Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

740.0011 European War 1939/30810: Telegram

The Chargé at Vatican City to the Acting Secretary of State

Vatican City, August 20, 1943.

U.S. urgent

Following is from a reliable source. (This is Tittmann’s 159, August 20 with reference to his 156, August 17.)

An interministerial committee met some days ago to discuss measures to be taken in connection with declaration by Italian Government that Rome is an open city and another meeting held yesterday of same committee with Badoglio presiding. In addition to orders already given to anti-aircraft batteries Rome not to react in case of raid pending their suppression Badoglio ordered immediate removal from Rome of all possible military objectives both personnel and material. Question of military traffic through Rome still presents difficulties but every effort is being made to solve problem and it is hoped satisfactory solution will soon be found. Meanwhile, orders have been given military trains all kinds now obliged pass through Rome should do so without stopping.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 20 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 321

Policy Towards Spain

We have examined the suggestion put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 303 paragraph 10) that the time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy towards Spain.

We can say at once that we agree entirely with the sense of this suggestion. The only point at issue is exactly how far we should go.

We feel that it will be agreed that:
a. The Spaniards, with Germany on their doorstep, will not be persuaded to take any military action which appears to threaten Germany and which might bring on them German retaliation. Any action or threat on our part to coerce them in this direction would merely tend to unite them against us.

b. From our point of view, it is most undesirable that we should press the Spaniards to a point which might impose upon us any military commitment in support of diplomatic or military threats.

We suggest therefore that it would be unwise to go so far as to press the Spaniards to transfer the bulk of their defensive forces to the North, which they would be most unlikely to do.

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to (supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:
a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements. A note on the wolfram position by the Ministry of Economic Warfare is attached.

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.

d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.

g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.

h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units.

i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

Owing to the resentment which we are likely to cause if we interfere directly in Spanish internal affairs, it would not be in our military interests openly to promote the restoration of the monarchy since such interference would be likely to cause serious disorder in Spain, of which the Germans might take advantage by infiltration.

We should, however, welcome and encourage the formation of a less anti-Allied Government.

Enclosure

Memorandum Prepared in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare

Wolfram From the Iberian Peninsula

Germany’s Present Position
The virtual absence of stock, Allied preemptive purchasing in the Peninsula and the success achieved against blockade runners has made Germany’s wolfram position critical.

Stocks and Supplies
Germany started the war with a stock of 12,000 tons of concentrates. After the outbreak of war, Germany was dependent upon what was then a small output in the Peninsula, of which Portugal provided some 2,000 to 3,000 tons and Spain only 300 tons. Until 1942 Germany used her stocks to maintain an annual consumption of about 9,000 tons. From 1942 onwards, her consumption has been at the rate of about 5,800 per year, of which about 4,300 are basic industrial consumption and the balance for A.P. projectiles. Mines in Germany and France produce about 250 tons a year. Should our preemptive purchases in Spain and Portugal continue to be successful Germany will receive only about 2,000 tons from each country in 1943 and may receive substantially less from Spain. As Germany started the year with only 500 tons of stock, a further cut in consumption will be necessary unless she succeeds in obtaining further supplies by blockade running.

Effects of Shortage
Germany’s main uses for tungsten (the metal derived from wolfram) are to make tungsten carbide, which is used for providing a hard tip for machine tools, and for cores for armor piercing projectiles. Small quantities of tungsten are also used for providing filaments for electric lamps, radio valves, etc., and as a hydrogenation catalyst. A substantial reduction of supplies would therefore face Germany with the following alternatives:
a. A cut in the production of weapons of all types, resulting from the absence of tungsten carbide tips from cutting tools and consequent less efficient production, or

b. The sacrifice of armor piercing ammunition with tungsten carbide cores.

Should supplies from the Peninsula be entirely cut off, Germany would probably suffer both as it is improbable that she would obtain sufficient supplies by blockade running. Blockade running by surface ships should prove impracticable in the future and submarines could only bring the desired quantity at the expense of all other much needed commodities.

Speed of Effect
The loss of supplies from the Iberian Peninsula would probably not affect military operations for six months but after that the effect would be increasingly felt.

Conclusions
Failure to obtain wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula would seriously affect the rate of production throughout German industry and would render impossible the manufacture of armor piercing projectiles with tungsten carbide cores on any substantial scale. These effects would become apparent in actual operations after about six months, depending on the rate of military wastage.

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863.01/8–2043

Archduke Otto of Austria to the Secretary of State

Québec, August 20th, 1943.

Dear Mr. Hull, Enclosed I am sending to you two short aide-mémoires on questions which I believe are of a great importance for the cause of the United Nations in Central Europe.

I most sincerely hope that it will be possible for you to consider these questions at the present conference and to bring to them an adequate solution.

I am [etc.]
OTTO of Austria

[Enclosure 1]

Aide-Mémoire

The Austrian Question

The military and political events of the near past have put Austria into the forefront of the interest of the United Nations. As approximatively 84,8% of the German implements of war for Italy are shipped over the Austrian railroads, much will depend on the attitude and action of the Austrian people.

The trend of the United Nations has been to recognize the heroic fight of Austria against the Germans by considering that country as an occupied country, which shall be liberated. But as this point has not yet been made sufficiently clear, certain agencies have used this to spread false impressions.

News from Russia indicate that the Soviet Government is about to launch an Austrian Government or National Council under the presidency of Wilhelm Koplenig (36 Gorkova ulica, Moscow), former leader of the Austrian Communist Party. Such a move would very much strengthen the Austrian Communist Party – which hitherto was negligible – and would disturb the Catholic, agrarian and patriotic opposition. The fear of Communist dictatorship would gravely weaken the Austrian resistance against the Axis.

Under these circumstances and with due regard to the ever-increasing strategic importance of Austria, the following program with regard to Austria is submitted:

  1. A clear declaration at the Quebec Conference, that Austria is an occupied country and will therefore be liberated, like the other occupied countries.

  2. A settlement of the question of Southern Tyrol, along the lines suggested in the annexed memorandum on that question.

  3. The recognition by the United Nations of a provisional Austrian authority. This authority should be non-partisan and represent Austria only as long as its people is silenced. It should not have authority to commit Austria on constitutional questions. In order to achieve this aim, a Committee of all former Austrian diplomats and consuls, who have kept their nationality and resisted the Nazis, could be formed, linking thus the legality of the past with the condition of non-partisan character.

Such a program would avoid the harm which might be clone by a Russian unilateral step, without too much antagonizing Russia. It would strengthen Austria’s resistance against the Axis and thus help the progress of the war. It is finally in line with the lofty principles announced by the leaders of the United Nations.

[Enclosure 2]

Aide-Mémoire

The Question of Southern Tyrol (Alto Adige)

In the coming discussions of the United Nations, the question of establishing just and reasonable borders for Italy and her neighbours will be of great importance for the foundation of a lasting peace.

In this connection the question of Southern Tyrol, called by the Italians Alto Adige, will be of paramount importance. This land was conceded to Italy in the last peace treaty over the protest of its Austrian population and of several Allied leaders. Under Italian occupation the Southern Tyrolese population was severely persecuted, dispossessed and partly replaced by Italians. Under an agreement between Mussolini and Hitler1 a notable part of the population was forcibly moved to Germany between 1939 and 1942, where they still live under very hard and inhuman conditions. Southern Tyrol has therefore suffered more than many other parts of Europe from Axis cruelty.

Southern Tyrol can be divided roughly into two parts:
a) South of the present Austrian border and North of a line Adamello Mountains-Salurn-Cortina d’Ampezzo, is a country with 85% Austrian population, deeply attached to Austria.

b) South of the above-mentioned line and North of the Italian border of 1914 is a country which, contrary to Italian propaganda, has still 54% Austrian population.

It is therefore a matter of justice, well in line with the principles of the United Nations, that this territory should be returned to Austria. It would be also a matter of political wisdom. Neither the Southern Tyrolese, nor the Austrians have ever accepted the present border. If good relations ought to be established between Austria and Italy, this can only be done by solving the Southern Tyrolese question in an Austrian sense. This would furthermore strengthen Austria materially and morally against Germany.

If the necessity of a plebiscite in the Southern zone of Southern Tyrol would be felt, care should be taken that only real Southern Tyrolese could vote. The right to vote restricted to residents as of 1918 and to their descendants would be the guarantee that the voters really represent the Southern Tyrolese people.

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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 9:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Hull Mrs. Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden

Roosevelt spoke at this dinner meeting of “the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration.” The discussion also touched on the proposed tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union. Hull left about midnight. Roosevelt and Churchill “held their usual lengthy discussions after dinner and both retired very late.”

U.S. State Department (August 21, 1943)

Roosevelt meeting with his advisers, forenoon

Present
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Harriman Mr. Douglas

From the informal memorandum by Harriman:

The shipping situation was presented simply and clearly by Lew, both as to troopers and cargo ships. We both emphasized the fact that cargo shipping, against all statements to the contrary, was not easing up but in fact was still the tight bottleneck.

The news about the improvement in the sinkings figures has led to relaxation of people’s worries and this had led to some extent to increased demands in different directions. However, the increased military requirements for existing and future operations more than absorbed the savings.

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Douglas Mrs. Churchill
Subaltern Mary Churchill
Minister of War Transport Leathers

Hull-Eden meeting, 1 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Atherton
740.0011 EW/8–2143

Department of State Minutes

August 21, 1943, 1 p.m.

Secret

Mr. Eden said that he had several minor points he wished to bring up and spoke of the following:

Palestine Declaration
Mr. Eden said that some further information had been given to him by the British military authorities with regard to this, which he handed to the Secretary in a memorandum.

Civilian Administration in Liberated Areas
There was some discussion of this matter, and Mr. Eden asked that a draft be prepared for further study with the view to a possible statement explaining the form in which this would be taken care of in liberated areas as opposed to military government in enemy-conquered areas.

Surrender Conditions for Italy
There was some discussion on this matter also and it was decided that the present form of instructions which had been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower were satisfactory for the moment, but that a further study would be given to the document known as “the long formula” or comprehensive formula of conditions for possible use at some future time.

Dependent Peoples
The Secretary brought this question up again, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to discuss it.

The French National Committee of Liberation
Mr. Eden asked whether there had been any fresh lights on the matter of recognition of the French National Committee, and proceeded to again set forth the British position. The general conversation which followed brought no new light on the situation.

When the Secretary had given a very reasoned resume of the American position Mr. Eden went back to the necessity as he saw it for including the word “recognition” and even if this necessitated independent action by the two governments.

He did, however, adopt the suggestion of Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan that of course the final decision would have to be made for the British by the Prime Minister.

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867n.01/1950

Memorandum by the British Delegation

Québec, August 21(?), 1943.

Palestine

It is not apparent why the United States Government should think that the situation in Palestine is less inflammable. An American-Jewish congress is to held at the end of this month which may well put forward the most uncompromising demands. Much publicity has recently been given to talks between the Prime Ministers of Iraq and Egypt on Arab federation which, though innocuous in themselves, might lead to agitation in the Arab world about Palestine. A further incident which might set a match to the flames is the recent discovery of large-scale thefts of arms by Jews in Palestine. Investigations have disclosed the existence of a highly-organised racket, and these investigations may well lead direct to the Jewish Agency. Courts-martial have been held on some British soldiers, who have been condemned to terms of penal servitude, and the trial is now proceeding of two Jews. The High Commissioner reports that if these Jews are convicted, a violent outbreak is possible. It is clear, therefore, that both in America and in the Middle East, the need for some sedative joint statement is as urgent as ever. Such a statement would not of course be directed solely against the Jews, but applies equally to agitation from Arab or any other quarter. It is not easy to understand the Zionists’ opposition to it, except on the assumption that they wish to bring the Palestine question to a head at a moment inconvenient to us from the point of view of the war. If a statement is to be issued, the sooner it appears the better.

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Draft of Joint Statement

Québec, August 21(?), 1943.

The United States and United Kingdom Governments have decided to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the responsible authority representing all Frenchmen outside France who are resolutely engaged in the expulsion from French soil of all German forces and in the destruction of the Hitler régime.

The two Governments have taken this action on the basis that the French Committee of National Liberation themselves do not claim to represent the future Government of France which can only be established after the French Nation in conditions of freedom and tranquility has been able to express its wishes in a constitutional form.

During the continuance of the war military needs are paramount and all controls necessary for operational purposes are in consequence reserved to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in any theatre of war.


Draft of Joint Statement

Québec, August 21(?), 1943.

U.S. Draft Formula

The Governments of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are in accord that the following statement in no sense constitutes recognition of a Government of France or of the French Empire. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France in a free and untrammeled manner proceed to select their own form of Government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy. The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administrating those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.


Draft of Joint Statement

Québec, August 21(?), 1943.

Statement by the President and the Prime Minister

The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.

From the outset military equipment and assistance has been given to the French armed forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been constantly growing since the landing of British and American forces in North Africa. In recent weeks, arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the liberation of France.

It is our firm hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will demonstrate a single-minded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the overseas French. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people as a whole are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves. Only the people of France itself can determine the form of their future government and make the choice of their future leaders. In making this decision, they must be wholly untrammeled.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of liberating France from the German and Italian yokes. We trust that it will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent, at this time, in promoting this great cause we are agreeing to the conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unity itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political problems.


Draft of Joint Statement

Québec, August 21(?), 1943.

The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual, war effort against the Axis powers.

This constitutes in no sense recognition of that Committee in speaking for the people in France or for a future Government of France.

It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations on behalf of French territory and colonies outside of France.

In view of the paramount importance in of the common war effort, the relationship between our two Governments with and the French Committee continues to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

The simple purpose is cooperation with all patriotic Frenchmen working to for the liberation of the French people and territories from the oppression of the enemy.

Accordingly we welcome the establishment of the French Committee of on National Liberation. It is our understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members to the prosecution of the war.

Obviously, it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own Constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had untrammeled opportunity to express themselves with the utmost freedom.

In an earnest effort to promote our great cause, we are agreeing to the recognition of the Committee in the hope that it will achieve further unity within itself and continued cooperation with the United nations.

May the restoration of France come with all speed.

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Draft of Statement for President Roosevelt

Québec, August 21, 1943.

Statement by the President on Relationship with the French National Committee

In line with the traditional and binding friendship of the American People for the People of France, I feel that the Government of the United States should do everything within its power to restore France to its rightful position among the family of nations. Over 90 per cent of Frenchmen are today still under the domination of the enemy and unable freely to express themselves. French forces outside Axis domination have fought valiantly with the United Nations against the oppressor.

From the outset, this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French Forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French Forces have adequate modern military equipment, effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.

This Government has cooperated and will continue to cooperate fully with French authorities who are insuring the administration of French interests until such time as the French People freely elect their own Government. The relationship of this Government with the French National Committee must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for matters other than military is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French People and the United Nations, and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to conditional acceptance of the Committee as already stated, for a trial and any further efforts to unify itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objectives.

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Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 21, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 113th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 319/1, as amended in the course of the discussion. (Amended version subsequently published as CCS 319/2.)

Southeast Asia Command (CCS 308, 308/1, 308/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 308, excluding paragraph 8.

b. Approved the amendments to paragraphs 8 a and b set forth in CCS 308/1.

c. Approved the amendment to paragraph 8 c set forth in CCS 308/2. (The amended paper subsequently published as CCS 308/3.)

Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East 1943-1944 (CCS 301, 301/1, 301/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the new subparagraph eight (i) “Air Route into China,” set forth by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in CCS 301/2.

Supply Routes in Northeast India (CCS 325)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in the paper.

Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan (CCS 323)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that this paper should be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943.

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Paper Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 21 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 308/3

Southeast Asia Command

Part I

[Paragraph 1 is identical with paragraph 1 of CCS 308.]

Command in India
[Paragraph 2 is identical with paragraph 2 of CCS 308.]

Command in Southeast Asia
[Paragraph 3 is identical with paragraph 3 of CCS 308.]

  1. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast [Asia] Command will be as follows:

a. Eastern Boundary
From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo-China and Thailand meet, southwards along the eastern boundary of Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.

b. Northern Frontier
From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo-China and Thailand meet generally north and west along the Eastern and Northern Frontier of Burma to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along the border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the South-East Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.

[Subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 are identical with subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 of CCS 308.]

Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia
[Paragraphs 6 and 7 are identical with paragraphs 6 and 7 of CCS 308.]

Part II

a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the overall plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander-in-Chief.

General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces and of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander-in-Chief, India.

b. Command Relationship
The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as OSS, OWI, FCB, etc., with Comparable British Organizations
In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

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Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 21 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 312/1

Pipeline From India to China

The ad hoc Committee appointed by the COS to examine administrative matters reviewed CCS 312, and recommended its approval.

Orders for the construction of these pipelines are included in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia, submitted for approval of the CCS under COS(Q) 36. The tentative allocation of shipping has included the movement of these troops.

GENERAL SIR T. S. RIDDELL-WEBSTER
LT. GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL
REAR ADMIRAL O. C. BADGER

Memorandum by the British Quartermaster General and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Service Forces

Québec, 21 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 325
  1. The opening of an overland route to China will greatly facilitate operations and may well assist in bringing hostilities to an earlier conclusion than would otherwise be possible. In addition to meeting requirements for 1943-1944 operations in Burma, and the short-term projects which are necessary to make them possible, it is necessary because of the Herculean task ahead to make urgent preparations for completing the overland route and insuring an adequate supply of stores for delivery over the route when opened.

  2. Preliminary studies of the possible opening date and capacity of the road from Ledo via Myitkyina-Paoshan to Kunming, together with projected pipelines, disclose certain divergence of views as between the U.S. and British Staffs. It is not possible or necessary in this paper to assess which of the views is more nearly correct, but it is agreed by all parties that the project is urgent and should be carried out at the earliest possible date, subject to such operations as may be agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  3. Regardless of the date of opening of the route, which depends on the course of operations and on the major constructional problems that may arise, it is necessary now to examine the target requirement of tonnage to be carried over the route and to initiate urgent action for the expansion of the Assam L of C in preparation for this tonnage and that required for the maintenance of the route if development is not to be held up for lack of prompt action.

  4. The present planned capacity of the Assam L of C to be reached by 1 November 1943 is 102,000 tons per month, including petroleum products, which will suffice only for minimum operational maintenance of essential ground and air forces, for an estimated air ferry delivery to China of about 10,000 tons per month and for road construction to keep pace with operational advances.

  5. When the overland route is opened it is estimated that the additional requirement will be:

a. Increase of air route 10,000 tons per month
b. Increase for operational forces 13,000 tons per month
c. Stores for delivery to China by road 65,000 tons per month
d. Maintenance stores for route 30,000 tons per month

This represents an increase of 118,000 tons per month to be carried by the Assam L of C, exclusive of petroleum products for which two six-inch pipelines from Calcutta to Ledo are essential features and whose construction must keep pace with the development of the project.

  1. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in principle the project for a supply route to China through Burma and Assam and that a directive (draft attached) be issued to the Supreme Commander to initiate immediate action to increase the capacity of the Assam L of C to the following target figures:
1st November 1943 102,000 tons per month
1st May 1944 140,000 tons per month
1st July 1944 1st six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo
1st January 1945 170,000 tons per month
1st May 1945 200,000 tons per month
1st July 1945 a. a second six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo
b. balanced increase of tankage at Calcutta
1st January 1946 220,000 tons per month
  1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the special personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate the route Ledo-Kunming and, having due regard to agreed operational priorities, will make available such personnel, equipment and stores as may be necessary to achieve the increased tonnage on the Assam L of C in conformity with the plan recommended by the Supreme Commander. Pending the assumption of command by the Supreme Commander, the Commander-in-Chief India should be charged with the primary action in regard to the above.
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Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 21 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 246/1

Movement of the QUEENS

At the 94th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the TRIDENT Conference, approval was given to the QUEENS running on a 28-day cycle as at that time the urgency of lifting personnel was not as great as it is now.

It is understood that a situation is developing in which it is essential to lift as many personnel as possible, and in view of the longer nights we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now approve that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.


Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 21 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 326

Amphibians for OVERLORD

  1. In view of the proved value and necessity of the DUKW, two and one-half ton amphibious truck, it is considered essential that adequate provision of these vehicles be available for OVERLORD in order to mitigate the great problems involved in prolonged maintenance over the beaches under difficult conditions.

  2. Preliminary examination of requirements resulted in demands being placed for 1,200 DUKWs, of which 700 were destined for use by U.S. Forces and 500 for use by British Forces. It is understood that this requirement was accepted on the basis of production of 400 DUKWs per month to meet present global requirements.

  3. Subsequent to the above demand, additional requirements for OVERLORD, it is understood, have been stated bringing the total requirement to 2,400; covering 1,400 for U.S. Forces, and 1,000 for the British, of which the latter will probably be increased to 1,500. Preliminary inquiries in Washington lead us to suppose that these enhanced demands have not yet been presented to the Amphibian Subcommittee of the Munitions Assignment Committee, and there appears to be some doubt in Washington as to what is the full OVERLORD requirement. With a view to clarifying the position, a telegram has been sent to London.

  4. It is probable that the present production of DUKWs will prove too small to compete with requirements, and it is considered that every effort should be made as a matter of urgency to increase productive capacity. It is believed that a substantial increase can be achieved with existing plant but at the expense of production of two and one-half ton trucks and by a reallotment of the requisite steel for hulls.

  5. It is further understood that the U.S. Navy has, or will shortly have, a considerable requirement for DUKWs additional to any already demanded.

  6. In view of the above, agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is requested for:

a. Acceptance of the principle that priority of allocation of production be given to OVERLORD.

b. The issue of instructions for the urgent examination of possible increases in production.

c. Allocations to OVERLORD be concurrent for American and British needs in a ratio to be stated by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate).

840.48 Refugees/5137

Memorandum by the British Delegation

Québec, 21st August, 1943.

Refugees

Up till now approaches to neutral countries on refugee questions have been conducted by joint efforts of Foreign Office and State Department. At Bermuda we thought that approaches of this kind would have much more chance of success if they were made not by Foreign Office or State Department but by Intergovernmental Committee as a whole. It would seem sensible therefore to arrange that Intergovernmental Committee should from now on take over approaches of this kind. This would not cut either of us out of the picture since we are both represented on the Committee and nothing would in fact be done without our consent but if we are to use Intergovernmental Committee for this purpose it is essential that there should be quicker decisions than there have been in the past[;] otherwise the Committee will become an object of ridicule and both our Governments will be open to the most serious criticism. Any announcement of a decision to proceed on these lines should make it clear that the two Governments are not in any way disinteresting themselves from these questions, but are convinced that this procedure will make for greater efficiency and expedition.


740.0011 European War 1939/30942½

Memorandum by the British Delegation

Québec, 21 August, 1943

Greece

We have long known that Guerilla bands, particularly those of the organisation known as EAM, which is Communist-run, and the Politicians in Athens, are predominantly Republican and opposed to the return of the King before a plebiscite has been held to decide the future form of the régime. This view has now been reiterated by Representatives of the EAM and the Liberal politicians recently arrived in Cairo without knowledge of Greek Government or H.M. Ambassador, and their arrival has led to strong pressure being put on the King in this sense. M. Tsouderos himself is in favour of the King giving such a pledge on the grounds that a refusal would result in the resignation of his colleagues and in antagonising opinion in Greece. The King is being told that if he agrees all parties would unite to form a coalition Government which would include representatives of the Guerillas and of the politicians in Athens. But such a coalition Government would not necessarily include representatives of the Royalist elements in Greece.

It has been pointed out to H.M. Ambassador to the Greek Government that a government reconstructed on the basis proposed would be almost entirely Republican and on returning to Greece would be more than human if they did not attempt to influence opinion in favour of a Republic. We should therefore be careful before advising the King to place himself at the mercy of an EAM Government on the assumption that it would play straight by him when established in Greece and allow a free plebiscite to be held when the time comes. In our view if the King now undertakes not to return to Greece on liberation he would be practically signing his abdication. Nor could we guarantee to protect the King’s interests during his absence, since after Greece is liberated we shall want law and order maintained and shall therefore have to work with whatever Government is in power. Meanwhile although we felt that the decision must rest with the King, it was still our policy to give him all the support we can with a view to replacing him on his throne.

M. Tsouderos now hopes that it may be possible to defer both the reconstruction of the Government and an immediate decision about the King’s position, but he may not succeed on the latter point. As a compromise he suggested some days ago that the King should agree to return after the liberation of Greece for a short visit of two or three weeks, after which he should remain outside the country until a plebiscite is held. This is what the King refers to in the last paragraph of his message to the Prime Minister. We do not regard this proposal as satisfactory, since there may well be a period of many months between the date of the Government’s return to Greece and the time when a plebiscite could be held. Apart from the short initial period of the King’s visit the Provisional Government would be free during this time to undermine his position if they chose to do so.

H.M. Ambassador reports that he is doing what he can to prevent any hasty and undignified decision.

I am not convinced that if the King stands firm he will necessarily find himself isolated particularly if we and the United States Government continue to support him and show clearly that we do so. The opinion of the British officers who have recently returned from Greece is that even the EAM which is the most powerful organisation in the country and most strongly opposed to the King, now realise that only a pro-British policy can gain popular support and that they are not strong enough to stand alone. This estimate is supported by the fact that their representatives have agreed to come to Cairo.

I would therefore suggest that in reply to the King’s message he should be told that in our view the policy outlined in his declaration of July 4th is that best calculated to serve the interests of Greece and that we therefore hope it may be possible for His Majesty to avoid any further statement at this stage about his own position when Greece is liberated. By sending his message the King is evidently trying to strengthen his own hand in dealing with his Government and the Emissaries from Greece. But I do not think this need deter us from giving him the above advice, while repeating to him the assurances that whatever his decision may be, we shall continue to give him the maximum support in our power.

[Attachment]

The British Foreign Secretary to the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

QUADRANT, [undated.]

Most secret
Important

For Sargent from Foreign Secretary. Your telegram CONCRETE 374.

Prime Minister agrees to reply as suggested to message from King of Greece.

Please therefore instruct H.M. Ambassador to the Greek Government to convey the following to His Majesty:

I have received Your Majesty’s Message.

I venture to suggest that in the view of HMG the policy outlined in Your Majesty’s declaration of July 4th is that best calculated to serve the interests of Greece and they therefore hope that it may be possible for Your Majesty to avoid any further statement at this stage about your own position when Greece is liberated.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty that whatever your decision may be, HMG will continue to give you the maximum support in their power.

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The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Algiers, 21 August 1943.

Secret
Urgent

4227.

The following are the minutes of the meeting held in Lisbon on August 18 [19] (to KKAD and AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHCOS. Reference NAF 333. This is NAF 334.) with the following present:

  • Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador;
  • Mr. George F. Kennan, American Chargé d’Affaires;
  • General Castellano, Italian Army;
  • Mr. Montanari, Interpreter;
  • Major General William [Walter] B Smith, US Army;
  • Brigadier Strong, British Army.

The following was the general discussion.

General Smith opened the discussion by stating that on the assumption that the Italian Armed Forces were ready to surrender authorization had been made to communicate the terms on which General Eisenhower was prepared to agree to a cessation of hostilities between the Allied Forces under his command and the Italian Forces. It was to be understood that these terms constituted a Military Armistice only and must be accepted unconditionally.

General Castellano explained that there had been some misinterpretation of the purpose of his visit as he had come to discuss the question of how Italy could arrange to join the United Nations in opposition to Germany with the view to expelling the Germans from Italy in collaboration with the Allies.

General Smith stated that he was prepared only to discuss the terms on which the Allied Forces would be prepared to cease hostilities against the Italian Forces. The question of the status of the Italian Army and Government’s participation in the operations against the Germans was one of high governmental policy of the United Nations and would have to be decided by the Heads of the 2 Governments concerned. The Allied Forces were prepared, however, to assist and support any Italian Forces or Italians who fought against or obstructed the German military effort, as would be brought out in amplification of the armistice conditions. He then proceeded to read aloud paragraph by paragraph the armistice conditions and the various comments which he was authorized to make with regard thereto and these documents were currently translated point by point to their representative.

The British and American representatives then left the room for a time in order to give the Emissary an opportunity to examine in detail the armistice conditions. After this examination the conference reassembled.

General Castellano stated beforehand that he had no intention of discussing the various points of the armistice conditions as he is not empowered to do so but would like to have certain explanations which he could furnish to his government.

With respect to point 3, there might be practical limitations to what the Italians could accomplish in preventing the movement of Allied Prisoners of War to Germany. The Italians would make every effort to comply fairly with this condition.

The meeting was then told that the United Nations understood the possible difficulties involved but expected the Italian Army and Government to do its best to carry out this condition.

General C requested clarification of point 4 particularly with regard to the future disposition of the Italian vessels and aircraft. He was informed that this point implied the surrender of the fleet and of the planes and that their future disposition must be a matter for decision by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

General C added that the warships and many of the planes might be prevented by lack of fuel from complying with this condition.

Our representative observed that this would be a matter for the Italian authorities who naturally were interested in the preservation of their ships and aircraft and who should in their own interest make every effort to see that sufficient fuel was available for the assembly of the ships and planes to points designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Their Emissary with respect to the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports pointed out that most of the airdromes were in German hands and that those remaining to the Italians were small and scattered. With respect to point 8 he stated that it might prove almost impossible to withdraw to Italy those Italian Forces which were now stationed at inland points in the Balkans.

Our representative replied that the Italians were not expected to accomplish the impossible but that certain Italian Divisions were located sufficiently near the coast to permit their removal to Italy by Allied shipping.

Their Emissary referring to point 10 asked for explanations as to the question of retention of Sovereignty by the Italian Government.

He was informed that our representative’s instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice and that he was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future Government of Italy. A military government under the Allied Commander-in-Chief would unquestionably be necessary over parts of Italian territory.

He invited the attention of their Emissary to the fact that military government in Sicily had been established and was being exercised in a fair and humane manner.

Their Emissary then mentioned the danger to the person of the King of Italy involved in the acceptance of these terms and expressed the fear that the Germans might hold the King as a hostage or that his life might be in danger. It was suggested that the King might leave Italy on an Italian Naval Vessel.

He was assured that the King would be treated with all due personal consideration.

In the general discussion which ensued their Emissary reverted again to the manner and extent of Italian military collaboration against Germany. The United Nations representatives explained carefully that the subject under discussion must be considered a military capitulation and not any arrangement for the participation of Italy in the war on our side. Our representative explained that the terms of the armistice did not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. However, he was authorized to state that the extent to which these terms of armistice would be modified in favor of Italy would depend on how far the Italian Government and people did in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war but that the United Nations stated without reservation that wherever Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans, destroy German property or hamper German movements they will be given all possible support by the Forces of the United Nations.

Their Emissary then brought up the probability of immediate German retaliation against Italy in the event that the terms of the armistice were accepted and placed in effect. The possibility of minimizing these reprisals was discussed. It was brought out that it would be folly on the part of the Germans to institute reprisals against Italian cities and population which would certainly lead to reprisals on our part. In any case the effects of a few days of vindictive action by the Germans would be much less serious for Italy than a long war of attrition.

Their Emissary after expressing his understanding of the terms of armistice and the supplemental information conveyed by the Allied representatives stated that he was not authorized to accept the armistice terms and that these must be taken back to Italy for consideration by the Italian Government. He added that it would be most useful to his government to know when and where the Allied Invasion would take place particularly as German reaction would probably make it necessary for a part of the government to remove from Rome coincidental with announcement of cessation of hostilities. He pointed out that there were several thousand members of the SS Organization in Rome in civilian clothes and a Parachute Division in the immediate vicinity. The Italians have removed most of their troops from Rome upon declaring the city open and that it would arouse German suspicion if they were returned. He was informed that as a soldier he would understand why it was impossible for us at this time to give any detailed information of the plans of the Allied Commander. Arrangements would be made for a direct channel of communication and it was proposed that if Marshal Badoglio agreed to accept the terms of the armistice General Eisenhower would announce the granting of the armistice 5 or 6 hours prior to the main Allied landing in force. General Eisenhower’s announcement was to be immediately followed by Marshal Badoglio’s proclamation of cessation of hostilities.

Their Emissary pointed out that 5 hours was insufficient advance notice to permit the preparations which should be made in anticipation of an Allied landing and to permit effective collaboration. He felt that a much longer period, preferably 2 weeks, was highly desirable.

General Smith thought that this might be done and stated that he would consult the Commander-in-Chief in an effort to make the necessary arrangements.

The Italian representatives were supplied with a copy of the terms of the armistice and with an Aide Mémoire covering the supplemental matters contained in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The general meeting then adjourned to permit a detailed discussion of military matters by the representatives of the 2 armies and arrangements for establishing communications. Minutes end.

New Subject. With reference to your 5650 detailed breakdown of German Forces in Italy will be sent in another cable.

The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Algiers, 21 August 1943.

Secret

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General statements made as follows:
a. Estimated Germany would require some 15 Divisions for occupation of Italy if Italian Troops cooperated. Possible more would be brought in. These likely be chiefly withdrawn from France. No permanent fortifications as yet on Genoa-Ravenna Line.

b. Best tactics for Allies would be to land in Leghorn area between Grosetto and Spezia. German lines of communication into Italy particularly via Brenner [Pass] extremely vulnerable and should be attacked by Allies.

c. Germans intended defend Sardinia and Corsica. Italian Forces to be withdrawn from Corsica but not Sardinia.

d. 2 Italian Divisions recently sent North Italy to offset occupation of Brenner area by Germans. Had been no actual fighting as result of this but firm attitude of Italians had caused Germans to hesitate in number of their actions. (AGWar personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated TROOPERS personal for DMI USFor pass to TROOPERS. From Strong from G-2 FREEDOM signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI).

e. Strength of German Military Personnel in Italy estimated at 400,000.

f. Genoa-Ravenna Line would be extremely difficult to penetrate owing hilly nature of country and narrow roads.

g. Conference on 14 August held at Bologna at which General Roatta, Field Marshal Rommel and General Jodl present. Plans for defence of Italy discussed. These included return of Italian troops from France, Slovenia and North Croatia. Final result discussions not known.

h. Italian Army short of gasoline and entirely dependent on Germany for this. Italy would require supplies of wheat and coal if Germany ceases to provide. Italian Army short of many types of weapons especially anti-tank guns, anti-tank ammunition and boots.

i. Italian Fleet had only sufficient fuel oil for one main fleet action. Mussolini was responsible for stopping Italian Fleet putting to sea on several occasions in order to have it to counter any attack on Italian Peninsula. Germans informed Italians that submarine warfare was to be put on completely new basis which they thought would have considerable success. No details disclosed.

j. Italian Air Force very short of material but fighter element considered good. All Italian airfields except a few small ones in hands of Germans.

k. German policy towards Russia was to hold back reserves and adopt defensive policy in hope Russians would wear themselves out. Germans considered this might happen by spring 1944. German Divisions totalled 260 of which 50 to 60 in reserve. Up to December 1942 estimated German permanent casualties killed or wounded three million. Russian divisions numbered 320. Ribbentrop reckoned on Allied, especially American, war weariness increasing.

l. Ribbentrop has threatened that if Italy turned against Germany gas would be used against the country and most terrible vengeance would be exacted on Italian people as an example to remainder of Satellites. Italian people had no gas masks or protection against gas. Italian Army almost in same position. Hungary might follow Italian example but Roumania and Bulgaria less likely.

m. Allies could not look for collapse in German morale owing to Gestapo. Number of Generals desirous of getting rid of Hitler but this unlikely at present owing considerable loyalty towards him.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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740.00119 EW/8–2143: Telegram

The British Consul General at Tangier to the British Foreign Office

Tangier, August 21, 1943.

Most secret

Signor Berio asked to see me last night to tell me he had received a short telegram from Rome informing him that the situation there remained the same as when he had left. The Germans were at Badoglio’s throat and the latter could not capitulate because it would not be physically possible for him to carry out terms of Armistice.

Speaking then as from himself Signer Berio again pleaded that the Allies should take some action against the Germans which would relieve Badoglio of this intense German pressure. Badoglio was only too willing to make an honourable peace if he was sure of being able to keep his word and carry out the necessary conditions. The Allies were the victors but it was for them to assist Badoglio to capitulate. As the situation was at present this was impossible for immediately he were to start to implement the Armistice terms he and his Government would be overthrown by the Germans and Farinacci or some other Italian “Quisling” put in his place.

I said that in my opinion there was no question of choice which Badoglio should make. It ought to be perfectly clear that unless he did as we wished, i.e. submit to our unconditional surrender, Italy would continue to be attacked from end to end. Even admitting German pressure which Signor Berio had spoken of, surely it was better to risk the consequences of accepting Allied terms than to continue resistance as at present for the latter course must only end in Badoglio’s ultimate downfall whereas former offered an honourable way out not only for Badoglio and his Government but also the Italian people would be spared the continued hardship of having useless war.

Signor Berio then turned to the question of surrender terms and asked me whether I could not at least give him some Anglo-American main lines and whether they were such as could be carried out by Badoglio under present “suffocating German pressure.” Could I not also give him some notion of the support which the Allies might give to Badoglio to carry out these terms in face of 100% opposition from Germany which Italian forces would be incapable of dealing with as they were “tired out and had no modern weapons.”

I replied that I could give him no information either about terms or future intentions of the Allies and I reminded him severely that there could be no sort of haggling over these questions. I had already told him by your direction that terms would provide for honourable capitulation but Allies did not intend to enter into prior negotiations or discussion regarding them.

Signor Berio then begged me with great emotion to endeavour to assist him in finding a way out of the present impasse. I told him that his own opinion of the way was perfectly clear: it lay in (a) capitulation and (b) carrying out of Allied terms whatever they might be. Badoglio should capitulate immediately; but if he continued to delay as at present what could he hope for but complete destruction in the long run not to mention the hardships which would accrue to his country in the process.

Finally Signor Berio said that although we had made no headway during our conversation and although he could see no daylight at present he hoped that our contact for which express purpose he had been sent here might be continued and he again expressed the greatest desire to be informed of main lines of the Armistice terms.

740.00119 EW/8–2143: Telegram

The British Consul General at Tangier to the British Foreign Office

Tangier, August 21, 1943.

Most secret

Summary of additional points which emerged in my conversation with Signor Berio were:
(a) Berio’s insistence on the good faith of Badoglio and also of Guariglia.

(b) Berio’s professed hatred of Fascism and the Germans and his cynical desire (though genuinely expressed) that Italy would be able to fight Germany with the Allies.

(c) Berio’s alleged terror of general European Communism. He told me that members of the local German Consulate-General with whom he said that necessarily he was passing his time were all saying that rather than surrender to the Anglo-Saxons they would throw themselves into the arms of Stalin and that Germany and Russia would then form a Communist bloc. The Balkans and France [garble] might also be expected to go the same way.

Impressions left upon me after this conversation were that Badoglio who is of course under the direct orders of Guariglia has received instructions to pump me for information regarding (a) armistice terms and (b) Allies’ plans regarding their action in Italy after capitulation. It seemed from my conversation which lasted 2½ hours that Badoglio wants peace but on his own terms.

If there is anything which I could say to Berio to end this impasse between us I should be grateful if I might be informed and I should also be grateful to learn whether the “negative” line I have taken with him as described in my immediately preceding telegram is approved and whether owing to the Lisbon negotiations you wish me to continue to contact him on his request. He stressed that he had been sent here by the direct orders of the Marshal at the bidding of my colleague Mario Badoglio but Guariglia’s unfortunate influence is presumably one which is now directly focussed on him.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Urgent

My Dear Mr. President: I have received this morning the visit of the Apostolic Delegate who has given me the attached communication which I am sending to you for your information. The Pope requested particularly that these memoranda be brought to your attention as speedily as possible.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

The Apostolic Delegate to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 20, 1943.

No. 244/43

My Dear Mr. Welles, Inasmuch as events of the past few weeks in Sicily and in Italy at large have given great prominence to the prospects for the immediate future, the Holy See wishes to place before the United States government certain observations which have been dictated by its direct contact with these important events.

These reflections aim to evaluate recent and present happenings in the light of the future which they are molding and of the effects which they will have on the formulation of the peace towards which the Holy See continues to bend its every effort.

Trusting that these considerations will receive every attention I avail myself [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea Apostolic Delegate

[Subenclosure 1]
Washington, August 18, 1943.

No. 244/43

Memorandum

In the light of possible imminent developments in the Italian war situation, the Holy See cannot but be preoccupied with the grave consequences of such developments on the Church at large. These preoccupations “are greatly heightened by the determination, public[ly] expressed, that through wholesale bloodshed and destruction, even if this were to lead eventually to national chaos and anarchy, Italy must be forced out of the war.

Were these sad possibilities to be realized, the restricted territorial extent of Vatican City could not possibly prevent it from feeling most acutely the grave consequences of such a military campaign. Vatican City would inevitably become involved in, and perhaps even engulfed by, any serious disorders which might arise.

The noble and spiritual ideals which have assertedly been embodied in the Allied cause would appear to dictate that every precaution should be taken and every measure employed which might safeguard spiritual values and enhance their worth in the eyes of all men. On this point the Holy See recalls with satisfaction and hope the letter of the President of the United States to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, on July 9, 1943. It cannot be denied that the religious sensibilities of millions of Catholics throughout the world would be sorely wounded by injuries, although unintended, which might be inflicted on Vatican City and, consequently, on the Holy See.

Were the Vatican to be cut off or hindered in its communication with the outside world, the nations at large would thus be deprived of one of their most potent sources of inspiration and guidance. Catholics in particular would suffer greatly from lack of contact with their Spiritual Head, and this would most assuredly make itself felt in other fields of activity.

An additional important consideration is found in the fact that at the present time the Vatican City serves as headquarters for all the resident diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations accredited to the Holy See.

For these reasons, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State has asked that every precaution be taken to avoid creating a situation of chaos in Italy, which would make it most difficult, not to say impossible, for the Holy See to continue as the center of government for the Catholic Church.

[Subenclosure 2]
Washington, August 20, 1943.

No. 244/43

Memorandum

The Holy See respectfully offers the following considerations with reference to the avowed intention of the Allies to make Italy feel unrestrainedly the full brunt of the war in every quarter:

  1. Slaughter and destruction, especially when carried out on a large scale, contribute little or nothing to the establishment of genuine peace. These elements of warfare irritate and embitter the civilian population, with the effect of inciting the populace to blind hate against those who punish it by depriving it of everything which it holds most dear.

  2. The destruction and damaging of churches, charitable institutions, and artistic monuments, even when this destruction is not intended, as well as the ruining of civilian homes etc., are doing much harm to the Allied cause. They are actually diminishing the prestige of the United States, which has always been regarded by the Italian people as a nation nurturing great respect for religion, art, and culture. If, unfortunately, at the present time, the passion for war beclouds the clear vision of good judgment, it cannot be denied that, years hence, the American people itself will be the first to deplore and condemn such actions.

  3. A consideration of paramount importance is to be found in the favorable reaction of such a war policy in the interests of Communism. Under the influence of the bitterness engendered by the dread results of war, the people fall an easy prey to Communism, which is ever ready to avail itself of all means afforded by any event of public importance, especially by those of a calamitous nature.

Communism is already making noteworthy progress as the result of war.

The recent demonstrations accompanying the fall of Fascism are sufficient evidence that the Communists are well organized in Italy, and that they have at their disposal both financial means and arms.

Information reaching the Holy See also shows that Communism is making continual progress also in Germany.

These facts are a clear warning of the grave peril that Europe will find itself overrun with Communism immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31032

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, August 21, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I have just had with the Apostolic Delegate.

Believe me [etc.]
SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 21, 1943.

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Attitude of Italian Government toward continuation of war.

Participants: The Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate;
Mr. Welles, Acting Secretary.

The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this evening for the second time today. The Archbishop brought with him a copy of a telegram which he had sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State on August 19 and which he read to me. In this telegram the Delegate had informed the Holy See that in his judgment public opinion in the United States was exceedingly uncertain as to whether the policy of the present Italian Government of apparently continuing the war on the side of Germany was a spontaneous decision on the part of the Italian Government or whether it was a decision which was forced upon it by German power. He also said that American public opinion was equally uncertain as to whether the Italian Government sincerely desired to find the ways and means of bringing to an end Italian participation in the war against the United Nations.

The Archbishop then read to me the reply which he had just received from Cardinal Maglione. In this message the Cardinal Secretary of State stated that the Italian Government desired to find as promptly as possible the means of ending its war against the United Nations, and second, that its continued collaboration with Germany was not spontaneous but was forced upon it by the German Government.

I thanked the Delegate for bringing this information so promptly to my attention and I said I would of course immediately refer the message he had given me to the President for his knowledge.

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