Tehran Conference (EUREKA)

105

London erwartet ‚Erläuterung der Erklärung‘ –
Teheran – ein Komplott von Schwerverbrechern

Von unserem Berner Berichterstatter

b—r. Bern, 7. Dezember –
In London kann man nicht recht Erstaunen und Enttäuschung darüber ver­bergen, daß die Mitteilung über die Konferenz von Teheran trotz der großen Ankündigung so kurz und nichtssagend ausgefallen ist. Man erklärt verlegen, daß „eine nähere Erläuterung des tieferen Sinns der Erklärung“ abgewartet werden müsse. Es scheine sich zu bestätigen, daß Stalin auch diesmal wieder dem Versuch, seine Ansprüche festzulegen, ausgewichen ist.

Stalin bewohnte ein Gebäude im Garten der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft in Teheran, während das eigentliche Gesandtschaftsge­bäude Roosevelt zur Verfügung gestellt war. Dieser hatte sich in die amerikanische Gesandtschaft begeben, war aber kurz da­ nach in die der Sowjetunion übersiedelt. Hier wurde er durch seine „Bundesgenos­sen“ gründlich überwacht. Er wohnte zu­sammen mit seinen nächsten Mitarbeitern und dreißig amerikanischen Verwaltungs­beamten als Büropersonal. Außerdem durfte er einen amerikanischen Koch mitnehmen, im übrigen aber wurde die eigentliche Be­dachung und das gesamte Personal durch die GPU gestellt, die, überdies das ganze Haus mit Posten und Patrouillen spickte.

‚Weltbeglücker‘ durch Panzerwagen geschützt

Die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen für die Teil­nehmer an der Konferenz gingen eher noch weiter als vorher in Kairo. Teheran war von der Umwelt abgeschnitten, sein Rund­funksender schwieg, es wurden keine Telegramme zur Beförderung angenom­men, die Grenzen Irans waren während der Konferenztage gesperrt. Starke Truppenabteilungen mit Panzerwagen und Ma­schinengewehren umstanden die Gesandt­schaften, deren Mauern nachts durch Scheinwerfer beleuchtet wurden. Zu die­sem Wachtdienst waren neben sowjeti­schen auch indische Truppen herangezogen worden. Zwischen der sowjeti­schen und der britischen Gesandtschaft hatte man einen besonderen Gang zwi­schen eigens errichteten Mauern angelegt, um eine völlig gesicherte Verbindung zwischen den Wohnsitzen Stalins und Roosevelts einerseits und Churchills ander­seits herzustellen. Auch diese Mauer und die umgebenden Stadtteile waren natürlich von schwer bewaffneten Truppen bewacht. Die drei „Weltbeglücker“ hatten offenbar das überzeugende Gefühl, sich vor der Dankbarkeit und Liebe ihrer Mitmenschen beschützen zu müssen.

Auch ein Ergebnis der Konferenz –
Stalin setzt Exkönig Peter ab

Unmittelbar nach Abschluß der Kon­ferenz in Teheran ist im Auftrag Moskaus die von England anerkannte Emigranten-,Regierung“ des Königs Peter für abge­setzt erklärt worden. Unter dem Vorsitz des Kommunisten Dr. Iwan Ribar wurde an unbekanntem Ort in Anwesenheit einer Reihe von bolschewistischen Parteifunk­tionären eine sogenannte „provisorische Regierung“ gebildet, der bolschewistische Bandenführer Tito wurde zum „Marschall“ des sogenannten Roten Jugoslawien er­nannt.

Die Emigranten-„Regierung“ König Peters in Kairo ihrerseits bezeichnete in ihrer Stellungnahme dieses Vorgehen als Akt einer „Bewegung terroristischer Gewalt,“ die das Volk „in ihrem sozialen und natio­nalen Geist“ keineswegs repräsentiere und die das Ergebnis der auswärtigen feind­lichen Agitation einer auswärtigen Macht – sprich Sowjetunion – sei, zu deren Erfolg obendrein die eigenen Verbündeten beigetragen hätten.

Damit ist nunmehr auch zwischen den bisher von England garantierten und ge­stützten serbischen Emigranten und den von Stalin eingesetzten roten Banden­führern, wie seinerzeit zwischen den Mos­kau und London angehörigen Polen der offene Konflikt zum Ausbruch gekommen.

Sträfling als „Ministerpräsident“

dnb. Agram, 7. Dezember –
Die bolschewistischen Tito-Banden haben eine eigene Regierung gegründet, gegen welche die „Jugoslawische Exilregierung“ in Kairo bereits Protest eingelegt hat. „Staatschef“ ist der bisherige politische Kommissar Titos, Ivan Ribar, „Ministerpräsident und Kriegsminister“ Tito selbst, der sich erstmalig als der ehemalige kroatische Sträfling Josip Bros bekennt.

Die kroatische Presse weist in ihrem Kommentar darauf hin, daß die Mitglieder dieser „Regierung“ durchweg als Kommunisten begannt sind, bar jeden völkischen Empfindens und daß sie in Wahrheit für die Weltrevolution kämpfen.

106

Die Gastgebräuche der GPU

vb. Wien, 7. Dezember –
Gezählt waren die Worte, die acht Tage nach ihrem Abschluß endlich die Konferenz von Teheran der Welt sachlich zu sagen hatte; 44 Zeilen genau, davon vier im Stile des Gottesgnadentums „Wir, der Präsident…“ der Einleitung, eine der Unterschrift gewidmet, bei der Churchill an letzter Stelle rangiert. Ungezählt sind bisher die Worte, die den tauben Kern hinter einer bald undurchdringlichen Schale byzantinischer Hofberichte anscheinend schamhaft verstecken sollten. Selbst amtlich wird mitgeteilt, daß die Gabelfrühstücks- und Abendessen in ihrer Häufigkeit nur von der genußsüchtigen Übung ihrer drei Teilnehmer zu bewältigen waren; ohne jede weitere Tafelfolge genügt die Kenntnis der Quantitäten, die allein den Herren Roosevelt und Churchill auf der Rückreise in Jerusalem aufgetischt wurden. 26 Flaschen Whisky, 12 Flaschen Champagner, 3 Flaschen Kognak, Jahrgang 1864, sowie 17 Flaschen verschiedene Weine spülten im intimsten Kreise den Staub, von Teheran aus den anglo-amerikanischen Kehlen.

Da Stalins Stimmung lebhafte Fröhlichkeit bei den nächtlichen Banketten zeigte, wie seine Hofberichter kundtun, wird sich die Getränkekarte in Teheran von der Jerusalemer in Quantität und Qualität kaum nachteilig unterschieden haben. In einem wunderbaren Kamelhaarmantel, der bis zu den Knöcheln reichte, Haar und Schnurrbart jetzt stahlgrau, und mit jenen tiefen Linien auf seinen kräftigen Zügen, die der russische Krieg ihnen eingegraben hat – der deutsche Leser merkt mühelos, daß wir wörtlich den Hofberichten folgen – kehrte der Bluthund sehr befriedigt und in bester Stimmung in den Kreml zurück.

Dies konnte er wohl, denn in Teheran hatten sich seine Kumpane auch äußerlich ziemlich restlos dem Bolschewismus ausgeliefert. Nur der eigene Koch blieb den beiden Plutokraten gestattet, alles andere stellte die GPU. „Die Konferenz wurde unter äußerst vertraulichen Umständen abgehalten,“ hieß das offiziell. Roosevelt bezog ein angewiesenes Zwangsquartier in der Sowjetbotschaft, einem viereckigen gelben Ziegelbau, wie ein großer Kasten.

Fast alle paar Schritt standen innerhalb des Gebäudes GPU-Männer, sie wirkten wie Bildsäulen, sie erwiesen keine Ehrenbezeigungen, sie standen vier Stunden, ohne einen Muskel zu rühren.

Diese Atmosphäre wurde „herzlich und voll Begeisterung“ genannt. Die Bewegungsfreiheit der Gäste war äußerst eingeschränkt.

Nie zuvor gab es solche Sicherheits- und Vorsichtsmaßnahmen. Jäger der sowjetischen Luftstreitkräfte gaben den Flugzeugen von Churchill und Roosevelt das Geleit, als sie auf dem Flugplatz Gale Morghe bei Teheran landeten, der ringsum von russischen Truppen besetzt war, die in blauen Hosen und khakifarbenen Röcken steckten, Khakimützen trugen und mit Maschinenpistolen bewaffnet waren. Alle persischen Grenzen wurden geschlossen, die Funkstationen hielten alle Telegramme nach dem Ausland an, ebenso wurde die Beförderung von Reisenden unterbunden, alle Transporte waren lahmgelegt, kein Flugzeug, keine Eisenbahn, kein Kraftwagen verkehrten mehr.

Die Bewachung in Teheran wies das gleiche Ausmaß auf. Die Sowjettruppen hatten die Stadt mit Maschinengewehrnestern gespickt, und um das Geheimnis der Exterritorialität dort unter Sowjeteinfluß ins rechte Licht einer lächerlichen Farce zu setzen, führen an den vier Ecken der britischen Gesandtschaft Panzerkraftwagen auf, die das Gebäude des Nachts in grelles Scheinwerferlicht tauchten. „Die Mitglieder aller Abordnungen ließ Stalin besonders scharf bewachen,“ und der USA.-Botschafter in Großbritannien, John Winant, wurde am Eingang zur USA.-Botschaft zur Feststellung seiner Person sogar arretiert. Die Delegierten hatten strenge Anweisungen, wie sie sich zu verhalten hatten, und man ließ sie nicht einen Augenblick „ohne Schutz,“ um sicherzustellen, daß überhaupt keine Berührung mit der Außenwelt eintrat (wie es wörtlich heißt).

Unter solchen äußeren Umständen feierte Churchill am Konferenzort seinen 69. Geburtstag. Mrs. Sarah Oliver erstand für den Papa schnell eine kleine alexandrinische Silbermünze bei einem Trödelhändler Teherans, die 300 Jahre vor Christi Geburt gemünzt worden sein sollte, Roosevelt schenkte seinem Trabanten mit einer Porzellanschale die ironische Widmung „seiner Zuneigung und die Hoffnung, daß sie noch viele Jahre zusammenbleiben mögen.“

Churchill hatte sich als Ehrenoberst des 4. Husarenregiments verkleidet, wohl, um sich passend von Stalin als „mein kämpferischer Freund“ anreden zu lassen. Das war so der Jargon der Unterhaltung, W. C. bezeichnete Roosevelt als den „großen Mann“ und den Meister ihrer GPU-Gastgebräuche titulierten die beiden Angelsachsen nur als „Stalin den Großen.“ Die Jovialität und Freundlichkeit des bei den Verhandlungen in undurchdringlicher Gefühllosigkeit eiskalten bolschewistischen Henkerfürsten ließen vermuten, daß zumindest er „mit dem Verlauf der Konferenz zufrieden war.“ Mit solchem Ausdruck wird uns der Schluß nahegelegt, daß der Alkohol in Jerusalem den plutokratischen Rückwanderern aus dem GPU-Gefängnis mehr als nur den Reisestaub vertreiben mußte.

Ihre vier Freiheiten scheinen sie jedenfalls in Teheran nicht vorgefunden zu haben.

107

U.S. State Department (December 8, 1943)

740.0011 EW 1939/32243: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 8, 1943 — 9 a.m.
2144.

Supplementing my 2131, December 6, 7 p.m.

I had occasion to ask Molotov last night how it had happened that TASS had made a statement regarding the conclusion of the Tehran Conference. He explained that (one) Reuter’s [Reuters] from Lisbon had predicted the meeting and (two) Senator Connally had announced it was going on. TASS could not ignore these reports and therefore stated the truth to end further rumors which were considered to affect adversely our mutual interests. It is my personal opinion that the British and we have more to explain to the Soviet Government than they have to us. I therefore recommend that we do not pursue the matter further with the Soviets.

HARRIMAN

108 
891.00/2072: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State 

Tehran, December 8, 1943 — 5 p.m.
1096.

In reply to my inquiry as to reason for premature publication of declaration regarding Iran, my 1090, December 5, Soviet Chargé told me he had heard Iranians were going to release text on morning of December 5 and that his Embassy therefore rushed publication in order not to be left behind.

In a separate conversation with an officer of this Legation and Major Henry, Hurley’s aide, Soviet Press Attaché denied all knowledge of any agreement regarding release date for publicity on Tehran conference and further intimated he had not understood declaration on Iran to form part of general release.

It is obvious that these two statements are conflicting and both seem implausible. If Soviet Chargé had heard of Iranian intention to break deadline, he could easily have intervened with the Iranian authorities, at same time notifying his American and British colleagues. Likewise, the Press Attaché’s plea of ignorance is vitiated by fact that he was present at meeting with Major Henry and British representatives on December 4 at which release arrangements were discussed. However, I have not pressed the point and shall take no further action unless instructed.

DREYFUS

109

Curse you newspaper. You were supposed to keep it a secret.

2 Likes
110

U.S. State Department (December 9, 1943)

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, December 1943
Secret

There are given below some incidental remarks which occurred during dinners or luncheons of the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin which were not sufficiently important to include in the regular memoranda or minutes of the conference or were merely briefly mentioned. These are set forth here as of possible general interest.

At the dinner given by Marshal Stalin on November 29 at which Stalin was so industrious in his attacks on the Prime Minister, he told Churchill that there was one thing he was glad of and that was that Mr. Churchill had never been a “liberal.” This was said with an expression of great contempt for the word “liberal.” It is doubtful if the President heard this statement since he remarked that he felt himself somewhat between the two political views as represented by the Marshal and Mr. Churchill.

During this same dinner the Munich agreement was discussed, and the Prime Minister remarked that at the time he had held the same views as the Soviet Government as to the stupidity and shame of the Munich agreement. Stalin replied that he personally had never believed that the Czechs meant to fight; that he had sent some Soviet aviation experts to look into the question of the use by the Red Air Force of Czech bases in the event of war; and that they had reported that the Czechs would not fight. He said he knew that this was not in accordance with Mr. Churchill’s views. Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister’s statement that he must admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up Communist regimes.

In one of his toasts to the cooperation of the three countries at his birthday dinner at the British Legation on November 30, the Prime Minister said that the complexion of the world was changing and that a common meeting ground might be found for the different colors. He remarked in this connection that the complexion of Great Britain was becoming “pinker.” Stalin interrupted to state, “That is a sign of health.” Mr. Churchill agreed provided the process was not carried so far as to induce congestion.

At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin referred to both the President and Churchill as his “fighting friends” or “comrades-in-arms,” but in the case of Churchill he added the observation, “if it is possible for me to consider Mr. Churchill my friend.”

At the political meeting on December 1 when the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier was under discussion, Marshal Stalin evinced great interest in the maps which had been prepared in the Department of State and particularly the one showing the ethnological composition of eastern Poland. He came around the table to examine these maps personally and asked Mr. Bohlen who had made up these maps and on the basis of what statistics. Mr. Bohlen told him that they had been drawn up in as objective and scientific a manner as possible on the basis of the best available data. Marshal Stalin replied, after the map had been explained to him, that it looked as though Polish statistics had been used. Mr. Bohlen repeated that the best available statistics had been used, but that since the areas in question had been part of Poland from 1920 to 1939, most available data were of course Polish. Marshal Stalin made a somewhat vague reference to some British statistics on the question but did not pursue the matter further.

At the dinner on December 1 when the declaration on Iran was being put into final form and the Russian and British texts were being compared et cetera, a discussion arose between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to the use of the word Persia. The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to have the word Persia rather than Iran used in the declaration and that he had given orders to the British Foreign Office to have the word Persia used in all British public documents in order to avoid confusion between Iraq and Iran. Marshal Stalin brushed this statement aside with the remark that the name of the country they were in was Iran and no other. The President also insisted on the use of Iran in the declaration and the Prime Minister then said he surrendered. When the time came for signature of the declaration, Stalin insisted that Churchill sign first in order, he said, to avoid any further argument as to the designation of the country that they were in.

During the dinner when the President had made a remark in regard to the shrewdness of Yankee traders, Marshal Stalin replied that there was a Russian saying that “no Jew could earn a living in Yaroslavl because of the shrewdness of the merchants of that city.”

Towards the end of the dinner when Marshal Stalin, who was obviously exhausted and for that reason not in the best of humor, was with close attention examining the Russian text of the communiqué with the Soviet interpreter Mr. Pavlov and Mr. Molotov, the President called Mr. Bohlen over to give him a message to translate to the Marshal. Stalin, hearing an interruption in his ear and without turning to see who it was, said over his shoulder, “For God’s sake, allow us to finish this work.” Then, when he turned and realized that the interruption had come from the President of the United States, for the first and only time during the Conference he showed embarrassment and turned quickly back to the examination of the communiqué. This remark was not translated to the President.

111 
891.00/2078

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State 

Tehran, December 9, 1943

Secret
No. 750

Subject: DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING IRAN

Sir: I have the honor to report, for the Department’s background information, the circumstances of the drawing up of the joint declaration regarding Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, and on the same day declared acceptable by the Iranian Government through its Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During a visit by General Hurley and myself to Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed on November 25, 1943, the Iranian officials spoke of the proposed declaration on Iran which was discussed, but not approved, at the Moscow meeting of foreign secretaries October 19 to 30 (See Mr. George V. Allen’s despatch of November 4 from this Legation. I do not know how the Iranian Government learned of this Moscow proposal but assume they were informed by the British).

General Hurley informed me that on November 28 he discussed with the President the possibility of securing from the conference of the chiefs of governments a declaration pertaining to the status of Iran. The President had authorized him to see Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and endeavor to work something out.

On the morning of November 29, when I called at the Foreign Office regarding another matter, Prime Minister Soheily told me [he] had just seen Mr. Eden and had put forward the request that the conference should issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover the following points:

  1. Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.

  2. Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance with respect to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.

  3. Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

M. Soheily said that Mr. Eden had agreed in principle but had requested that he approach the Soviet representatives and the American Minister.

General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30 and advised me that he had reached agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on the desirability of a declaration such as that proposed. The Moscow draft declarations were considered, and General Hurley suggested that, in addition to the points which they covered, there should be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Eden assented. It was further agreed that the provision of the Moscow draft calling for support for foreign advisers in Iran should be omitted.

General Hurley advised me that, inasmuch as the Moscow draft had not been approved by the Russians, he and Mr. Eden had agreed it would be appropriate to have the Iranian Prime Minister present his request himself to M. Molotov and endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the new proposal. Later that same day, the Iranian Foreign Minister told me that Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov had expressed their willingness to meet the request for a declaration. However, from information reaching General Hurley, it appeared that Soviet concurrence was not certain, and the following day he requested the President to speak to Marshal Stalin on the matter. General Hurley tells me he was afterwards informed that the President had done so.

December 1 was the last day of the meeting at Tehran, and there was no time for joint discussions among the American [,] Soviet and British representatives with respect to the text of the proposed communiqué. In consultation with General Hurley, this Legation had prepared a tentative draft, which was the first draft to include specific affirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was approved by the American delegation to the conference and was submitted to Mr. Eden and M. Molotov late in the afternoon of December 1. With a few minor changes in wording, this draft was accepted by the final plenary session of the conference, held that evening. I understand time was so short that it was not practicable to make three original copies, and that only one was signed, this original remaining in possession of the American delegation. A copy of the final text is enclosed herewith.

I had previously given the Iranian Foreign Minister a copy of the Legation’s first draft, which he had discussed with the Prime Minister. I had also informed him that the proposal would be discussed by the chiefs of government on December 1. Accordingly, when the conference session ended at about 11 o’clock in the evening, General Hurley and I took a copy of the final draft to the Foreign Ministry and went over it word by word with M. Saed, explaining the slight changes which had been made in the phraseology. The Foreign Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone and read him the altered phrases. He then informed us that the revised text was acceptable to the Government of Iran. He initialed a copy which we had brought for that purpose.

The Foreign Minister agreed to give no publicity to the Declaration until it should have been released by the three signatory governments. It was explained to him that this would probably be delayed for several days.

In the course of our conversation with M. Saed, General Hurley emphasized that the American representatives had given special support to the proposed declaration, that certain objections had been encountered, but that we had, happily, been able to secure the agreement of the British and Soviets. Since the Foreign Minister also could see for himself that the Legation’s draft declaration had been adopted almost in toto by the conference, I think there can be little doubt in his mind that the United States played a large part in the issuance of the declaration.

As the Department will recall, the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference resolutely opposed the issuance of any statement regarding policy toward Iran. I was, therefore, surprised at the readiness of Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov to agree to a substantially similar proposal when made at Tehran only a few weeks later. It may well be that the President’s personal appeal, coming at the end of a successful conference, was the deciding factor, although I am inclined to think that some general shift in Soviet attitude toward Iran may also have taken place in recent weeks (As I have previously reported, there are indications that Irano-Soviet relations have attained a more friendly basis). Contributing or alternative reasons for Soviet acquiescence at Tehran may have been:

  1. The opposition at Moscow may have originated with subordinates, such as former Ambassador Smirnov, who were not present here and so could not bring their views to the attention of the chiefs.

  2. At Moscow, the proposal was made by the British and supported by the Americans, no Iranian representatives being present. At Tehran, the proposal came from the Iranians themselves, and the Soviets may have felt that they could not well oppose it without placing themselves in an unfavorable light vis-à-vis the Iranian Government, especially after both the American and British representatives had indicated agreement.

  3. The Soviet leaders may have thought this a more appropriate occasion to make a gesture toward Iran, since the meeting was taking place on Iranian soil.

Respectfully yours,
LOUIS G. DREYFUS JR.

112

The Pittsburgh Press (December 9, 1943)

Iran ‘tricked’ by Roosevelt

People expected gala show, blaring trumpets
By Gault MacGowan, North American Newspaper Alliance

Cairo, Egypt –
President Roosevelt’s visit to Iran disappointed the Persian people on the whole. The average man on the streets, getting his news from conversation instead of from a steady flow of newspaper editions containing many pictures, expected to see the President of the fabulous rich country across the seas in a gorgeous uniform as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces.

The display-loving everyday people naturally looked forward to a triumphal arrival with all the ceremonials of an oriental welcome they got, instead of the unostentatious plunking down of a plane at a dusty airport, with the security police discouraging even spontaneous and informal demonstrations.

Two Persians overheard discoursing on the subject expressed with a fine flourish of words the fairly general impressions of their countrymen.

One of them exclaimed:

What? He wears no uniform! What trick is this they play upon us?

His friend said:

Perhaps they bring someone in the likeness of the President to deceive malefactors. Possibly we should look for his coming by a later sky carriage.

The first Persian said:

No, it is indeed he. See how they salaam him. But he has not even a trumpeter.

The other commented, with an evident attempt to look on the bright side of a somewhat disheartening situation:

The expansion of his smile is exceeded only by the width of his shoulders.

The man who had opened the chat wanted to know:

What is this lie of the fine coffee of America? There is no serving of coffee here.

A Kurd would give a better welcome, it cannot be denied.

And no spreading of carpets.

As to that, America has no carpets like Persia, and probably has not learned the custom of carpet spreading.

What is the gain of being Shah of 48 states, which they say America has, when your caravan is poorer than that of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah?

The allusion was an effective one, for Mohammerah is the oil country of Persia and a symbol of wealth in Persian household talk.

The more cheerful of the two was forced to grant:

Magnificence has truly gone from the world.

113

The Pittsburgh Press (December 10, 1943)

MacGowan: Cat’s-whisker miniature given Churchill at Tehran

Bearded Sikhs of Iran-Iraq force give tiny painting and three big cheers
By Gault MacGowan, North American Newspaper Alliance

Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 7, delayed)
Bearded Sikhs, who are a big part of the backbone of the British Army in India, presented Prime Minister Churchill on his 69th birthday with one of the famous cat’s-whisker miniatures, painted with a single hair from the sideburns of a Persian feline upon a velvet table runner by the veteran artist Imami.

The Sikhs who selected the strikingly unusual gift are members of the PI Force, an abbreviation for Persia-Iraq Expeditionary Force. Officers and soldiers jointly subscribed for the birthday present for the Prime Minister. Tommies had chosen for their birthday remembrance an Ispahan silver cigar box on an oval silver tray, and the Imami runner was to go underneath the cigar box set.

Mr. Churchill said in expressing his thanks:

I am a stranger to the PI Force but I know what you troops have done. I hope and trust that the decisions we are making at this conference will shorten the war and enable all of you to go back to your homes in the East or West, wherever they may be.

Give three cheers

The three cheers for Prime Minister Churchill which echoed at the conclusion of his remarks were so enthusiastic and prolonged that some of those who heard the in Tehran believed that the war had ended.

A tall sergeant major called for one more cheer for Mr. Churchill “to take back to the old folks at home,” and it was given as vociferously as the others.

Most members of the Tehran delegation brought Persian carpets back with them, the best being one that the Shah of Persia gave to President Roosevelt.

Old and bearded

Imami, the artist who painted the table runner presented to Prime Minister Churchill, is bearded himself; and old – so old that no one knows quite how old. He sits all day in a vaulted archway fronting the sidewalks of Ispahan and chooses with loving care the single whiskers from the beard of his Persian cat with which he paints scenes the ancient Zoroastrian history on bracelets of bone and other souvenirs.

His cat sits beside his busy, magic hands, watching patiently while he mixes his colors and applies them, and allows itself to be cuddled affectionately whenever its artist-master needs a new whisker. American officers and GIs from the great railroad and truck highway across the mountains from the Persian Gulf stop to watch Imami work. They pet his cat and buy from him Christmas bracelets which will soon be gracing pretty wrists in America.

All know Imami

Lt. Mitchell H. Habeeb, a carpet expert of Brooklyn, New York, told me:

Everybody knows Imami and his Persian cat. He is the most famous artist of Ispahan by popular acclaim and Ispahan is the most famous art center of Persia. The city turns out the best Persian rugs – real craftsmanship – and the silversmiths do lovely work – elaborate statues, minarets and table sets wrought in designs as fine as old lace.

Lt. Habeeb’s family is of Syrian origin, though he was born in the United States.

1 Like
114

Before war yes. Population wise they are the largest. Some tribes in that have an almost 100% recruitement rate.

Nice

1 Like
115

Völkischer Beobachter (December 14, 1943)

Noch ein ‚Ergebnis‘ von Teheran –
Hull will die ‚Kleinen‘

dnb. Berlin, 13. Dezember –
Bekanntlich waren als Ergebnis der Teheraner Konferenz sogenannte „psychologische Riesenbomben“ gegen Deutschland und seine Verbündeten angekündigt worden. Nachdem die nichtssagende Verlautbarung von Teheran die Erwartungen unserer Feinde durch das völlige Fehlen solcher Erklärungen enttäuscht hat, versuchte der US-amerikanische Außenminister Hull, das Versäumte durch eine auf plumpe Täuschung berechnete Drohrede an die Adresse Ungarns, Rumäniens und Bulgariens nachzuholen.

Die Erklärung erinnert an die vor zwei Jahren erfolgte Kriegserklärung der bulgarischen, ungarischen und rumänischen Regierung an die USA und bezeichnet diese Regierungen in der Hull geläufigen Gangstersprache als „servile Marionetten.“ Hull wirft dann überheblich die abwegige Frage auf, er wisse nicht:

…in welchem Maße diese Regierungen auf die Großmut der USA gerechnet haben, ihre Völker vor den Folgen dieses übereilten Schrittes zu verschonen.

Tatsache sei, daß die an der Macht befindlichen Regierungen in diesen drei Ländern rücksichtslos ihre Teilnahme am Kriege gegen uns fortgesetzt und mit Menschen und Material die deutsche Kriegsmaschine gestärkt haben.

Die Erklärung schließt mit der üblichen Dreistigkeit, mit der die Herren im Weißen Haus mit Worten umzuspringen pflegen, wenn die militärischen Tatsachen nicht ihren Hoffnungen entsprechen. Freche Drohung und faustdicken Bluff verbinden sie zu grotesken Formulierungen, mit denen Hull auf die Ungarn, Rumänen und Bulgaren, die ebenso wie Deutschland für nichts anderes als ihre nationale Existenz und Zukunft kämpfen, Eindruck zu machen sucht: So droht Herr Hull:

Es muß ihnen klar geworden sein, daß sie mit Sicherheit die Verantwortung für die Folgen der Niederlage, welche die Vereinigten Nationen Deutschland zufügen werden, zu teilen haben.

Rumänien antwortet

Gegenüber der plumpen Drohrede Cordell Hulls an Rumänien lassen maßgebende rumänische Kreise keinen Zweifel darüber, daß die Stellung Rumäniens in dieser Frage klar und unzweideutig Stei. Schon in vielen öffentlichen Kundgebungen des abgelaufenen Jahres sei die Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gekommen, daß Rumänien im Osten um seine völkische Existenz kämpfe und seinen Kampf gleichzeitig als einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Wahrung der europäischen Zivilisation ansehe. Man verweist in diesen Kreisen auf die von den rumänischen Blättern bereits unmittelbar nach der Konferenz von Teheran den von dort ausgehenden Gerüchten gegenüber unmißverständlich und einheitlich zum Ausdruck gebrachte Haltung. So schrieb zum Beispiel der offiziöse Timpul, das von Teheran ausgehende „moralische Trommelfeuer“ könne nur dort wirksam sein, wo man lieber auf der Lauer liege als kämpfe. Im rumänischen Volk jedenfalls finde die Nachricht von dem Siege der rumänischen Truppen auf der Krim mehr Achtung als jedes anglo-amerikanische Bluffmanöver.

Die Front meldet sich zum Wort in einem Aufsatz der Porunca Vremii: So schrieb ein Hauptmann in diesem Blatt:

Die Frontkämpfer werden der rumänisch-deutschen Waffenbrüderschaft treu bleiben.

Der Feind irrt sich

Am Sonntag fand im Militärklub in Plovdiv eine feierliche Kundgebung aller Mitglieder des Verbandes der Reserveunteroffiziere des Gaues Plovdiv statt. Der Kundgebung wohnten Ministerpräsident Boschiloff und Innenminister Dr. Christoff bei. Der Innenminister unterstrich den Gedanken, daß sich der Feind durch die Luftangriffe und durch seine Agitation bemühe, die innere Front des Landes zu schwächen. Der Feind irre sich aber, denn er werde erst über die Leichen von zehn Millionen Bulgaren die bulgarische Grenze überschreiten können. Das bulgarische Volk stehe in seinem größten Teil an der Front des Staates. Der bulgarische Bauer liebe seine Scholle und sei bereit, sie um jeden Preis zu verteidigen.

Ministerpräsident Boschiloff erklärte: Die Außenpolitik Bulgariens werde von 99% des bulgarischen Volkes gebilligt. Das bulgarische Volk verlange nichts Fremdes, könne aber auf seine nationalen Ideale nicht verzichten. Die bulgarische Außenpolitik habe die Verteidigung der legitimen Rechte der Nation und die Sicherstellung der Einigkeit und Unabhängigkeit Bulgariens für die Zukunft zum Ziel. Alle guten Bulgaren müßten sich daher verpflichtet fühlen, der Regierung in ihrem Aufbauwerk beizustehen.

Fast zur gleichen Stunde also, als Hull die Bulgaren, Ungarn und Rumänen mit dem Kinderschreck eines amerikanischen Sieges auf die Rachsucht der Plutokraten gegen die stolze Tapferkeit ihres europäischen Selbstbehauptungswillens vorbereitete, wurde ihm in dieser Plovdiver Kundgebung von den Bedrohten fest und entschlossen gesagt: „Der Feind irrt sich, nur über unsere Leichen geht sein Weg auf unserem Kontinent.“

Die Liquidierung der Hullschen Großsprechereien wirkt umso eindrucksvoller, als sie so prompt und mit so viel Selbstsicherheit geäußert wurde.

Die Kundgebung sowie die Reden der Minister wurden im bulgarischen Rundfunk übertragen. Cordell Hull hätte, wenn es ihm nicht peinlich gewesen wäre, also die wahre Meinung der von ihm mit Drohungen verfolgten europäischen Völker unmittelbar hören können.

116

U.S. State Department (December 15, 1943)

740.0011–EW/12–1543

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union

Moscow, December 15, 1943

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strongpoints or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies elsewhere.

While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.

There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set forth the facts.

[Attachment]

Attitude of the Soviet Government on European political questions as expressed by Marshal Stalin during the Tehran Conference

Secret

These views have all been recorded in the official records of the Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are summarized here for convenient reference.

  1. International security after the war.
    No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases and other strongpoints in the vicinity of those countries and in general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism. These bases will be held as trustees for the international organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa.

No specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet Union.

  1. Treatment of Germany.
    The Soviet Government does not consider that any international organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war industry and supervision could not prevent this process being concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves together in any federation either among themselves or in association with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany with the framework for developing another great aggressive state. Strongpoints (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity of Germany to prevent Germany’s “moving a muscle.”

  2. France.
    The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its criminal association with Germany. De Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology. The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an insignificant military power and become a charming but weak country.

  3. Confederations.
    The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.

  4. Poland.
    The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is given the northern part of East Prussia including Königsberg and Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwów is admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. The Soviet Government is prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder River.

  5. Finland.
    Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet conditions are:

(1) The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.
(a) The Soviet Government would, however, be willing to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo, the latter town to pass into the permanent possession of the Soviet Union.

(2) The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime strength.

(3) Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union; these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from five to eight years and if Finland should default, the Red Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.

(4) Finland to break off all association with Germany and expel the German forces from her territory.

If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a province of the Soviet Union.

  1. The British Empire.
    Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire, but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and strongpoints throughout the world.

  2. The Dardanelles.
    The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace. This question was not pursued in any detail.

117

U.S. State Department (December 18, 1943)

President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information

Washington, December 18, 1943

Dear Brendan: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.

Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.

I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.

Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

118

U.S. State Department (December 20, 1943)

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President

Moscow, 20 December 1943
Secret

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At the Tehran Conference you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be delivered on one February. Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out this commitment as I shall undoubtedly be queried by Molotov at a meeting with him scheduled for Friday or Saturday to discuss unfinished business of Tehran.

119

U.S. State Department (December 21, 1943)

The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Washington, 21 December 1943

Secret
Priority

For Ambassador Harriman from the President. Repeated to Prime Minister

Referring to your message [Alusna Moscow 201719 December] it is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one-third of the total be allocated to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort commencing about February 1.

Title of ownership to be decided after the surrender of our common enemies.

I have requested combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower.

ROOSEVELT

120

U.S. State Department (December 22, 1943)

740.00119 EW 1939/2036

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington, December 22, 1943
Secret

Aide Mémoire

The Tehran Conference considered the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin informed President Roosevelt on November 29 that he thought this would be bad tactics vis-à-vis of Germany and suggested instead that the Allied Governments concerned should work out terms together and make them generally known to the German people.

Mr. Eden suggests that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by the European Advisory Commission. He hopes that, if the United States Government agree, they will send appropriate instructions in this sense to their representative on the Commission.

121

U.S. State Department (December 23, 1943)

740.00119 EW 1939/2057½

The President to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 23, 1943

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

This I think should be taken up by Winant with Prime Minister Churchill as soon as the latter gets back. It was not brought up in any way at Tehran in my presence.

FDR

122

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President 

Moscow, 23 December 1943
Secret

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

Referring to your cable to me USnavcom 211720 of December, I beg respectfully to mention that the request Stalin made to you and the Prime Minister at Tehran was for the fulfillment of the Soviet request for a specific number of Italian ships, namely one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for dispatch to North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of mer[chant] shipping for use in the Black Sea.

After some discussion both you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Soviet request should be approved and that the delivery of the ships was to be made by the 1st of February. No mention was made at Moscow or Tehran of their getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured.

I believe Stalin expects all the ships he requested will be turned over to the Soviet Government’s control by February first.

If for any reason it is not now advisable to meet this commitment on time I recommend that the facts be given to the British Minister and myself in Moscow as promptly as possible with instructions that we go directly to Stalin to explain to him the situation in full. Under this method of handling I have no doubt that Stalin will be reasonable and cooperative. On the other hand if the commitment cannot be carried out and we wait for him to bring pressure on us to carry out our earliest commitment resulting from Tehran I am afraid that suspicion might be aroused in his mind or in the minds of his associates who were not present as to the firmness of the other commitments taken at Tehran.

I interpret your cable as being for my information and if queried by Molotov will simply advise him that you are giving active consideration to the matter.

123

U.S. State Department (December 24, 1943)

The British Ambassador to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 24, 1943

Dear Mr. President, Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in your telegram No. 422 of December 21 to the Prime Minister,” has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which you sent to Mr. Harriman.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

There is a further point on which there appears to be some uncertainty in London. According to our record of what was said at Tehran, it seems to have been agreed there between yourself and the Prime Minister to assign “a battleship and a cruiser” for Soviet use “about the end of January,” the title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of Germany. The suggestion mentioned in your telegram to Mr. Harriman of handing over to the Russians a third of surrendered Italian ships appears to be a different one. (The request which the Soviet Government made at the Moscow Conference was for one battleship, one cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.)

Eden has not specifically asked me to put to you the point contained in this last paragraph, but he has put it to our Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, who may therefore be speaking to Harriman about it.

Believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,
HALIFAX

124

U.S. State Department (December 27, 1943)

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President

Moscow, 27 December [1943]
Secret
Unnumbered.

Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.

At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc., paraphrase of which follows:

There is no objection in principle, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airdromes for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.

With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943.

Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations. Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:

Under point A of the President’s memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow.

With reference to weather information referred to in the President’s memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.

[In] Regard to the other questions contained in the President’s memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time.

In making this statement Mr. Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words “at the present time.”

I thereupon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date. Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin had made this quite clear.

I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin’s objectives.

Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.

Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.