Russia was used as the colloquial term for the Soviet Union, despite Russia only being one part of the Union, among other countries. The Russian state had the ultimate authority over Soviet affairs.
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But things only happened in the USSR after Stalin’s explict permission who himself was Georgian. Are you referring to the politiburo?
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In general terms, yes. There were plenty of Ukrainians in government and the armed forces as well, but the seat of government was in Moscow.
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U.S. State Department (December 9, 1943)
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
Moscow, December 1943
Secret
There are given below some incidental remarks which occurred during dinners or luncheons of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin which were not sufficiently important to include in the regular memoranda or minutes of the conference or were merely briefly mentioned. These are set forth here as of possible general interest.
At the dinner given by Marshal Stalin on November 29 at which Stalin was so industrious in his attacks on the Prime Minister, he told Churchill that there was one thing he was glad of and that was that Mr. Churchill had never been a “liberal.” This was said with an expression of great contempt for the word “liberal.” It is doubtful if the President heard this statement since he remarked that he felt himself somewhat between the two political views as represented by the Marshal and Mr. Churchill.
During this same dinner the Munich agreement was discussed, and the Prime Minister remarked that at the time he had held the same views as the Soviet Government as to the stupidity and shame of the Munich agreement. Stalin replied that he personally had never believed that the Czechs meant to fight; that he had sent some Soviet aviation experts to look into the question of the use by the Red Air Force of Czech bases in the event of war; and that they had reported that the Czechs would not fight. He said he knew that this was not in accordance with Mr. Churchill’s views. Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister’s statement that he must admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up Communist regimes.
In one of his toasts to the cooperation of the three countries at his birthday dinner at the British Legation on November 30, the Prime Minister said that the complexion of the world was changing and that a common meeting ground might be found for the different colors. He remarked in this connection that the complexion of Great Britain was becoming “pinker.” Stalin interrupted to state, “That is a sign of health.” Mr. Churchill agreed provided the process was not carried so far as to induce congestion.
At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin referred to both the President and Churchill as his “fighting friends” or “comrades-in-arms,” but in the case of Churchill he added the observation, “if it is possible for me to consider Mr. Churchill my friend.”
At the political meeting on December 1 when the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier was under discussion, Marshal Stalin evinced great interest in the maps which had been prepared in the Department of State and particularly the one showing the ethnological composition of eastern Poland. He came around the table to examine these maps personally and asked Mr. Bohlen who had made up these maps and on the basis of what statistics. Mr. Bohlen told him that they had been drawn up in as objective and scientific a manner as possible on the basis of the best available data. Marshal Stalin replied, after the map had been explained to him, that it looked as though Polish statistics had been used. Mr. Bohlen repeated that the best available statistics had been used, but that since the areas in question had been part of Poland from 1920 to 1939, most available data were of course Polish. Marshal Stalin made a somewhat vague reference to some British statistics on the question but did not pursue the matter further.
At the dinner on December 1 when the declaration on Iran was being put into final form and the Russian and British texts were being compared et cetera, a discussion arose between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to the use of the word Persia. The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to have the word Persia rather than Iran used in the declaration and that he had given orders to the British Foreign Office to have the word Persia used in all British public documents in order to avoid confusion between Iraq and Iran. Marshal Stalin brushed this statement aside with the remark that the name of the country they were in was Iran and no other. The President also insisted on the use of Iran in the declaration and the Prime Minister then said he surrendered. When the time came for signature of the declaration, Stalin insisted that Churchill sign first in order, he said, to avoid any further argument as to the designation of the country that they were in.
During the dinner when the President had made a remark in regard to the shrewdness of Yankee traders, Marshal Stalin replied that there was a Russian saying that “no Jew could earn a living in Yaroslavl because of the shrewdness of the merchants of that city.”
Towards the end of the dinner when Marshal Stalin, who was obviously exhausted and for that reason not in the best of humor, was with close attention examining the Russian text of the communiqué with the Soviet interpreter Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Molotov, the President called Mr. Bohlen over to give him a message to translate to the Marshal. Stalin, hearing an interruption in his ear and without turning to see who it was, said over his shoulder, “For God’s sake, allow us to finish this work.” Then, when he turned and realized that the interruption had come from the President of the United States, for the first and only time during the Conference he showed embarrassment and turned quickly back to the examination of the communiqué. This remark was not translated to the President.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Cairo, December 9, 1943
Secret
509
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal.
I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inönü. They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout.
… I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings. Every good wish to you and Harry.
740.0011 EW 1939/32275: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State
Ankara, December 9, 1943
1997
Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu made following statement at press conference of Allied and Turkish correspondents last evening:
The Cairo conference was one of the most important events in this; phase of the war. We returned from [talks?] in [Cairo?] extremely pleased and extremely satisfied with our conversations. We talked about everything there. All aspects of international politics and of the war were passed in review.
You doubtless know that the invitation to this conference was addressed to the Turkish Government by England, United States and USSR who was to have been represented by M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky]. But the latter who was at a distant place could not attend our meetings and did not reach Cairo until this morning. But I can tell you that even without M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky] the Soviets were there.
As you have been able to see from the communiqué our alliance with England has been strengthened by this conference. Our conversations were so intimate and searching that we can likewise say that our relations with the United States and Soviet Union are almost as cordial and strong as those with England.
We studied all aspects of the problems with a frankness which was sometimes brutal but with understanding. We learned a great many things which we did not know. Our friends likewise learned many things of which they were ignorant. We drew closer to them and they drew closer to us for a better mutual understanding of our interests and our possibilities. It is because all our conversations were impregnated with this spirit that we could leave Cairo in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.
I can tell you without going into details that during our conversations we remained on the Axis [apparent omission] of the directives of the peoples party and that our foreign policy remains unchanged.
STEINHARDT
870.01 AMG/21: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, December 9, 1943 — 5 p.m.
8552
We again took up the subject matter of the Department’s 7742, December 7, 8 p.m., with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.
BUCKNELL
891.00/2078
The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State
Tehran, December 9, 1943
Secret
No. 750
Subject: DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING IRAN
Sir: I have the honor to report, for the Department’s background information, the circumstances of the drawing up of the joint declaration regarding Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, and on the same day declared acceptable by the Iranian Government through its Minister of Foreign Affairs.
During a visit by General Hurley and myself to Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed on November 25, 1943, the Iranian officials spoke of the proposed declaration on Iran which was discussed, but not approved, at the Moscow meeting of foreign secretaries October 19 to 30 (See Mr. George V. Allen’s despatch of November 4 from this Legation. I do not know how the Iranian Government learned of this Moscow proposal but assume they were informed by the British).
General Hurley informed me that on November 28 he discussed with the President the possibility of securing from the conference of the chiefs of governments a declaration pertaining to the status of Iran. The President had authorized him to see Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and endeavor to work something out.
On the morning of November 29, when I called at the Foreign Office regarding another matter, Prime Minister Soheily told me [he] had just seen Mr. Eden and had put forward the request that the conference should issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover the following points:
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Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.
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Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance with respect to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.
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Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.
M. Soheily said that Mr. Eden had agreed in principle but had requested that he approach the Soviet representatives and the American Minister.
General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30 and advised me that he had reached agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on the desirability of a declaration such as that proposed. The Moscow draft declarations were considered, and General Hurley suggested that, in addition to the points which they covered, there should be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Eden assented. It was further agreed that the provision of the Moscow draft calling for support for foreign advisers in Iran should be omitted.
General Hurley advised me that, inasmuch as the Moscow draft had not been approved by the Russians, he and Mr. Eden had agreed it would be appropriate to have the Iranian Prime Minister present his request himself to M. Molotov and endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the new proposal. Later that same day, the Iranian Foreign Minister told me that Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov had expressed their willingness to meet the request for a declaration. However, from information reaching General Hurley, it appeared that Soviet concurrence was not certain, and the following day he requested the President to speak to Marshal Stalin on the matter. General Hurley tells me he was afterwards informed that the President had done so.
December 1 was the last day of the meeting at Tehran, and there was no time for joint discussions among the American [,] Soviet and British representatives with respect to the text of the proposed communiqué. In consultation with General Hurley, this Legation had prepared a tentative draft, which was the first draft to include specific affirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was approved by the American delegation to the conference and was submitted to Mr. Eden and M. Molotov late in the afternoon of December 1. With a few minor changes in wording, this draft was accepted by the final plenary session of the conference, held that evening. I understand time was so short that it was not practicable to make three original copies, and that only one was signed, this original remaining in possession of the American delegation. A copy of the final text is enclosed herewith.
I had previously given the Iranian Foreign Minister a copy of the Legation’s first draft, which he had discussed with the Prime Minister. I had also informed him that the proposal would be discussed by the chiefs of government on December 1. Accordingly, when the conference session ended at about 11 o’clock in the evening, General Hurley and I took a copy of the final draft to the Foreign Ministry and went over it word by word with M. Saed, explaining the slight changes which had been made in the phraseology. The Foreign Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone and read him the altered phrases. He then informed us that the revised text was acceptable to the Government of Iran. He initialed a copy which we had brought for that purpose.
The Foreign Minister agreed to give no publicity to the Declaration until it should have been released by the three signatory governments. It was explained to him that this would probably be delayed for several days.
In the course of our conversation with M. Saed, General Hurley emphasized that the American representatives had given special support to the proposed declaration, that certain objections had been encountered, but that we had, happily, been able to secure the agreement of the British and Soviets. Since the Foreign Minister also could see for himself that the Legation’s draft declaration had been adopted almost in toto by the conference, I think there can be little doubt in his mind that the United States played a large part in the issuance of the declaration.
As the Department will recall, the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference resolutely opposed the issuance of any statement regarding policy toward Iran. I was, therefore, surprised at the readiness of Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov to agree to a substantially similar proposal when made at Tehran only a few weeks later. It may well be that the President’s personal appeal, coming at the end of a successful conference, was the deciding factor, although I am inclined to think that some general shift in Soviet attitude toward Iran may also have taken place in recent weeks (As I have previously reported, there are indications that Irano-Soviet relations have attained a more friendly basis). Contributing or alternative reasons for Soviet acquiescence at Tehran may have been:
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The opposition at Moscow may have originated with subordinates, such as former Ambassador Smirnov, who were not present here and so could not bring their views to the attention of the chiefs.
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At Moscow, the proposal was made by the British and supported by the Americans, no Iranian representatives being present. At Tehran, the proposal came from the Iranians themselves, and the Soviets may have felt that they could not well oppose it without placing themselves in an unfavorable light vis-à-vis the Iranian Government, especially after both the American and British representatives had indicated agreement.
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The Soviet leaders may have thought this a more appropriate occasion to make a gesture toward Iran, since the meeting was taking place on Iranian soil.
Respectfully yours,
LOUIS G. DREYFUS JR.
The Pittsburgh Press (December 9, 1943)
YANKS POUND NAZIS BACK
Strategic peaks on road to Rome cleared of enemy
Americans attack pillboxes, defy powerful artillery fire to fight way to within a mile of important Liri Plain
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
…
U.S. Fleet strikes –
4 Jap bases, 2 warships are wrecked
72 planes also downed in attack on sea lanes on road to Tokyo
By William F. Tyree, United Press staff writer
…
Million face father draft before July 1
Hershey: Fifth of total to be called in next six months
…
Ear drum punctured –
Frank Sinatra classified 4-F
Doctors tell crooner he needs some sleep
…
They miss 170 quota by 169 –
One plane for $13,423,794 is this war plant’s record
2,350 workers tied up by inefficient management, prober reports to House committee
…
Willkie to enter primary in Wisconsin for buildup
Announcement expected soon as answer to Landon and test of ex-isolationist sentiment
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
In Washington –
Senators cut betting levy from tax bill
Revenue of $1,922,700,000 left in boosts voted by House
…