America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 15 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 308

South-East Asia Command

Part I

1. The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below.

Command in India

2. The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in GHQ India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

Command in Southeast Asia

3. A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:

a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three services and of the Allied forces.

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.

4. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command will be as follows:

a. Eastern Boundary
From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin, southwards along the coast of Indo China, Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.

b. Northern Frontier
From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin westwards along the Chinese frontier to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along that border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the Southeast Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.

c. Western Boundary
Southward along meridian 60 degrees East to Albatross Island, thence Southeastward to exclude Rodriguez Island and thence due southward.

5. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be formed in the first instance at Delhi, since it will take over elements of the present General Headquarters, India. The Supreme Allied Commander will submit his recommendations as to the ultimate location of his Headquarters as soon as he has had time to study the problem.

Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia

6. Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

7. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Part II

8. The above arrangements have been generally agreed between the President and Prime Minister, but the following points call for further discussion:

a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
It has been proposed that the responsibilities of General Stilwell as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander should be defined as follows:

The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, in addition to his duties as such, will command, under the Supreme Allied Commander, all ground and air forces at present under the United States Commander in the Southeast Asia Theater, and such additional United States and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available, and will continue to be responsible for the operation of the air route to China and for the defense of its India terminal. Furthermore the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander will continue to have the same direct responsibilities to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as now lie with the United States Commander.

The British Chiefs of Staff are doubtful whether the above arrangements will work satisfactorily and would welcome discussion of them. They think it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise executive command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force.

b. Command Relationship
The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the relationship of the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, should follow as closely as possible, mutatis mutandis, the MacArthur model. Under this arrangement, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and over such relating factors as are necessary for implementing this policy, including the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. It is understood that the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the more appropriate Command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff following the Eisenhower model.

c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as OSS, OWI, FCB, etc., with Comparable British Organizations
It is proposed that all American agencies functioning in relation to the Southeast Asia Command, notably the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Office of War Information (OWI), the Federal Communication Board (FCB), and the Office of Economic Warfare (OEW), having been placed by the United States Chiefs of Staff under the control of the Deputy Supreme Commander, these agencies should operate in conformity with the requirements of the Supreme Commander. To this end, the activities of these agencies in the Southeast Asia Command Area, whether conducted from within the India Command or from within the Southeast Asia Command Area or from other locations in Asia, should be coordinated with those of similar British agencies, such as the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW)

The British Chiefs of Staff consider that this coordination can best be arranged by agreement between the Supreme Commander, the Commander in Chief, India, and the Deputy Supreme Commander, in consultation with the Viceroy. These authorities should also decide the degree and method of liaison which it is expedient to establish between the American and their corresponding British agencies.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the Chief of the British Air Staff

Québec, 15 August 1943.

Most secret
Enclosure to CCS 309

POINTBLANK

I annex an appreciation by Air Intelligence of the trend of development and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation to POINTBLANK.

The salient points are:
a. The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1 January 1943.

b. Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since the same date.

c. The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire expansion under [a.].

d. Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have nevertheless had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts as well, in spite of the critical situation on those fronts.

e. In spite of the present strain on the German night fighters they are being used by day to counter the deep daylight penetration of POINTBLANK into Germany.

The buildup of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the POINTBLANK plan approved by the CCS at TRIDENT should have been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of the actual buildup achieved on that date was 921 (including 105 detached to North Africa).

The present strength of the GAF Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in first line units compared with a strength of 2000 which it was hoped would not be exceeded if POINTBLANK could have been executed as planned. Thus, the GAF Fighter Force is 13% stronger than had been hoped, and this in spite of increased successes in Russia and the Mediterranean which were not taken into account in the POINTBLANK plan.

I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of an inability to have achieved complete fulfillment of POINTBLANK. My object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the buildup, Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of POINTBLANK can be maintained and increased before the increase in the GAF Fighter Force has gone too far.

There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of POINTBLANK on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the Russian and Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses there, tell us by their acts what importance to attach to it.

The daylight “Battle of Germany” is evidently regarded by the Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them throw into it most, if not all, of their available reserves.

If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear to win this battle during the next two or three months but are content to see the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements just as success is within its grasp, we may well miss the opportunity to win a decisive victory against the German Air Force which will have incalculable effects on all future operations and on the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may not recur.

6. I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the USCS to take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date to increase the striking power of the 8th Bomber Command as much as possible during the next two months.

Annex

British Intelligence Appreciation

GAF Single-Engined Fighter Reinforcement of the Western Front, January-July, 1943

Strength and Disposition
The Initial Equipment (IE) of the GAF single-engined fighter force as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 to 1,340 between 1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force in the main operational areas on the respective dates was as follows:

	1-1-43	1-8-43	Difference
Western Front	305	600	+295
Mediterranean	320	295	-25
Russian Front	430	395	-35
Refitting	40	50	+10
Total	1,095	1,340	245

It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front has been doubled during the period under review and that this increase has in effect more than absorbed the entire expansion which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts notwithstanding the important military campaigns in those areas where the Axis forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the year.

Sources of Increased Strength
The raising of SE fighter strength on the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways:

a. As a result of the defensive strategy forced on the GAF since the end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western Front, in the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to adopt the policy of achieving the maximum possible expansion of fighter production.

The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of new fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition there has been a noticeable tendency to maintain the actual strength of many fighter units well in excess of IE, particularly on the Western Front.

b. By the withdrawal of units from the Mediterranean and Russia.

The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the above measures can be analyzed as follows:

Newly formed units	165
Expansion of existing units	165
Transferred from Russia	90
Transferred from Mediterranean	60
Gross Total	315
Loss [Less?]:
Fighter units transferred to fighter-bomber Category	20
Net Total Increase	295 aircraft

Redisposition on the Western Front
A most striking change in the disposition of the GAF fighter force on the Western Front has taken place since 1 January in order to secure the greatest possible defensive strength to cover the approaches to Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter dispositions were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the Low Countries against RAF fighter sweeps in these areas and against such daylight bombing of occupied territory as then took place.

The comparative dispositions are shown as follows:

Area	IE at 1-8-43	IE at 1-1-43	Differences
France (West of the Seine)	95	95	0
France (East of the Seine and Belgium)	105	70	+35
Holland	150	40	+110
N.W. Germany	180	35	+145
Denmark and S. Norway	50	35	+15
Trondheim and N. Norway	20	30	-10
Total	600	305	+295

The salient points which emerge are:
a. The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany have absorbed 50% of the total increased fighter strength on the Western Front.

b. The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the Belgium-Holland area.

A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the movement eastwards of French based units and the bringing of others from Norway to Northwest Germany; there has therefore been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible forces into the area between the Scheldt and the Elbe. Nevertheless, it is certain that the present fighter strength defending Northwest Germany and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this is supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight interception especially against deep penetration into Germany where the resources of the GAF are inadequate to maintain SE day fighter forces.

Reason for Increased Defenses
The doubling of the German SE fighter force on the Western Front and the allocation of virtually the whole of this increase to Belgium, Holland and Northwest Germany are attributable solely to the development of Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the GAF and is being undertaken even at the expense of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue to constitute the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the GAF: if anything, this commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of further units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot be excluded.

Strain on Crews
Despite their strength and flexibility, the fighter defenses of Germany are liable to be subject to extreme strain over periods of sustained day and night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively employed as night fighters in addition to their day operations and conversely night fighters had to be employed for day interception. The effects of such continued activity on crews must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in the later raids during this period opposition was less determined and Allied losses noticeably reduced. There is no doubt that during this period the German fighter defenses were subjected to the most severe test they have yet experienced.

Transfer of Experienced Pilots to Western Front
The urgent necessity of the defense of Germany has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those fronts, notably Russia since there is strong evidence that the most experienced pilots are being transferred to the Western Front and replaced by others of inferior skill.

Conclusions
a. There can be no doubt that Germany regards the defense of the Reich against daylight air attack as of such supreme importance that adequate support for military operations in Russia and the Mediterranean has been rendered impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged on the entire front is now little more than half that on the Western Front; this fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important contributory factor to the German failure in Russia this year.

Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for support of Italy no reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming; consequently, Allied air operations have been carried out with the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible opposition, thereby largely contributing to present conditions in Italy.

b. The Western Front with a fighter strength almost equal that of the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts combined constitutes the only source from which reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless further new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the immediate future. Consequently, in the event of South Germany becoming exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that such fighter defenses as may be set up must be derived almost exclusively from the West; the defense of South Germany against air attack on a scale equivalent to that now existing on the Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the fighter force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing commitments of the GAF in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

[NormanStewart]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Québec, 15 August 1943

Secret
Urgent

Standstill order issued by Combined Chiefs of Staff in their message of 14th August regarding bombing of Rome is revoked. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 194, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You are free to carry on these operations to the extent that you consider necessary or advisable subject to previous limitations regarding safety of Vatican.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 15 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 310

Propaganda Committee

Recent events have indicated the necessity for establishing some machinery whereby propaganda policies to be followed by London, Washington, and Theater Headquarters may be coordinated, particularly in emergency cases.

The enclosure is presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a possible solution to this problem. They consider it desirable that something along these lines be accomplished during the QUADRANT Conferences.

Enclosure
[Propaganda Committee]

Problem

To establish a central agency with power of decision regarding propaganda lines to be followed.

Facts bearing on the problem

The recent removal of Mussolini disclosed the fact that in emergencies there is no United Nations agency immediately available to coordinate and determine the propaganda policy that should be followed in order to derive the maximum benefit from the situation. As a result, there has been a divergence in the propaganda aims as between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Theater Commander, which will be difficult to correct.

The time involved in obtaining agreed views from the Chief Executives of the two governments, the State Department, the Foreign Office, and the military and naval leaders of the two countries is too long to permit taking full advantage of a situation which requires immediate action.

Action recommended

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:
a. That a Propaganda Committee be set up in Washington to include one high-level representative each from the U.S. State Department, British Foreign Office, U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff.

b. That this Committee be authorized to make decisions and issue broad directives on propaganda policies to be followed by the propaganda agencies of the two countries. These should be such as to insure the maximum benefit in furthering the military and political aims of the two governments. It should be understood that this committee ordinarily is free to seek guidance on the highest levels, but in emergencies to have the responsibility of taking immediate action without reference to higher authority.

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with the implementation of the above.

[NormanStewart]

Marshall-Churchill meeting, evening

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General Marshall		Prime Minister Churchill

From the minutes of the 105th Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held at 10 a.m., August 16:

General Marshall said that last night it was evident that the Prime Minister had been informed of the results of yesterday’s CCS Meeting. Mr. Churchill did not mention the subject at first. He talked about Burma and the COSSAC command and referred to the misunderstanding with General Eisenhower about a certain dispatch. Finally, the Prime Minister got around to the subject of OVERLORD and said he had changed his mind regarding OVERLORD and that we should use every opportunity to further that operation, General Marshall said he told the Prime Minister that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a difficult meeting yesterday afternoon and that there had been frank differences of opinion but that he believed such a situation was excellent at the start. He said there was discussion regarding the “right” and “left” method of approach and that he informed the Prime Minister that he could not agree to the logic of supporting the main effort by withdrawing strength therefrom in order to bolster up the force in Italy. The Prime Minister finally dropped the subject, saying “give us time.”

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (August 16, 1943)

Schwerer Schlag unserer Torpedoflieger gegen feindliches Großgeleit –
170.000 BRT. ostwärts Gibraltar vernichtet

In schneidig durchgeführten Angriffen Torpedotreffer auf 32 Schiffseinheiten

Der Nachschub für Sizilien hart getroffen

dnb. Aus dem Führer-Hauptquartier, 15. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:

In den Abendstunden des 13. August griff ein deutsches Torpedofliegergeschwader unter Führung des Majors Klümper ostwärts Gibraltar einen starken in das Mittelmeer einlaufenden Geleitzug überraschend an. In schneidig durchgeführten Angriffen erzielten unsere Besatzungen Lufttorpedotreffer auf 32 Schiffseinheiten. Zwei Zerstörer und vier vollbeladene Handelsschiffe großer Tonnage, darunter ein Tanker, sanken sofort. Acht weitere Schiffe blieben brennend mit starker Schlagseite liegen. Wegen hereinbrechender Dunkelheit und starker Flakabwehr konnte das Schicksal der übrigen torpedierten Schiffe zunächst nicht erkannt werden. Die laufend durchgeführte Aufklärung bestätigte aber, daß mindestens 170.000 BRT. aus dem Geleitzug versenkt oder vernichtend getroffen wurden. Sieben eigene Flugzeuge kehrten nicht zurück.

Wien, 15. August –
Am Sonntag erklangen zum erstenmal seit geraumer Zeit wieder die Fanfaren einer Sondermeldung über den Tonnagekrieg gegen die englisch-amerikanische Schiffahrt. Die glänzende Tat eines deutschen Torpedofliegergeschwaders unter Führung des Majors Klümper, das ostwärts Gibraltar im Mittelmeer 32 feindliche Schiffe mit seinen Torpedos traf und mindestens 170.000 BRT. versenkte, hat im Herzen des deutschen Volkes freudigen Widerhall gefunden. Darüber hinaus hat der harte Schlag der Torpedoflugzeuge der deutschen Luftwaffe gegen ein stark gesichertes Großgeleit in der ganzen Welt besonderes Aufsehen erregt. Er zeigt auf das eindringlichste, daß uns wirksame Kampfmittel der verschiedensten Art zur Verfügung stehen, um den Aderlaß am feindlichen Schiffsraum kräftig weiterzuführen.

Deutsche Torpedoflugzeuge, die im westlichen Mittelmeer nun einen so konzentrierten Angriffserfolg erringen konnten, haben in diesem Kriege schon häufig ihre Angriffskraft gegen feindliche Schiffe unter Beweis gestellt. Das geschah nicht nur im Mittelmeer, sondern auch in den Gewässern um England und vor allem im Nordmeer, wo die Torpedoflugzeuge im Vorjahr erheblich an den Erfolgen gegen die Geleitzüge nach Murmansk beteiligt waren. Diese englisch-amerikanischen Geleite zu den sowjetischen Eismeerhäfen sind übrigens wegen der außerordentlich hohen Verluste durch die Bomben und Torpedos deutscher Flugzeuge und Unterseeboote seit einer Reihe von Monaten zum Erliegen gekommen und durch den langwierigen Nachschubweg über iranische Häfen ersetzt worden. Als die englisch­amerikanischen Truppen am 10. Juli auf Sizilien landeten, verkündete die feindliche Agitation, daß damit das Mittelmeer wieder zu einem bequemen Durchgangsweg für die Schiffahrt nach Indien und Iran geworden sei. Doch bereits beim Nachschubverkehr für die Truppen auf Sizilien hat der Feind erfahren müssen, daß die Flugzeuge und trotz der schwierigen Kampfverhältnisse auch die Unterseeboote und Schnellboote der Achsenmächte im Mittelmeer den englischen und amerikanischen Transportern schwerste Verluste zuzufügen wissen.

Bekanntlich haben die Regierungen Englands und der USA. am 10. Juli, dem Tage der Landung auf Sizilien, vorsichtigerweise erklärt, daß ihrer Presse und auch ihren Ministern fortan alle Äußerungen über den Stand des Tonnagekrieges verboten seien. Nur noch am 10. eines jeden Monats sollte eine kurze zusammenfassende Meldung erscheinen. Der erste Stichtag, der 10. August, ist jedoch vergangen, ohne daß der Feind sich auch nur zu einer farblosen Sammelmeldung über die Schiffsverluste aufschwingen konnte. Statt dessen wurde erklärt, daß London und Washington sich geeinigt hätten, überhaupt keine Meldungen über die Schiffsverluste mehr herauszugeben. Dies ist eine eindrucksvolle Unterstreichung der Tatsache, daß die Aktionen im Mittelmeer dem Feind weitaus mehr Transporttonnage gekostet haben, als er je erwartet hat, obwohl er sich in Sizilien noch im insularen Vorfeld des Festlandes befindet. Es ist ein weithin sichtbares Vorzeichen für alle weiteren feindlichen Unternehmungen der sogenannten „amphibischen Strategie“ im Mittelmeer, daß schon im ersten Monat der Kämpfe auf Sizilien mehr als 1,2 Mill. BRT. an feindlichem Schiffsraum, in erster Linie durch deutsche Flugzeuge, versenkt oder für längere Zeit ausgeschaltet werden konnte. Die feindlichen Bemühungen, die bitteren Schiffsverluste im Mittelmeer totzuschweigen, ändern die Sachlage nicht im mindesten, sondern kennzeichnen nur ihre Bedeutung. Im Falle des Sieges deutscher Torpedoflugzeuge vor Gibraltar ist die feindliche Schweigetaktik völlig vergebens, denn diese Geleitzugschlacht ist von der spanischen Küste her beobachtet worden.

Seit Juli ist nun das Mittelmeer im Tonnagekrieg die Hauptquelle der englisch­amerikanischen Schiffsverluste geworden. Der Feind mußte im Mittelmeer durch den Untergang so vieler Schiffe erkennen, welche starke Stellung wir in Europa besitzen. Aber auch auf den anderen Meeren muß der Feind immer wieder empfindliche Einbußen an Schiffsraum hinnehmen. Zwar haben die Engländer und Nordamerikaner im nördlichen Atlantik, wo sie ihre Abwehr durch See- und Luftstreitkräfte gegen die Unterseeboote auf ein Höchstmaß gebracht haben, eine Zeitlang den großen Geleitzugschlachten ausweichen können. Ihre Abwehr haben sie hingegen auch dort nicht abbauen können, da sie im Unterseebootkrieg an plötzliche Wendungen und Überraschungen gewöhnt sind und der künftigen Entwicklung nicht recht trauen. Jedenfalls haben die Unterseeboote in anderen Teilen des Atlantischen Ozeans, so an der südamerikanischen und westafrikanischen Küste und im Indischen Ozean bis nach Madagaskar und Mauritius hin zahlreiche Schiffe vernichtet und ihre Versenkungserfolge seit dem Tiefstand des Juni bereits sichtbar steigern können.

Fügt man die mehrfachen Erfolge deutscher Fernkampfflugzeuge gegen englische Geleitzüge im westlichen Atlantik und auch die ständigen feindlichen Schiffsverluste der Amerikaner durch japanische See- und Luftstreitkräfte im Südwestpazifik hinzu, dann kann man wohl begreifen, warum Churchill und Roosevelt sich so viel Mühe geben, die weiterhin für sie schwierige Lage im Tonnagekrieg zu verschleiern. Seit Juli ist die Fieberkurve der feindlichen Schiffsverluste wieder in die Höhe gegangen. Die Torpedos deutscher Flugzeuge im westlichen Mittelmeer aber haben nicht nur die Bordwände feindlicher Frachter und Tanker, sondern auch die feindlichen Tarnschleier über die Schiffsverluste zerrissen und der Welt offenbar gemacht. Der Tonnagekrieg geht mit allen Kampfmitteln der See- und Luftkriegführung und auf allen Meeren weiter.

Erich Glodschey

[NormanStewart]

Das große Ringen im Raume südwestlich Bjelgorod –
Zum Teil im Gegenstoß blutig abgewiesen

dnb. Aus dem Führer-Hauptquartier, 15. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:

Vom Südabschnitt der Ostfront werden nur örtliche Kämpfe gemeldet. Das große Ringen im Raume südwestlich Bjelgorod hält in unverminderter Heftigkeit an. überall, wo die Sowjets anrannten, wurden sie blutig abgewiesen. An einzelnen Stellen gingen unsere Truppen zum Gegenangriff über und zerschlugen, von starken Verbänden der Luftwaffe unterstützt, vorgedrungene feindliche Stoßverbände.

Im Kampfgebiet westlich Orel und an der Front südlich und südwestlich Wjasma scheiterten ebenso zahlreiche Angriffe der Sowjets in schweren Kämpfen und unter hohen blutigen Verlusten für den Feind.

Auch südlich des Ladogasees brachen gestern alle Angriffe der Bolschewisten zusammen.

Die Sowjets verloren gestern 86 Flugzeuge und 179 Panzer, davon allein 117 im Bereich eines nordwestlich Jarzewo eingesetzten Armeekorps.

In Sizilien erlitt der Feind bei stärkeren Vorstößen am Nordabschnitt empfindliche Verluste.

Ein deutscher Unterseebootjäger versenkte im Mittelmeer ein feindliches Unterseeboot.

Über dem nördlichen Reichsgebiet flogen in der vergangenen Nacht nur vereinzelte Störflugzeuge ein.

[NormanStewart]

Erfolg italienischer Torpedoflugzeuge –
Volltreffer auf 10.000-BRT.-Tanker

dnb. Rom, 15. August –
Der italienische Wehrmachtbericht vom Sonntag lautet:

In den neuen Stellungen der Sizilienfront leisten die italienischen und deutschen Truppen zähen Widerstand und halten den feindlichen Ansturm auf.

Italienische Jäger schossen in Luftkämpfen über dem Schlachtfeld, mit einem zahlenmäßig überlegenen Feindverband sechs „Spitfires“ ab. Weitere fünf Flugzeuge wurden von deutschen Jägern vernichtet.

Verbände italienischer Torpedoflugzeuge erzielten im Golf von Palermo Treffer auf einem mittelgroßen Dampfer und vor Bizerta auf einem Tanker von mehr als 10.000 BRT. Der Tanker erhielt einen Volltreffer und explodierte.

In der vergangenen Nacht warfen feindliche Flugzeuge Bomben auf Mailand, die den Einsturz zahlreicher Gebäude und viele Brände hervorriefen. Drei Bomber wurden von den Abwehrbatterien und einer von Nachtjägern abgeschossen.

Der Feind verlor bei mit Brandbombenabwurf durchgeführten Unternehmen gegen Ortschaften der Provinz Catanzaro ein Flugzeug.

Zwei unserer Flugzeuge sind vom Einsatz der letzten zwei Tage nicht an ihren Stützpunkt zurückgekehrt.

In der vergangenen Woche vernichteten unsere Marineeinheiten sowie Motorflöße beim Einsatz in der Straße von Messina elf Flugzeuge verschiedenster Bauart.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (August 16, 1943)

FINAL SICILY VICTORY NEAR
Allied guns shell Axis at Messina

Americans, British speed along coasts toward tip of island
By Reynolds Packard, United Press staff writer

Within shelling range of Messina, U.S. and British troops drove against the Axis bridgehead in Sicily. Many Germans were trapped inland when U.S. soldiers cut off Milazzo as an enemy escape port. The British 8th Army drove beyond Taormina and captured Castiglione on the north slope of Mt. Etna.

Allied HQ, North Africa –
The U.S. 7th and British 8th Armies drove forward along the north and east coasts of Sicily to within artillery range of Messina today, and the triumphant end of the campaign was officially reported to be at hand.

A U.S. artillery expert said the 7th Army was probably using 155mm guns with a range of 20,000 yards, which on the basis of the headquarters report, would put U.S. troops within a little more than 10 miles of Messina.

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s flying column had struck 14 miles eastward to the Milazzo area, isolating that Axis evacuation port 16 miles from Messina and plunging on toward the last Sicilian stronghold in Axis hands.

Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery’s Imperials seized Taormina, 25 miles below Messina, and joined in the swift pincer movement against the last tottering Axis toehold on the island.

The battle of Sicily was finished except for the mop-up of the ragtag Axis elements covering the panicky evacuation of the island, and Allied big guns were now in positions to shell the mainland of Italy.

Captured documents indicated that in the Taormina sector, the Germans left two Italian coastal regiments behind for a delaying action while they scurried up the coast and across the narrow Strait of Messina.

The Axis evacuation, a pale shadow of a “Dunkirk,” continued under the day-and-night assault of Allied land, sea and air guns and bombs.

Seventh Army reports revealed that a large number of Germans were trying to infiltrate into the American lines, disguised as civilians and their hair and skin darkened with nut juices and olive oil to simulate the appearance of Sicilian peasants.

The reported infiltration might indicate that the Germans were trying to escape through the American positions or sneaking in on sabotage missions as part of the rearguard action.

As the cattle went into its final phase, it was announced that Gen. Patton’s army had captured or destroyed 188 Axis tanks of all sizes and 293 guns of 75mm or larger during the campaign.

Only skimpy details were available on the American push along the north coast. An official announcement said they had reached the Milazzo area, representing an advance of 14 miles in a single day from Oliveri.

The port, the last one of value in Axis hands except Messina, lies on a tongue of land thrusting a few miles north from the coastal road, and it appeared that the Americans had sliced across the base of the miniature peninsula.

On the other wing of Allied advance, the British troops pushed on five miles to seize Taormina. Inland they took nearby Gaggi and Castiglione, on the north slope of Mt. Etna.

The advances made yesterday were describe at headquarters as the most spectacular made in the Sicilian campaign for weeks. They made it clear that the Axis had written off the Messina bridgehead.

Allied quarters, easing the tight reserve which they had imposed on the accounts of the Sicilian campaign, made it evident that the rearguard action was expected to last no more than a few days, perhaps even a matter of hours.

Yesterday’s gains deprived the Germans of virtually all roads except the two coastal ways directly in front of the 7th and 8th Armies. Fleeing Nazis from the central sector were confronted by the appalling handicap of hiking across the rugged tip of Sicily, probably to find themselves trapped if and when they reach a highway.

A new danger arose to the advancing Allied armies. Their gains had carried them near the range of Italian coastal batteries on the mainland. There was no indication so far that the big guns across the Strait of Messina had taken any part in the campaign, possibly because of Allied air operations.

Where the German evacuees were escaping the Sicilian beaches and the hazards of the crossing, Allied planes were pursuing them right on the mainland and bombing all railroad lines leading northward from the tip of Italy.

All the air attacks on the Italian mainland were directed against key communication points and rail lines which the Germans would use to regroup disorganized forces.

The Desert Air Forces, assisted by Bostons, Baltimores, Mitchells and Warhawk and Kittyhawk fighter-bombers, maintained continuous attacks along both sides of the Strait of Messina where the enemy was shuttling back and forth in small speedboats and Siebel ferries imported from Germany. these ferries can carry more than 100 men.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. cruiser sunk off Sicily, Nazis say

London, England (UP) –
A Transocean (German) News Agency dispatch broadcast by Berlin radio said today that a Nazi U-boat had sunk a U.S. light cruiser of the Brooklyn class off the north coast of Sicily.

Brooklyn-class cruisers range from 9,650 to 10,000 tons and carry normal complements of 868-888 men. Nine ships were included in the class in 1941.

[NormanStewart]

Decision awaits inspection –
Allied require proof by Rome

Roosevelt, Churchill may rule on open city
By Robert Dowson, United Press staff writer

London, England –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill will probably issue a pronouncement from Québec in reply to the Italian government’s designation of Rome as an open city, diplomatic sources said today.

Allied action on the Italian declaration rests with them and their military advisers, these sources pointed out.

Bern dispatches said all telegraph and telephone communications from Switzerland to Italy were cut off today, but no official explanation was forthcoming immediately.

Proof needed

Meanwhile, qualified observers believed that Rome would continue to be regarded as a military target until the United Nations satisfy themselves, presumably through neutral inspection, that the city is no longer being used for any military purposes.

Even the Rome radio told the Italian people that the open city declaration was not binding on the Allies, and only a bilateral declaration based on proof satisfactory to the Allies that the city contained no military objectives would prevent further air attacks.

No official word of the Italian government’s decision had yet reached London.

Evacuation reported

A Rome dispatch published in Sweden today said the Italians are rushing evacuation of military material from Rome at a “feverish” pace in an attempt to make the capital an open city.

A Madrid dispatch said the Germans were exerting heavy pressure on the Badoglio government to delay designation of Rome as an open city until an estimated 60,000 German troops south of Rome were moved to northern Italy.

Nazis build defenses

German forces, reinforced by reserves streaming through the Brenner Pass, are frantically building hedgehog defenses along the Po River in northern Italy for a stand against any Allied attempt to invade Germany from the south, according to a Swiss report published in the Stockholm newspaper Svenska Dagbladet.

Reports reaching Madrid estimated that some 20,000 German troops have been evacuated from Sicily to San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria in southern Italy and another 40,000 are stationed around Rome.

Sought to end alliance

Another Stockholm newspaper, Dagerns Nyheter, asserted that Italy sought to dissolve its alliance with Germany during conferences in northern Italy a little more than 10 days ago, but reluctantly consented to continue fighting when German troops, supported by tanks and planes, surrounded Rome.

Seeking to avert any flood of refugees from other bomb-ravaged cities in Italy in the event the Allies accept Rome as an open city, the Prefect of Rome has issued orders imposing a ban on visitors.

[NormanStewart]

BERLIN AND MILAN BOMBED
Raid boosts peace pleas by Italians

British fliers find fires still burning from Saturday night
By Walter Cronkite, United Press staff writer

…

[NormanStewart]

Quick victory forecast laid to Churchill

Québec hears report of prediction end will come in 6 months
By John A. Reichmann, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
Prime Minister Winston Churchill was reported without official confirmation today to have predicted the end of the European war within the next six months.

The report was published in the influential French-language newspaper Catholic Action and was understood to have been made before the Québec Cabinet, presumably early last week before Mr. Churchill left for his three-day conference with President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, New York.

The newspaper published the report as a “rumor” but it had also been known confidentially by a number of persons for the last several days.

Heavy blows hinted

The report, if true, would be almost revolutionary for the conservative Mr. Churchill, who has consistently promised his people nothing but “blood, sweat and tears,” and would support previous predictions that tremendous blows are planned against Hitler’s European fortress within the next few weeks.

The newspaper said Mr. Churchill’s statement was made in French and was to the effect the war would be over “d’ici a une demi-douzaine de mois” – or, literally, from now to within six months.

The Prime Minister’s prediction was supposed to have dealt only with Germany and not the war against Japan.

The fate of Rome will be decided by Wednesday, it was believed in Québec Conference circles.

The Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain were understood to have decided not to accept the Italian declaration that Rome has been declared an open city, unless Marshal Pietro Badoglio accepts the Allies’ unconditional surrender demand.

May not occupy city

The Allies were said to be considering a decision not to occupy Rome and not to use it for any military purpose.

In such case, the Vatican, the International Red Cross, and possibly Swiss neutral representatives might be invited to form a commission which would guarantee Rome’s neutrality.

However, it was assumed that there will be no final decisions involving political policy for transmission to Badoglio until Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt have made their final review of Italian policy. This, it was assumed, will be one of their first acts when they hold their scheduled meeting here this week.

Plans completed

It was understood that the Anglo-American military plans for Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean have been completed and approved by the general staffs.

The conference, therefore, was expected to concern itself this week almost exclusively with plans for an attack from Britain along the shortest lines to Berlin.

The groups of specialists who have been working 16 hours a day in the Château Frontenac, are understood to have drawn up detailed reports outlining the basic military, naval and air needs for a series of attacks, a number of which would be diversionary sorties extending from the coastal area of Norway to the border between France and Spain.

May aim for Paris

The fundamental objective of the conference was to define where and how soon the greater part of Anglo-American strength now in England and Iceland can be landed across the continent.

There was reason here to believe that Paris will be among the first main objectives.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill was working with his chiefs of staff.

Confer at Hyde Park

Mr. Churchill returned here yesterday and it was revealed by the White House in Washington that he and Mr. Roosevelt had been together for three days at the Roosevelt estate at Hyde Park, New York. Mr. Roosevelt was back in Washington.

It was presumed that the two leaders had preliminary talks at Hyde Park but the presence of Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill’s daughter Mary suggested that the social angle had been at least one reason for their meeting there.

Mr. Roosevelt held a series of meetings with top advisers in Washington, in preparation for his conference with Mr. Churchill.

To cover wide field

Weekend developments made clear the wide fields to be covered by the conference. Among them was the definite disclosure that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden would be here.

From this, it was concluded that the agenda will roughly be divided into three parts:

1. Military considerations, which will come first and will be secret until they are transmitted into concrete action.

2. Immediate political problems which will be encountered as the armies move into new enemy territory.

3. Long-range political problems likely to be encountered as the Allies try to convert into action the objectives of the Atlantic Charter and related pledges.

Many observers believe that Mr. Eden, or even Mr. Churchill, will proceed to Moscow to discuss what has been done with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.

After conferring with Mr. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that neither he nor any State Department official planned, at this time, to participate in the Québec Conference.

Standing invitation to Stalin reported

London, England (UP) –
The Sunday Express diplomatic correspondent, commenting on the Russian TASS News Agency statement that Premier Stalin had not been invited to attend the Québec Conference, said President Roosevelt had earlier had invited the Russian war leader to a meeting at any place he might name.

Mr. Roosevelt, the correspondent said, sent Stalin a personal letter by former Ambassador Joseph E. Davis, inviting him to meet the British and American leaders “in the near future at any place Stalin named.”

The Soviet leader cordially and lengthily replied, thanking Mr. Roosevelt for the invitation and saying that while it was not impossible that circumstances might change before long, the military situation at the moment compelled all his attention and presence, the correspondent said.

[NormanStewart]

Yanks destroy 48 Jap planes

Americans storm enemy pocket near Bairoko
By Brydon Taves, United Press staff writer

…

[NormanStewart]

Share the gas –
Obedient east to get ½ gallon

But no pleasure driving please, just yet

…

[NormanStewart]

U.S. puts teeth in job control

Violators to be barred from work 60 days

…

[NormanStewart]

Simms: Stalin holding whip hand over Roosevelt, Churchill

Sinister implications seen in Soviet Premier’s aloofness from Allied war talks
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

…

[NormanStewart]

I DARE SAY —
Evening at the movies

By Florence Fisher Parry

…

[NormanStewart]

WACs now allowed to date ‘shavetails’

Allied HQ, North Africa (UP) –
The Army newspaper Stars and Stripes caused a stir in the Red Cross officers’ club today with the revelation of the new order which permits WACs to date Army officers.

For a long time, second lieutenants have been watching wealthy sergeants, and privates, wining and dining the best-looking American girls in this theater. At the same time, the Red Cross girls seemed to confine their dates solely to the higher-ranking officers, resulting in the saying that you have to be a colonel to date a Red Cross girl.

Capt. Martha E. Rodgers new company commander, has opened the field to the shavetails with the order lifting the restriction on WAC dating.

The only string to the order is that WACs are still not permitted to date officers for whim they are working.

[NormanStewart]

UP writer is wounded in Sicily

Allied HQ, North Africa (UP) –
Richard McMillan, United Press war correspondent, has been evacuated to North Africa after suffering powder blast burns on the head, face and forearms at the front in Sicily.

His condition was not believed serious.

Mr. McMillan has covered most of the principal campaigns of World War II in Europe and Africa, including France, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Crete and Sicily.