In Washington –
Morgenthau asks reconstruction bank for world
Treasury Secretary urges $10-billion setup to promote prosperity in the post-war era
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In Washington –
Leather pool squeezes U.S., attorney says
Justice Department asks investigation of British-dominated monopoly
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FCC bans hold on 2 air bands
Dual radio ownership to end June 1
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Thanksgiving Day! (1943)
By Fred S. Wertenbach, Press staff writer
We thank Thee, Lord!
For little homes that nestle back
A short ways from the beaten track.
For windows where a warming light
Guides our step when comes the night.
For baby folk, whose soft arms make
Bonds of love we would not break.
For women who, with arms flung wide,
Wait to heal our hurts – and pride.
For this, our land, whose brave sons fight
On distant shores, for truth and right.
For peace to come, that fires may glow
On every hearthstone here below
For these Thy gifts; for work and play
Humbly on this Thanksgiving Day.
We thank Thee, Lord!
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
Ernie Pyle is on his way overseas again. His column will be resumed shortly after he arrives at an unannounced point somewhere in the Mediterranean Theater.
Washington –
When I came east from New Mexico, I thought it might be nice to ride the train for a change, since I’d traveled only by auto, air and water for the past six years.
When I went to the depot, I found that getting on a train these days is about as hard as getting on a plane. They had orders not to make any reservations out of Albuquerque for two months. But the agent did have one lone space which he’d been hoarding – it was for a bedroom on the Santa Fe Chief. I decided to take it.
In the first place, I’d never had anything so flossy on a train as a bedroom. That’s really getting classy, and I enjoy a shot of class once in a while to break the monotony. Further, I thought a private bedroom would be just the thing for me to do some writing during the 27-hour journey to Chicago.
The train was fine and the bedroom was fine. Nothing was the railroad’s fault. But the next time I take a trip, I’m going to ride the rods. I’m apparently just not the train-bedroom type. For at night, I couldn’t sleep because of the air-conditioning, and in the daytime, I got so lonesome, all shut in there by myself, that I sat in the club car all the time. On my next splurge of railroad class, I guess I’d better hire a whole car and ask a few friends to come along.
Barber’s last haircut is silent
I had one experience on the train I hadn’t counted on. I got a haircut. Yep, right on the train, while crossing Illinois at 70 miles an hour. The Chief has practically everything.
The barber was a sleight, grayish man of upper middle age. He never said a word during the whole operation. And then just as he finished, he said:
You’ve had the distinction, slight as it is, of getting my last haircut in 55 years of barbering!
Now that is a distinction, so I asked for the details. It seems he was retiring from the railroad forever when we hit Chicago a few minutes later. He was going to give away all his barber tools, keeping only one razor, a hone and a strop for himself.
The barber’s name is William F. Obermeyer, and his home is in Los Angeles. He is 69 and therefore has been barbering since he was 14. He has spent 41 of those 55 years on the railroad, 30 of them with the Santa Fe.
He didn’t seem excited about the impending end of such a long career, but I guess he was, for several other passengers said he told them about it, too.
Oregon man shows appreciation
This next item falls under the “virtue is its own reward” department.
Do you remember last fall in Sicily when I was writing about the 3rd Division’s engineers repairing the Point Calava demolition, and how two soldiers especially worked on and one with more fervor and sincerity than anybody need expect of them?
Well, now comes a letter from a man in Hillsboro, Oregon, wanting to know how he could get in touch with them so he could send them $100 apiece, just out of gratitude.
His letter says:
Such men are not common, and I want to show them that I appreciate such actions and perseverance.
I’m not giving the man’s name, because I haven’t time to write and fine out whether he would object to being named. Then the two boys were Cpls. Gordon Uttach of Merrill, Wisconsin, and Alvin Tolliver of Alamosa, Colorado. I hope the Samaritan finds them, and that they enjoy their $100.
Ernie expresses his thanks
We’ve had some amusing instances of how sketchily people read these days.
While I was on vacation, some of the papers reprinted old columns starting back as far as eight years ago. In one month, those reprint columns roamed all the way from Alaska to Argentina. Each one carried an editor’s note above it, and told what year the column was written.
Yet we’ve had dozens of remarks indicating that readers hadn’t read the editor’s noted at all, and thought I was literally jumping from Dutch Harbor to Pearl Harbor to French Guiana overnight. There was even one advertising agency man in New York who, after reading the reprint of a 1938 Guatemala column, called up Washington and wanted to know how soon I’d be back from Central America.
That’s all for now. There will be a pause in the columns while I get to where I’m going. Take care of yourselves here in America, and thanks for being so nice to me during my two-month respite from war.
Pegler: On the Patton incident
By Westbrook Pegler
New York –
If Gen. Eisenhower thinks Gen. Patton is indispensable, he should be allowed to keep him on the job, for certainly the public humiliation inflicted on Patton for berating and striking a sick soldier and kicking up a scene in a hospital cannot be regarded as a temptation.
But the incident can serve to revise a popular notion that a profane tongue and a brutal disposition are the characteristics of a good soldier. Patton happens to be a good soldier in spite of these faults and, while his absolute fearlessness and his drive and ability are recognized by others, he is not admired personally.
The majority of the officers of the Regular Army are remarkably well-mannered and clean of speech and gentlemen in the true meaning of the word. The reserves and the new officers who did not go through the Military Academy are about as they were in civilian life, subject, however, to any improvement that might have been wrought by the code of the regulars.
We had in our public life a few years ago a former officer who, all his life, both in the Army and in his civilian career, affected a hardboiled manner and who was encouraged to excesses by his publicity which presented him as merely rugged when he was, in fact, so profane and vulgar that sensitive people sometimes gave him up.
Rebuked by civilian
On one occasion, he was rebuked by a civilian at a social gathering for using disgusting language which he apparently thought was only picturesque.
Another officer, a general who had been his classmate at the Military Academy, once commented privately that he was sick and tired of hearing civilians remark that his old comrade was the salt of the earth, for he regarded him as just a dirty man and recalled that in their cadet days he was shunned by many of the corps for just that reason.
However, the man did have ability and great energy and imagination, and so enjoyed a fairly successful career, notwithstanding.
Those who have a chance to associate with officers at West Point cannot fail to be impressed by their gentlemanly manners and speech. I have sat through meals and spent hours at evening gatherings with groups of them and noted the absence of expressions which most civilians allow themselves for purposes of emphasis or to attract attention.
This certainly does not mean that they are prigs, for if an occasion requires force and emphasis, they usually have plenty at their command. And, although Patton’s bravery is as famous as his bullying ways, there are others just as brave who also have the respect and the deep personal loyalty of their subordinates.
Patton was with Gen. Pershing in Mexico and went to France with him as a captain and may have thought he was using Pershing as a model, because Pershing could swear resoundingly when he was in a temper and he wasn’t what anyone could have called a fatherly commander.
Pershing a dignified soldier
But Pershing did have dignity and would not have encouraged the war correspondents to call him Old Blood and Guts, a title in which Patton apparently gloried. For contrast, there was another captain who went to France and caught Pershing’s eye who has come far since then without ever resorting to the language of the gutter or the manners of a thug.
That would be Gen. George Marshall, who has outrun Patton all the way, and might be President of the United States sometime after the war.
The punishment imposed on Patton was absolutely unique and undoubtedly will curb him, for now he surely understands that he will be watched closely and that if he ever repeats the offense, he will be relieved and probably court-martialed. It might even teach him to clean up his language for he must realize that he has overplayed his role in which he imposed on men who couldn’t talk or strike back.
All this being so, Gen. Eisenhower would seem to have acted with wisdom as well as force and originality, for it probably means that he keeps a strong able officer and cures an evil condition which had to be challenged some time. If Patton had been allowed to get away with this outrageous conduct, then every other officer and noncom would have been justified in acting likewise.
Ban on profit in relief for Europe urged
Equal distribution without trade advantages sought by UNRRA
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Elbie Fletcher gets call from Navy
Pirates first sacker takes final physical exam in Boston next Tuesday
By Dick Fortune
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Poll: Public favors strict control over Germany
21% favor complete destruction of country after the war
By George Gallup, Director, American Institute of Public Opinion
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Thanksgiving programs on air for your boy
Football and fine entertainment scheduled
By Si Steinhauser
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Völkischer Beobachter (November 25, 1943)
Eisenhower nach Washington –
Sowjetgeneralstab für London
dnb. Genf, 24. November –
Nach einer Reuter-Meldung aus Washington werden dort zur Zeit bestimmte Pläne eingehend besprochen, die auf die engste Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem sowjetischen Oberkommando in Moskau und dem anglo-amerikanischen Oberkommando in London abzielen.
Reuter zufolge soll in Aussicht genommen sein, daß der bisherige Generalstabschef der USA, General Marshall, sein Hauptquartier als Oberbefehlshaber der anglo-amerikanischen Streitkräfte in London errichtet. Er werde Offiziere der Sowjetarmee in seinen Generalstab aufnehmen. General Eisenhower soll von seinem bisherigen Posten als Oberbefehlshaber im Mittelmeer nach Washington als Generalstabschef berufen werden.
Für England noch gut genug –
Wirtschaftskrieg hinter den Kulissen
tc. Lissabon, 24. November –
Nach Washingtoner Meldungen hat das USA.-Kriegsproduktionsamt die Forderung erhoben, daß die Engländer ihre Kohlenproduktion auf ein Höchstmaß steigern sollen, damit die nordamerikanischen Bergwerke entlastet werden könnten. Um den Engländern die schnelle Steigerung der Kohlenförderung zu ermöglichen, erklären sich die Nordamerikaner bereit, den Briten sofort Fördereinrichtungen für die Kohlengruben zu überlassen. Hiebei soll es sich um veraltete Fördereinrichtungen handeln. In Washington ist man aber der Ansicht, daß diese alten Fördereinrichtungen für den englischen Bergbau noch gut genug sind, da der britische Bergbau nach Ansicht nordamerikanischer Fachkreise rückständig ist.
Wie man sieht, hat Washington sich ein neues Terrain ausgesucht, um auf Kosten des britischen Verbündeten seine Wirtschaftsmacht zu stärken. Die Nordamerikaner wollen jetzt schon alle Schritte einleiten, um im Kohlenbergbau für die Friedenszeit so gerüstet zu sein, daß die englische Konkurenz das Nachsehen hat.
Bezeichnend für das Mißtrauen gegenüber England ist der in USA.-Wirtschaftskreisen zum Ausdruck gebrachte Verdacht, England sei trotz des Krieges dabei, riesige Kohlenvorräte zu horten, um nach dem Kriege sofort als großer Kohlenexporteur das internationale Feld zu beherrschen. Den Engländern wirft man vor, ihre Kohlenpolitik sei darauf abgestellt, die USA zu veranlassen, während des Krieges die Kohlenvorräte bis aufs äußerste in Anspruch zu nehmen, um hei Kriegsschluß in den USA nur noch einen schwachen wirtschaftlichen Konkurrenten zu haben.
Dieser britischen Absicht, so erklärt man, müsse rechtzeitig ein Riegel vorgeschoben werden. Wie frühere Wirtschaftsvorgänge, so beweisen auch diese, daß das Mißtrauen auf beiden Seiten ständig im Wachsen begriffen ist. Auf die machtgierige Ölpolitik folgt nun die Kohlenpolitik, und jede Partei versucht eifersüchtig, ihre Position auf Kosten der anderen zu stärken.
Neue Strömungen gegen Roosevelt –
McArthur als Verschwörer
dnb. Stockholm, 24. November –
Die demokratische und ein Teil der republikanischen Presse in den Vereinigten Staaten richtet nach einer Meldung von Folkets Dagblad heftige Anklagen gegen General McArthur.
Er wird beschuldigt, die Seele einer gegen Roosevelt gerichteten Verschwörung zu sein. Trotz Seiner Stellung als. Angehöriger der USA.-Wehrmacht habe McArthur offen gegen Roosevelt zu intrigieren begonnen. Seine Freunde, vor allem der Isolationist Senator Vandenberg, hätten über das Hauptorgan der Isolationisten, die Chicago Tribune, eine kräftige Agitation zur Ernennung McArthurs zum Oberbefehlshaber der USA.-Wehrmacht eingeleitet. Nach dem USA.-Korrespondenten der Daily Mail habe sich auch der Gouverneur in Wisconsin, La Follette, und dessen progressionistische Partei hinter McArthur gestellt.
U.S. State Department (November 25, 1943)
U.S. draft of the communiqué, with amendments by the President’s special assistant
November 25, 1943
Draft of communiqué
President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. The time, place, and scope of our joint offensives in this area cannot now be disclosed, but Japan will know of their power.
We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to so militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever, and the territory [all conquered, violence & greed] they have [occupied belonging to the Dutch] so treacherously stolen from the [Dutch and the] Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.
We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our three countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, who took part with the Generalissimo in several of the conferences with our military leaders.
The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by: Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; [Steinhardt] Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.
British representatives were: General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.
The Chinese mission include [among others]: General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [Hsuan-ch’eng]; and Lt. General Chow [Chou] Chih-jou.
Revised U.S. draft of the communiqué
November 25, 1943
Draft of communiqué
President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and their respective military leaders, have completed a conference somewhere in Africa. They issued the following joint statement:
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations directed against Japan from China and Southeast Asia. The plans, the details of which cannot be disclosed, provide for continuous and increasingly vigorous offensives against the Japanese. We are determined to bring unrelenting pressure against our brutal enemy by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already underway. Japan will know of its power.
We are determined that the islands in the Pacific which have been occupied by the Japanese, many of them made powerful bases contrary to Japan’s specific and definite pledge not to militarize them, will be taken from Japan forever.
The territory that Japan has so treacherously stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa, will of course be returned to the Republic of China. All of the conquered territory taken by violence and greed by the Japanese will be freed from their clutches.
We are mindful of the treacherous enslavement of the people of Korea by Japan, and are determined that that country, at the proper moment after the downfall of Japan, shall become a free and independent country.
We know full well that the defeat of Japan is going to require fierce and determined fighting. Our countries are pledged to fight together until we have received the unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Generalissimo was accompanied by his wife, Madam Chiang Kai-shek.
The conference was attended on behalf of the United States by Admiral William D. Leahy; General George C. Marshall; Admiral Ernest J. King; General H. H. Arnold; Lt. General B. B. Somervell; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Rear Admiral Ross McIntire; Mr. Harry Hopkins; Ambassador W. Averell Harriman; Ambassador J. G. Winant; Ambassador Steinhardt; Mr. L. Douglas; Mr. J. J. McCloy.
British representatives were General Sir Alan Brooke; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal; Admiral Sir A. Cunningham; Lord Leathers; Lt. General Sir Hastings Ismay.
The Chinese mission included, among others, General Shang Chen; Dr. Wang Chung-hui; Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan-chen [Hsuan-ch’eng]; and Lt. General Chow [Chou] Chih-jou.
British draft of the communiqué
November 25, 1943
10 Downing Street
Whitehall
Press communiqué
President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued:
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria Formosa, [?] shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence ad greed. The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in views the three Allies, in harmony with [?] the United Nations, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Roosevelt-Cadogan conversation, forenoon
Roosevelt-Leathers luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Lord Leathers | |
| Mr. Douglas | ||
| Ambassador Winant | ||
| Assistant Secretary of War McCloy |
According to Elliott Roosevelt, the principal subject of conversation was supply.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshall Dill | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Admiral Mountbatten (for item 1 only) | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Captain Royal |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
November 25, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Operations in the Southeast Asia Command
At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mountbatten gave an account of his meeting with the Generalissimo the day before on the subject of the plan of operations in the Burma campaign. At this meeting the Generalissimo insisted that the alternative plan of campaign should be carried out, the plan for which, in fact, the resources were not available and which demanded an additional 535 transport aircraft.
When Admiral Mountbatten expressed his opinion that these aircraft could not be found and insisted that in this event it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to give his enthusiastic and personal support to the less extensive plan being put into effect, the Generalissimo acceded but said that first the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be asked formally to provide the aircraft necessary for the more extensive plan.
The Generalissimo also insisted that an amphibious operation should be carried out at the same time as the land operation in North Burma.
The Prime Minister gave the Generalissimo the details of the British Fleet to be available at which the Generalissimo expressed great pleasure.
Also, the Prime Minister informed him that the amphibious operation would not affect the land battle.
The Generalissimo made the point that it would, in that it would draw off part of the enemy air forces available.
Sir Charles Portal then made it clear that this would act both ways and that for an amphibious operation to be carried out at the same time as a land operation would mean that the whole air force would not be made available for the land operation.
General Arnold said that possibly 25 aircraft could be made available but that the figure of 535 might be impossible to find without taking aircraft away from other operations to which they had already been allotted.
In regard to the amphibious operation, Sir Alan Brooke said that the Generalissimo must be told that he must wait for the answer as it depends upon progress at SEXTANT. The question of air lift to China was then discussed.
Admiral Mountbatten said that the Generalissimo had been told that the average air lift over the “hump” for a period of six months during the course of the operation would be 8,900 tons per month.
The Generalissimo had demanded that the full 10,000 tons per month should be made available.
Admiral Mountbatten had made it clear that this was only a target figure which, indeed, had not been reached hitherto.
The Generalissimo had then said that he would deal direct with General Somervell in the matter.
General Arnold said that he would like the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide that support should not be given to the Chinese Air Force over and above that which had already been agreed upon.
Admiral Mountbatten asked that it should be accepted as a principle that if there should be an increase in the transport available over the “hump,” the right to use that additional transport should be reserved to the Southeast Asia Command.
General Marshall said this acceptance could not be given without reference to the President.
Admiral Mountbatten said that in view of the important issues involved, it was necessary to get a written agreement from the Generalissimo regarding the Burma campaign to be carried out before the monsoon in 1944. He understood that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic support and had accepted the implication of reduced air lift.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that it would not be possible to find the additional 535 aircraft that would be required for the more ambitious plan of campaign in North Burma to be adopted, and for the increased tonnage over the “hump.”
b. Took note that Admiral Mountbatten would draw up a paper for submission to the Generalissimo with a view to getting the latter’s written agreement to the Burma operations now contemplated; this paper to be submitted for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible in view of the impending departure of the Generalissimo from SEXTANT.
c. Agreed that it would be very desirable if Admiral Mountbatten would get a clearance to this paper in view of the dealings he had already had with the Generalissimo in the matter.
Approval of decisions of CCS 129th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 129th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners to have the Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December.
OVERLORD and the Mediterranean
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Discussed the subject of “OVERLORD and the Mediterranean” in closed session.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 25 November 1943
CCS 408
Secret
Command of British and U.S. forces operating against Germany
- Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:
a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.
b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.
c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.
-
Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.
-
These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, overall objective – Defeat of Germany. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.
-
The United States Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive overall command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.
-
In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day-to-day operational basis, of the United States Air Forces in both the U.K. and Mediterranean by day and RAF bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.
-
The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area. We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.
-
The United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British Chiefs of Staff:
a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
b. That an overall commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.
c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.
d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and
a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations;
b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and materiel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and
c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill
Cairo, 25 November 1943
Most secret
-
The difficulties and short-comings in our conduct of the war since the Battle of Salerno have arisen from divergencies of view between our two Staffs and Governments. It is not seen how these divergencies would be removed by the appointment of a Supreme Commander working under the Combined Chiefs of the Staff and liable to have his decisions reversed by them. The divergencies, which are political as much as military, would still have to be adjusted by the present methods of consultation between the Combined Staffs and the Heads of the two Governments. Thus, the Supreme Commander, after being acclaimed as the world war-winner, would in practice find his functions restricted to the narrow ground between the main decisions of policy and strategy which can only be dealt with by the present methods, and the spheres of the two chief regional Commanders.
-
This would certainly not be sufficient to justify arousing all the expectations and setting up all the apparatus inseparable from the announcement of a “Supreme Commander for the defeat of Germany.”
-
On the other hand, if the power of decision is in fact accorded to the Supreme Commander, the work of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff would be virtually superseded and very great stresses would immediately arise between the Governments and the Supreme Commander. Without going into personalities, it is greatly to be doubted whether any single officer exists who would be capable of giving decisions over the vast range of problems now dealt with by the Heads of Government assisted by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff.
-
The principle which should be followed as far as possible between Allies of equal status is that the Command in any theatre should go to the Ally who has the largest forces deployed or about to be deployed there. On this it would be natural that the Command in the Mediterranean should be British and that the Command of OVERLORD should be American. Such Commands would also correspond with the outlook of the two Governments, the Americans regarding OVERLORD of overwhelming importance, while the British believe that the greatest and most immediate results can be obtained in the Mediterranean and that OVERLORD is a knock-out blow, the timing of which must be settled in relation to the condition and dispositions of the enemy.
-
If the two Commands are merged under a Supreme Commander, the British would have available against Germany in May decidedly larger forces than the United States. It would therefore appear that the Supreme Command should go to a British officer. I should be very reluctant, as Head of His Majesty’s Government, to place such an invidious responsibility upon a British officer. I have very little doubt that he would concentrate his main effort on the Mediterranean and treat the OVERLORD sphere as a highly important but none the less residuary legatee. This point of view would certainly not be accepted by the Government or Staff of the United States. If, on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance of forces involved, the Supreme Command was given to a United States officer and he pronounced in favour of concentrating on OVERLORD irrespective of the injury done to our affairs in the Mediterranean, His Majesty’s Government could not possibly agree. The Supreme Commander, British or American, would therefore be placed in an impossible position. Having assumed before the whole world the responsibility of pronouncing and being overruled by one Government or the other, he would have little choice but to resign. This might bring about a most serious crisis in the harmonious and happy relations hitherto maintained between our two Governments.
-
It is not seen why the present arrangement should not continue, subject to any minor improvements that can be suggested. Under this arrangement, an American Commander would conduct the immense Operation OVERLORD and a British Commander would conduct the war in the Mediterranean, their action being concerted and forces assigned by the Combined Chiefs of the Staff working under the Heads of the two Governments. Regular periodic conferences should be held at Gibraltar between the two Commanders, at which they could adjust minor differences about the movement of units, landing-craft etc., so as to help each other as much as possible, and they should also prepare together the timing and concert of their respective operations. More frequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also be arranged, and possibly visits of one weeks’ duration by the Chairman of each Chiefs of Staff Committee alternately to London and Washington.