U.S. State Department (May 14, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Lieutenant General McNarney | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Embick | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Field Marshal Wavell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Admiral Somerville | |
| Vice Admiral Horne | Air Chief Marshal Peirse | |
| Major General Streett | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Chennault | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Captain Lambe | |
| Colonel Smart | Brigadier Porter | |
| Commander Freseman | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | ||
| Commander Coleridge | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
May 14, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Previous Meeting
Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the record and conclusions of the 83rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Global Strategy
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the Global Strategy of the War. There were certain points in this paper with which they were not in entire agreement. They adhered to the views agreed to at Casablanca as set out in C.C.S. 155/1.
The British Chiefs of Staff had two main points of difference which he would like to mention. Firstly, paragraph 2b of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper referred to an extension of pressure against Japan. Such extension might well cause a vacuum into which forces would have to be poured and would thereby depart from the object set out in paragraph 2a of the same paper, i.e., to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. Action in the Pacific must be coordinated with that in Europe and must not prejudice the defeat of Germany or the war would drag on indefinitely.
The second point of difference was in connection with paragraph 3 of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper, i.e., ROUNDUP and its possibilities. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the possibilities of ROUNDUP were dependent on the success or failure of the Russians on the Eastern Front, Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which ROUNDUP was possible.
The views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to ROUNDUP might be summed up as follows:
It was their firm intention to carry out ROUNDUP at the first moment when the conditions were such that the operations would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. These conditions might arise this year, but in any case, it was the firm belief of the British Chiefs of Staff that they would arise next year. They could be created only by the Russian Army. Our action, therefore, must consist of:
a. Continuing our increasing bombardment of Germany; and
b. Drawing off from the Russian Front as many forces as possible.
On the basis of this definition of ROUNDUP the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward their views on operations in the Mediterranean.
Paragraph 5 of the U.S. paper pointed out how essential it was that Russia should be kept in the war. The British Chiefs of Staff looked on the matter differently and regarded it as essential not only that Russia should be kept in the war but that we should create a situation whereby Russian victories could be achieved.
Admiral Leahy said that he was unable to see that the U.S. conception of global strategy differed materially from that set out at Casablanca. The intention was now and was then to prepare for and launch cross-Channel operations. The African venture was undertaken in order to do something this year while preparing for cross-Channel operations. Little preparation for the latter had, in fact, been made, since all available U.S. resources had been sent to North Africa. The North African campaign was now completed. If we launched a new campaign in the Mediterranean, then we should continue to use our resources in that area. This would again postpone help to Russia since we should not be able to concentrate forces in the U.K. and thus cause a withdrawal of German troops to western Europe. If new operations in the Mediterranean were the best way to bring the European war to a conclusion, then they must be undertaken; but if these operations would have the effect of prolonging the war, he saw great difficulties in committing U.S. resources to them.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Alan Brooke confirmed that, in the British view, Mediterranean operations would shorten the European war.
Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Planners in reporting to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the necessity of shortening the war in the Pacific and thus preventing Japan from consolidating her gains.
Admiral Leahy then read out a paper giving the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on global strategy.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared two papers – one on operations in the European Theater and one on operations from India for 1943-1944, which he would like to hand over to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting.
Admiral Leahy drew attention to paragraph 11 of the British Chiefs of Staff paper contained in Annex “B” to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting with regard to a combined examination of the method by which the defeat of Japan was ultimately brought about. He thought it would be helpful if Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell were asked to give their views on this subject. An examination should be made of each plan and of what it would accomplish. He suggested that there should also be a combined examination as to how to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany. He would like to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Pacific campaign as a whole.
Operations in Burma
Sir Alan Brooke said that after the Casablanca Conference, plans had been drawn up for operations from India. Field Marshal Wavell would outline the plan which had been decided on as being the best; but this plan did not, in his opinion, hold out great hopes. Even when Burma was cleared and the Burma Road opened, it would take from six to nine months to develop it to a capacity of 10,000 tons per month. Was ANAKIM the best plan? He believed that we should examine other lines of approach to the problem and whatever action was decided on from India this should be coordinated as part of a complete plan for the defeat of Japan. One possibility was to seize the Kra Isthmus and to punch through to Bangkok, thereby cutting the main Japanese line of communications to Burma and obtaining bases from which to threaten Japanese oil traffic. There was no communication by rail with Bangkok from the west coast of the Kra Peninsula, and the roads were poor; but the principal difficulty was the lack of adequate port facilities on the Kra Isthmus.
Another alternative was to capture northern Sumatra and Penang. This operation again would give us air bases to cover the Japanese oil routes.
The third alternative would be to take the whole of Sumatra and then Java, the latter either from the east or west.
Only preliminary examination had been given to these plans. It was essential to decide whether one of these or Operation ANAKIM held out the best hopes. The latter might prove to be the most valuable, but the very poor lines of communication through Assam must be remembered. The Brahmaputra River had to be crossed by train ferries since there was no bridge, and the only railways available were single track meter gauge. It was planned to use more shipping on the Brahmaputra when it could be returned from Iraq. Rather than undertake ANAKIM, it might be better to develop new airports and to increase the capacity of the air ferry service into China to the maximum.
Land operations would have to take place down the two roads from Imphal and Ledo at the end of which roads, when built, our forces would have to be maintained through the monsoon season, when no operations could take place. A thrust from the north would have to be accompanied by landings on the west coast designed to secure airfields. These landings would require carrier-based air support, and only relatively small forces could infiltrate over the mountains. To capture southern Burma an assault on Rangoon would be necessary. Owing to the delta and mangrove swamps, no landings on the coast were possible, so that a hazardous operation up the Irrawaddy was required. Even when Rangoon was captured, there would be a continuous threat on our eastern flank; and once committed in this area, we might be drawn on into further operations against Thailand and the consequent difficulties of maintaining ourselves.
If on examination Operation ANAKIM proved to be the best answer, it must be done; but any action we took must be coordinated with United States thrusts from the east. In any event, the air route to China should be developed. It must be remembered, too, that successful operations against Germany in Europe might well bring Russia to our assistance in the Far East.
Admiral Leahy pointed out that the object of the Burma Campaign was to assist China by opening the Burma Road. Alternative operations did not appear to afford immediate relief to China.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed that unless the Burma Road was opened, no immediate relief to China would be given except by air. He considered that the moral effect of recapturing Burma would be great both in China and in India; and it was, therefore, desirable to do this operation if possible; but from the material point of view we must consider whether operations to open the Burma Road would produce sufficient result to warrant the scale of effort which would be necessary and the commitments which would arise. The actual supplies which the Road could take through to China were relatively small.
Admiral Leahy said that it was essential to do something for China. We must maintain the air route whose capacity was now relatively small and which would fall further during the monsoon season.
Sir Alan Brooke said that it was important to appreciate the fact that operations to recapture Burma would interfere with developing facilities for increasing the capacity of the air route.
Admiral King said that he understood that airfields in Assam were now being developed though slowly. As in Europe, where Russia’s geographical and manpower position were regarded as vital to the defeat of Germany, so China’s geographical position and manpower were vital to the defeat of Japan and must be used. A collapse of China would vastly prolong the war and vitally affect the whole situation vis-à-vis Japan.
Sir Alan Brooke said he fully appreciated this point. The value of Russian bases for use against Japan was also great.
Admiral King said that he was attracted toward the Bangkok operation, but it must be remembered that this was of no direct assistance to China. The Japanese attitude toward the Puppet Government in Nanking had changed, and the people in the occupied area were being offered supplies and facilities which were not available to Free China. Morale was weakening, and if China went out of the war, the task of the United Nations in defeating Japan would be terrific.
At this point, Field Marshal Wavell, Admiral Somerville, and the Air Chief Marshal Peirse entered the meeting.
Admiral Leahy stated that the Chiefs of Staff had just been discussing the Burma situation. They would like very much to hear Field Marshal Wavell’s idea on the best methods of procedure.
Field Marshal Wavell said that, considering such operations, the first thing necessary to make clear was the administrative situation in India, which would of necessity be used as a base for operations in Burma. The communications in eastern India and Assam are very poor. One means of communication is the Brahmaputra River, but the value of the river ports is limited by the fact that the seasonal rise and fall is as much as 25 feet. On the other hand, the river constitutes a formidable barrier, as it is unbridged throughout its length and frequent changes of course make it difficult if not impossible to bridge. The result is that the bottleneck of transportation from India to Assam is the ferries which operate across this river. It has railroads on either side which are of meter gauge, single line, and in poor condition. A year ago this railroad carried only three or four trains a day, had no modern methods for operation, and few crossings. Improvements have made it possible to operate 14 pairs of trains a day up as far as Manipur Road. Beyond that point 12 pairs a day is the maximum capacity. Unless this rail route is double tracked, which would be a tremendous undertaking and would take from two to three years, the present volume of traffic cannot be increased. There is one stretch of the railroad north of the Brahmaputra which runs along the south of the Himalayas. This part of the road is frequently broken by floods. Last year it was out of action for five months during the monsoon season. The only other approach to Assam was through Bengal, which is a single-track route. There were no satisfactory road communications between India and Assam. Such as there were, were poor in the dry season and impossible during the wet season. This necessitated sending by rail all vehicles for use in Assam or Burma. Before the Japanese entered the war, one of the principal tasks for India was to establish a line of communications to Russia through Iraq. Therefore, most of the steamers from the Brahmaputra were sent into Iraq for this purpose. It is now difficult and a long haul to get them back, but an effort was being made. The ultimate result is that the amount of supplies which can be sent into northeast Assam is limited. The scope of the operations which can be conducted is in turn dependent upon this volume of supplies.
In referring to conditions in Assam and northern Burma, General Wavell stated that it was one of the rainiest spots in the world. Recently over 22 inches of rain fell in a period of three weeks, in the dry season. During the wet season it rains continuously. There are few roads, and those which do exist are in poor condition. There is very little stone or other suitable building material which could be used for the purpose of constructing roads or airdromes, and such as there is usually has to be carried great distances. The entire country is intensely malarial resulting in a high casualty rate. At present they are very short of engineering equipment such as bulldozers, rollers, etc., as well as qualified personnel to operate this machinery.
When the Japanese entered the war, there were approximately thirty airfields in India. Last year over 200 were constructed at a very great effort, which demanded practically all of the resources which could be made available in India. The original layout of these airfields had to be defensive and therefore further back than now required. There were only a limited number in the forward area including Assam. The conditions there are therefore unfavorable for offensive operations.
Work is going on on three or four projects, but each of these projects demands the same thing. There are two bases being constructed, also the road from Manipur to Imphal and on to Tamur. This was originally a one-way road as far as Imphal only. It has now been made two-way as far as Imphal; and work is in hand to extend it as a two-way, all-weather road as far as Tamu. Beyond Tamil and into Burma it is at present a fair-weather road only. This project is not completed. Malaria is intense in the area. The road to Imphal, over 200 miles, all requires fill. It would have to be doubled in some places in order to bear the traffic. When this road gets into Burma, it will still have another seventy miles to go to get into the Chindwin Valley, across a route which a year ago was nothing more than a mule track.
The other base is at Ledo from which it is intended to construct a road by the Hukaung Valley to Myitkyina. Here again a road needs to be constructed approximately 200 miles in length, for most of which there has formerly been not even a mule track, although a road alignment had been surveyed for part of the way.
General Wheeler had taken over the construction of this road and had at present gone about 50 miles. In the Hukaung Valley section the only way to get a road through was to stick to the hills; otherwise in the rainy season this section will be covered with water. Whether or not a road could be constructed to open the line of communication from India to China was open to doubt. However, General Stilwell, who has recently seen General Wheeler, could give a more accurate report. The moral effect on the Chinese would be good if such a project were undertaken, even though the carrying capacity might prove small.
They had tried to run two roads from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley. One is through, but the other is considered as being a much greater undertaking.
With regard to airfields, the original requirement had been three fields in the northeast corner of Assam. These were in use but not quite completed but had encountered various delays, particularly because of labor and equipment shortages. These airfields now are operating with runways complete. However, the standings are limited; and with the increase in the numbers of aircraft, the demands for standings are increasing proportionately. After the visit of Generals Arnold and Somervell, three more airfields had been requested. The sites had been selected. The target date for their completion was 1 October, but a great deal will depend on monsoons and the availability of labor. It was difficult to get native labor to work during the rainy season. It was proposed to use on these fields steel mats, which in turn mean an added burden on the railway – 6,000 tons per runway.
He had had another administrative survey made just before leaving India; the conclusion reached was that the facilities were not available both to establish communications for the maintenance of the large force necessary to invade Burma successfully and to provide sufficient airfields for the support of China. He had left instructions to put the construction of the airfields on top priority.
The land route to Akyab was extremely difficult. The sea landing could have been successfully made, but he did not have the shipping, landing craft, and other essential equipment available. Therefore, he tried the operation overland down the coast. The essence of this operation should have been speed in order to arrive at Akyab before the Japanese were able to reinforce. However, the conditions encountered proved extremely difficult and provided the time necessary for the Japanese to reinforce and eventually drive the British out. Operations on a small scale against Akyab could not have had any major effect. The original plan was to have been coordinated with a Chinese offensive beginning in March. He had not been told that the Chinese had abandoned their operation until well into February, when his arrangements were already underway. He had continued with the operation, but the Japanese had been able to move reinforcements from Upper Burma and use them against his force. While Akyab had not been captured, the Japanese had suffered heavily, and air operations against them had been effective.
Further north, it had been the intention that one brigade should advance from the Fourth Corps Area and penetrate deeply beyond the Chindwin Valley to cover work taking place on the road and to help Chinese operations. This brigade had been specially trained to live on the country and operate without communications. When he had learned that the Chinese did not intend to take any action, he had decided to send the brigade in to gain experience in this form of fighting. They crossed the Chindwin early in February and went through to the Irrawaddy, cut the railway in 75 places, and put it out of action for several months. The commander of the brigade then decided to try to operate against Japanese communications near Lashio. However, in crossing the Irrawaddy, he had lost many of his transport animals and some of the remainder had died of disease. After being in action with the Japanese, he decided to break up the brigade into small columns, as had been arranged, and up to date some 1,500 of the original 2,500 had gotten back. Of the remainder, some were still on their way back while some were making for China. Casualties amounted to some 18 percent. The brigade consisted of British, Burmese and Ghurka troops. The Burmese had been included to assist the command with their local knowledge, and some had been deliberately left behind for future use. As a result of the experience gained, it had been decided to train one or possibly more brigades for this type of fighting.
The operations on the Arakan coast had proved disappointing, and we had failed to capture Akyab. This failure, together with the possible loss of Maungdaw, had strategic disadvantages in that it gave the Japanese an advance base for air attack on India and denied us bases.
In view of the difficulties of warfare in Upper Burma, it would never be possible to complete the conquest by land alone and a seaborne invasion of Lower Burma was essential. Landings on the Arakan Coast down to Cape Negrais would be cut off from the mainland by the Arakan Hills, through which there was only one bad road to Prome. It was impossible to land in the delta of the Irrawaddy; and, though landing at Moulmein was possible, these forces would be separated from Rangoon by big rivers and a flank guard against Siam would be essential.
Operations down the Arakan coast were designed to obtain air bases to give air cover for successive landings and finally for assault on Rangoon, but the latter town could not thus be captured in one season.
When Generals Arnold and Somervell had arrived from Casablanca with the proposal that a plan to capture Burma in one campaigning season should be drawn up, it was decided that the object could only be achieved in one way.
An advance by land must be made in Upper Burma to contain Japanese forces. This must be followed by landings on the Arakan coast to provide bases for air cover for a direct assault on Rangoon by going up the river. Forces from Assam and the Chinese from Yunnan would join up. The final assault up the Rangoon River was extremely difficult and hazardous. Though the river was not at present heavily defended, this could quickly be done if the Japanese learned of our intentions.
Certain conditions were essential if this plan was to be successful. Sufficient forces must be available, fully trained and fully equipped with all the necessary supplies and specialized equipment, and be ready to start operations at the beginning of the dry season during the first fortnight of November. Planning and Operational staffs were gotten together to prepare for the operation; and it was estimated that 180,000 tons of supplies a month, loading during March, April, May and June, were essential in order to mount the operation. In fact, in March and April only 70,000 and 65,000 tons respectively had been loaded. This was approximately half the normal maintenance requirements, and the operation was thus put back from two to three months.
The operations on the Arakan coast had proved that the Japanese were as good in defense as in attack and that our troops would require careful and lengthy training. Training in India was a difficult process due to the climate, and took longer than elsewhere. It was unlikely that the necessary shipping or naval forces would be available and therefore ANAKIM as originally planned was not possible of execution in full during the coming cold weather season. He was prepared to undertake the operation only if fully trained and equipped troops were available with the necessary amphibious transport assault and landing ships and specialized equipment. However, much shipping was sent now it would not be in time for the forces to be ready in early November.
Admiral Leahy asked Field Marshal Wavell what he considered to be the best practicable action which could be taken to keep China in the war.
Field Marshal Wavell said that he fully realized the political importance of the recapture of Burma, both on China and on India. Even if Operation ANAKIM was undertaken in full and was successful the Burma Road was unlikely to attain a capacity of 20,000 tons per month until June 1945. He believed the U.S. Air Force was now ferrying some 6,000 tons per month into China and hoped to work up to 10,000 tons per month. This was a greater capacity than the road would have for a long time and it might be possible to raise even this figure. He believed that the best way to help China was to increase the strength of General Chennault’s forces and that this, together with an increase of air-borne supplies, would have more material results than Operation ANAKIM. An unsuccessful operation into Burma would be almost worse than no operation at all. General Chennault’s forces could bring pressure to bear both against Japanese air and their shipping and port facilities. These were their weak links. It was not easy to construct more airfields in Assam since the requirements of gasoline and of construction material, including steel tracks, were heavy. If large-scale operations into Burma were not undertaken, then it would be easier to construct the airfields required to increase the flow into China. Thus, it would be feasible to increase General Chennault’s forces which could then achieve bigger results.
Admiral Leahy thanked Field Marshal Wavell for his description of the position in Burma.