America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

6823

Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Secret

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 4 E 859, Office of Assistant Secretary of War, on Saturday, 21 August 1943, at 1500

Members Present
Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring (Acting Chairman) Col. G. A. Rickards
Mr. J. Wesley Jones (Rept’g Mr. James C. Dunn) Mr. R. E. Barclay (Rept’g Sir Ronald Campbell)
Captain H. L. Pence, USN
Others Present
Col. David Marcus Captain C. K. Lloyd
Major C. C. Hilliard Lt. Col. C. A. de Linde
Mr. William H. Taylor Sir David Waley
Lt. (jg) F. F. Fowle, USNR
Secretariat
Col. R. J. Laux (Acting) Major C. W. Garnett
  1. Surrender Terms for Italy (CCS 258 and 258/1)

General Hilldring stated that there were the following three documents before the Committee for their consideration and approval:
a. A comprehensive document containing all the surrender terms for Italy entitled Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, upon which U.S. and British authorities are in general agreement.

b. A document containing the political, economic and fiscal conditions of surrender to supplement the military terms now in General Eisenhower’s possession entitled Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government, upon which U.S. and British authorities are not entirely in agreement.

c. A document to serve as a guide to General Eisenhower in effecting and implementing the terms of surrender entitled Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia, upon which U.S. and British authorities are not in agreement.

The Committee proceeded to take up the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy.

Mr. Barclay suggested the following changes in this document:
a. That the words “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender” at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble be changed to read as follows:

And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations.

b. That there be deleted from Article 22 the second sentence which reads as follows:

The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.

Mr. Taylor called attention to the fact that the second sentence of Article 23, and in particular the words “free of cost” in this sentence, were final and unequivocal and would prohibit the possibility of negotiations between the Italian Government and the United Nations. The sentence in question reads as follows:

The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations.

After discussion concerning the suggested alterations in Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, the Committee: Agreed,
a. That the words “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender” at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble should be amended to read:

And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations.

b. That the second sentence of Article 22 be deleted.
c. That the second sentence of Article 23 stand in its present form.
d. That the document, Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, as amended in paragraphs a, b, and c, above, is approved.

The Committee then proceeded to discuss the document entitled Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government.

Mr. Barclay stated that comments from London on this document had not been received and that therefore no final action could be taken by the British Members.

Captain Lloyd made the following suggestions with respect to this document:
a. That there should be a Preamble at the beginning and a place for signatures at the end of the document.
b. That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted. The sentence is as follows:

The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or, participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.

c. That Article 21b should be deleted and Article 21a should become Article 21. Article 21b reads as follows:

The Italian Government will immediately surrender all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with the plants for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in all occupied countries, and all enemy countries.

d. That there appears to be some inconsistency between Article 6, which provides for suspension of powers of the Italian Government in all occupied areas, and Article 17, which provides that local administrative authorities and public services will continue to function.

Mr. Jones, referring to Articles 7 and 8a of this document and Article 8 of the draft Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia, stated that it seemed inconsistent that the Directive provides for the suspension of all prerogatives of the Crown, whereas the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government contains no such provision.

Mr. Barclay stated that while it would no doubt be true that the powers of the Crown would be suspended in occupied areas, he very much doubted whether London would accept any such provision with regard to unoccupied areas. He stated further that he anticipated that the British authorities in London might ask for deletion of Article 8a.

Captain Lloyd made the following additional suggestions with respect to the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government:
a. That Article 14 referring to Italian shipping be amended to include all Axis shipping.

b. That there be included in this document an Article similar to Article 1c of the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons or authorities to refrain from destruction of or damage to any property.

After discussion with respect to the suggested changes in the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government, the Committee: Agreed,
a. That the document include a preamble relating it to the military terms of surrender, and a place for signatures of the signatory parties.

b. That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted.

c. That the Article 21b should be deleted and Article 21a should become Article 21.

d. That further consideration would be given by both British and U.S. authorities to the questions raised with respect to Articles 6, 8a and 17, concerning the suspension of the powers of the Italian Government and the prerogatives of the Crown.

e. That Article 14 relating to Italian shipping should be amended to include all Axis shipping.

f. That a provision should be added similar to Article 1c of Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons and authorities to refrain from the destruction of or damage to property.

g. That the amendments and questions referred to above would be cleared informally by the Secretaries.

General Hilldring stated that all differences as to Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government should be settled quickly and informally in order that this document, together with the Draft of Surrender of Italy, and statements as to the advantages and disadvantages of each document, may be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision as to which of the documents should be used.

Mr. Barclay recommended that the views of the British and U.S. Members as to the advantages and disadvantages of the two documents be combined in a single memorandum to accompany the documents when they are forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Committee: Agreed,
That a joint note should be prepared, setting forth the views of the British and American authorities with respect to the two documents, to be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the documents themselves.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6824

Hull-Mackenzie King meeting, about 4 p.m.

Present
United States Canada
Secretary Hull Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Hull called on Mackenzie King at the Citadel shortly after 4 o’clock and the two went for a drive, during which they discussed the question of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.

6825

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Rear Admiral McIntire

The “household” and McIntire dined together. The “household” presumably included Mrs. Churchill and Subaltern Mary Churchill at least, and may have included other members of the Roosevelt and Churchill parties.

6826

Hull-Eden meeting, 9 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Atherton Mr. Jebb 
740.0011 EW/8–2143

Department of State Minutes 

August 21, 1943, 9 p.m.

Secret

Political and Civilian Aspects of Military Operations in Planning Future Military Operations on the Continent

Mr. Eden brought up the question of organizing an exchange of views and a coming to agreement between the two governments with respect to the manner of dealing with political considerations in connection with military operations to be undertaken in Allied countries on the continent of Europe now occupied by the Axis. He said that in the first place it would seem advisable to dissipate the impression which had arisen that the Allied military government system now in effect in Sicily would be carried over and put into effect in the liberated countries. He said that while the Allied military government in Sicily, and possibly in Italy and Germany, was perfectly appropriate for use in enemy countries, there was a general objection to the thought of imposing only military government on the populations of the liberated countries where we had constituted governments which had been recognized and which felt they should bear their share of maintenance of order in the civilian administration as soon as possible and in such areas as were not actually under military operations.

The Secretary agreed with this view and said that he himself had given this matter considerable thought, arriving at these same conclusions.

Mr. Eden produced a memorandum which had been drafted in the Foreign Office on this subject and which he said had been conveyed to the AT(E) Committee (Administration of Enemy Territories, Europe), and which he understood had been transmitted to the American authorities.

The Secretary stated that he had no knowledge of this memorandum and, as far as he knew, it had never been received in the State Department.

It came out further that the United States was only represented on the AT(E) by a military observer assigned for that purpose from General Devers’ staff, and that the Department had no participation in its work and functions.

There was considerable discussion then upon the best and most efficient method of thrashing out questions having to do with the civilian aspects of military operations on the Continent, resolving itself into a question of whether the best method was to have agreement between the two governments reached in the Combined Chiefs of Staff or whether some special arrangement should be made for discussions of these matters to take place in London, possibly in connection with the COSSAC organization in London.

Mr. Eden stated that in view of the fact that the British Government was so near to the Continent and that the problems of dealing with the refugee governments and the civilian populations in their countries was of such direct and close interest to the British Government, he could not conceive of dealing with these matters by the roundabout method of cabling back and forth to Washington about matters relating to countries such as France, where they had such intimate political considerations.

He pointed out how well the North African situation had worked out through Macmillan and Murphy, whereupon it was pointed out, in reply, that the President had taken a definite position he did not favor any political representative going into HUSKY, which was a clear indication of the way he was thinking at the present time.

It was decided that this was a matter which would have to be discussed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for eventual decision by the President and Prime Minister.

There was general agreement, however, as to the necessity of setting up some definite machinery for discussing and reaching agreement on these political and civilian aspects of future military operations on the Continent.

Four Power Declaration

The subject of an approach to Russia, with a view to general conversations on subjects of mutual interest to the Soviet, British and U.S. Governments, then came up.

The Secretary told Mr. Eden of the plan which had been discussed by him with the President for a Four Power Declaration to be entered into by Great Britain, U.S., the Soviet Government and China, and showed Mr. Eden a draft which he had prepared for that purpose.

Mr. Eden, after reading the draft, immediately said he liked it and asked for a copy which the Secretary gave him.

Mr. Eden said, without hesitation, that he thought this proposal offered a good basis for an approach to the Soviet Government and, without giving it studied consideration, he thought it would be a good idea for the United States to transmit a copy to the Soviet Government, saying at the same time that a copy had been given to the British Government for its consideration. He said the method of presenting it to the Soviet Government could very well be given further thought while both the U.S. and British officials were still here at Quebec.

It was agreed that this matter would be brought up at the next meeting of the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and the Secretary.

Conversations at Washington on Monetary Stabilization and Related Subjects, and Commercial Policy in Connection with Article VII of the U.S.-U.K. Lend-Lease Agreement

The Secretary then brought up the memorandum handed to him by Lord Halifax, suggesting that high-ranking British officials come to Washington to discuss these subjects.

Mr. Eden said he knew very little about this subject.

The Secretary said he particularly did not want to have these conversations formalized, that he preferred to have the financial subjects treated as a continuation of conversations which were already in course with the U.S. Treasury and that the other subjects he wished kept in the form of exchanges of views for the purpose of drawing up an agenda of topics to be discussed rather than the [with a] view to coming to any agreements on the matters themselves.

The Secretary continued that he did not think it was perhaps the best idea to give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous agreement on these matters before other governments were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions.

Mr. Eden said that he would see that the matter of the representatives coming to Washington was handled in a way satisfactory to the Secretary.

Dependent Peoples

The Secretary then raised the subject of dependent peoples for the third time in the Quebec discussions.

Mr. Eden said to be perfectly frank he had to say that he did not very much like the American draft on this subject. He said it was the word “independent” which troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire system, which was built on the basis of Dominion and Colonial status. He said that, according to the British thought Dominion status provided for self-government and as a matter of fact through the popular institutions now in force in the Dominions it was always possible for the Dominions, if they so desired, to take the further step of declaring their own independence, although none of them had done so nor had shown any desire to do so up to the present time.

He pointed out that under the British Empire system you had varying degrees of self-government in the units, mentioning the Dominion status, the status of Ireland, which was somewhat different but still within the Empire, and, running from those degrees of self-government down through the Colonial establishments which had in some cases, like Malta, complete self-government, to other more backward areas which, he confessed, were never likely to have their own government. He said that Australia and New Zealand – Dominions themselves – had Colonial possessions which they would be unwilling to remove from their supervisory jurisdiction.

The Secretary said that the thought behind his dealing with this problem had been to give encouragement to the peoples in dependent areas, not with any view to their being given, tomorrow or next week, complete independence as a separate entity, but to offer them, at some time when they might have proved that they were capable of independence, the possibility of so conducting their political development that they might hope for this achievement at some future time. He said that often, when you were stating a principle, it was useful to give an example which clearly represented the end in view. He cited in this respect the attitude of the United States toward the Philippines, that independence had always been held out to them as a possibility if and when they were able to carry out the responsibilities that go with such status.

Mr. Eden’s position was absolutely unchanged at the end of the discussion of this subject and it was perfectly clear that it was the word “independence” which he found could never have a satisfactory meaning which would cover what various governments might have in mind by this term.

Germany and Central Europe

The Secretary asked Mr. Eden how his thoughts were running on the question of dealing with Germany after the war, that is, whether it was to be left as an entity or an attempt was to be made to dismember it.

Mr. Eden replied that while there were some in the British Government who felt that dismemberment of Germany should be imposed on that country, he himself, and he felt that the Cabinet in general were not in favor of imposing a dismemberment on Germany largely because of the impracticability of carrying it out.

He said that he entirely agreed that it would be well, if possible, to bring about a separation of the different parts of Germany if it could be done by a voluntary act of different sections of the country, but that any decision to impose such separate divisions would result in tremendous difficulties for the Allies in its maintenance.

The Secretary said that as we went forward in discussions of this matter those who were studying the question in the State Department appeared to be arriving at this same view as to the difficulties of imposing or maintaining a separation of the different sections of Germany.

It was brought out that American thought in this connection was fearful lest an imposed dismemberment of Germany might merely create a German national slogan for union; that Germany economically must exist for the support of the people of Germany and for this such national systems as canals, railroads, post and telegraph must exist as units; but it was not impossible to consider an economic breakup of Germany whereby in her own interests the decentralization of the State would unconsciously develop. Such a means might be found in providing a Mediterranean port for Southern Germany so that those regions might look south for their access to water rather than be dependent on Northern Germany. Indeed, an area including Fiume and Trieste might be the proper solution.

Cadogan, as well as Eden, gave considerable approval of this, which was an indication that it was very much along the line of some of their post-war planning to bring about, by natural forces, a separation of the German people, and specifically use those ports as southern German access to water.

Mr. Eden went on to say that he, for one, had never been in favor of detaching Bavaria from Germany and setting it up as a separate State with Austria. His view was that it would be more advisable to restore, as a matter of fact, in general lines, the separate States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and form them as a Danubian group. He said that these were matters on which it would be most helpful if there were exchanges of views between the British and U.S. Governments as the thinking developed.

6827

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Foreign Secretary Eden

Eden and Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt and Churchill after dinner and “discussed affairs of state until a late hour.” Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eden at about 10:45 p.m., and the discussion, which lasted until 2 a.m. on August 22, dealt with post-war world organization, the international position of China, and recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is possible that the joint Roosevelt-King press release of August 22 on the establishment of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada, was approved at this time.

6828

Völkischer Beobachter (August 22, 1943)

Der harte Weg nach Europa –
Auf der Suche nach unserer ‚Lindenblattstelle‘

Eigener Bericht des „Völkischen Beobachters“

…

6829

Im Gebiet der Salomeninseln –
Erfolgreiche Seekämpfe der Japaner

…

6830

Das letzte Urteil über Sizilien steht noch aus –
‚Die Alliierten verloren kostbare Zeit‘

…

6831

Das englisch-amerikanische Verhältnis –
‚Angst vor der Verkrüppelung‘

Von unserem Lissaboner Berichterstatter C. E. Frhr. von Merck

…

6832

The Pittsburgh Press (August 22, 1943)

Japs driven from Kiska stronghold; way cleared for attacks on Tokyo

Foe loses toehold in this hemisphere, faces great air and sea blows

…

6833

Raiders cut 3 rail lines near Naples

Allied warships bombard Italian coast, wreck 7 escape boats
By Reynolds Packard, United Press staff writer

…

6834

Surprise Russian move –
Litvinov removed as envoy to U.S.

Shift considered rebuff for delaying action on second front

…

6835

Yanks destroy 73 Jap planes

Another blow dealt foe in New Guinea

…

6836

No secret anymore –
Draft boards ask finances of 3-A men

Data sought on in-laws as preparation goes on to call fathers
By John Troan

…

6837

Legs lost in boobytrap, Yank colonel flies again

Spitfire group commander gets artificial limbs like those used by famed RAF pilot

…

6838

Busy war agencies take enough time to tell you how to spend spare hours

By Daniel M. Kidney, Scripps-Howard staff writer

…

6839

Oil from ‘Big Inch’ reaches New Jersey

…

6840

Yanks put out to find Kiska ‘a ghost camp’

By Russell Annabel, United Press staff writer

…

6841

Kirkpatrick: Presence of Nazis certain to make Italy battleground

Review of situation since Duce’s fall shows that breach between Badoglio and people will widen
By Helen Kirkpatrick

…

6842

Nazi air spies use captured Yank bombers

Planes sneak into Flying Fortress formations to study tactics
By Walter Cronkite, United Press staff writer

…