By Raymond Clapper
By Hal O’Flaherty
Nipponese appear to possess neither needed brains not machinery
By Ira Wolfert
Agony and torture grip men at home base while ‘their’ bombers are attacking enemy
Placed on same footing as other service branches
Army, Navy men have miniature radio city serving Armed Forces in Dutch Harbor area
By Morley Cassidy, North American Newspaper Alliance
U.S. State Department (August 21, 1943)
|President Roosevelt||Mr. Hopkins|
|Mr. Harriman||Mr. Douglas|
From the informal memorandum by Harriman:
The shipping situation was presented simply and clearly by Lew, both as to troopers and cargo ships. We both emphasized the fact that cargo shipping, against all statements to the contrary, was not easing up but in fact was still the tight bottleneck.
The news about the improvement in the sinkings figures has led to relaxation of people’s worries and this had led to some extent to increased demands in different directions. However, the increased military requirements for existing and future operations more than absorbed the savings.
|United States||United Kingdom|
|President Roosevelt||Prime Minister Churchill|
|Mr. Douglas||Mrs. Churchill|
|Subaltern Mary Churchill|
|Minister of War Transport Leathers|
|United States||United Kingdom|
|Secretary Hull||Foreign Secretary Eden|
|Mr. Dunn||Sir Alexander Cadogan|
August 21, 1943, 1 p.m. Secret
Mr. Eden said that he had several minor points he wished to bring up and spoke of the following:
Mr. Eden said that some further information had been given to him by the British military authorities with regard to this, which he handed to the Secretary in a memorandum.
Civilian Administration in Liberated Areas
There was some discussion of this matter, and Mr. Eden asked that a draft be prepared for further study with the view to a possible statement explaining the form in which this would be taken care of in liberated areas as opposed to military government in enemy-conquered areas.
Surrender Conditions for Italy
There was some discussion on this matter also and it was decided that the present form of instructions which had been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower were satisfactory for the moment, but that a further study would be given to the document known as “the long formula” or comprehensive formula of conditions for possible use at some future time.
The Secretary brought this question up again, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to discuss it.
The French National Committee of Liberation
Mr. Eden asked whether there had been any fresh lights on the matter of recognition of the French National Committee, and proceeded to again set forth the British position. The general conversation which followed brought no new light on the situation.
When the Secretary had given a very reasoned resume of the American position Mr. Eden went back to the necessity as he saw it for including the word “recognition” and even if this necessitated independent action by the two governments.
He did, however, adopt the suggestion of Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan that of course the final decision would have to be made for the British by the Prime Minister.
Québec, August 21(?), 1943.
It is not apparent why the United States Government should think that the situation in Palestine is less inflammable. An American-Jewish congress is to held at the end of this month which may well put forward the most uncompromising demands. Much publicity has recently been given to talks between the Prime Ministers of Iraq and Egypt on Arab federation which, though innocuous in themselves, might lead to agitation in the Arab world about Palestine. A further incident which might set a match to the flames is the recent discovery of large-scale thefts of arms by Jews in Palestine. Investigations have disclosed the existence of a highly-organised racket, and these investigations may well lead direct to the Jewish Agency. Courts-martial have been held on some British soldiers, who have been condemned to terms of penal servitude, and the trial is now proceeding of two Jews. The High Commissioner reports that if these Jews are convicted, a violent outbreak is possible. It is clear, therefore, that both in America and in the Middle East, the need for some sedative joint statement is as urgent as ever. Such a statement would not of course be directed solely against the Jews, but applies equally to agitation from Arab or any other quarter. It is not easy to understand the Zionists’ opposition to it, except on the assumption that they wish to bring the Palestine question to a head at a moment inconvenient to us from the point of view of the war. If a statement is to be issued, the sooner it appears the better.
Québec, August 21(?), 1943.
The United States and United Kingdom Governments have decided to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the responsible authority representing all Frenchmen outside France who are resolutely engaged in the expulsion from French soil of all German forces and in the destruction of the Hitler régime.
The two Governments have taken this action on the basis that the French Committee of National Liberation themselves do not claim to represent the future Government of France which can only be established after the French Nation in conditions of freedom and tranquility has been able to express its wishes in a constitutional form.
During the continuance of the war military needs are paramount and all controls necessary for operational purposes are in consequence reserved to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in any theatre of war.
Québec, August 21(?), 1943.
The Governments of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are in accord that the following statement in no sense constitutes recognition of a Government of France or of the French Empire. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France in a free and untrammeled manner proceed to select their own form of Government and their own officials to administer it.
The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy. The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.
In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.
On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administrating those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.
The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.
Québec, August 21(?), 1943.
The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.
From the outset military equipment and assistance has been given to the French armed forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been constantly growing since the landing of British and American forces in North Africa. In recent weeks, arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the liberation of France.
It is our firm hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will demonstrate a single-minded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the overseas French. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people as a whole are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves. Only the people of France itself can determine the form of their future government and make the choice of their future leaders. In making this decision, they must be wholly untrammeled.
This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of liberating France from the German and Italian yokes. We trust that it will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.
In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent, at this time, in promoting this great cause we are agreeing to the conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unity itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political problems.
Québec, August 21(?), 1943.
The President and the Prime Minister
have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual, war effort against the Axis powers.
This constitutes in no sense recognition of that Committee in speaking for the people in France or for a future Government of France.
It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations on behalf of French territory
and colonies outside of France.
In view of the paramount importance in of the common war effort, the relationship between our two Governments
with and the French Committee continues to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.
The simple purpose is cooperation with all patriotic Frenchmen working
to for the liberation of the French people and territories from the oppression of the enemy.
Accordingly we welcome the establishment of the French Committee
of on National Liberation. It is our understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members to the prosecution of the war.
Obviously, it will be for the French people themselves
to settle their own Constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had untrammeled opportunity to express themselves with the utmost freedom. In an earnest effort to promote our great cause, we are agreeing to the recognition of the Committee in the hope that it will achieve further unity within itself and continued cooperation with the United nations.
May the restoration of France come with all speed.
Québec, August 21, 1943.
In line with the traditional and binding friendship of the American People for the People of France, I feel that the Government of the United States should do everything within its power to restore France to its rightful position among the family of nations. Over 90 per cent of Frenchmen are today still under the domination of the enemy and unable freely to express themselves. French forces outside Axis domination have fought valiantly with the United Nations against the oppressor.
From the outset, this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French Forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French Forces have adequate modern military equipment, effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.
This Government has cooperated and will continue to cooperate fully with French authorities who are insuring the administration of French interests until such time as the French People freely elect their own Government. The relationship of this Government with the French National Committee must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.
This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for matters other than military is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French People and the United Nations, and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.
In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to conditional acceptance of the Committee as already stated, for a trial and any further efforts to unify itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objectives.
|United States||United Kingdom|
|Admiral Leahy||General Brooke|
|General Marshall||Admiral of the Fleet Pound|
|Admiral King||Air Chief Marshal Portal|
|General Arnold||Field Marshal Dill|
|Brigadier General Deane||Brigadier Redman|
August 21, 1943, 2:30 p.m. Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 113th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 319/1, as amended in the course of the discussion. (Amended version subsequently published as CCS 319/2.)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 308, excluding paragraph 8.
b. Approved the amendments to paragraphs 8 a and b set forth in CCS 308/1.
c. Approved the amendment to paragraph 8 c set forth in CCS 308/2. (The amended paper subsequently published as CCS 308/3.)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the new subparagraph eight (i) “Air Route into China,” set forth by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in CCS 301/2.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in the paper.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that this paper should be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943.
Québec, 21 August 1943. Secret Enclosure to CCS 308/3
[Paragraph 1 is identical with paragraph 1 of CCS 308.]
Command in India
[Paragraph 2 is identical with paragraph 2 of CCS 308.]
Command in Southeast Asia
[Paragraph 3 is identical with paragraph 3 of CCS 308.]
a. Eastern Boundary
From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo-China and Thailand meet, southwards along the eastern boundary of Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.
b. Northern Frontier
From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo-China and Thailand meet generally north and west along the Eastern and Northern Frontier of Burma to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along the border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the South-East Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.
[Subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 are identical with subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 of CCS 308.]
Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia
[Paragraphs 6 and 7 are identical with paragraphs 6 and 7 of CCS 308.]
a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.
The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the overall plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.
The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander-in-Chief.
General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.
The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces and of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.
Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander-in-Chief, India.
b. Command Relationship
The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.
c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as OSS, OWI, FCB, etc., with Comparable British Organizations
In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.
There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.
Québec, 21 August 1943. Secret CCS 312/1
The ad hoc Committee appointed by the COS to examine administrative matters reviewed CCS 312, and recommended its approval.
Orders for the construction of these pipelines are included in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia, submitted for approval of the CCS under COS(Q) 36. The tentative allocation of shipping has included the movement of these troops.
GENERAL SIR T. S. RIDDELL-WEBSTER
LT. GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL
REAR ADMIRAL O. C. BADGER
Québec, 21 August 1943. Secret Enclosure to CCS 325
The opening of an overland route to China will greatly facilitate operations and may well assist in bringing hostilities to an earlier conclusion than would otherwise be possible. In addition to meeting requirements for 1943-1944 operations in Burma, and the short-term projects which are necessary to make them possible, it is necessary because of the Herculean task ahead to make urgent preparations for completing the overland route and insuring an adequate supply of stores for delivery over the route when opened.
Preliminary studies of the possible opening date and capacity of the road from Ledo via Myitkyina-Paoshan to Kunming, together with projected pipelines, disclose certain divergence of views as between the U.S. and British Staffs. It is not possible or necessary in this paper to assess which of the views is more nearly correct, but it is agreed by all parties that the project is urgent and should be carried out at the earliest possible date, subject to such operations as may be agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Regardless of the date of opening of the route, which depends on the course of operations and on the major constructional problems that may arise, it is necessary now to examine the target requirement of tonnage to be carried over the route and to initiate urgent action for the expansion of the Assam L of C in preparation for this tonnage and that required for the maintenance of the route if development is not to be held up for lack of prompt action.
The present planned capacity of the Assam L of C to be reached by 1 November 1943 is 102,000 tons per month, including petroleum products, which will suffice only for minimum operational maintenance of essential ground and air forces, for an estimated air ferry delivery to China of about 10,000 tons per month and for road construction to keep pace with operational advances.
When the overland route is opened it is estimated that the additional requirement will be:
|a. Increase of air route||10,000 tons per month|
|b. Increase for operational forces||13,000 tons per month|
|c. Stores for delivery to China by road||65,000 tons per month|
|d. Maintenance stores for route||30,000 tons per month|
This represents an increase of 118,000 tons per month to be carried by the Assam L of C, exclusive of petroleum products for which two six-inch pipelines from Calcutta to Ledo are essential features and whose construction must keep pace with the development of the project.
|1st November||1943||102,000 tons per month|
|1st May||1944||140,000 tons per month|
|1st July||1944||1st six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo|
|1st January||1945||170,000 tons per month|
|1st May||1945||200,000 tons per month|
|1st July||1945||a. a second six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo|
|b. balanced increase of tankage at Calcutta|
|1st January||1946||220,000 tons per month|
Québec, 21 August 1943. Most secret CCS 246/1
At the 94th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the TRIDENT Conference, approval was given to the QUEENS running on a 28-day cycle as at that time the urgency of lifting personnel was not as great as it is now.
It is understood that a situation is developing in which it is essential to lift as many personnel as possible, and in view of the longer nights we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now approve that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.
Québec, 21 August 1943. Most secret CCS 326
In view of the proved value and necessity of the DUKW, two and one-half ton amphibious truck, it is considered essential that adequate provision of these vehicles be available for OVERLORD in order to mitigate the great problems involved in prolonged maintenance over the beaches under difficult conditions.
Preliminary examination of requirements resulted in demands being placed for 1,200 DUKWs, of which 700 were destined for use by U.S. Forces and 500 for use by British Forces. It is understood that this requirement was accepted on the basis of production of 400 DUKWs per month to meet present global requirements.
Subsequent to the above demand, additional requirements for OVERLORD, it is understood, have been stated bringing the total requirement to 2,400; covering 1,400 for U.S. Forces, and 1,000 for the British, of which the latter will probably be increased to 1,500. Preliminary inquiries in Washington lead us to suppose that these enhanced demands have not yet been presented to the Amphibian Subcommittee of the Munitions Assignment Committee, and there appears to be some doubt in Washington as to what is the full OVERLORD requirement. With a view to clarifying the position, a telegram has been sent to London.
It is probable that the present production of DUKWs will prove too small to compete with requirements, and it is considered that every effort should be made as a matter of urgency to increase productive capacity. It is believed that a substantial increase can be achieved with existing plant but at the expense of production of two and one-half ton trucks and by a reallotment of the requisite steel for hulls.
It is further understood that the U.S. Navy has, or will shortly have, a considerable requirement for DUKWs additional to any already demanded.
In view of the above, agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is requested for:
a. Acceptance of the principle that priority of allocation of production be given to OVERLORD.
b. The issue of instructions for the urgent examination of possible increases in production.
c. Allocations to OVERLORD be concurrent for American and British needs in a ratio to be stated by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate).
Algiers, 21 August 1943. Secret Urgent 4227.
The following are the minutes of the meeting held in Lisbon on August 18  (to KKAD and AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHCOS. Reference NAF 333. This is NAF 334.) with the following present:
The following was the general discussion.
General Smith opened the discussion by stating that on the assumption that the Italian Armed Forces were ready to surrender authorization had been made to communicate the terms on which General Eisenhower was prepared to agree to a cessation of hostilities between the Allied Forces under his command and the Italian Forces. It was to be understood that these terms constituted a Military Armistice only and must be accepted unconditionally.
General Castellano explained that there had been some misinterpretation of the purpose of his visit as he had come to discuss the question of how Italy could arrange to join the United Nations in opposition to Germany with the view to expelling the Germans from Italy in collaboration with the Allies.
General Smith stated that he was prepared only to discuss the terms on which the Allied Forces would be prepared to cease hostilities against the Italian Forces. The question of the status of the Italian Army and Government’s participation in the operations against the Germans was one of high governmental policy of the United Nations and would have to be decided by the Heads of the 2 Governments concerned. The Allied Forces were prepared, however, to assist and support any Italian Forces or Italians who fought against or obstructed the German military effort, as would be brought out in amplification of the armistice conditions. He then proceeded to read aloud paragraph by paragraph the armistice conditions and the various comments which he was authorized to make with regard thereto and these documents were currently translated point by point to their representative.
The British and American representatives then left the room for a time in order to give the Emissary an opportunity to examine in detail the armistice conditions. After this examination the conference reassembled.
General Castellano stated beforehand that he had no intention of discussing the various points of the armistice conditions as he is not empowered to do so but would like to have certain explanations which he could furnish to his government.
With respect to point 3, there might be practical limitations to what the Italians could accomplish in preventing the movement of Allied Prisoners of War to Germany. The Italians would make every effort to comply fairly with this condition.
The meeting was then told that the United Nations understood the possible difficulties involved but expected the Italian Army and Government to do its best to carry out this condition.
General C requested clarification of point 4 particularly with regard to the future disposition of the Italian vessels and aircraft. He was informed that this point implied the surrender of the fleet and of the planes and that their future disposition must be a matter for decision by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
General C added that the warships and many of the planes might be prevented by lack of fuel from complying with this condition.
Our representative observed that this would be a matter for the Italian authorities who naturally were interested in the preservation of their ships and aircraft and who should in their own interest make every effort to see that sufficient fuel was available for the assembly of the ships and planes to points designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
Their Emissary with respect to the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports pointed out that most of the airdromes were in German hands and that those remaining to the Italians were small and scattered. With respect to point 8 he stated that it might prove almost impossible to withdraw to Italy those Italian Forces which were now stationed at inland points in the Balkans.
Our representative replied that the Italians were not expected to accomplish the impossible but that certain Italian Divisions were located sufficiently near the coast to permit their removal to Italy by Allied shipping.
Their Emissary referring to point 10 asked for explanations as to the question of retention of Sovereignty by the Italian Government.
He was informed that our representative’s instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice and that he was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future Government of Italy. A military government under the Allied Commander-in-Chief would unquestionably be necessary over parts of Italian territory.
He invited the attention of their Emissary to the fact that military government in Sicily had been established and was being exercised in a fair and humane manner.
Their Emissary then mentioned the danger to the person of the King of Italy involved in the acceptance of these terms and expressed the fear that the Germans might hold the King as a hostage or that his life might be in danger. It was suggested that the King might leave Italy on an Italian Naval Vessel.
He was assured that the King would be treated with all due personal consideration.
In the general discussion which ensued their Emissary reverted again to the manner and extent of Italian military collaboration against Germany. The United Nations representatives explained carefully that the subject under discussion must be considered a military capitulation and not any arrangement for the participation of Italy in the war on our side. Our representative explained that the terms of the armistice did not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. However, he was authorized to state that the extent to which these terms of armistice would be modified in favor of Italy would depend on how far the Italian Government and people did in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war but that the United Nations stated without reservation that wherever Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans, destroy German property or hamper German movements they will be given all possible support by the Forces of the United Nations.
Their Emissary then brought up the probability of immediate German retaliation against Italy in the event that the terms of the armistice were accepted and placed in effect. The possibility of minimizing these reprisals was discussed. It was brought out that it would be folly on the part of the Germans to institute reprisals against Italian cities and population which would certainly lead to reprisals on our part. In any case the effects of a few days of vindictive action by the Germans would be much less serious for Italy than a long war of attrition.
Their Emissary after expressing his understanding of the terms of armistice and the supplemental information conveyed by the Allied representatives stated that he was not authorized to accept the armistice terms and that these must be taken back to Italy for consideration by the Italian Government. He added that it would be most useful to his government to know when and where the Allied Invasion would take place particularly as German reaction would probably make it necessary for a part of the government to remove from Rome coincidental with announcement of cessation of hostilities. He pointed out that there were several thousand members of the SS Organization in Rome in civilian clothes and a Parachute Division in the immediate vicinity. The Italians have removed most of their troops from Rome upon declaring the city open and that it would arouse German suspicion if they were returned. He was informed that as a soldier he would understand why it was impossible for us at this time to give any detailed information of the plans of the Allied Commander. Arrangements would be made for a direct channel of communication and it was proposed that if Marshal Badoglio agreed to accept the terms of the armistice General Eisenhower would announce the granting of the armistice 5 or 6 hours prior to the main Allied landing in force. General Eisenhower’s announcement was to be immediately followed by Marshal Badoglio’s proclamation of cessation of hostilities.
Their Emissary pointed out that 5 hours was insufficient advance notice to permit the preparations which should be made in anticipation of an Allied landing and to permit effective collaboration. He felt that a much longer period, preferably 2 weeks, was highly desirable.
General Smith thought that this might be done and stated that he would consult the Commander-in-Chief in an effort to make the necessary arrangements.
The Italian representatives were supplied with a copy of the terms of the armistice and with an Aide Mémoire covering the supplemental matters contained in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The general meeting then adjourned to permit a detailed discussion of military matters by the representatives of the 2 armies and arrangements for establishing communications. Minutes end.
New Subject. With reference to your 5650 detailed breakdown of German Forces in Italy will be sent in another cable.
Algiers, 21 August 1943. Secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General statements made as follows:
a. Estimated Germany would require some 15 Divisions for occupation of Italy if Italian Troops cooperated. Possible more would be brought in. These likely be chiefly withdrawn from France. No permanent fortifications as yet on Genoa-Ravenna Line.
b. Best tactics for Allies would be to land in Leghorn area between Grosetto and Spezia. German lines of communication into Italy particularly via Brenner [Pass] extremely vulnerable and should be attacked by Allies.
c. Germans intended defend Sardinia and Corsica. Italian Forces to be withdrawn from Corsica but not Sardinia.
d. 2 Italian Divisions recently sent North Italy to offset occupation of Brenner area by Germans. Had been no actual fighting as result of this but firm attitude of Italians had caused Germans to hesitate in number of their actions. (AGWar personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated TROOPERS personal for DMI USFor pass to TROOPERS. From Strong from G-2 FREEDOM signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI).
e. Strength of German Military Personnel in Italy estimated at 400,000.
f. Genoa-Ravenna Line would be extremely difficult to penetrate owing hilly nature of country and narrow roads.
g. Conference on 14 August held at Bologna at which General Roatta, Field Marshal Rommel and General Jodl present. Plans for defence of Italy discussed. These included return of Italian troops from France, Slovenia and North Croatia. Final result discussions not known.
h. Italian Army short of gasoline and entirely dependent on Germany for this. Italy would require supplies of wheat and coal if Germany ceases to provide. Italian Army short of many types of weapons especially anti-tank guns, anti-tank ammunition and boots.
i. Italian Fleet had only sufficient fuel oil for one main fleet action. Mussolini was responsible for stopping Italian Fleet putting to sea on several occasions in order to have it to counter any attack on Italian Peninsula. Germans informed Italians that submarine warfare was to be put on completely new basis which they thought would have considerable success. No details disclosed.
j. Italian Air Force very short of material but fighter element considered good. All Italian airfields except a few small ones in hands of Germans.
k. German policy towards Russia was to hold back reserves and adopt defensive policy in hope Russians would wear themselves out. Germans considered this might happen by spring 1944. German Divisions totalled 260 of which 50 to 60 in reserve. Up to December 1942 estimated German permanent casualties killed or wounded three million. Russian divisions numbered 320. Ribbentrop reckoned on Allied, especially American, war weariness increasing.
l. Ribbentrop has threatened that if Italy turned against Germany gas would be used against the country and most terrible vengeance would be exacted on Italian people as an example to remainder of Satellites. Italian people had no gas masks or protection against gas. Italian Army almost in same position. Hungary might follow Italian example but Roumania and Bulgaria less likely.
m. Allies could not look for collapse in German morale owing to Gestapo. Number of Generals desirous of getting rid of Hitler but this unlikely at present owing considerable loyalty towards him.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
740.0011 European War 1939/31032
Washington, August 21, 1943. Urgent
My Dear Mr. President: I have received this morning the visit of the Apostolic Delegate who has given me the attached communication which I am sending to you for your information. The Pope requested particularly that these memoranda be brought to your attention as speedily as possible.
Believe me [etc.]
Washington, August 20, 1943. No. 244/43
My Dear Mr. Welles, Inasmuch as events of the past few weeks in Sicily and in Italy at large have given great prominence to the prospects for the immediate future, the Holy See wishes to place before the United States government certain observations which have been dictated by its direct contact with these important events.
These reflections aim to evaluate recent and present happenings in the light of the future which they are molding and of the effects which they will have on the formulation of the peace towards which the Holy See continues to bend its every effort.
Trusting that these considerations will receive every attention I avail myself [etc.]
A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea Apostolic Delegate
Washington, August 18, 1943. No. 244/43
In the light of possible imminent developments in the Italian war situation, the Holy See cannot but be preoccupied with the grave consequences of such developments on the Church at large. These preoccupations “are greatly heightened by the determination, public[ly] expressed, that through wholesale bloodshed and destruction, even if this were to lead eventually to national chaos and anarchy, Italy must be forced out of the war.
Were these sad possibilities to be realized, the restricted territorial extent of Vatican City could not possibly prevent it from feeling most acutely the grave consequences of such a military campaign. Vatican City would inevitably become involved in, and perhaps even engulfed by, any serious disorders which might arise.
The noble and spiritual ideals which have assertedly been embodied in the Allied cause would appear to dictate that every precaution should be taken and every measure employed which might safeguard spiritual values and enhance their worth in the eyes of all men. On this point the Holy See recalls with satisfaction and hope the letter of the President of the United States to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, on July 9, 1943. It cannot be denied that the religious sensibilities of millions of Catholics throughout the world would be sorely wounded by injuries, although unintended, which might be inflicted on Vatican City and, consequently, on the Holy See.
Were the Vatican to be cut off or hindered in its communication with the outside world, the nations at large would thus be deprived of one of their most potent sources of inspiration and guidance. Catholics in particular would suffer greatly from lack of contact with their Spiritual Head, and this would most assuredly make itself felt in other fields of activity.
An additional important consideration is found in the fact that at the present time the Vatican City serves as headquarters for all the resident diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations accredited to the Holy See.
For these reasons, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State has asked that every precaution be taken to avoid creating a situation of chaos in Italy, which would make it most difficult, not to say impossible, for the Holy See to continue as the center of government for the Catholic Church.
Washington, August 20, 1943. No. 244/43
The Holy See respectfully offers the following considerations with reference to the avowed intention of the Allies to make Italy feel unrestrainedly the full brunt of the war in every quarter:
Slaughter and destruction, especially when carried out on a large scale, contribute little or nothing to the establishment of genuine peace. These elements of warfare irritate and embitter the civilian population, with the effect of inciting the populace to blind hate against those who punish it by depriving it of everything which it holds most dear.
The destruction and damaging of churches, charitable institutions, and artistic monuments, even when this destruction is not intended, as well as the ruining of civilian homes etc., are doing much harm to the Allied cause. They are actually diminishing the prestige of the United States, which has always been regarded by the Italian people as a nation nurturing great respect for religion, art, and culture. If, unfortunately, at the present time, the passion for war beclouds the clear vision of good judgment, it cannot be denied that, years hence, the American people itself will be the first to deplore and condemn such actions.
A consideration of paramount importance is to be found in the favorable reaction of such a war policy in the interests of Communism. Under the influence of the bitterness engendered by the dread results of war, the people fall an easy prey to Communism, which is ever ready to avail itself of all means afforded by any event of public importance, especially by those of a calamitous nature.
Communism is already making noteworthy progress as the result of war.
The recent demonstrations accompanying the fall of Fascism are sufficient evidence that the Communists are well organized in Italy, and that they have at their disposal both financial means and arms.
Information reaching the Holy See also shows that Communism is making continual progress also in Germany.
These facts are a clear warning of the grave peril that Europe will find itself overrun with Communism immediately on the cessation of hostilities.
740.0011 European War 1939/31032
Washington, August 21, 1943.
My Dear Mr. President: I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I have just had with the Apostolic Delegate.
Believe me [etc.]
Washington, August 21, 1943.
|Participants:||The Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate;|
|Mr. Welles, Acting Secretary.|
The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this evening for the second time today. The Archbishop brought with him a copy of a telegram which he had sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State on August 19 and which he read to me. In this telegram the Delegate had informed the Holy See that in his judgment public opinion in the United States was exceedingly uncertain as to whether the policy of the present Italian Government of apparently continuing the war on the side of Germany was a spontaneous decision on the part of the Italian Government or whether it was a decision which was forced upon it by German power. He also said that American public opinion was equally uncertain as to whether the Italian Government sincerely desired to find the ways and means of bringing to an end Italian participation in the war against the United Nations.
The Archbishop then read to me the reply which he had just received from Cardinal Maglione. In this message the Cardinal Secretary of State stated that the Italian Government desired to find as promptly as possible the means of ending its war against the United Nations, and second, that its continued collaboration with Germany was not spontaneous but was forced upon it by the German Government.
I thanked the Delegate for bringing this information so promptly to my attention and I said I would of course immediately refer the message he had given me to the President for his knowledge.