted on coastal gun positions, warehouses and a lighthouse at Angaur.
On September 12, Navy search planes of Fleet Air Wing Two, attacked and damaged a large sampan and two large troop laden landing craft near Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands.
Pagan Island was bombed twice on September 12, one attack being made by a Thunderbolt of the 7th Army Air Force, the other by a Liberator. Buildings and gun positions were hit. There was no anti-aircraft fire.
A single Liberator of the 7th Army Air Force bombed buildings on Marcus Island on September 11. The plane which returned was damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Other 7th Army Air Force Liberators bombed Marcus Island on September 12.
Mitchell bombers of the 7th Army Air Force flew through meager anti-aircraft fire to bomb Nauru on September 12.
The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing sent Corsair and Dauntless dive bombers over Wotje on September 11 and again on September 12 to bomb gun positions and communications facilities. Dauntless dive bombers struck at Mille on September 11, hitting bivouac areas. Meager anti-aircraft fire was encountered at both targets.
U.S. State Department (September 14, 1944)
The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt
Moscow, September 14, 1944
[Translation]
I have received your message regarding the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks.
I also hope that these important discussions may end successfully. This may be of serious significance for the further strengthening of cooperation of our countries and for the whole cause of future peace and security.
I must say that for the success of the activities of the International Security Organization, of great significance will be the order of voting in the Council, having in mind the importance that the Council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the Council, who have the statute [status?] of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise, will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Tehran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, the unanimity of agreement of four powers necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future.
Such a unanimity proposes [presupposes?], of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which often hinder an actually objective attitude toward the USSR And the other nations also should weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about.
I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find a harmonious solution of this question as well.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/21
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 14, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-SECOND DAY
Meeting of the Joint Formulation Group
The joint formulation group met this afternoon and made a number of refinements in and additions to the draft proposals as follows:
a) Introductory statement
An introductory statement was added to the effect that an international organization should be created under the title of the United Nations and that its charter should contain provisions to give effect to the proposals.
b) Voting procedure in the assembly and in the Economic and Social Council
The provisions on voting in the assembly and in the Economic and Social Council were amended to read that in either case the vote should be by a majority of those states present and voting. This would apply in the assembly in the case of either a ⅔ majority or a simple majority.
c) Representatives in the assembly
It was agreed to add to the provision concerning the composition of the assembly a statement to the effect that the states members should have “a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.”
d) Disarmament
The British insisted that the word “disarmament” should be placed in brackets wherever it occurs in the draft proposals to indicate that they have not as yet agreed to its use in the document.
e) Availability of air force contingents
Agreement has not as yet been reached to accept either our alternative or the British alternative concerning national air force contingents. However, the British and Russian representatives agreed to our proposal to eliminate an inner bracket in the American alternative and to alter the statement to read that “the strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to above.”
f) Transitional arrangements
It was agreed that the present section of Chapter VIII relating to Interim Arrangements should become a new Chapter XII to be designated Transitional Arrangements but should for the time being remain in brackets.
g) Non-intervention in domestic matters
With reference to the present bracketed paragraph of the chapter on Principles which states that the organization should refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of any state, the British proposed the addition of a new paragraph to the section on Pacific Settlement to the effect that the present provisions of this section should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. Both the Soviet and the American representatives regarded this addition favorably but reserved their positions on it pending consideration.
Meeting of the American Group
The American group, at its regular 9:30 meeting, considered the tentative proposal on voting in the council formulated on Wednesday. Suggested modifications by individual members will be considered on Monday.
Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 10:00 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Mr. White | Mr. MacDougall |
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant
[Undated]
This was the meeting which the President had suggested the Secretary have with Lord Cherwell. Lord Cherwell had asked to bring along Mr. MacDougall.
The Secretary asked Cherwell which of the two subjects before them for discussion would he like to take up first. Cherwell replied that he would like to take up the lend-lease program first since he thought that would be simpler to dispose of than the question of policy toward Germany. Cherwell went into some detail on the need for getting to work quickly on a lend-lease program for England during the period after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. He outlined British views of what would be appropriate for England to receive in the way of lend-lease aid. He described England’s need for increasing her exports and relaxing on the home working front. He expressed the view that a cut of 27 percent in our lend-lease to the British Empire would appear reasonable to the British. In general, he repeated the gist of what was in the memorandum of the State Department to the President.
When he got through, the Secretary said that he had heard all that before from the Exchequer and others when he was in England. He then told Cherwell about his conversation with the Exchequer and with the President and said that it was now up to Churchill. If Churchill thought that the idea of forming a committee to handle the whole problem was a good one, it was up to Churchill to suggest it to the President.
The Secretary also said that he didn’t like the approach of determining the amount of lend-lease aid that Britain was to get that Cherwell presented. In his (the Secretary’s) opinion, the question should be approached from the point of view of just how much munitions the British need in the role that they are to play in the Pacific. The Secretary thought that food shipments could be handled all right but he felt that commercial goods could not appropriately go into exports.
In any case, the Secretary stressed the need for its being handled by a joint committee of British and Americans. Cherwell liked the idea of the committee and asked whether the Secretary would head it up. The Secretary replied that he didn’t know; that that was up to the President. The Secretary told Cherwell that the President had given him (Morgenthau) for his comment a memorandum prepared by the State Department and that the President might want somebody from State Department or possibly the Treasury to head up the committee. Cherwell suggested that White and MacDougall attempt to draft a directive setting up such a committee so that if the Prime Minister and the President did agree on the idea, they might get it out then and there. The Secretary agreed.
The Secretary then took up the question of Germany. He handed Cherwell the book on Germany to read and explained that it was compiled on a day’s notice. Cherwell read hurriedly through the first part and expressed skepticism as to whether Organized Labor in the United States would approve a program so drastic in character. Secretary Morgenthau thought that it would. Cherwell commented that he didn’t understand why Churchill had taken so contrary a position on the program the evening before. He (Cherwell) was surprised at Churchill’s attitude and thought possibly that it was due to the fact that Churchill did not wholly understand what the Secretary was driving at.
The Secretary told Cherwell that Secretary Hull was in general agreement with the views expressed by the Treasury and that he was of the opinion that Eden would be likewise. He said that the question came down to a choice of: “Do you want a strong Germany and a weak England or a weak Germany and a strong England?” The Secretary said that he preferred to rely on a strong England and a weak Germany.
Cherwell thought that the proposal could be dressed up in a way to be more attractive to the Prime Minister and the Secretary said that he would be very glad to have Cherwell try it.
After the Secretary and Cherwell left to see the President and Churchill to report on the morning’s conversation, I talked at length with MacDougall on the merits of the Treasury’s proposed program and MacDougall appeared to be in agreement. Later MacDougall, a Mr. Weeks of the British Government, and I met to draft the directive suggested by Cherwell.
When the Secretary returned with Cherwell from the President and the Prime Minister, he reported that both Churchill and the President had liked the idea of creating a committee. They wanted to set up one on an informal and ad hoc basis, to formalize it after the election.
The Secretary told me after the others had gone that when it came to the question of who should be the chairman of the joint committee that Churchill had said, “Plow about Harry Hopkins?” But the President had replied, “No, I want Morgenthau to be chairman.”
H. D. WHITE
The Under Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 14, 1944
Top secret
For immediate personal attention of the President.
Yesterday Ambassador Gromyko notified me and Cadogan that he had received his instructions on the question of voting in the council. He said that his Government maintained its insistence upon the inviolability of the principle of the unanimity of the four great powers. He said that he had made a number of other concessions but that there was no possibility of his being authorized to give in on this point.
Yesterday afternoon and evening we worked hard with the British and Russians devising a compromise formula which would provide that in all procedures concerning pacific settlement of disputes, the votes of all members of the council parties to such disputes should not be counted but that in procedures concerned with enforcement action decisions by the council must be on the basis of the concurrence of members having permanent seats on the council, including parties to the dispute.
Gromyko is tentatively sounding out his government on this new formula. Mr. Hull is considering the matter carefully. May we have your views as promptly as possible?
All other developments have been reported to you in my daily progress reports.
ES
Under Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, 14 September 1944
Status of French lend lease negotiations on September 14.
The French have been told that the basic question of the scope and time limit of the Lend Lease Agreement has been placed before the President for decision.
The State Department and FEA have agreed on a draft (6th draft, dated September 11) of a lend lease agreement which permits:
a) Long life industrial reconstruction goods to go to the French under long term credits (Section 3c of the Lend Lease Act). This provision permits requisitions to be accepted by FEA until at least the end of the war with Japan and provides that the requisitions once accepted would be filled regardless of the end of the war with Japan. This would obviously enable a large scale program of reconstruction for France. (Monnet has a program ready of $2 billion for which he proposes to have requisitions placed immediately.)
b) The agreement permits giving the French on a straight Lend Lease basis, short-lived industrial goods and materials purportedly for French war production until at least the end of the war with Japan.
Secretary Hull has sent a memorandum to the President through Harry Hopkins pointing out:
a) This draft lend lease agreement goes beyond the July 15 memorandum which the President approved.
b) This memorandum proposes that the possibility of excessive leniency in the administration be controlled by requiring FEA to submit to someone in the White House all programs and proposals for lend lease assistance before requisitions are accepted by FEA.
This memorandum to the President is now before the President at Quebec for his approval. State Department has not given us a copy of this memorandum although the State Department promised to clear this memorandum with us before it went to the President.
As you know the original memorandum which went to the President during the French negotiations on July 15 was designed to limit lend lease to France to the end of hostilities in Europe. Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department have definitely stated that French industrial production will be of no help in fighting the war in Europe and that the help which a reconstructed French industry will give to us in fighting the war with Japan can be “put in your right eye.”
The importance of the phrase which will limit the scope of the program to the end of the war is that the immediate set of requisitions for aid will be much greater in volume under the prospect of a long war against Japan than it would be under the certainty of a short war in Europe.
The argument used to justify broadening the scope of the Lend Lease Agreement is that we should give the fullest discretion possible to the President. This argument has no basis in fact. The President already has all the discretion he needs under the Lend Lease Act. If after the war in Europe comes to an end, the President feels that France is making a contribution to the war in the Pacific or should for other reasons be entitled to reconstruction under Lend Lease, he can enter into a new agreement at that time. The only additional “discretion” gained by signing the agreement, as recommended by State and FEA, and immediately making large supply commitments thereunder, is to present Congress and the public with a fait accompli when the war in Europe is over. If the Congress should cut off Lend Lease following the end of hostilities in Europe, any attempt to rely on large requisitions placed under a previously existing agreement with the French (having no relation to the war in Europe) as permitting the reconstruction of France would be politically impossible and highly undesirable.
As we see it, the broadened scope of the memorandum will have the following effects:
a) Since the French have already been presented with a memorandum limiting the scope of lend lease to hostilities in Europe, the change to permit lend lease at least until the end of the war with Japan will obviously lead the French to believe that the President has agreed to a reconstruction program for France. This is particularly true in the light of informal commitments which have been made to the French by various people in FEA and State to this effect. It follows that this will be construed by the French as being a major political victory arising from their strategy of playing one department of the United States Government against another on financial questions.
b) Although the program being presented to the President provides for approval by the White House of the implementation of this agreement, it is obvious that the White House is not and should not be placed in a position to police detailed supply programs. The door will be wide open for reconstructing France under the Lend Lease Act without understandings as to the role of France in the future of Europe and of the world, and particularly of French participation in the war against Japan.
In conclusion, quite contrary to the avowed purpose of the proposal to give discretion to the President, its practical effect will be to tie his hands with respect to our dealings with the French at the termination of the war in Europe much more than would otherwise be the case.
DAN BELL
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 14, 1944
My Dear Friend, I understand that we are meeting at 11:30 about Stage 2. Dick Law arrived here late last night, and I wonder whether I might bring him at 11 o’clock with or without Anthony, to discuss the application of UNRRA to Italy. He tells me that a compromise proposal would get through whereby 50 million dollars of UNRRA would be available for Italy. I consider this should be an essential part of our friendly gesture to Italy.
If agreeable then, I will turn up at 11.
Yours always,
W
740.0011 EW/9–1444: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, September 14, 1944
Secret
US urgent
niact
7558
Personal for the Secretary.
Eden left last night for Quebec Conference by air. I understand he is going more in his capacity as unofficial Deputy Defense Minister than as Foreign Secretary.
WINANT
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Handy | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 14, 1944, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 173rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 173rd Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was approved, subject to later minor amendments.
Control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/4)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:** Approved the directive in CCS 520/4 as amended in CCS 520/5 (Amended directive circulated as CCS 520/6).
British participation in the Pacific (CCS 452/26 and 452/27)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were disturbed by the statement of the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/27 with regard to British participation in the war against Japan. He realized that this paper had been written before the Plenary session on the previous day. He felt that it did not entirely coincide with the proposal put forward at that conference and accepted by the President. For political reasons it was essential that the British Fleet should take part in the main operations against Japan.
Admiral Leahy asked if Sir Alan Brooke’s point would be met by the elimination of the words, “They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific.” It might be that the British Fleet would be used initially in the Bay of Bengal and thereafter as required by the existing situation.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the main fleet would not be required in the Bay of Bengal since there were already more British forces there than required. He agreed to the deletion proposed by Admiral Leahy.
Admiral King also agreed to the deletion of these words which he felt were not relevant to the general case.
Continuing, Sir Andrew Cunningham asked the U.S. views as to the meaning of the term “balanced forces” in the final sentence of paragraph 1 of CCS 452/27. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind a force of some 4 battleships, 5 to 6 large carriers, 20 light fleet carriers and CVEs and the appropriate number of cruisers and destroyers. This he would regard as a balanced force.
Admiral King stressed that it was essential for these forces to be self-supporting.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that if these forces had their fleet train, they could operate unassisted for several months provided they had the necessary rear bases – probably in Australia. The provision of bases would be a matter for agreement.
Admiral King said that the practicability of employing these forces would be a matter for discussion from time to time.
Admiral Leahy said that he did not feel that the question for discussion was the practicability of employment but rather the matter of where they should be employed from time to time.
Sir Andrew Cunningham referred to the Prime Minister’s statement that he wished the British Fleet to take part in the main operations in the Pacific. Decision with regard to this was necessary since many preliminary preparations had to be made.
Admiral King suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should put forward proposals with regard to the employment of the British Fleet.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British wish was that they should be employed in the Central Pacific.
Admiral King said that at the Plenary meeting no specific reference to the Central Pacific had been made.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the emphasis had been laid on the use of the British Fleet in the main effort against Japan.
Admiral Leahy said that as he saw it the main effort was at present from New Guinea to the Philippines and it would later move to the northward.
Admiral King said that he was in no position now to commit himself as to where the British Fleet could be employed.
Sir Charles Portal reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the original offer made by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/18, paragraph 9, which read:
It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty’s Government’s policy, that this fleet should, play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest naval strength is required.
When the British Chiefs of Staff spoke of the main operations against Japan they did not intend to confine this meaning to Japan itself geographically but meant rather that the fleet should take part in the main operations within the theater of war wherever they might be taking place.
Sir Andrew Cunningham stressed that the British Chiefs of Staff did not wish the British Fleet merely to take part in mopping up operations in areas falling into our hands.
Admiral Leahy said that he felt that the actual operations in which the British Fleet would take part would have to be decided in the future. It might well be that the fleet would be required for the conquest of Singapore, which he would regard as a major operation.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered paragraph 2 of CCS 452/27 referring to the use of a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.
Sir Charles Portal said that the Prime Minister had offered the British Fleet for use in the main operations against Japan. By implication this paragraph accepted a naval task force for the Southwest Pacific, and was therefore contrary to the intention he had expressed.
Admiral King said that it was of course essential to have sufficient forces for the war against Japan. He was not, however, prepared to accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support. In principle he wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific but it would be entirely unacceptable for the British main fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific and thus necessitate withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet.
Sir Charles Portal reminded Admiral King that the Prime Minister had suggested that certain of the newer British capital ships should be substituted for certain of the older U.S. ships.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that as he understood it the Prime Minister and President were in agreement that it was essential for British forces to take a leading part in the main operations against Japan.
Admiral King said that it was not his recollection that the President had agreed to this. He could not accept that a view expressed by the Prime Minister should be regarded as a directive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Charles Portal said that the Prime Minister felt it essential that it should be placed on record that he wished the British Fleet to play a major role in the operations against Japan.
Sir Alan Brooke said that, as he remembered it, the offer was no sooner made than accepted by the President.
Admiral King asked for specific British proposals.
Sir Charles Portal referred once more to the offer made in CCS 452/18 which he had had previously quoted.
Admiral Leahy said that he could see no objection whatever to this proposal. He could not say exactly where the fleet could be employed at this moment but there would be ample opportunity for its use provided it was self-supporting.
Admiral King said that the question of the British proposal for the use [of] the main fleet would have to be referred to the President before it could be accepted.
Admiral Leahy said that if Admiral King saw any objections to this proposal he should take the matter up himself with the President. It might not be wise to use the term “main fleet.”
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the British Fleet had been offered by the Prime Minister and the President had accepted it. He was prepared to agree to the deletion of the word “main” from paragraph 1 of CCS 452/27.
Admiral King said that the Prime Minister had also referred to the use of British airpower in the Pacific.
General Arnold said that a definite answer with regard to British air help in the war against Japan could not be given now. The amount which could be absorbed would depend on the development of suitable facilities.
Sir Charles Portal said that it was, of course, impossible to be definite at the moment since the forces available would depend on the length of the war with Germany. What he would ask for was air facilities available in the bases in the Pacific so that the British could play their part. He would put forward a proposal for consideration.
General Marshall said that the best method would be a statement of numbers of aircraft and dates at which they would be available.
General Arnold agreed that this would be preferable.
Referring to paragraph 2 of CCS 452/27, Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that this paragraph dealt with the formation of a British Empire task force which was the second alternative put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff if for any reason the support of the British Fleet in the main operations could not be accepted. Since this support had been accepted there would be no British naval forces available for the task force and British land forces could only arrive at a later date. He suggested therefore that this paragraph should be deleted.
Admiral King asked if it was intended to use the British Fleet only in the main operations and to make no contribution to a task force in the Southwest Pacific.
General Marshall said there were certain objections to forming a British Empire task force under General MacArthur’s command at the present time. This had been proposed by General Blarney but if it were carried out between now and February of next year it would cause considerable difficulties from the point of view of land forces since the grouping of formations and the sequence of their movement had already been scheduled in accordance with future operations. The position would be different after March.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that since British land forces would not be available until after Operation Dracula it would be of no particular value to form a British task force now. The British Fleet could of course play a part in operations in the Southwest Pacific if they were required.
Sir Andrew Cunningham confirmed that there would be no objection to the British Fleet working from time to time under General MacArthur’s command.
General Marshall requested that, in order to safeguard his position with regard to the immediate formation of a task force, paragraph 2 of CCS 452/27 be deleted.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed. General MacArthur’s plans had already been made and since no British land contribution could at present be made there was no object in retaining this paragraph.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific.
b. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that this fleet would be balanced and self-supporting.
c. Agreed that the method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific would be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.
d. Took note that in the light of a above, the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw their alternative proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.
e. Invited the Chief of the Air Staff to put forward, for planning purposes, a paper containing an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force would be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.
Future operations in Southeast Asia (CCS 452/28 and 452/29) (OCTAGON–in–9)
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the situation report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (OCTAGON–in–9 of 8 September) should be noted.
Admiral Leahy agreed.
Sir Alan Brooke then suggested that before considering the draft directive to Admiral Mountbatten contained in CCS 452/28, he should briefly outline the British views with regard to future operations in Burma. It was the British intention to endeavor to carry out operations aimed at liquidating the Burma commitment as soon as possible. This commitment was a heavy one, particularly with regard to casualties from sickness and the large numbers of men required in view of the long and tenuous lines of communication. For instance, an ordinary division amounted to some 40,000 men, whereas one particular division in Southeast Asia required approximately 90,000. The reconquest of Burma would also eliminate the commitments for the protection of the northeast frontier of India and the air route to China.
With these objects in view, operations against Rangoon had been examined. A seaborne amphibious operation was extremely difficult due to the fact that Rangoon lay some way up a river and the surrounding terrain was extremely marshy. An airborne assault had therefore been considered. By the use of airborne forces it was thought that the airfields to the north of Rangoon could be seized and that formations could then be flown in. These formations would seize the area to the north of Rangoon, then open up the river communications through Rangoon, block the Pegu route and then eliminate the Japanese in Burma by operations both from the south and from the north. If this could be achieved we should be in far better position. Forces could be released from the theater and the protection of India would be simplified.
To sum up, we should eliminate the Burma commitment, secure the air route to China, and possibly at a later date a land route, and obtain jumping-off places for further operations against Bangkok or to the Kra Peninsula and from there to Singapore.
Admiral Mountbatten had prepared a plan. This, however, had entailed removing forces from north Burma, which was felt to be unacceptable. The possibility therefore of obtaining forces from Europe had been examined. It was estimated that a decision to remove these forces would have to be taken by the first of October and that they would include the 6th Airborne Division, the 52nd Division, and the 3rd Division, from northwest Europe and three Indian divisions from Italy. There were certain difficulties with regard to this plan. The Indian troops who had been fighting for five years would have to be taken home and given three weeks’ leave. This would take some time since many of them lived in extremely inaccessible parts of India, entailing in some cases a journey of a month each way to their homes. Further, India’s capacity to absorb personnel was limited and had been estimated at 50,000 a month, though it was believed that this could, in certain instances, be raised to 80,000 a month. If forces were brought to India, it was estimated that two months must elapse between their arrival and the period when they would be ready to start. Every effort was being made to try and cut the time factor in this jigsaw puzzle, but there was no doubt that the moves ought to begin in October if the 15th of March was taken as the date for Operation DRACULA. It might be possible to postpone this date until the 1st of April, the limiting factor being the weather conditions in April rendering the airdromes north of Rangoon unserviceable.
Another possibility might be to undertake the operation with fewer forces. However, if the operation was launched and Japanese resistance was extremely strong, we should find ourselves in a difficult position since the nearest reserves would be in northwest Europe or Italy. It was felt therefore that if the operation was to be undertaken it must be undertaken with an adequate margin of strength. Operations in Europe did not permit of reaching a decision at the present time with regard to the removal of the necessary forces, i.e., three divisions from Italy and three divisions from northwest Europe. Further, there was the question of the administrative troops which would be required, particularly signal and movement personnel. These were of the utmost importance to the 21st Army Group and to General Alexander if his army advanced towards the Po. The situation was such therefore that we could not at present gamble by removing these troops. Every effort was being made to reduce the estimated time from the removal of the troops from Europe till the launching of the operation in order that a decision could be postponed and yet the operation be undertaken in the spring. Such a decision with regard to withdrawal of troops from Europe might be possible in a month’s time. There were also the complications of the regulations now being instituted with regard to conditions of service for the war against Japan, the giving of leave before troops who had been fighting for many years were sent to a new theater, and the question of the release of men who had over five years of war service. Every conceivable effort was being made to find the necessary forces to carry out DRACULA in the spring. If it were carried out, then Admiral Mountbatten’s advance in the north would be limited, whereas if the operation was postponed till November, he could fight his way much further south.
Sir Charles Portal said that the air transport side of the problem was all-important. At present Admiral Mountbatten had 448 transport aircraft, and required 1200 for the Rangoon operation. Only 190 of the additional 752 required could be found from British sources, and these only from operations in Europe. The remainder would have to be provided by the United States either from Europe or from elsewhere if they were available.
At present Admiral Mountbatten had two combat cargo groups and wished to obtain the third combat cargo group by the 15th of October in order to undertake Operation CAPITAL. Further, he also required the ground echelon of the second group by that date. If Operation DRACULA were undertaken, he would require the fourth combat cargo group by mid-January and the ground echelon of the third at the same time.
General Arnold said that even if the fourth combat cargo group were made available to Admiral Mountbatten, he would not have enough aircraft for Operation DRACULA, and it would be necessary to divert further air forces to assist him.
Sir Charles Portal said that he noticed in CCS 452/29 that the United States Chiefs of Staff were allocating the fourth combat cargo group to the Southwest Pacific. He asked that if Operation DRACULA was approved, the effect of this proposal should be examined.
General Marshall pointed out that this fourth combat cargo group was required for the Philippine operations, but it might be possible to send it back for the peak period of the DRACULA operation if the timings fitted. B-24 aircraft might also be used.
Sir Charles Portal said it was hoped by then to have a suitable staging point.
There was general agreement that the provision of the necessary aircraft would depend on the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.
General Arnold said that if hostilities in Europe had terminated, there would be 2200 U.S. transport aircraft which would become available.
Sir Charles Portal said he felt that the ground echelons for these aircraft would probably have to be taken out of Europe by December.
General Arnold felt that the date might be postponed since a large part of the ground echelons could be flown out in the aircraft. The ground echelon for the second combat cargo group was already on its way to Southeast Asia, and the ground echelon for the third combat cargo group could sail as soon as shipping was available.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then examined the draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in CCS 452/28.
Admiral Leahy put forward certain amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. These included provision in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2a for the opening of land communications with China.
General Marshall said that this was an important factor, and was necessary in order to introduce wheeled transport into China. It might be possible to take the short northern route though this was tortuous and difficult.
General Arnold said that in the last month 23,000 tons of stores had been flown into China but in view of the lack of motor transport certain of these were lying on the airfields and could not be distributed.
Referring to CCS 452/29, Sir Charles Portal asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that the whole feasibility of Operation DRACULA was dependent upon the provision of the necessary aircraft and, further, of the possibility of the transfer of the fourth combat cargo group from operations against the Philippines for a short period at the peak load of Operation DRACULA.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the progress report on operations in the Southeast Asia Command contained in OCTAGON–in–9.
b. Approved the directive in CCS 452/28 as amended during discussion (Amended directive circulated as CCS 452/30).
c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff were making every effort to overcome the problems involved in moving the necessary resources from Europe for DRACULA so that the operation can be carried out before the 1945 monsoon.
d. Recognized that the ability to carry out Operation DRACULA would depend very largely on the provision of transport aircraft, and took note:
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That the ground echelon of the second combat cargo group was already on its way to the Southeast Asia Command.
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That the United States Chiefs of Staff had already assigned the third, combat cargo group to Southeast Asia and that it would go out as soon as shipping was available.
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That the possibility of assigning to Southeast Asia Command the fourth combat cargo group and the remaining transport aircraft required would depend on the progress of operations in Europe and in the Pacific, and that, on the whole, the prospects of making the necessary provision seemed good.
Planning date for the end of the war against Japan (CCS 678)
Admiral Leahy said that the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the proposed date for the end of the war against Japan was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff with certain amendments. It was felt that paragraph 1a should be eliminated, since it was hoped that the redeployment of forces against Japan would not take two years. The United States Chiefs of Staff also felt that 18 months was a more appropriate time factor than two years. A further sentence should be added to paragraph 2, to read: “This date will be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.”
General Marshall said that for demobilization purposes the United States Army were using a time factor of one year. This, of course, would not affect the decision with regard to the date of 18 months after the termination of hostilities with Germany for planning for production.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
Operations of the Twentieth Air Force
General Arnold made the following statement with regard to operations of the Twentieth Air Force:
The Twentieth Air Force is designed around and includes all B-29 airplanes.
The B-29 airplane, which is the basis of the Twentieth Air Force, is a very long range, fast, heavily armed precision day bomber. At maximum combat loading its gross weight is 140,000 pounds at which weight it operates up to 30,000-feet altitudes at a top speed of 370 miles per hour and cruises at 220 miles per hour. During a normal combat mission it burns 450 gallons per hour and at high speed consumes up to 700 gallons per hour. The airplane is operated by a crew of 11 men. A notable feature is the airplane pressurization which results in providing inside pressure equivalent to altitudes of about 8,000 feet when the airplane is actually at 30,000 feet. The most notable feature, however, is probably the central fire control features whereby three centrally located gunners handle, with precision, twelve 50-caliber machine guns and one 20 mm. cannon, all remotely controlled. In spite of its weight, this airplane can be operated from 8500-foot runways at maximum gross loadings and from 7500-foot runways when loaded to 135,000 pounds.
The Twentieth Air Force operates directly under the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is commanded by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who acts as the executive agent of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in implementing their directive for the employment of very long range bomber forces.
Theater commanders in which elements of the Twentieth Air Force are based are responsible for logistic support and defense of Twentieth Air Force bases.
At this time the major units of the Twentieth Air Force are the XX, XXI and XXII Bomber Commands. Each of these Bomber Commands, as a matter of fact, is a complete self-sustaining very long-range air force.
The XX Bomber Command is now based in the Southeast Asia Command in the area just west of Calcutta and operates principally from bases in the vicinity of Chengtu, China, against targets in Japan and Manchuria. It comprises four groups and had in the theater on September 11, 155 B-29s, of which 120 are unit equipment aircraft.
The XXI Bomber Command consists of three wings of four groups each with a total unit equipment strength of 360 B-29 aircraft. Its headquarters, ground echelons and service units, are now moving to the Marianas. All 12 groups will complete their training and move to bases in the Marianas as bases become available.
The XXII Bomber Command, consisting of two 4-group wings, was activated on August 15 and ground echelons will be available for movement to bases in Formosa or Luzon as quickly as they can be made available. The first air echelons of the XXII Bomber Command will be ready to move in March 1945.
The logistic requirements of the XX Bomber Command operating out of China were extremely heavy, and provision of the necessary gasoline had presented a major problem. It had, in fact, been necessary to divert some 20 B-29s to use in the role of tankers; these were now being relieved by B-24 tankers which were now en route.
General Arnold then outlined with the aid of a map the targets that were being brought within range of B-29s operating from the various bases either now available or which it was hoped would shortly be available.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of General Arnold’s statement with respect to the Twentieth Air Force.
Communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
Admiral King suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should prepare for submission to the President and Prime Minister draft communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek dealing with the broad results of the Conference. This had been done on previous occasions.
It was generally agreed that, with regard to the communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, details of Operation DRACULA should not be entered into and that some broad statement should be used to the effect that amphibious operations against Lower Burma would be undertaken at the earliest possible date.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Secretaries to draft suitable messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of OCTAGON.
Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1030 Friday, 15 September.
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 14 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 520/6
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe following the establishment of Allied forces on the continent
| References: | CCS 172nd Meeting, Item 10 |
| CCS 173rd Meeting Item 2 | |
| CCS 174th Meeting Item 2 | |
| CCS 680/2, Paragraph 7 |
The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting approved the directive in CCS 520/4 as amended by CCS 520/5, and the directive as approved (Enclosure) was dispatched to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, by the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, for action and furnished to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, for information.
A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
Enclosure
Top secret
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe – Directive
Subject: CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that executive responsibility for the control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe shall be vested in the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, jointly.
The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, are designated as representatives of the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, respectively, for the purpose of providing control and local coordination through consultation.
The overall mission of the strategic air forces is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and naval forces.
Under this general mission you are to direct your attacks, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, against the systems of objectives and in the order of priority now established by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. When you decide that changes in objectives or priorities are necessary, you will issue the necessary directives and inform the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces.
Objectives other than those covered in paragraph 4 above will be attacked in accordance with the following:
a. Counter air force action. As the result of air action against the production, maintenance and operation facilities of the German Air Forces (GAF), its fighting effectiveness has now been substantially reduced. At the same time our combined air strength has been vastly increased. In these circumstances we are no longer justified in regarding the GAF and its supporting industry as a primary objective for attack. Our major effort must now be focused directly upon the vital sources of Germany’s war economy. To this end policing attacks against the GAF are to be adjusted so as to maintain tactical conditions which will permit of the maximum impact upon the primary objectives. No fixed priority is, therefore, assigned to policing attacks against the GAF. The intensity of such attacks will be regulated by the tactical situation existing.
b. Direct support. The direct support of land and naval operations remains a continuing commitment upon your forces. Upon call from the supreme commanders concerned either for assistance in the battle or to take advantage of related opportunities, you will meet their requirements promptly.
c. Important industrial areas. When weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives attacks should be delivered upon important industrial areas by both Bomber Command RAF and USSTAF (using blind bombing technique as necessary).
d. SOE operations. All SOE/OSS operations undertaken by units of RAF Bomber Command and United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commanders, who will issue the requisite orders from time to time, under existing procedure.
e. Attacks in support of the Russian armies. Attacks in support of operations by the Russian armies should be delivered as prescribed from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
f. Fleeting targets. There may be certain other targets of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.
You are responsible that the operations of the strategic air forces are coordinated with the operations of the tactical air forces in the theaters.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 14 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/29
Allocation of the two remaining combat cargo groups and the two remaining air commando groups
The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to allocate one combat cargo group and one air commando group to the China-Burma-India Theater in order to assure adequate resources for Admiral Mountbatten to clear and secure the land line to China. The remaining combat cargo group and air commando group have been allocated to the Southwest Pacific in an effort to fill at least part of the deficiency in resources for operations in that area.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 14 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 679
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe
Reference: CCS 675 Series
We consider that the whole redeployment problem, including repatriation, after the end of the war in Europe needs combined study which cannot be completed at this conference. This study appears to be required in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved including personnel and cargo shipping and to make certain that forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date.
The United States Chiefs of Staff have prepared tentative plans for redeployment which are available to the United States members of the combined agencies concerned. Presumably the British members of these agencies have similar information available.
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Administrative Committee in collaboration with the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Shipping Authorities and Combined Staff Planners study and report on the problem. Questions requiring decision before completion of the study will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Draft report by CCS to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, September 14, 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 680
Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the OCTAGON Conference
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:
I. Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
II. Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
III. Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Continue the offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the Axis Powers in the present war.
i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.
j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.
IV. Execution of the overall strategic concept
Defeat of the Axis in Europe
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe
Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the Air Forces involved including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A Directive (CCS___) has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (Facs ____).
Operations in North West Europe
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has reported (Scaf 78) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.
The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander’s first operation will be one to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.
We have approved General Eisenhower’s proposals and drawn his attention (Facs 78):
a. to the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and
b. to the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.
Operations in Italy
We have examined a report by General Wilson (Naf 774) on operations within his theatre. Insofar as the battle in Italy is concerned, he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways:
a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or
b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.
We have agreed:
a. that no forces should be withdrawn from. Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known.
b. that the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.
c. to inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10 October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (Fan 415).
Operations in the Balkans
General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except:
a. the small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.
b. the small Adriatic land forces which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.
Command of “DRAGOON” Forces
Command of the DRAGOON forces operating in Southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Facs 76).
Initial adjustments to the command of the air forces operating in support of DRAGOON forces have been made. Further adjustments, on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required, are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.
Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.
Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort
Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow suggested that improvement should be made in the system of military coordination between the USSR, U.S. and the United Kingdom.
We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the USSR and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Military Committee consisting of Senior Representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff.
We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.
In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the U.S. and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S. and British sides, the heads of the present missions would represent the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.
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The CSA to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union
OCTAGON, 14 September 1944
Top secret
Urgent
OCTAGON 26 TopSec sent to Deane from Marshall information to Spaatz and AGWar.
If arrangements, satisfactory to Spaatz, reference your MX 20947 of 13 September and further reference our OCTAGON 10, Russians and yourself, can be completed without representatives from London proceeding to Moscow it is satisfactory here. You and Spaatz complete the arrangements and carry out the project as the two of you see fit.