You have edited, so a new answer: Because the Germans have had no option to leave the French borders unprotected from the Soviets.
How exactly? The soviets were on the west germany’s border.
So… I don’t get this part.
Yep. My mind races faster than my fingers. And hence I end up eating words.
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Germany is east of France, so the Soviet could not invade France without fighting the Germans, but the Americans can be occupied in Korea or Vietnam or with “America first”
Early on, it was Churchill pleading de Gaulle’s case to FDR on a semi-regular basis, despite de Gaulle’s blatant dislike (edging toward open contempt) towards Churchill personally and the British generally. It’s clear from the record that the US government distrusted de Gaulle and would have preferred almost any other French leader to him.
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Yes, but why?..
U.S. State Department (December 9, 1943)
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Cairo, December 9, 1943
Secret
509
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal.
I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inönü. They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout.
… I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings. Every good wish to you and Harry.
740.0011 EW 1939/32275: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State
Ankara, December 9, 1943
1997
Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu made following statement at press conference of Allied and Turkish correspondents last evening:
The Cairo conference was one of the most important events in this; phase of the war. We returned from [talks?] in [Cairo?] extremely pleased and extremely satisfied with our conversations. We talked about everything there. All aspects of international politics and of the war were passed in review.
You doubtless know that the invitation to this conference was addressed to the Turkish Government by England, United States and USSR who was to have been represented by M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky]. But the latter who was at a distant place could not attend our meetings and did not reach Cairo until this morning. But I can tell you that even without M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky] the Soviets were there.
As you have been able to see from the communiqué our alliance with England has been strengthened by this conference. Our conversations were so intimate and searching that we can likewise say that our relations with the United States and Soviet Union are almost as cordial and strong as those with England.
We studied all aspects of the problems with a frankness which was sometimes brutal but with understanding. We learned a great many things which we did not know. Our friends likewise learned many things of which they were ignorant. We drew closer to them and they drew closer to us for a better mutual understanding of our interests and our possibilities. It is because all our conversations were impregnated with this spirit that we could leave Cairo in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.
I can tell you without going into details that during our conversations we remained on the Axis [apparent omission] of the directives of the peoples party and that our foreign policy remains unchanged.
STEINHARDT
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870.01 AMG/21: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, December 9, 1943 — 5 p.m.
8552
We again took up the subject matter of the Department’s 7742, December 7, 8 p.m., with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.
BUCKNELL
I haven’t done enough reading on the US viewpoint to say, but de Gaulle certainly had sandpaper for a soul … as my family used to say about some of our relatives, he could start a fight in an empty house.
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U.S. State Department (December 10, 1943)
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
Ankara, December 10, 1943
Personal and strictly confidential for the Ambassador:
The recent meeting at Cairo was most helpful in drawing Turkey much closer to the Allies; although nothing definite was agreed upon for the time being. I hope the foregoing gives you the present picture.
STEINHARDT
Wow… I don’t know how his wife handled him or whether he had any.
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Like: “Vive le Québec libre!” (1967)
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U.S. State Department (December 12, 1943)
868.01/416: Telegram
The Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the Secretary of State
Cairo, December 12, 1943 — 10 a.m.
Greek Series 128
I am reliably informed that during a long session on December 8 with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden the King of Greece steadfastly refused to make a declaration proposed by them to the effect that he will not return to Greece unless and until called for by the Constituent Assembly to the formation of which he agreed in his declaration of July 4.
I saw the President on December 3 and advised him regarding this proposal and after he had seen the King he desired me not to associate myself with any effort to force him to a course of action against his will. This I have been careful not to do both before and since. I understand that the President told the King that there was no necessity for him to make any declaration whatever unless he so desired.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In this connection the British appear to have been influenced in taking the attitude they did chiefly by a change in military plans regarding operations in Greece and by the anti-British and anti-King propaganda being spread there to the benefit of the Communist leadership. They hoped to kill this propaganda and deprive this leadership of many recruits by making clear now that no possibility exists of the King’s being forced on the country. Because of the present and probable future Republican makeup of the Greek Government the solution arrived at may be regarded as amounting to much the same thing in effect as the original proposal.
MacVEAGH
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As is common with extra-large personalities, she was reputedly the only one who could tell him he was wrong. Peter Hitchens included this sketch of his personality in an article published by First Things a few years ago:
Only his wife Yvonne was unimpressed by his grandeur, more than once urging him to retire, or puncturing his ambition. During the long, frustrating wilderness years between his wartime glory and his final presidential triumph, he mused to her that he might one day repeat his great rallying call of 1940. Using the rather patronizing endearment “Pauvre Ami,” she declared flatly, “Nobody will follow you.” He snapped back, “Shut up, Yvonne! I am old enough to know what I want to do!” In fact, on that occasion he was wrong and she was right. She even mocked his soldierly abilities. When the general’s aides suggested that they might install a machine gun at their remote, forbidding country home in Colombey, in case of an attack by communists, Yvonne scoffed that her husband would have no idea how to use it. Perhaps she would have.
And:
… he was perhaps the last great man to make it his business to know those things that it is proper for a king to know. He could talk fluently with philosophers and literary novelists. He had a minute knowledge of history: not just that of France, but of Europe and the world. After many, many conversations with Winston Churchill, a large number of them furious quarrels, he concluded that England’s savior was not in fact very intelligent. He believed wartime, with its austerity and tests of manhood, was more virtuous than peacetime. He believed nothing important could be achieved without recklessness. He stood up to people with considerable courage, even when he was a powerless and lonely figure without soldiers, money, or supporters. He once justified his bloody-minded awkwardness by pointing out that if he were not so difficult, he would himself have been a collaborator. He said “If I were easy to work with, I would be on Marshal Petain’s staff.” He had no time for people like himself. He confessed, “I only esteem those who stand up to me but unfortunately I cannot stand them.”
De Gaulle possessed that great chivalrous virtue of being ready to walk unbowed and defiant in front of the powerful, while being gentle and even submissive to the defenseless and weak. He once became so angry with Churchill that he smashed a chair in his presence to emphasize his rage. Likewise, he defied Franklin Roosevelt over and over again. But he would go home after these battles to sing tender love songs to his daughter Anne, who suffered from Down syndrome. The tiny glimpses we have of this part of his life, obtained from the accidental observations of others, tear at the heart. His concern for Anne was entirely private and not at all feigned. After any long absence from home his first act was to rush up to her room. She died, aged twenty, in his arms. At her funeral, he comforted his wife Yvonne with the words, “Maintenant, elle est comme les autres” (“Now she is like the others”), which must be one of the most moving things said in the whole twentieth century.
Precisely. “Publius” at the old blog Gods of the Copybook Headings put it this way:
De Gaulle was great because he knew how to act the part. Actually doing great things was someone’s else problem. The heavy lifting of the Second World War was done by the Russian foot soldier and the English speaking powers. Objectively, Canada did more to defeat Hitler than France. Being a nation of citizen soldiers, who desperately wanted to get home, we did our bit and went home. This allowed a prima donna like De Gaulle to take the credit for liberating France. In gratitude, the Liberator then travelled to Montreal, some twenty years later, and thanked Canada by trying to destroy it.
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The prima donna only insisted that the free french helped in the liberating of France, and she did not try to destroy Canada, but was just stupid at the wrong time and the wrong place.
U.S. State Department (December 14, 1943)
893.5151/976: Telegram
The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State
Chungking, December 14, 1943 — 8 p.m.
Urgent
2417.
To Secretary of Treasury from Adler. …
-
I indicated that the price of United States dollars had become an outstanding issue for all United States Government agencies in China relations and that the working out of a satisfactory arrangement was advisable from point of view of Sino-American relations. Kung replied that “the Generalissimo had said no.” When I inquired again into the possibility of the sale of gold, Kung informed me that Chinese Government sales had been quite small, its policy being to buy back a substantial part of what it had sold to keep up price which is now around CN 13,000 per Chinese oz. selling in Chungking.
-
Kung intimated that Generalissimo had discussed exchange rate with President in Cairo but did not inform me of content of discussion.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GAUSS
The record shows that the prima donna did a lot more than merely “insist” on that one thing. And the prima donna very clearly did try to destroy Canada. There’s a right time to cheer on a terrorist organization while you’re an official guest in the country that organization is pledged to destroy? Do tell.
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I do not think that de Gaule was aware of terrorist organisations. I think that he fucked up because French nationaltst ignorance and arogance. I am not defending his actions, but I think it was more stupidity than trying to gain annything.
Please help me to find information about this terrorist organisation.
U.S. State Department (December 15, 1943)
Report by the Combined Administrative Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 15 December 1943
Secret
CCS 428 (Revised)
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944
Availability of resources to meet the requirements of critical strategy
The problem
To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated in CCS 426/1.
Facts bearing on the problem
The basis of investigation is given in Annex I.
We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at SEXTANT are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories.
The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned.
Conclusions
Ground Forces (Annex II)
The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should preclude the operations.
Naval Forces (Annex III)
So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.
Air Forces (Annex IV)
The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be available with the following exceptions:
a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the detailed plan to be made for ANVIL requires more than a one brigade lift.
b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the additional resources required.
c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma.
Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive.
Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)
Production of combat loaders, LSTs and LCTs still continues to be the bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 1944 there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations.
The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments.
Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)
In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI. In no case, however, is it considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of approved operations.
Shipping (Annex VII)
Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation HERCULES in spring 1944. In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo resources.
Oil (Annex VIII)
An examination of the oil position has revealed that the most critical petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during February 1944. It is believed that the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant building program.
In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.
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