7 more Jap vessels sunk by U.S. subs
…
New gas order brings growls from everyone
Easterners are warned to obey or driving ban will continue
…
Husband of 12-year-old fifth grader seeking job
4-F youth and bride residing with her parents in converted trolley car
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Fight brewing in Congress –
Unions, New Deal urge extension of Social Security
Bill providing greater benefits is meeting opposition from medical association and unemployment compensation heads
By Fred W. Perkins, Pittsburgh Press staff writer
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U.S. operates world’s biggest adults’ school
Army and Navy prepare men for skilled jobs after the war
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Crushing of Axis viewed as hinging on Allies’ unity
Germany is believed trying to play one foe against another in effort to save something for ‘next war’
By Carroll Binder, foreign editor of The Chicago Daily News
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Cunningham: All Randazzo found in ruins as Yanks enter
Allied artillery, German demolition squads wreck city
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
Randazzo, Sicily, Italy – (Aug. 13, delayed)
Randazzo looks like Mt. Etna had toppled over on it.
U.S. bombers hit the town first on July 13, and the bombers and artillery have been pounding it constantly ever since.
What they missed the German demolition crews completed before they left, for hardly a building is standing, and the streets are piles of lava rock of which the structures were built.
The entire population fled a month ago, but today they began coming back by twos and threes. Like shy youngsters, they poked their heads around the rockpiles, staring at the Americans before venturing forth to greet them.
Monk greets Yanks
At the edge of the town, a bearded monk, disregarding the mines with which the wreckage is filled, greeted the Americans as they arrived, giving each a holy medal and his blessing.
Through an interpreter, Sgt. Henry Ingargiola of New Orleans, I asked the monk about the 20 churches in the town. He replied:
Some are wrecked, but it was the Lord’s will.
Picking a way through the streets, I met Minio Luigi, an old man who gave me a hesitant “hello.”
He said:
I come from the farm to see my houses. They no here. They all wrecked. No, I gotta start all over again.
Luigi made his “fortune” working on a subway, “one that ran to Coney Island.” He returned to Randazzo to run a real estate business. Now he has no business.
The Germans burned everything they hadn’t wrecked before they pulled out about 7 o’clock this morning (2 a.m. ET).
A second lieutenant, poking through Fascist papers in the home of the escaped mayor, said:
This bird had a lock on this town. He was one of the Squadrista 23 years ago. Those were the boys who used to punish the people with doses of castor oil. The mayor’s cousin was secretary of the party here. Another cousin was postmaster, and his brother-in-law ran the bank. The mayor skipped town a month ago.
Yanks, Tommies meet
The Yanks and Tommies met at 8:55 a.m. today (3:55 a.m. ET) at a big road crater a mile and a quarter from the town, where the road from Bronte joins that from Cesarò.
It wasn’t an “historic” meeting. Since the start of the battle of Randazzo four days ago, Allied troops had been watching each other fight their way across the mountains.
The meeting occurred a few minutes after two U.S. jeeps struck mines. There was a mixture of Irish brogue and Bronx swearing as the Yanks and Tommies piled up the wounded men.
Cpl. Jack Miller of the Bronx, New York, said:
Dese guys is all Irish.
Americans fly 2,600 miles, raze Austrian plane plant
Messerschmitt factory hidden away near Vienna reported left in mass of blazing ruins
By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer
Cairo, Egypt – (Aug. 14)
Scores of U.S. Liberator bombers flew some 2,600 miles across the Mediterranean and Southern Europe yesterday to drop more than 350,000 pounds of explosives on the big German Messerschmitt airplane plant 30 miles south of Vienna, which the returning airmen said was left “a flaming shambles.”
Today’s accounts of the record-breaking raid – it was one of the longest of the entire war – said a telling blow was struck by the big fleet of Liberators at a vital factory believed to turn out about one-third of Germany’s entire Messerschmitt production.
The Berlin radio said today that Allied bombers “attempted a raid on Naples in the early evening hours of the day.” Details of the broadcast recorded by CBS were inaudible.
A communiqué announcing that the long-range U.S. bombers had carried their war to Austria for the first time said all of them had been “accounted for” – an apparent indication of small losses.
The Liberators planted their bombs squarely amidst the factory buildings and hangars of the Messerschmitt plant at Wiener Neustadt, official reports said. Scores of their heavy bombs were seen bursting among 400 fighter planes parked in neat rows on the ground.
The raid, a more extended venture than the Liberator bombardment of the Romanian oil fields, was believed here to have cut deeply into the Nazi aircraft production potential. The Wiener Neustadt plant was reported to assemble Me 109s at the rate of 400 a month.
Joseph W. Grigg, United Press correspondent formerly assigned to Berlin, said the plant employed several thousand workers in four or five big assembly units. When he visited it about two years ago, the plant was turning out about 30 planes a week.
Wiener Neustadt was also described as one of the largest advanced air-training schools in Germany. The plane was opened in 1940.
Cloud opens
2nd Lt. Everett E. Segeant of Brookline, Massachusetts, bombardier in the lead plane of his formation, reported:
Going in to the target there was a complete cloud cover. This was very disheartening, but just as we started over the bomb run there was a hole through which we socked the target smack in the center.
We laid our eggs right where they belong, including some among hundreds of fighter planes on the ground that looked as though they just came off the assembly lines.
All Europe vulnerable
Wiener Neustadt is 200 miles south of the deepest point of penetration into Axis Europe from Britain, demonstrating that no point in Greater Germany is immune from air attack.
The pilots were briefed by Brig. Gen. Uzal G. Ent of the 9th Air Force Bomber Command, who was highly pleased with the result.
Gen. Ent is a former Pittsburgher who almost lost his life in balloon race at Bettis Field. His wife, the former Eleanor Marwitz, and her 9-year-old son, are visiting her mother, Mrs. Minnie B. Marwitz, 419 N Craig St.
The mission required slightly more than 12 hours. The tired pilots were served hot coffee and doughnuts by American Red Cross girls on their return.
Millett: Volunteer nurses’ aides give but they also receive
And they see much more of life than they did when they were only housekeepers
By Ruth Millett
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Crowds surge about Pope crying ‘peace’ after raid
Swiss tell of U.S. accuracy in attack on Rome; Milan bombing called most violent of war
By Paul Ghali
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United Nations ship torpedoed, shelled
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Wounded sergeants eye mattress cover business
Two who became close friends through coincidences are now in hospital together
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28,490 Navy casualties
Washington –
The Navy Department today announced that 79 additional casualties of the naval forces raised to 28,490 the total of Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard casualties in this war. This includes 9,063 dead, 5,002 wounded, 10,274 missing and 4,151 prisoners of war.
U.S. State Department (August 15, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Handy | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Fairchild | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Barker | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Kuter | Brigadier Porter | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Freseman | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier MacLean | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | Brigadier Redman | |
| Captain Royal | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 15, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Previous Meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 106th and 107th meetings. The detailed record of the meetings was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Rome – An Open City (CCS 306)
Sir Alan Brooke referred to the FAN message which had been sent to General Eisenhower yesterday telling him to make no further attacks on Rome nor any statements from Allied Force Headquarters pending clarification and further instructions regarding the Press reports indicating that the Italian Government had declared Rome an open city. He felt it was now necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take a new decision in the matter.
Admiral Leahy said that he felt that it would be impossible to reach a decision until the matter had been discussed with the President and suggested that no action should be taken until his views had been obtained.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt it the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to express the military point of view to the Chiefs of Government for them to make whatever decisions might be necessary politically.
Sir Charles Portal said that it appeared that Rome had unilaterally been declared an open city by the Italians. He felt that General Eisenhower should be allowed to retain his freedom of decision until the Combined Chiefs of Staff were restrained from this by political action. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had advised their Government that acceptance of open city status for Rome was fraught with much difficulty for the Allies in the future. It might be preferable that we had Rome in our possession to use its communications and to risk German bombing.
Admiral Leahy suggested that no disadvantage would be suffered by refraining from bombing.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that it might be desirable from the military point of view to bomb and that a signal should be sent to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff revoking yesterday’s decision and giving him a free hand.
Sir Charles Portal said that the only reports that he had received regarding the latest bombing effort on Rome were that it had achieved success against its targets and that there had been little or no damage caused to non-military targets.
Admiral King referred to the French declaration of Paris as an open city at the time of their collapse. Then the Germans moved into Paris and used it as a base. Did this establish a precedent for the Allies in relation to Rome?
Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the danger of political pressure later if the Allies were to agree indeed to Rome being considered an open city.
Admiral King agreed that if we were in any way a party now to its being declared an open city our hands would be tied.
Sir Charles Portal said that he understood that the U.S. and British Governments had agreed to take no action regarding any request for Rome to be made an open city.
Admiral King suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should encourage the two Governments to make no reply and that this would leave us free to bomb. He also referred to the possibility of the danger of political capital being made regarding this whole question in the future.
General Marshall affirmed that the political complications in the U.S. would tend to be so serious that clearance from the President must be obtained before yesterday’s message was cancelled. He agreed that it should be reaffirmed that the Allies should in no way commit themselves to agreeing regarding the reported declaration of Rome as an open city and that an early recommendation to this effect should be made to the two Governments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the President and Prime Minister should be informed at once:
a. Of yesterday’s “stand still” order regarding the bombing of Rome and that they should be advised that from the military point of view the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was that the order should be revoked;
b. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered that the two Governments should in no way commit themselves on the subject of Rome being declared an open city.
Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (CCS 303)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would first like to say, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, that after reading CCS 303 they believed that there was a great similarity of outlook between themselves and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Such divergencies as there were did not appear to be fundamental. The British Chiefs of Staff were in entire agreement that Overlord should constitute the major offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned with this conception as a background.
The plan for OVERLORD was based on three main conditions being created in order to give it reasonable prospect of success. Firstly, reduction in German fighter strength; secondly, German strength in France and the Low Countries and her ability to reinforce during the first two months must be kept at specified limits; and thirdly, the problem of beach maintenance must be solved. He believed that the OVERLORD plan envisaged too rapid a rate of advance and too small a margin of superiority, bearing in mind our experience in fighting German forces. It was essential, therefore, to insure that the Germans had available to them the minimum possible number of divisions in France and that their rate of reinforcement should be as slow as possible.
Operations in Italy, therefore, must have as their main object the creation of a situation favorable to a successful OVERLORD. This could be achieved by holding German reserves and by reducing German fighter strength by bombing fighter factories in Southern Germany from Italian airdromes.
He considered, therefore, that the statement (CCS 303, para. 4b (3)) in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum that as between OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources, OVERLORD will have an overriding priority, was too binding. Sufficient forces must be used in Italy in order to make OVERLORD a possibility.
There were two further points in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper which he would like elucidated. How far north was it proposed our forces in Italy should go, and what strength was it estimated would be required to hold that line? He understood that the line proposed was the “Apennine” line across the neck of Italy. He believed that this should be regarded as the first stage only, and that if possible, the northwestern plains should also be seized. Fighter factories in Southern Germany could be bombed from Central Italy but far greater results could be achieved by the use of those airdromes in the Milan-Turin area. Whether or not this area could be seized would depend on the amount of resistance met and could not be decided now, since the number of German divisions which would be deployed against us could not, at this stage, be assessed. Some 20 divisions might be required to hold the neck of Italy which might entail retaining three of the seven divisions earmarked for OVERLORD. If the Milan-Turin area were taken, then all seven might be required, but a decision should be deferred until it could be seen what forces were required to attain the desired result, i.e., the production of the situation requisite for a successful OVERLORD.
He agreed, however, that trained “battle experienced” troops were required for OVERLORD and therefore it would be necessary to exchange those of the extra divisions required with others from the U.S. or the U.K.
Sir Alan Brooke then explained, with the aid of a map, the possible lines which might be held in Italy. He pointed out that the occupation of the northwestern part of Italy would afford a gateway into Southern France through which troops, possibly French, might attack in conjunction with the amphibious operations suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He asked finally that certain details of the Appendices might be revised by the Combined Staff Planners.
General Arnold pointed out that the desired targets in Germany could be reached by heavy bombers based in the Florence area, which would lie within the line across the neck of Italy. He felt that the advantage of having these northern fields was outweighed by the disadvantage of the additional forces required to gain and hold them.
Sir Charles Portal said that the advantages of the Turin-Milan area were considerable. There were many excellent airfields in the Turin-Milan area, capable of operating within a reasonably short period a thousand heavy and a thousand medium bombers, whereas fields in the south would have to be extended and improved and the rate of buildup would therefore be slower. Further, the Germans would make good use of the northern airfields and would not have the barrier of the Alps between them and our bases.
Admiral King said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing OVERLORD.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British view was that OVERLORD would be a success if the three conditions laid down in General Morgan’s paper were brought about, and it was essential to take the necessary steps to insure the achievement of these conditions.
Admiral King said he did not believe that the achievement of the necessary conditions was dependent solely on operations in Italy. The necessary conditions might be produced by many other factors, such as, operations in Russia, the result of those already taking place in Sicily, and the air offensive from the United Kingdom.
General Marshall said that it seemed to him that the essence of the problem was whether or not the required conditions for a successful Overlord could only be made possible by an increase in the strength in the Mediterranean. Only by giving an operation overriding priority could success be insured. TORCH was a perfect example of this concept. He agreed that if resistance was weak, we should seize as much of Italy as possible. It would be better if we, and not the Germans, held the northern airfields, though almost as much could be achieved from the Florence area. On the other hand, unless a decision were taken to remove the seven divisions from the Mediterranean, and unless overriding priority was given to OVERLORD, he believed that OVERLORD would become only a subsidiary operation. A delay in the decision would have serious repercussions on our ability to build up for OVERLORD and any exchange of troops, as had been suggested would absorb shipping and complicate logistic considerations of ‘supply as far back as the Mississippi River. Recently in North Africa an additional unexpected requirement for 60,000 service troops had arisen. This requirement had been met but with very serious results for planned expansion and movement to other theatres. Not only would the OVERLORD buildup be hampered, but operations in the Pacific would also suffer.
If OVERLORD was not given overriding priority, then in his opinion the operation was doomed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast and the United States forces in Britain might well be reduced to the reinforced army corps necessary for an opportunist cross-Channel operation.
General Barker had submitted a paper with regard to the required conditions. This note (the main points of which General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff) pointed out that in the view of the Combined COSSAC Staff, the required condition[s] concerning the German buildup did not imply that the operation became impracticable if the conditions were not achieved but rather that more extensive use would have to be made of available means to reduce the enemy’s ability to concentrate his forces.
To sum up, he felt that unless OVERLORD were given overriding priority it would become a minor operation, in which case we should be depending for the defeat of Germany on air bombing alone. This had achieved great results, but its final result was still speculative. We must make a plan and bring our strength against Germany in such a way as to force Germany to feel it. An “opportunist” operation would be cheaper in lives but was speculative. If we relied on this, we were opening a new concept which in his view weakened our chances of an early victory and rendered necessary a reexamination of our basic strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific.
In the course of discussion, the following points were made:
a. In the British view, successful operations in France necessitated a preponderance of force. It was essential to achieve this preponderance in order to avoid a catastrophe, which might seriously delay our ultimate victory. Success depended not on the absolute strength of the United [Allied?] forces available for OVERLORD, but on the relative strength of those forces vis-à-vis the Germans opposed to them. This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces, and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German fighter forces. By agreeing now to the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks might be run in that theatre which would not only prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but might make it impossible of successful achievement.
In the British view OVERLORD was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting OVERLORD.
b. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that unless overriding priority were given to OVERLORD the operation would never materialize. In every previous operation, requirements had arisen additional to those originally envisaged. These requirements might also arise in Italy and must not be met by unilateral action. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should now take a decision that Operation OVERLORD should have overriding priority and maintain this decision in order that the success of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to give further consideration to CCS 303 at their next meeting;
b. Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to examine the Appendices and amend as necessary.
Operation OVERLORD – Outline Plan (CCS 304), “Synthetic” Harbors (CCS 307)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed a note (CCS 304) by the British Chiefs of Staff on the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Lord Louis Mountbatten outlined the various methods by which the problem of beach maintenance could be overcome.
General Barker and Brigadier MacLean of the COSSAC Staff explained the main features of the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, as set out in British Chiefs of Staff paper, COS (43) 416 (O), and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.
Air and Naval Command – Operation OVERLORD
Sir Charles Portal said that he would like to have an opportunity to discuss with General Arnold the question of an Air Commander for OVERLORD. At present Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was giving the necessary decisions but the Air Commander should be selected as soon as possible.
Sir Dudley Pound said that consideration had been given to the problem of naval command for OVERLORD. The majority of the forces to be employed would be trained, organized and operate under the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth. He had been given a special Chief of Staff to assist him in this matter. The Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, could be given control over adjacent commands as might be necessary. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should endorse the appointment of the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, as Naval Commander in Chief.
Admiral King said he would like to consider this suggestion.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That the British Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold would examine the question of the appointment of an Air Commander for OVERLORD and would put up their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the end of QUADRANT.
b. Of the proposals by the British Admiralty that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, should carry out the duties of Naval Commander for OVERLORD, with authority over the Naval Commanders, Plymouth and Dover, for this purpose; and deferred a decision on this matter.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 15 August 1943.
Most secret
CCS 308
South-East Asia Command
Part I
- The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below.
Command in India
- The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in GHQ India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.
Command in Southeast Asia
- A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:
a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.
b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three services and of the Allied forces.
c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.
- The proposed boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command will be as follows:
a. Eastern Boundary
From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin, southwards along the coast of Indo China, Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.
b. Northern Frontier
From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin westwards along the Chinese frontier to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along that border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the Southeast Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.
c. Western Boundary
Southward along meridian 60 degrees East to Albatross Island, thence Southeastward to exclude Rodriguez Island and thence due southward.
- The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be formed in the first instance at Delhi, since it will take over elements of the present General Headquarters, India. The Supreme Allied Commander will submit his recommendations as to the ultimate location of his Headquarters as soon as he has had time to study the problem.
Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia
-
Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.
-
The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.
Part II
- The above arrangements have been generally agreed between the President and Prime Minister, but the following points call for further discussion:
a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
It has been proposed that the responsibilities of General Stilwell as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander should be defined as follows:
The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, in addition to his duties as such, will command, under the Supreme Allied Commander, all ground and air forces at present under the United States Commander in the Southeast Asia Theater, and such additional United States and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available, and will continue to be responsible for the operation of the air route to China and for the defense of its India terminal. Furthermore the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander will continue to have the same direct responsibilities to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as now lie with the United States Commander.
The British Chiefs of Staff are doubtful whether the above arrangements will work satisfactorily and would welcome discussion of them. They think it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise executive command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force.
b. Command Relationship
The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the relationship of the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, should follow as closely as possible, mutatis mutandis, the MacArthur model. Under this arrangement, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and over such relating factors as are necessary for implementing this policy, including the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. It is understood that the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the more appropriate Command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff following the Eisenhower model.
c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as OSS, OWI, FCB, etc., with Comparable British Organizations
It is proposed that all American agencies functioning in relation to the Southeast Asia Command, notably the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Office of War Information (OWI), the Federal Communication Board (FCB), and the Office of Economic Warfare (OEW), having been placed by the United States Chiefs of Staff under the control of the Deputy Supreme Commander, these agencies should operate in conformity with the requirements of the Supreme Commander. To this end, the activities of these agencies in the Southeast Asia Command Area, whether conducted from within the India Command or from within the Southeast Asia Command Area or from other locations in Asia, should be coordinated with those of similar British agencies, such as the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW)
The British Chiefs of Staff consider that this coordination can best be arranged by agreement between the Supreme Commander, the Commander in Chief, India, and the Deputy Supreme Commander, in consultation with the Viceroy. These authorities should also decide the degree and method of liaison which it is expedient to establish between the American and their corresponding British agencies.
Memorandum by the Chief of the British Air Staff
Québec, 15 August 1943.
Most secret
Enclosure to CCS 309
POINTBLANK
I annex an appreciation by Air Intelligence of the trend of development and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation to POINTBLANK.
The salient points are:
a. The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1 January 1943.
b. Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since the same date.
c. The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire expansion under [a.].
d. Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have nevertheless had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts as well, in spite of the critical situation on those fronts.
e. In spite of the present strain on the German night fighters they are being used by day to counter the deep daylight penetration of POINTBLANK into Germany.
The buildup of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the POINTBLANK plan approved by the CCS at TRIDENT should have been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of the actual buildup achieved on that date was 921 (including 105 detached to North Africa).
The present strength of the GAF Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in first line units compared with a strength of 2000 which it was hoped would not be exceeded if POINTBLANK could have been executed as planned. Thus, the GAF Fighter Force is 13% stronger than had been hoped, and this in spite of increased successes in Russia and the Mediterranean which were not taken into account in the POINTBLANK plan.
I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of an inability to have achieved complete fulfillment of POINTBLANK. My object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the buildup, Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of POINTBLANK can be maintained and increased before the increase in the GAF Fighter Force has gone too far.
There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of POINTBLANK on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the Russian and Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses there, tell us by their acts what importance to attach to it.
The daylight “Battle of Germany” is evidently regarded by the Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them throw into it most, if not all, of their available reserves.
If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear to win this battle during the next two or three months but are content to see the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements just as success is within its grasp, we may well miss the opportunity to win a decisive victory against the German Air Force which will have incalculable effects on all future operations and on the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may not recur.
- I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the USCS to take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date to increase the striking power of the 8th Bomber Command as much as possible during the next two months.
Annex
British Intelligence Appreciation
GAF Single-Engined Fighter Reinforcement of the Western Front, January-July, 1943
Strength and Disposition
The Initial Equipment (IE) of the GAF single-engined fighter force as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 to 1,340 between 1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force in the main operational areas on the respective dates was as follows:
| 1-1-43 | 1-8-43 | Difference | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Western Front | 305 | 600 | +295 |
| Mediterranean | 320 | 295 | -25 |
| Russian Front | 430 | 395 | -35 |
| Refitting | 40 | 50 | +10 |
| Total | 1,095 | 1,340 | 245 |
It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front has been doubled during the period under review and that this increase has in effect more than absorbed the entire expansion which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts notwithstanding the important military campaigns in those areas where the Axis forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the year.
Sources of Increased Strength
The raising of SE fighter strength on the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways:
a. As a result of the defensive strategy forced on the GAF since the end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western Front, in the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to adopt the policy of achieving the maximum possible expansion of fighter production.
The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of new fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition there has been a noticeable tendency to maintain the actual strength of many fighter units well in excess of IE, particularly on the Western Front.
b. By the withdrawal of units from the Mediterranean and Russia.
The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the above measures can be analyzed as follows:
| Newly formed units | 165 | ||
| Expansion of existing units | 165 | ||
| Transferred from Russia | 90 | ||
| Transferred from Mediterranean | 60 | ||
| Gross Total | 315 | ||
| Loss [Less?]: | |||
| Fighter units transferred to fighter-bomber Category | 20 | ||
| Net Total Increase | 295 aircraft |
Redisposition on the Western Front
A most striking change in the disposition of the GAF fighter force on the Western Front has taken place since 1 January in order to secure the greatest possible defensive strength to cover the approaches to Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter dispositions were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the Low Countries against RAF fighter sweeps in these areas and against such daylight bombing of occupied territory as then took place.
The comparative dispositions are shown as follows:
| Area | IE at 1-8-43 | IE at 1-1-43 | Differences |
|---|---|---|---|
| France (West of the Seine) | 95 | 95 | 0 |
| France (East of the Seine and Belgium) | 105 | 70 | +35 |
| Holland | 150 | 40 | +110 |
| N.W. Germany | 180 | 35 | +145 |
| Denmark and S. Norway | 50 | 35 | +15 |
| Trondheim and N. Norway | 20 | 30 | -10 |
| Total | 600 | 305 | +295 |
The salient points which emerge are:
a. The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany have absorbed 50% of the total increased fighter strength on the Western Front.
b. The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the Belgium-Holland area.
A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the movement eastwards of French based units and the bringing of others from Norway to Northwest Germany; there has therefore been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible forces into the area between the Scheldt and the Elbe. Nevertheless, it is certain that the present fighter strength defending Northwest Germany and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this is supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight interception especially against deep penetration into Germany where the resources of the GAF are inadequate to maintain SE day fighter forces.
Reason for Increased Defenses
The doubling of the German SE fighter force on the Western Front and the allocation of virtually the whole of this increase to Belgium, Holland and Northwest Germany are attributable solely to the development of Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the GAF and is being undertaken even at the expense of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue to constitute the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the GAF: if anything, this commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of further units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot be excluded.
Strain on Crews
Despite their strength and flexibility, the fighter defenses of Germany are liable to be subject to extreme strain over periods of sustained day and night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively employed as night fighters in addition to their day operations and conversely night fighters had to be employed for day interception. The effects of such continued activity on crews must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in the later raids during this period opposition was less determined and Allied losses noticeably reduced. There is no doubt that during this period the German fighter defenses were subjected to the most severe test they have yet experienced.
Transfer of Experienced Pilots to Western Front
The urgent necessity of the defense of Germany has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those fronts, notably Russia since there is strong evidence that the most experienced pilots are being transferred to the Western Front and replaced by others of inferior skill.
Conclusions
a. There can be no doubt that Germany regards the defense of the Reich against daylight air attack as of such supreme importance that adequate support for military operations in Russia and the Mediterranean has been rendered impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged on the entire front is now little more than half that on the Western Front; this fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important contributory factor to the German failure in Russia this year.
Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for support of Italy no reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming; consequently, Allied air operations have been carried out with the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible opposition, thereby largely contributing to present conditions in Italy.
b. The Western Front with a fighter strength almost equal that of the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts combined constitutes the only source from which reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless further new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the immediate future. Consequently, in the event of South Germany becoming exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that such fighter defenses as may be set up must be derived almost exclusively from the West; the defense of South Germany against air attack on a scale equivalent to that now existing on the Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the fighter force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing commitments of the GAF in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.