America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Verhaftungen und Hinrichtungen –
Das USA.-Regime in Tunesien

tc. Lissabon, 14. Mai –
Die Besatzungsbehörden in Tunesien haben die Einberufung aller wehrfähigen Franzosen angeordnet. Zunächst werden die Jahrgänge 1910 bis 1923 erfaßt.

Die Einberufungen sollen, wie man hier erfährt, in erster Linie den Zweck haben, Aufstandsbewegungen der jungen Franzosen gegen die Besatzungsmacht von vornherein zu unterdrücken. Der nordamerikanische Grenzschutz an der spanisch-­marokkanischen Grenze ist verstärkt worden, da ständig Fluchtversuche aus den besetzten Gebieten unternommen werden.

Nach einer aus Algier eingetroffenen Meldung hat die nordamerikanische Besatzungsbehörde bereits eine Reihe von Exekutionen vorgenommen. Es handelt sich bei den Opfern neben jungen Franzosen hauptsächlich um Araber, die der Sabotage angeklagt waren. Die Verhaftungen in Tunis werden fortgesetzt.

Harte Kämpfe auf der Alëuteninsel –
USA.-Truppen auf Attu gelandet

vb. Berlin, 14. Mai –
Wie das Kaiserlich japanische Hauptquartier bekanntgab, sind am 12. Mai starke amerikanische Einheiten auf Attu, der westlichsten Insel der Alëutengruppe, gelandet. Zwischen den japanischen Streitkräften auf Attu und den angreifenden Amerikanern haben sich heftige Kämpfe entwickelt, die noch im Gange sind.

Die Insel Attu ist bei einer Ausdehnung von über 100 Kilometer Länge und einer Breite von stellenweise über 50 Kilometer eine der größten Inseln der westlichen Aleuten. Wie im gesamten Gebiet zwischen Nordostasien und Alaska herrschen hier während des größten Teiles des Jahres schwere Stürme und Nebel. Erst im Mai pflegt eine Periode besseren Wetters einzusetzen, die bis in den Sommer hinein dauert. Im vorigen Jahr benutzten die Japaner diese Zeit zu einem überraschenden Vorstoß gegen die Aleuten. Am 7. Juni 1942 besetzten sie die Inseln Kiska und Attu. Sie haben in der Zwischenzeit beide Inseln zu Stützpunkten ausgebaut, doch fehlen aus begreiflichen Gründen Angaben über den Umfang ihrer Arbeiten wie die Stärke ihrer Garnisonen.

Die Yankees gaben sofort nach dem Verlust der beiden Inseln zu, daß der japanische Vorstoß an dieser Stelle ihnen das Konzept gehörig verdarb. Schon vor dem Kriege hatten sie durch den Ausbau des wichtigen und starken Stützpunktes Dutch Harbour auf Alaska und durch den Beginn des Baues einer Straße entlang der amerikanischen Westküste bis nach Alaska zu verstehen gegeben, daß sie im Falle einer Auseinandersetzung mit Japan der Inselbrücke im Nordpazifik einen besonderen Wert beimaßen. Zwar liegt auch zwischen Alaska und dem Kern des japanischen Reiches eine Entfernung von rund 4500 Kilometer, aber wenn man rein die Entfernungen in Rechnung stellt und von klimatischen Bedingungen absieht, sind Alaska und die Aleuten der günstigste Ausgangspunkt für amerikanische Luftoperationen gegen die japanischen Inseln.

Landung in dichtem Nebel

Über die Landung nordamerikanischer Truppen auf der Alëuteninsel Attu wurden bis jetzt folgende Einzelheiten bekannt:

Die Amerikaner näherten sich am 12. Mai unter dem Schutz dichten Nebels, der gegenwärtig das gesamte Seegebiet um Attu bedeckt. Die Operationen begannen mit einer Beschießung der Insel durch Schiffsartillerie und gleichzeitiger Bombardierung durch Flugzeuge. Die japanischen Truppen, obwohl dem Feind zahlenmäßig weit unterlegen, verwickelten die Amerikaner sofort in heftige Kämpfe, die zur Zeit andauern.

MacArthur – Oberkommandierender im Pazifik

m. Lissabon, 14. Mai –
Wie das Hauptquartier der amerikanischen Streifkräfte im Südwestpazifik mitteilt, ist General MacArthur jetzt zum Oberkommandierenden für alle kombinierten Operationen der Marine- und Landtruppen im Süd- und Südwestpazifik ernannt worden.

Hinter dieser kurzen Meldung versteckt sich die Geschichte eines zähen Ressortkrieges zwischen den verschiedenen Kommandostellen der USA. im pazifischen Kampfraum. MacArthur war bisher lediglich Befehlshaber der Land- und Luftstreitkräfte im Kampfraum Australien und Neuguinea, daneben bestand die Stellung eines Befehlshabers der nordamerikanischen Marinestreitkräfte im Südpazifik, die der Admiral Halsey einnahm. Beide Stellen arbeiteten nebeneinander und manchmal auch gegeneinander. Beide gaben, jeder für sich, offizielle Kriegsberichte heraus. Sie unterstanden zwar gemeinsam dem formalen Oberbefehl Roosevelts, aber Washington ist weit.

U.S. State Department (May 15, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General McNarney Lieutenant General Ismay
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Vice Admiral Horne Admiral Noble
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Streett Air Marshal Welsh
Rear Admiral Cooke Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Brigadier Porter
Colonel Smart Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Freseman Brigadier Macleod
Commander Long
Secretariat
Brigadier Redman
Brigadier General Deane
Commander Coleridge
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

May 15, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

Secret

Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.

Future Work of the Committee

Admiral Leahy said that the Committee had not yet directed the Planners to prepare an agenda for future work. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should first consider various courses of action open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe and then similarly the defeat of Japan.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much the same views. He felt that ROUNDUP should first be considered, and for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of conditions and feasibility; next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum; and, lastly, the war with Japan, considering operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their coordination.

When the scope and requirements of operations in the theaters had been defined, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine the extent to which our demands for shipping resources could meet what was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global strategy in terms of concrete facts and deal with miscellaneous points such as the Portuguese islands and Ploești.

Admiral King felt that the first step should be to set out agreed basic fundamentals: for instance, the vital importance of Atlantic and Pacific lines of communications, security of the citadel of Britain, and the fact that the full weight must be thrown first on the defeat of Germany. To this might be added others. Was China essential as a basis for the defeat of Japan? These fundamentals, when agreed, would constitute a point of departure and yardsticks by which our strategy could be judged. Many of these points had been contained in previous papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got out as early as possible.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed with Admiral King’s views and suggested that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a document on those lines.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed:
a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May:
i) A statement of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which would serve as a background for the formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential sea communications; security of the citadel of Britain; etc.

ii) A draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

Operations in Burma

Sir Alan Brooke said that at the White House the previous day it had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. and British commanders in the area, examine the best means of expanding the air route to China and of opening a land route from India.

Sir Charles Portal said that he considered it important that the commanders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be related to practical possibilities.

Admiral Leahy suggested that it would be desirable that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. Soong and General Chu an opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early date.

The Committee then discussed a draft directive to the Combined Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed:
a. That the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary with the British and U.S. Commanders in Chief, India and China Theaters, should examine and report on:
i) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China given complete priority for its development except for the minimum requirements of the forces defending the air field areas, and whether any further steps can now be taken to enable these potentialities to be realized.

ii) The most promising operation, having regard to the various considerations brought to light in previous discussions, for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources and conditions are necessary for carrying it out without prejudicing the development of the air route.

b. That Dr. T. V. Soong and Major General Shih-ming Chu should be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater.

Operations in Europe

Sir Alan Brooke considered the possibilities of undertaking ROUNDUP should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from the shutting down of future operations in the Mediterranean. United States views on the possibilities of the BOLERO buildup and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the acceptance of General Eaker’s plan for the buildup of SICKLE as one of the fundamentals of our agreed strategy.

Sir Alan Brooke believed that at this stage SICKLE should not be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be found to tie our hands with regard to future plans.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement that SICKLE should not at this stage be accepted as a fundamental, though it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a material effect on any land operations, whether undertaken across the Channel or in the Mediterranean and should not therefore be reduced except after critical examination.

Sir Charles Portal said that the most important point was to decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to BOLERO, or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up at the maximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should examine this problem with a view to a combined assessment of the effect on Germany of the two alternatives.

Sir Alan Brooke said that both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were agreed that ROUNDUP must be undertaken as early as possible, but in the British view it was necessary, before ROUNDUP could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of German forces. The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which decisive results would be achieved.

General Marshall said that great faith was being pinned to the results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the Mediterranean would not materially slow up the BOLERO movement. The exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated.

Sir Alan Brooke said that it was estimated that further operations in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. divisions being available in the United Kingdom.

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last year considered the necessity of undertaking Operation SLEDGEHAMMER to relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces in the bridgehead, thereby materially altering the balance of force in our favor.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from attacks on German industry and transferred to the direct aid of our land forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be isolated, the penetration of these forces inland could not be assisted since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis.

General Marshall said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent had been appreciated, whereas great stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered that, in North Africa, though we had had air superiority since El Alamein, Rommel had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by some 100,000 men.

General Marshall pointed out the outstanding results achieved by the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out with regard to air power that fighter cover was essential.

General McNarney agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France would enable us to move forward the necessary fighter cover. Air power must be related to our ground power. For instance, it might well be that the correct application of air power might halve the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance, The seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could be advanced and air power applied at the correct moment in support of ground operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that he entirely agreed in the abstract with General McNarney’s last statement but it was important that in considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a sound tactical and logistic basis.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead.

Admiral Leahy agreed to the study suggested by Sir Charles Portal. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had prepared a brief outline plan for ROUNDUP which would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff. He believed that the results expected from the air bombardment of Germany should be taken into consideration both, in connection with cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.

Sir Charles Portal said that one of the main features of the air plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its tremendous effect both on production and morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense effect on any operations against Germany, whether across the Channel, in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not maintain that the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to SICKLE, but it must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed.

Admiral King said that Operation ROUNDUP must be carefully examined. While it had originally been believed that cross-Channel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 now appeared to be the earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should never come to grips with Germany by cross-Channel operations in 1944. He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they would, he believed, render cross-Channel operations in 1944 impossible.

Sir Alan Brooke said that only by Mediterranean operations to draw off and hold German forces could a situation be achieved in which a successful ROUNDUP is possible. Otherwise at best only SLEDGEHAMMER could be undertaken and we should then be committed in France and pinned down to a bridgehead.

Sir Charles Portal said that all were agreed that ROUNDUP was essential and that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, whereas the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken.

Admiral King said that he did not believe it would be possible to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, since these would cause a vacuum into which our forces would be sucked.

Sir Charles Portal said it must be remembered that this vacuum would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces.

With regard to General Morgan’s plans, General Marshall said that these, without forces to implement them, were of little value. He feared that unless we concentrated on the United Kingdom buildup, we should lack the necessary punch to undertake cross-Channel operations when the critical moment arose.

Sir Alan Brooke undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate of the shipping commitment to meet the economic situation that would arise in the event of an Italian collapse.

Admiral King drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for ROUNDUP, valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England.

Sir Charles Portal said that this also applied to airborne forces which were also essentially offensive and absorbed much air power which might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with landing craft and airborne troops their use was so essential to achieve success at the critical moment that their inactivity until this moment arrived must be accepted.

General McNarney said that he regarded SLEDGEHAMMER as a preliminary to ROUNDUP. Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it would bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front and inducing attrition. When, during Operation TORCH, it had been obvious to the Germans that no cross-Channel operations were possible, they had sent part of their garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the commitment of our forces to a bridgehead such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to disperse.

General Marshall said that on two previous occasions the forces which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of Operations TORCH and HUSKY, which had exceeded expectations. Unless BOLERO buildup was now given priority over operations in the Mediterranean, similar results might be expected and no forces would be available to undertake the operation at the critical moment.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that it had always been agreed that the buildup in the United Kingdom should take place subject to the requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been expected.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May, two papers as follows:
i) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in consultation with the British.

ii) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) which accepts the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to be prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U.S.

In the preparation of the above plans, cognizance should be taken of the effects of a full-scale SICKLE.

In submitting the above two papers, the Combined Staff Planners should make such recommendations as they feel able to on the respective plans.

b. Took note that a paper which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the economic results of the defeat of Italy would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Directive to Allied Authorities in the Far East

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the terms of a directive to the U.S. and British authorities in the Far East on the expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.

In the course of discussion, General Marshall outlined certain steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by Sir John Dill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of British good will.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed That the following telegram should be despatched forthwith by the appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in Chief:

Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam airfields in order that not less than 7,000 tons per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943.

It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly transportation of 10,000 tons should be provided at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that adequate defensive measures for the airfield area must be maintained.

The Azores

Admiral King, in stressing the urgency of action with regard to the Azores as a vital factor in the battle of the Atlantic, asked if any further developments had taken place.

General Ismay stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a paper on this subject which had been submitted to the Prime Minister and which he had invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff. This paper will be circulated. The military desirability of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our object.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be considered at the meeting on Monday, 17 May.

The Pittsburgh Press (May 15, 1943)

YANKS GAIN EDGE ON ATTU
Army troops carrying out Aleutian job

Knox hints current attack is only start of push in North Pacific
By Joseph L. Myler, United Press staff writer

U.S. FLIERS POUND PORT NEAR ROME
Allies boost air assaults from Africa

Bombers blast 4 ships, hit airfields, rail lines in Sardinia
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

Inside story of Tunisia –
‘Last battle’ alibi a farce – Germans were cut to pieces

Smart tactics, tremendous Allied supply effort smashed Axis in Africa – victory sets pattern for invasion
By Edward W. Beattie, United Press staff writer

Girl gunners used, wounded Yanks say

Phoenixville, Pennsylvania (UP) –
Nazi planes in the Tunisian campaign used girl tail gunners, wounded U.S. soldiers said today at the Army’s Valley Forge General Hospital, where they are convalescing after being wounded in the North African campaign.

Sgt. Victor R. Woodward, of Seymour, Indiana, said one German plane shot down near him carried a pretty blonde tail gunner. Several of his companions said they had seen other girls in the Nazi planes.

Tec. John Chandler, of Cleveland, Mississippi, said he was “knocked cold” when shrapnel struck his helmet, was bombed 16 times in one day and that a shell knocked the steering wheel of a jeep from his hands. He said grinning:

And then they sent me home with stomach ulcers.

4-way U.S. raid blasts Europe

Yank bombers hit Kiel, Belgium, Holland
By Robert Vermillion, United Press staff writer

Churchill, Roosevelt try to restrain overoptimism

Prime Minister warns that danger from Axis remains until its unconditional surrender

Washington (UP) –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill are trying today to restrain enthusiasm over recent Allied military successes lest a wave of overconfidence slow the forward movement of the war effort.

Both men have made obvious efforts to prevent runway optimism as a result of the Tunisian victory. Mr. Churchill’s radio speech to the British people yesterday was an example.

He said:

People who note our growing mastery of the air, not only over our island, but penetrating into ever-widening zones on the continent, ask whether the danger of invasion has not passed away.

Let me assure you of this, that until Hitler and Hitlerism are beaten into unconditional surrender, the danger of invasion will never pass away.

He admitted that the news was predominantly good, but he reminded that the drive for victory is still in its early stages.

Mr. Roosevelt followed the same theme recently, incorporating into his public statements such warnings as “the war is not over” and “the war has not been won.” He has stressed to me after time the necessity for still greater individual effort if final victory is to go to the United Nations.

War Information Director Elmer Davis also warned that this is not the end, although admitting that “this has been a glorious week.”

In his weekly radio review, Mr. Davis said that the mass surrender of Germans in Tunisia was proof that:

The master race will quit when it coincides that it is licked; and someday, that will happen in Germany itself.

But it won’t happen, he added, “until they have taken some more lickings.”

With their eyes “fixed upon the future,” as Mr. Churchill put it, he and the President planned to spend a weekend in uninterrupted conference. Late yesterday, they met for the second time this week with their full military, naval and air staffs and ranking government leaders closely related to the war effort.

To address Congress

They canvassed the developments since the arrival of the Churchill party and may have made4 some interim decisions which were reported to the President and the Prime Minister.

The public will have a better view of the war planning sessions next week when they are explained at a joint press conference by the President and the Prime Minister, and again when Mr. Churchill addresses a joint session of Congress on Wednesday.

Allies destroy 16 Jap raiders

Six others believed shot down over Guinea
By Don Caswell, United Press staff writer

Lewis holds the answers in coal case

Did he make a deal, or has WLB forced a showdown?

Compromise may be avoided –
Ruml Plan voted by Senate; House passage forecast

Total forgiveness accepted after five substitutes lose; GOP fights conference

Deems Taylor honored

New York (UP) –
Deems Taylor, president of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, last night received the Henry Hadley Medal for the greatest service to American music during the past year. The award was made at the annual reception of the National Association for American Composers and Conductors.

parry2

I DARE SAY —
Their world, their war

By Florence Fisher Parry

I do not feel qualified to write on this subject, for I have not been confronted with the problem. Yet so many girls and mothers have asked that I tell them “what to do” that I shall try, however lamely, to set down here my own feelings about our daughters enlisting in the WAACs, the WAVES, and the other branches of the Armed Forces which, within a little year, have swept thousands of our young women into enlistments.

I may as well confess: I hope my own daughter will not join up in any of these splendid branches of the service. Or, indeed, in any work that will take her far from me again. I know I am selfish and craven in my quite old-fashioned qualms. I confess my cowardice openly because I feel that there are many mothers who share my own misgivings. We rationalize our selfishness by making ourselves believe that our daughters are “better off” or “more useful” where they are, and in their present occupations.

But by the same token, I believe that these same mothers would be quick to acknowledge, with me, that were our daughters to profess a genuine desire and intention to join up with any or these branches of the armed service, we would not withhold our consent and blessing.

On this point, I can in all conscience hold firm. I am committed to the belief that this war and this world from now on are theirs, not ours, theirs to live absolutely. We cannot stand between; we must give ground.

Let them decide

For cannot we see, if we have eyes at all, that the pace and tempo of life have surged beyond us? Its urgency is for younger hearts and bodies than our own. We cannot longer keep up with our children. Time has moved up too fast.

In my day, we were caught up with the great issue of equal rights for men and women. The first great suffrage parade of women was held in 1915 or ’16, and because I wanted to step right down off the curb and join in, my family considered me a radical.

That was long ago, you say? But May 15, 1942, was not long ago, was it? Yet when the President on that date authorized the setting up of the WAAC, with Col. Oveta Culp Hobby to command it, confess did it not seem to us mothers that it was a kind of Eleanorish, White-House-ish step to take?

I admit I thought so. A year ago. One year. Yet since, our whole concept of its importance has gone through a revolutionary change. I say revolutionary. For the first time in U.S. military history, women have been given rank and recognition in the Army and Navy and Marines. It is in its way as much a step forward into the ranks of sex equality as was the passage of the 19th Amendment.

In one year, the first of the great military units of women has established itself as INDISPENSABLE to our conduct of the war. The call has gone out for enlistments, still more enlistments to meet a quota which a year ago would have seemed fantastic.

First in service

Shall we mothers lift our hands, then, vainly to stop the tide? I think not. Just as I should have been “allowed” to step off the curb into that first great parade of women down 5th Avenue, New York, just so, my daughter must be “allowed” to make her own choice, cost what it may to me.

WAACs, WAVES, SPARS, MARINES, RED CROSS, or a defense job or some other WAR-work, that is not my choice but hers. New worlds, new banners, new places for women: that is as it should be, must be. It is ridiculous to withhold our encouragement and consent because of fancied dangers and “exposures.” Consent is an outworn word, and danger is the adjective for all that is ahead of us!

The proof of the WAAC’s magnificent accomplishment lies in the appeal of the U.S. Army for more recruits! And reading and hearing of its great growth and work. I marvel that in one short year it could have worn down the last prejudice against American WOMEN in U.S. uniform, and brought a blush of shame to the cheeks of those of us who were so quick originally to deprecate their “place” in the ranks of our Army and Navy.

Hail the WAACs! Gangway for the WAVES! And their sister organizations, all releasing to the war manpower so needed for the victory now on its breathless way!

Aircraft plant working on 400-passenger plane

Davis sees Navy ‘double-cross’

OWI warns of peace tries to stave off defeat

Editorial: Wilt this ‘freeze’

Edson: WAAC colonel thinks ‘troops’ are ‘wonderful’

By Peter Edson

Ferguson: Faith and forests

By Mrs. Walter Ferguson