Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Urgent

My Dear Mr. President: I have received this morning the visit of the Apostolic Delegate who has given me the attached communication which I am sending to you for your information. The Pope requested particularly that these memoranda be brought to your attention as speedily as possible.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

The Apostolic Delegate to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 20, 1943.

No. 244/43

My Dear Mr. Welles, Inasmuch as events of the past few weeks in Sicily and in Italy at large have given great prominence to the prospects for the immediate future, the Holy See wishes to place before the United States government certain observations which have been dictated by its direct contact with these important events.

These reflections aim to evaluate recent and present happenings in the light of the future which they are molding and of the effects which they will have on the formulation of the peace towards which the Holy See continues to bend its every effort.

Trusting that these considerations will receive every attention I avail myself [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea Apostolic Delegate

[Subenclosure 1]
Washington, August 18, 1943.

No. 244/43

Memorandum

In the light of possible imminent developments in the Italian war situation, the Holy See cannot but be preoccupied with the grave consequences of such developments on the Church at large. These preoccupations “are greatly heightened by the determination, public[ly] expressed, that through wholesale bloodshed and destruction, even if this were to lead eventually to national chaos and anarchy, Italy must be forced out of the war.

Were these sad possibilities to be realized, the restricted territorial extent of Vatican City could not possibly prevent it from feeling most acutely the grave consequences of such a military campaign. Vatican City would inevitably become involved in, and perhaps even engulfed by, any serious disorders which might arise.

The noble and spiritual ideals which have assertedly been embodied in the Allied cause would appear to dictate that every precaution should be taken and every measure employed which might safeguard spiritual values and enhance their worth in the eyes of all men. On this point the Holy See recalls with satisfaction and hope the letter of the President of the United States to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, on July 9, 1943. It cannot be denied that the religious sensibilities of millions of Catholics throughout the world would be sorely wounded by injuries, although unintended, which might be inflicted on Vatican City and, consequently, on the Holy See.

Were the Vatican to be cut off or hindered in its communication with the outside world, the nations at large would thus be deprived of one of their most potent sources of inspiration and guidance. Catholics in particular would suffer greatly from lack of contact with their Spiritual Head, and this would most assuredly make itself felt in other fields of activity.

An additional important consideration is found in the fact that at the present time the Vatican City serves as headquarters for all the resident diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations accredited to the Holy See.

For these reasons, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State has asked that every precaution be taken to avoid creating a situation of chaos in Italy, which would make it most difficult, not to say impossible, for the Holy See to continue as the center of government for the Catholic Church.

[Subenclosure 2]
Washington, August 20, 1943.

No. 244/43

Memorandum

The Holy See respectfully offers the following considerations with reference to the avowed intention of the Allies to make Italy feel unrestrainedly the full brunt of the war in every quarter:

  1. Slaughter and destruction, especially when carried out on a large scale, contribute little or nothing to the establishment of genuine peace. These elements of warfare irritate and embitter the civilian population, with the effect of inciting the populace to blind hate against those who punish it by depriving it of everything which it holds most dear.

  2. The destruction and damaging of churches, charitable institutions, and artistic monuments, even when this destruction is not intended, as well as the ruining of civilian homes etc., are doing much harm to the Allied cause. They are actually diminishing the prestige of the United States, which has always been regarded by the Italian people as a nation nurturing great respect for religion, art, and culture. If, unfortunately, at the present time, the passion for war beclouds the clear vision of good judgment, it cannot be denied that, years hence, the American people itself will be the first to deplore and condemn such actions.

  3. A consideration of paramount importance is to be found in the favorable reaction of such a war policy in the interests of Communism. Under the influence of the bitterness engendered by the dread results of war, the people fall an easy prey to Communism, which is ever ready to avail itself of all means afforded by any event of public importance, especially by those of a calamitous nature.

Communism is already making noteworthy progress as the result of war.

The recent demonstrations accompanying the fall of Fascism are sufficient evidence that the Communists are well organized in Italy, and that they have at their disposal both financial means and arms.

Information reaching the Holy See also shows that Communism is making continual progress also in Germany.

These facts are a clear warning of the grave peril that Europe will find itself overrun with Communism immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, August 21, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I have just had with the Apostolic Delegate.

Believe me [etc.]
SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Attitude of Italian Government toward continuation of war.

Participants: The Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate;
Mr. Welles, Acting Secretary.

The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this evening for the second time today. The Archbishop brought with him a copy of a telegram which he had sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State on August 19 and which he read to me. In this telegram the Delegate had informed the Holy See that in his judgment public opinion in the United States was exceedingly uncertain as to whether the policy of the present Italian Government of apparently continuing the war on the side of Germany was a spontaneous decision on the part of the Italian Government or whether it was a decision which was forced upon it by German power. He also said that American public opinion was equally uncertain as to whether the Italian Government sincerely desired to find the ways and means of bringing to an end Italian participation in the war against the United Nations.

The Archbishop then read to me the reply which he had just received from Cardinal Maglione. In this message the Cardinal Secretary of State stated that the Italian Government desired to find as promptly as possible the means of ending its war against the United Nations, and second, that its continued collaboration with Germany was not spontaneous but was forced upon it by the German Government.

I thanked the Delegate for bringing this information so promptly to my attention and I said I would of course immediately refer the message he had given me to the President for his knowledge.

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Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Secret

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 4 E 859, Office of Assistant Secretary of War, on Saturday, 21 August 1943, at 1500

Members Present
Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring (Acting Chairman) Col. G. A. Rickards
Mr. J. Wesley Jones (Rept’g Mr. James C. Dunn) Mr. R. E. Barclay (Rept’g Sir Ronald Campbell)
Captain H. L. Pence, USN
Others Present
Col. David Marcus Captain C. K. Lloyd
Major C. C. Hilliard Lt. Col. C. A. de Linde
Mr. William H. Taylor Sir David Waley
Lt. (jg) F. F. Fowle, USNR
Secretariat
Col. R. J. Laux (Acting) Major C. W. Garnett
  1. Surrender Terms for Italy (CCS 258 and 258/1)

General Hilldring stated that there were the following three documents before the Committee for their consideration and approval:
a. A comprehensive document containing all the surrender terms for Italy entitled Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, upon which U.S. and British authorities are in general agreement.

b. A document containing the political, economic and fiscal conditions of surrender to supplement the military terms now in General Eisenhower’s possession entitled Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government, upon which U.S. and British authorities are not entirely in agreement.

c. A document to serve as a guide to General Eisenhower in effecting and implementing the terms of surrender entitled Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia, upon which U.S. and British authorities are not in agreement.

The Committee proceeded to take up the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy.

Mr. Barclay suggested the following changes in this document:
a. That the words “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender” at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble be changed to read as follows:

And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations.

b. That there be deleted from Article 22 the second sentence which reads as follows:

The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.

Mr. Taylor called attention to the fact that the second sentence of Article 23, and in particular the words “free of cost” in this sentence, were final and unequivocal and would prohibit the possibility of negotiations between the Italian Government and the United Nations. The sentence in question reads as follows:

The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations.

After discussion concerning the suggested alterations in Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, the Committee: Agreed,
a. That the words “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender” at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble should be amended to read:

And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations.

b. That the second sentence of Article 22 be deleted.
c. That the second sentence of Article 23 stand in its present form.
d. That the document, Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, as amended in paragraphs a, b, and c, above, is approved.

The Committee then proceeded to discuss the document entitled Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government.

Mr. Barclay stated that comments from London on this document had not been received and that therefore no final action could be taken by the British Members.

Captain Lloyd made the following suggestions with respect to this document:
a. That there should be a Preamble at the beginning and a place for signatures at the end of the document.
b. That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted. The sentence is as follows:

The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or, participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.

c. That Article 21b should be deleted and Article 21a should become Article 21. Article 21b reads as follows:

The Italian Government will immediately surrender all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with the plants for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in all occupied countries, and all enemy countries.

d. That there appears to be some inconsistency between Article 6, which provides for suspension of powers of the Italian Government in all occupied areas, and Article 17, which provides that local administrative authorities and public services will continue to function.

Mr. Jones, referring to Articles 7 and 8a of this document and Article 8 of the draft Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia, stated that it seemed inconsistent that the Directive provides for the suspension of all prerogatives of the Crown, whereas the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government contains no such provision.

Mr. Barclay stated that while it would no doubt be true that the powers of the Crown would be suspended in occupied areas, he very much doubted whether London would accept any such provision with regard to unoccupied areas. He stated further that he anticipated that the British authorities in London might ask for deletion of Article 8a.

Captain Lloyd made the following additional suggestions with respect to the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government:
a. That Article 14 referring to Italian shipping be amended to include all Axis shipping.

b. That there be included in this document an Article similar to Article 1c of the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons or authorities to refrain from destruction of or damage to any property.

After discussion with respect to the suggested changes in the Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government, the Committee: Agreed,
a. That the document include a preamble relating it to the military terms of surrender, and a place for signatures of the signatory parties.

b. That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted.

c. That the Article 21b should be deleted and Article 21a should become Article 21.

d. That further consideration would be given by both British and U.S. authorities to the questions raised with respect to Articles 6, 8a and 17, concerning the suspension of the powers of the Italian Government and the prerogatives of the Crown.

e. That Article 14 relating to Italian shipping should be amended to include all Axis shipping.

f. That a provision should be added similar to Article 1c of Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons and authorities to refrain from the destruction of or damage to property.

g. That the amendments and questions referred to above would be cleared informally by the Secretaries.

General Hilldring stated that all differences as to Additional Conditions to Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government should be settled quickly and informally in order that this document, together with the Draft of Surrender of Italy, and statements as to the advantages and disadvantages of each document, may be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision as to which of the documents should be used.

Mr. Barclay recommended that the views of the British and U.S. Members as to the advantages and disadvantages of the two documents be combined in a single memorandum to accompany the documents when they are forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Committee: Agreed,
That a joint note should be prepared, setting forth the views of the British and American authorities with respect to the two documents, to be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the documents themselves.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Hull-Mackenzie King meeting, about 4 p.m.

Present
United States Canada
Secretary Hull Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Hull called on Mackenzie King at the Citadel shortly after 4 o’clock and the two went for a drive, during which they discussed the question of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.

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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Rear Admiral McIntire

The “household” and McIntire dined together. The “household” presumably included Mrs. Churchill and Subaltern Mary Churchill at least, and may have included other members of the Roosevelt and Churchill parties.

Hull-Eden meeting, 9 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Atherton Mr. Jebb
740.0011 EW/8–2143

Department of State Minutes

August 21, 1943, 9 p.m.

Secret

Political and Civilian Aspects of Military Operations in Planning Future Military Operations on the Continent

Mr. Eden brought up the question of organizing an exchange of views and a coming to agreement between the two governments with respect to the manner of dealing with political considerations in connection with military operations to be undertaken in Allied countries on the continent of Europe now occupied by the Axis. He said that in the first place it would seem advisable to dissipate the impression which had arisen that the Allied military government system now in effect in Sicily would be carried over and put into effect in the liberated countries. He said that while the Allied military government in Sicily, and possibly in Italy and Germany, was perfectly appropriate for use in enemy countries, there was a general objection to the thought of imposing only military government on the populations of the liberated countries where we had constituted governments which had been recognized and which felt they should bear their share of maintenance of order in the civilian administration as soon as possible and in such areas as were not actually under military operations.

The Secretary agreed with this view and said that he himself had given this matter considerable thought, arriving at these same conclusions.

Mr. Eden produced a memorandum which had been drafted in the Foreign Office on this subject and which he said had been conveyed to the AT(E) Committee (Administration of Enemy Territories, Europe), and which he understood had been transmitted to the American authorities.

The Secretary stated that he had no knowledge of this memorandum and, as far as he knew, it had never been received in the State Department.

It came out further that the United States was only represented on the AT(E) by a military observer assigned for that purpose from General Devers’ staff, and that the Department had no participation in its work and functions.

There was considerable discussion then upon the best and most efficient method of thrashing out questions having to do with the civilian aspects of military operations on the Continent, resolving itself into a question of whether the best method was to have agreement between the two governments reached in the Combined Chiefs of Staff or whether some special arrangement should be made for discussions of these matters to take place in London, possibly in connection with the COSSAC organization in London.

Mr. Eden stated that in view of the fact that the British Government was so near to the Continent and that the problems of dealing with the refugee governments and the civilian populations in their countries was of such direct and close interest to the British Government, he could not conceive of dealing with these matters by the roundabout method of cabling back and forth to Washington about matters relating to countries such as France, where they had such intimate political considerations.

He pointed out how well the North African situation had worked out through Macmillan and Murphy, whereupon it was pointed out, in reply, that the President had taken a definite position he did not favor any political representative going into HUSKY, which was a clear indication of the way he was thinking at the present time.

It was decided that this was a matter which would have to be discussed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for eventual decision by the President and Prime Minister.

There was general agreement, however, as to the necessity of setting up some definite machinery for discussing and reaching agreement on these political and civilian aspects of future military operations on the Continent.

Four Power Declaration

The subject of an approach to Russia, with a view to general conversations on subjects of mutual interest to the Soviet, British and U.S. Governments, then came up.

The Secretary told Mr. Eden of the plan which had been discussed by him with the President for a Four Power Declaration to be entered into by Great Britain, U.S., the Soviet Government and China, and showed Mr. Eden a draft which he had prepared for that purpose.

Mr. Eden, after reading the draft, immediately said he liked it and asked for a copy which the Secretary gave him.

Mr. Eden said, without hesitation, that he thought this proposal offered a good basis for an approach to the Soviet Government and, without giving it studied consideration, he thought it would be a good idea for the United States to transmit a copy to the Soviet Government, saying at the same time that a copy had been given to the British Government for its consideration. He said the method of presenting it to the Soviet Government could very well be given further thought while both the U.S. and British officials were still here at Quebec.

It was agreed that this matter would be brought up at the next meeting of the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and the Secretary.

Conversations at Washington on Monetary Stabilization and Related Subjects, and Commercial Policy in Connection with Article VII of the U.S.-U.K. Lend-Lease Agreement

The Secretary then brought up the memorandum handed to him by Lord Halifax, suggesting that high-ranking British officials come to Washington to discuss these subjects.

Mr. Eden said he knew very little about this subject.

The Secretary said he particularly did not want to have these conversations formalized, that he preferred to have the financial subjects treated as a continuation of conversations which were already in course with the U.S. Treasury and that the other subjects he wished kept in the form of exchanges of views for the purpose of drawing up an agenda of topics to be discussed rather than the [with a] view to coming to any agreements on the matters themselves.

The Secretary continued that he did not think it was perhaps the best idea to give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous agreement on these matters before other governments were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions.

Mr. Eden said that he would see that the matter of the representatives coming to Washington was handled in a way satisfactory to the Secretary.

Dependent Peoples

The Secretary then raised the subject of dependent peoples for the third time in the Quebec discussions.

Mr. Eden said to be perfectly frank he had to say that he did not very much like the American draft on this subject. He said it was the word “independent” which troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire system, which was built on the basis of Dominion and Colonial status. He said that, according to the British thought Dominion status provided for self-government and as a matter of fact through the popular institutions now in force in the Dominions it was always possible for the Dominions, if they so desired, to take the further step of declaring their own independence, although none of them had done so nor had shown any desire to do so up to the present time.

He pointed out that under the British Empire system you had varying degrees of self-government in the units, mentioning the Dominion status, the status of Ireland, which was somewhat different but still within the Empire, and, running from those degrees of self-government down through the Colonial establishments which had in some cases, like Malta, complete self-government, to other more backward areas which, he confessed, were never likely to have their own government. He said that Australia and New Zealand – Dominions themselves – had Colonial possessions which they would be unwilling to remove from their supervisory jurisdiction.

The Secretary said that the thought behind his dealing with this problem had been to give encouragement to the peoples in dependent areas, not with any view to their being given, tomorrow or next week, complete independence as a separate entity, but to offer them, at some time when they might have proved that they were capable of independence, the possibility of so conducting their political development that they might hope for this achievement at some future time. He said that often, when you were stating a principle, it was useful to give an example which clearly represented the end in view. He cited in this respect the attitude of the United States toward the Philippines, that independence had always been held out to them as a possibility if and when they were able to carry out the responsibilities that go with such status.

Mr. Eden’s position was absolutely unchanged at the end of the discussion of this subject and it was perfectly clear that it was the word “independence” which he found could never have a satisfactory meaning which would cover what various governments might have in mind by this term.

Germany and Central Europe

The Secretary asked Mr. Eden how his thoughts were running on the question of dealing with Germany after the war, that is, whether it was to be left as an entity or an attempt was to be made to dismember it.

Mr. Eden replied that while there were some in the British Government who felt that dismemberment of Germany should be imposed on that country, he himself, and he felt that the Cabinet in general were not in favor of imposing a dismemberment on Germany largely because of the impracticability of carrying it out.

He said that he entirely agreed that it would be well, if possible, to bring about a separation of the different parts of Germany if it could be done by a voluntary act of different sections of the country, but that any decision to impose such separate divisions would result in tremendous difficulties for the Allies in its maintenance.

The Secretary said that as we went forward in discussions of this matter those who were studying the question in the State Department appeared to be arriving at this same view as to the difficulties of imposing or maintaining a separation of the different sections of Germany.

It was brought out that American thought in this connection was fearful lest an imposed dismemberment of Germany might merely create a German national slogan for union; that Germany economically must exist for the support of the people of Germany and for this such national systems as canals, railroads, post and telegraph must exist as units; but it was not impossible to consider an economic breakup of Germany whereby in her own interests the decentralization of the State would unconsciously develop. Such a means might be found in providing a Mediterranean port for Southern Germany so that those regions might look south for their access to water rather than be dependent on Northern Germany. Indeed, an area including Fiume and Trieste might be the proper solution.

Cadogan, as well as Eden, gave considerable approval of this, which was an indication that it was very much along the line of some of their post-war planning to bring about, by natural forces, a separation of the German people, and specifically use those ports as southern German access to water.

Mr. Eden went on to say that he, for one, had never been in favor of detaching Bavaria from Germany and setting it up as a separate State with Austria. His view was that it would be more advisable to restore, as a matter of fact, in general lines, the separate States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and form them as a Danubian group. He said that these were matters on which it would be most helpful if there were exchanges of views between the British and U.S. Governments as the thinking developed.

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Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King
Foreign Secretary Eden

Eden and Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt and Churchill after dinner and “discussed affairs of state until a late hour.” Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eden at about 10:45 p.m., and the discussion, which lasted until 2 a.m. on August 22, dealt with post-war world organization, the international position of China, and recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is possible that the joint Roosevelt-King press release of August 22 on the establishment of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada, was approved at this time.

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The Pittsburgh Press (August 22, 1943)

Bickel: Parley plans double punch against enemy

Jab into Western Europe, smash at Japan may come together
By Karl A. Bickel, Scripps-Howard staff writer

Québec, Canada – (Aug. 21)
The Roosevelt-Churchill conference took a sudden shift to the East today.

Rumors that Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell had arrived were a dime a dozen. British Eastern military experts were said to be on the ground. Swinging from the political repercussions of the meetings the “dope” ran to soldiers and sailors, naval changes and a fiercely up stepped tempo in the military planning.

One fading functionary said, as he revived himself on a Scotch and soda:

Our boys are dead on their feet from work.

The strategists are talking about a quick one-two, a short left-arm military jab on the European west coast and a long right swing in the Far East. The Kharkov battle, it is held, has again been underestimated. It was originally regarded as a desperate drive for the capture of a great Soviet city and German strongpoint preliminary to chasing the Germans to the Dnieper.

May break back

Today, the military experts here say that Kharkov is vastly more than that. Kharkov, they assert, is proving to be the point where Stalin is literally breaking the back of the mightiest of the German armies. If the Russians capture Kharkov and secure a real breakthrough, they have either smashed or enclosed the German armies to the south, freed the Caucasus and so endangered the German hold on the Crimea as to make it impossible to hold.

The Dnieper will no longer be sufficient protection and Hitler’s armies may well have to roll back onto Polish and even East Prussian soil. This ism of course, the most optimistic viewpoint but there is no question but that the tempo of things today is vastly swifter than yesterday, that the note is all military.

Stalin’s insistence, that the Western Front is the only front, is still potent with the captains and the kings on the hill, but the war is being regarded as a one-front war now from Russia to Tokyo.

Change strategy

Some observers indeed saw indications of the development of a new strategy involving the abandonment of the theory calling for the initial crushing of Hitler and the slower process of smashing Hirohito.

Instead, they envisaged destruction of Japan on approximately the same time schedule as Berlin. This would have obvious advantages, permitting the democracies to come into the peace conferences with the tremendous asset of a conquered Japan free and clear of any Soviet liens. The United States and Great Britain would then have a stronger position than that of uneasy minority stockholders in the assets of a global war.

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U.S. State Department (August 22, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of War Stimson Mrs. Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Subaltern Mary Churchill
Minister of Information Bracken
Colonel Willis-O’Connor

From Stimson’s diary:

… At the Citadel I was told the President wished to see me for a few minutes before we assembled at lunch and I was shown into a little room where he was waiting alone. He told me that Churchill had voluntarily come to him [at Hyde Park] and offered to accept Marshall for the Overlord operation. This the President said relieved him of the embarrassment of being obliged to ask for it. He also discussed with me Marshall’s successor, mentioning Eisenhower. I told him I already thought of that as a very possible solution.

After this brief talk which very greatly reassured me, we went into lunch at which there were present the President, Churchill, Mrs. Churchill, Subaltern Mary Churchill, Brendan Bracken, Harry Hopkins, and aides of the two generals. I sat between Mr. and Mrs. Churchill who were very cordial and friendly. Before we went in to luncheon, Churchill took me out on the parapet ostensibly to show me the view and then he told me that he had suggested Marshall to the President. He said he had done this in spite of the fact that he had previously promised the position to Brooke and that this would embarrass him somewhat, but he showed no evidence of retreating from his suggestion to the President. I was of course greatly cheered up to find that the whole matter was going so successfully.

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Memorandum by the Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet

Undated

Suggested Statement to Be Made to Mr. Soong

  1. The building up of the air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.

  2. We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bengal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be coordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus to pave the way for the eventual opening of the Ledo Road to China.

  3. An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

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Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:30 p.m.

The President returned to the Citadel at 5:45 p.m., at which time he had a conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden until 7:30 p.m. This conference was resumed between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Atherton

Agenda Prepared by the British Delegation

August 22, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Agenda

  1. Proposed joint U.S.-U.K. declaration about German crimes in Poland. Polish Government has made request for this to U.S. and ourselves.

  2. Civil administration of liberated friendly territory in Europe. Difference between this and AMGOT. Need to make use of exiled governments.

  3. Convoys to Russia. To inform the Americans of line we have taken.

  4. Joint statement on Palestine. American proposal which we approved and want, and they have now abandoned. Can it be re-examined.

  5. Encouragement of fraternization with American troops in U.K. Matter was raised by Secretary of State for War. I should like authority to talk to Gen. Marshall about it.

  6. Policy towards Greece. The King’s appeal to President and Prime Minister.

  7. Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation. Our draft amended declaration.

  8. United Nations’ Four-power Declaration.

  9. Italian Surrender Terms.

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740.0011 EW/8–2243

Department of State Minutes

August 22, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Strictly confidential

The Meeting followed an agenda previously prepared by the British.

Polish Statement

The first subject discussed was the text of the statement to be issued by the two Governments with respect to the atrocities against Polish citizens in the Lublin area where the population was outstandingly Polish. The discussion hinged on a text prepared by the British and which was generally agreed to as appropriate for issuance on the subject at this time even though it was not expected to have any real effect on the situation.

Liberated Areas

There was discussion of the text of a statement which had been prepared by the United States with a view to clearing up misrepresentation and apprehension as to putting military government into effect in the friendly and Allied countries which will be liberated by the military operations undertaken on the Continent against Germany.

With very minor amendments the draft text was adopted with the decision that it would first be conveyed to the Soviet Government and China and the refugee governments directly concerned, with eventual view to publication.

The Prime Minister suggested that the timing of publication would be on or about September 15, which corresponded roughly with the date fixed for the opening of Parliament. This was generally agreed to.

Convoys to Russia

This discussion turned on the text of a communication to the Soviet Government with respect to the temporary suspension of convoys to Russia in view of other military operations, the convoys to be resumed at the end of September or early in October.

Statement on Palestine Situation

The question of a statement with respect to the Palestine situation during the period of the war was discussed and views were exchanged as to the advisability of making any statement at this time and, if so, as to its form.

Both the President and Prime Minister agreed that this question should be held in abeyance and should be discussed further between the two Governments from month to month as the war situation developed, and any decision on the matter was left to the light of these further exchanges of views on the matter.

Fraternization Between U.S. and British Soldiers in the British Isles

It was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that all possible steps should be taken to promote fraternization between the U.S. and British forces in the British Isles and, with a view to accomplishing this end, Mr. Eden should speak to General Marshall, to General Devers and to Norman Davis as to methods for its accomplishment.

The King of Greece

This discussion turned on the subject of the message from the King of Greece recently received by the President and the Prime Minister, in which the King of Greece asked advice from the President and Prime Minister as to the action the King should take, in view of the request of certain Greek elements that His Majesty should not return to Greece until after a plebiscite on the subject of the Monarchy had been held.

At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden read a report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office.

At the further request of the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a communication on the subject from General Smuts, who advocated, as a matter of fair play, that the King of Greece not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject, perhaps, to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek régime.

There was some discussion then on the general subject of the attitude of the British and U.S. Governments toward the constituted governments of the refugee countries. It was decided, in general, that the two Governments should continue to support the governments and régimes as now recognized by them generally through the period up to the defeat of the enemy.

Mr. Hull pointed out that this attitude was in line with the attitude adopted in the statement with respect to administration of liberated areas, decided upon under Subject 2 of the agenda above.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King it was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that the British Foreign Office should reply to the King’s telegram, supporting his contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.

The President said the United States Government would not take any different position.

The Prime Minister further stated, on his own initiative, that the British Government would instruct the British agents who were working with the guerrilla elements in Greece to refrain from encouraging those elements to put forward political claims as to the future form of government of Greece at this time.

The French Committee of National Liberation

After some discussion The Prime Minister stated that all the liberal elements in the world, including the governments in exile and the Soviet Government, were demanding an immediate decision granting full recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation.

The President took the view that we had to think of the future of France itself, which he felt would be in no way advanced by turning over the whole control of the French people to the present group comprising the French Committee.

After a further rather lengthy discussion, the suggestion of the President was accepted that the President himself draft the form of statement which he thought should be made.

As it was getting late and it was not possible to make further advance on this subject until the two views were further reconciled it was decided to await the President’s draft to which he said he would apply himself that evening.

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800.0146/8–2243

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

Québec Conference, 22 August 1943.

Statement on Liberated Areas

The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved.

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Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 222/3

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic

a. CCS 222/2 indicates that convoy UGS 16, sailing 26 August, has 91 firm presenters as against a convoy limit of 80 ships.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two alternatives:
(i) To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
(ii) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected.

a. With regard to alternative (1), the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for security reasons.

b. The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by the withdrawal of 6 U.S. Army vessels and 2 BMWT vessels from the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded by 3.

c. It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels, at least 3 may fail to meet the convoy sailing date.

Recommendations

  1. It is recommended that:

a. Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority:

  • First withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Second withdrawal – 1 WSA vessel
  • Third withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned.

b. All vessels should be prepared to sail.

  1. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy fix the earliest practical date when a program of four UGS convoys per month will be established.

  2. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegate to the Combined Military Transportation Committee the executive authority to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority:
    a. U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean.
    b. U.S. and British ships destined for India.
    c. U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.
    d. U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.
    e. Ships destined for Persian Gulf.
    f. Lend lease to Turkey.
    g. Miscellaneous.

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Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 317/2

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

Action on CCS 317 has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10a and b of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French forces in North Africa. A decision at this time is necessary because of certain administrative arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event that the recommendations are to be approved.

H. REDMAN
J. K. DEANE

Combined Secretariat

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740.0011 EW/8–2243

Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Adviser on Political Relations

Washington, August 22, 1943.

Secret

PA/D – Mr. Dunn The attached message was left with me yesterday by an officer of the OSS. It is of interest as another “feeler” and channel from the Badoglio Govt.… the author of the message is Dulles. I told the OSS to make no reply to the question raised by the latter.

J WESLEY JONES

[Attachment]
Bern, August 20, 1943.

A reliable cutout has transmitted to me a report from … which states that Italy, according to Foreign Minister Guariglia, remains prepared to cease resistance on condition that we can guarantee plane protection against the Nazis, and they are willing to open the airports, and so forth. It would seem that … is anxious to be in touch with me directly. It is very possible that Guariglia and Rosso are making use of him here. Until I receive instructions, I am continuing to handle … with care, as an intelligence source only, and by means of cutouts.

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Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government

Québec, August 22, 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States our expectation that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war. It will be for the French people themselves to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It does constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations until during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until the French and Allied authorities are completely liberated soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.


Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government

Québec, August 22(?), 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of French people and French territories from the oppression of the enemy.

The Government of the United States accordingly welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the United States that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the Government of the United States with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, proceed to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

On these understandings, the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge the authority of the Committee.

The Government of the United States notes the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration [in] each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle, in cooperation with all the Allies, until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

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Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Secretary of State

Québec City, August 22, 1943.

Most secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you, herewith, a copy of our draft letter to the Delegate in Canada of the French Committee of National Liberation, about which I think I spoke to you yesterday. I have given a copy to Mr. Churchill and am sending one to the President.

Yours very sincerely,
W. L. MACKENZIE KING

[Enclosure]

Draft Note

Ottawa, August 6, 1943.

Most secret

Draft Note to the French Delegate in Ottawa

Sir, I have the honour to refer to your note of June 11 with which you transmitted the text of the Declaration adopted at Algiers on June 3 by which the French Committee of National Liberation was established.

[Here follows, with minor editorial differences and one difference in phrasing, the text of the Canadian statement on this subject released on August 26, 1943.]

Accept [etc.]

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Harriman-Bracken meeting, early evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Harriman Minister of Information Bracken

From an informal memorandum by Harriman:

Before dinner sold Bracken a bill of goods for Steve Early – that the President and Prime Minister should have a joint Press conference, which Bracken had evidently been opposing with a view to substituting a cocktail party in which newspaper men could mingle with all the Chiefs of Staff.

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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Subaltern Mary Churchill

Roosevelt dined with the Churchill family from 8 to 10 p.m.