America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

SACMED to CCS

Caserta, 13 September 1944
Confidential
Priority

FX 24540 to AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ Com Zone Main and SHAEF for information signed Wilson cite fhcos. This is Naf 778.

Subject is guidance on economic policy for Italy.

As battle line in Italy moves north and the operational phase in large portions of occupied territory is terminated, I feel that approach to problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation must be re-examined. While purely military considerations remain predominant in the forward areas, problems associated with civil administration, particularly of an economic character, raise general questions on which I, in my capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission, require guidance.

During the active operational phase, activities of an economic character conducted by the Allied Control Commission and other agencies in Italy under my command of necessity have been directly related to support of military operations. Supplies have been imported and distributed to the civilian population in order to minimize disease and prevent unrest, and efforts toward economic rehabilitation have had the primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of utilizing Italy’s resources for the war effort and producing in Italy goods which would otherwise have had to be imported.

In the light of the changed operational situation the limited directives which have governed seem no longer to be adequate. The Armistice agreement, under which the Allied Control Commission operates, contains no commitment to the Italian people as to any measure of material assistance. However, there has arisen in Italy the expectation, if not the assumption, presumably by reason of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, that an additional measure of assistance and relief to the civil population would be forthcoming. Public utterances in both countries have tended to support this view. Moreover, if the two governments continue at this stage to consider only what is required in the interest of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring one of their own long-term interests, i.e., the establishment of a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. Notwithstanding this fact the standard of military necessity still obtains and in the provision of supply is being strictly adhered to. For example, a clothing programme was submitted in June (Lac airgram 32) based on the estimated essential needs of the population this winter, but also having regard to the anti-inflationary effects of an increased supply of consumer goods. I am now asked, however, (Cal 738) to certify that this clothing is the minimum requirement to prevent disease and unrest which would prejudice military operations. As another example, not of great importance in itself but indicating the type of question which is now arising, in response to a requisition of paper essential for proper keeping of Italian tax records, it is asked (Cal 566) whether the paper is necessary “to control and manage the civil population.”

For the foregoing reasons I request that directives which govern the provision of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation be reexamined and that, if the policy of the governments is to furnish aid to Italy beyond that required by strict military necessity of the Allied Forces, the standards applicable to that aid be revised. In particular I request that I be informed:

a. To what extent, if any, I may take into account factors tending toward inflation, and to what degree I am responsible for measures to counter these tendencies.

b. To what extent, if any, is it desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out and if any rehabilitation is intended what industries should be given precedence?

c. Within the limitations of available shipping, to what extent, if any, are exports to be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade developed?

If my revised directive gives me responsibilities in the economic field broader than those now existing, I may require additional personnel of suitable technical training and experience, presumably drawn more from civil than military ranks. I am, as I have already indicated, prepared to accept qualified civilian experts in major proportion in the Allied Control Commission as soon as they are available.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson Admiral Noble
Rear Admiral Cooke Lieutenant General Macready
Rear Admiral McCormick Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Handy Major General Laycock
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Hollis
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes

September 13, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of the minutes of the 172nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

General Marshall drew attention to his statement recorded in the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes. He requested that this should be amended to read: “… the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 172nd Meeting. The detailed record was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject to later minor amendments.

Control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/4)

Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time fully to study the proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard to certain small details.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

Machinery for coordination of U.S.-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures “A” and “B” to CCS 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.

Report on the enemy situation in the Pacific (CCS 643/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the enemy situation in the Pacific–Far East (CCS 643/1).

General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676).

Strategy for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417/8)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/8. There was, however, one point he would like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements allowed.

Sir John Dill explained that supplies would be required for British forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the operations were not yet fully approved.

Admiral Leahy said that he quite appreciated the points made by Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the existing paper.

Sir Alan Brooke said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against Japan were not included in the program outlined in CCS 417/8 and that requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support of these forces would be put forward at a later date.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted the proposals in CCS 417/8 as a basis for planning.

b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind.

c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against Japan would be notified as soon as possible.

Basic policies for the “OCTAGON” Conference (CCS 654/8)

Admiral Leahy said that it seemed to him that the U.S. and British proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6i of CCS 654 were very similar.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British wording “inescapable commitments” was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided.

Admiral King suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: “having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments.”

Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6i of CCS 654:

Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.

Future operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 677/1)

Admiral Leahy explained that with regard to paragraph 2b of the U.S. draft of the message to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording “for planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” was more appropriate than “for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” since the operation was not yet approved and might, in fact, never take place.

General Marshall explained that the words “major units” in paragraph 1a had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous day.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that in the U.S. draft the date on which General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since a decision had to be reached by the 15th, it would be safer to call for the report on the 10th.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the U.S. draft was acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean the draft message in Enclosure “B” to CCS 677/1. (Subsequently dispatched as Fan 415.)

Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit photographs to be taken at that time.

Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 520/4 (OCTAGON)

Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe following the establishment of Allied forces on the continent

References: a. CCS 150th Mtg., Item 5
b. CCS 520 Series
c. CCS 304/13
d. CCS 172d Mtg., Item 10

While not accepting all points in CCS 520/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with the establishment of control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the directive proposed in the Annex to CCS 520/3 is in several respects inadequate, and therefore they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and dispatch a revised directive as set forth in the Enclosure.


Memorandum by the USCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/27

British participation in the war against Japan

The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting.

The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance of the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific.

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/28 (OCTAGON)

Directive to SACSEA

We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now despatch the following directive to Admiral Mountbatten.

Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command

Your primary object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, adequate protection of which is essential throughout.

The following are approved operations:
a) The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route;
b) Operation DRACULA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15 March.

If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 675/1

A combined memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to March 1945

The Representatives of United States and British military services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172nd Meeting of 12 September.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]
Top secret

Combined memorandum on troop movements covering the period October 1944 to March 1945

Assumptions
The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:
a. That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation DRACULA.
b. No further U.S. troops need be transported to European theaters.

If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1 above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon.

Statement of the problem
The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop shipping for DRACULA on U.S. and British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.

Facts bearing on the problem
The buildup of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India prior to 1 March 1945.

It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve virtually the entire British trooping lift.

This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only the two Queens on this run. However, in the event of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove necessary to withdraw one or both of the Queens from the Atlantic service.

A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S. cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S. withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.

The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two “General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean shipping.

Discussion

  1. Effect on British movement up to approximately mid-March

a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom.

b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages.

c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.

d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000.

  1. Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately end of March

a. U.S. shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops per month from Europe to the United States in British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will be:

1 Oct 44 2,760,000
1 Apr 45 1,535,000
6 months withdrawals from Europe 1,225,000

b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000 troops monthly would result in the following European position:

1 Oct 44 2,760,000
1 Apr 45 1,805,000
6 months withdrawals from Europe 955,000

In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months.

c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible.

Conclusion
Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until shipping priorities have been established as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not possible to present more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.

Memorandum by the British CS

Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 678

Planning date for the end of the war against Japan

The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated date for the end of the war against Japan:
a. The redeployment of forces against Japan.
b. The planning of production.
c. The allocation of manpower.

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a planning date two years after the defeat of Germany.

The Pittsburgh Press (September 13, 1944)

YANKS TAKE GERMAN TOWN
Bombs rained on Siegfried Line

New U.S. thrusts into Reich indicated; U.S. 9th Army in field
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

map.091344.up
New invasion of Germany was made by U.S. forces yesterday as they crossed the frontier below Aachen (2), following the initial thrust into the Reich near Trier (3). Hard fighting continued to the south as the U.S. 3rd Army battled from its bridgeheads across the Moselle River (4). Junction of the 3rd Army with the 7th Army was strengthened (5) when French forces reached Châtillon. French and U.S. forces also gained above Dijon and toward the Belfort Gap into Germany. There was no announced change in the British 2nd Army front in northern Belgium, while on the coast (1), British troops captured Le Havre and battled for the other holdout Channel ports.

Bulletin

SHAEF, London, England (UP) –
Dispatches from American-conquered German soil reported tonight that U.S. troops had captured the village of Roetgen – their first specific victory in the Reich – and had overrun a forested height in their drive east from the Eupen area of Belgium. Roetgen is six miles east of Eupen.

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s 3rd Army lashed out in a newly-announced drive in the Moselle Valley and captured Neufchâteau, 32 miles southwest of Nancy, and raced eastward 27 miles to the Moselle. Forcing a crossing, the Americans were fighting heavily at Charmes on the east bank.

United Press writer Jack Frankish said in a dispatch filed at 11:30 a.m. CET today that the Americans had made the first dent in the Siegfried Line, spearing through the first wall of its frontier crust and driving forward more than a mile and a half.

SHAEF, London, England –
Strong U.S. armored forces, leading a general advance against Germany, reached the Siegfried Line today, while indications grew that other U.S. troops might be pouring across the border in new invasions at unidentified points.

A dispatch from Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley’s 12th Army Group headquarters said U.S. tank and infantry forces were in contact with the Siegfried Line, which was taking one of the heaviest aerial poundings of the war from thousands of Allied planes.

The first spearhead was driven against the Siegfried Line, which lies five to 10 miles behind the frontier on the 1st Army front, by one of the armored forces smashing steadily deeper into Germany after crossings from Luxembourg and Belgium, the headquarters dispatch indicated, with advanced elements reaching within some 35 miles of the Rhine River.

A new U.S. army – the 9th Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson – was revealed to have landed in France to join in the climactic assault on Germany. Its location was not disclosed.

The 12th Army Group headquarters dispatch emphasized that the announcement that the Allies had crossed the German border in “at least” two places – eight miles northwest of Trier and east of Eupen – appeared to imply that other crossings may have been made.

For whatever it was worth in that connection, a Nazi-controlled Oslo broadcast reported crossings east of Malmedy, Belgium, between Trier and Eupen, and southeast of Trier.

Indications were that the Americans would be in close contact with the Siegfried Line at a number of points very soon.

On behalf of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied headquarters broadcast a warning to workers of northwestern, western and southern Germany that “you are in danger.”

Following by 24 hours a warning to the people of the Ruhr and Rhineland that their homes might soon be in the battle area, the new warning said that “in the next few days you may have the greatest opportunities for action” and added:

In a desperate effort to eliminate Allied support among the workers, Himmler plans to repeat in the west what he and the Gestapo have already done in the east. Workers there have been sent to man the fortifications. Thousands have been herded into concentration camps as hostages. Workers in the Ruhr and Rhineland are at this moment under threat of the same danger.

The workers were told to leave the German factories at once and go into hiding, since “the Nazis will not have the men to spare to search for you or to control your movements.”

Headquarters revealed that bombs were dropping on the Siegfried Line and its supporting bases at the rate of six tons a minute, day and night, in a mighty softening-up barrage that thundered into its sixth straight day today.

A blanket of security censorship obscured the advance of the U.S. 1st Army’s two spearheads into Germany south of Aachen and beyond Trier, but correspondents were permitted to reveal that both columns were operating in strength and that new crossings of the border were imminent at six other undisclosed points.

Another great striking arm, the newly-constituted Allied Airborne Army, was also ready to join in the battle for the Nazi homeland. Headquarters refused to comment, however, on a Paris radio report that the paratroopers and glider-borne infantry would soon be landed behind the Siegfried Line to smash the enemy’s communications and transport.

Disclosure that the 9th Army was in the field came as French units of the U.S. 7th Army from the south reached the Seine at Châtillon, 42 miles northwest of Dijon and 93 miles southeast of Nancy, and effected a junction in force with Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s 3rd Army.

Front dispatches said the U.S. 1st Army spearheads in Germany were pounding steadily eastward against relatively light opposition, probing into the main works of the Siegfried Line. Tanks equipped with great flails moved ahead of the invasion columns of clear away the enemy minefields, while formations of dive bombers streaked in overhead to bomb and machine-gun the retreating enemy.

Latest reports placed one American force about a mile inside the German border beyond Lammersdorf, 10 miles east of Eupen and 12 miles south-southeast of Aachen.

United Press writer Henry T. Gorrell, riding eastward with the invaders, reported that U.S. tanks, troops and guns were streaming into Germany in force, rolling swiftly past sullen German villagers who made no open attempt to interfere.

More than 50 miles to the south, the second invasion column last was reported more than six miles into the Reich after a thrust across the Luxembourg border north of the ancient Teuton city of Trier. The main works of the Siegfried Line at that point lay some 10 to 12 miles east of the frontier and it was indicated that the Yanks were just driving into the fortified belt.

Between the two columns, another 1st Army force captured the Belgian town of Bastogne in the Ardennes Forest and drove forward 13 miles to take Clervaux in Luxembourg, only four miles short of the Nazi frontier.

Malmedy and Spa, southeast of Liège, also fell to the Americans.

Battle near Moselle

On the 1st Army’s southern flank, Gen. Patton’s 3rd Army fought one of the bitterest battles of the campaign along the Moselle River line from Metz to Nancy.

A front dispatch from United Press writer Robert Richards said Gen. Patton was putting additional punching power into a half-dozen bridgeheads on the east bank of the river and the situation was more favorable than at any time since the offensive began.

Mr. Richards said the Germans were drawing reinforcements from other sectors to prevent a breakthrough on the Moselle.

On the British 2nd Army front to the north, the Germans withdrew from the Albert Canal line in Belgium to the Escaut Line, to the north.

Roundabout German reports via Stockholm said the British advanced 18 miles north of the Belgian towns of Petit-Brogel and reached the Eindhoven area, almost 10 miles inside Holland.

Other British units driving eastward through Belgium said to be within four and a half miles of the German border above Maastricht.

Three miles south of Maastricht, a U.S. 1st Army flying column captured the “mystery fort” of Ében-Émael, which the Germans overwhelmed in the first hours of their invasion of the Low Countries more than four years ago.

Capture 7,000

More than 7,000 German prisoners were rounded up in the captured port of Le Havre, after a bloody 36-hour assault by British units of the 1st Canadian Army, but the battle for the other Channel ports continued unabated.

Observers of the British coast reported a thunderous artillery duel was in progress throughout most of last night as the Canadians wheeled hundreds of siege guns up to within point-blank range of Calais, Boulogne and Dunkerque in an effort to blast the Nazis into submission.


Nazi counterattacks repulsed by infantry

With U.S. infantry on the German-Belgian border (UP) – (11:30 a.m. CET)
U.S. infantry units which went into Germany yesterday repulsed a series of small counterattacks throughout the night and retained possession of a forest height.

The infantry penetrated more than a mile and a half inside Germany, crossing the frontier shortly after the armored units.

Lt. Col. Edmund Driscoll of Garden City, New York, commanded the unit which made the greatest penetration. He was believed to have made the first telephone call from Germany, opening his report with: “This is a unit commander speaking from Germany.”

Germans lose 328 aircraft in two days

Luftwaffe weakens; oil plants hit again

Battleships join offensive in area near Philippines

Dreadnaughts shell Palau Islands to the east; planes rip other protective bases
By Frank Tremaine, United Press staff writer

He knew about the invasion –
Super-secret of the war kept by a sergeant major!

Canadian finds vital paper in Citadel after last Roosevelt-Churchill conference

Québec, Canada (UP) –
Military authorities admitted today that a mere sergeant major of the Canadian Army shared with the Allied High Command what was for months the super-secret of the war – the plans for the invasion of Normandy.

The hero of this drama was Sgt. Maj. Émile Couture, a French-Canadian, whose job it was to issue stationery at last year’s Québec Conference of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

Imbued with the French sense of economy, he was making an inspection of the conference quarters at the conclusion of the meeting to collect unused paper. In one of the rooms of the Chateau Frontenac, then as now the working and residential headquarters for the Anglo-American military staffs, Couture found an interesting memorandum.

The moment he read it, he was transported from his prosaic role of a garrison wheelhorse into the inner councils of the high and mighty. Couture gasped. It was in black and white – the alternative dates for the invasion of Normandy, the number of troops to be employed, how they would be transported in so many ships and how they would be supported from the air and sea.

The operational outline for the boldest, most difficult campaign of the war, was in HIS hands – a sergeant major!

Couture jammed the paper into an envelope and made with all haste to Canadian Army District Headquarters at the Citadel. There, an officer examined them. He uttered the French equivalent of “Wow!”

Given British medals

Couture and an officer were taken secretly to Washington. There in the inner sanctum of the top strategists – perhaps the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff – they turned over the paper and took a solemn oath of secrecy.

Couture discovered the memorandum in the conference room of the chiefs of staff. It was said to have belonged to an American general. There was a report that the general had been relieved of his duties but there was no one in authority here who knew anything about it.

For his scrupulous observance of the oath, Sgt. Maj. Couture received the Medal of the British Empire. The officer, Maj. C. E. Gerney, was also decorated.

‘Better not talk!’

L’Action Catholique, one of Canada’s most influential newspapers, first revealed the story of Couture’s secret. The public relations officers of the local military district confirmed it.

Today Sgt. Maj. Couture was not available for interviews. Explained an officer:

If he talks, he’ll be tossed in the guardhouse and the key will be thrown away.

Hurricane heading toward North Carolina

Roosevelt reports –
Québec plans tied in with Russia, China

Pacific commander is being debated

Québec, Canada (UP) –
President Roosevelt stressed today that the war plans being worked out in conferences here with Prime Minister Winston Churchill are being coordinated with those of all the Allies, “particularly the Chinese and the Russians.”

From the Citadel, where the President, the Prime Minister and their combined chiefs of staff are in “Victory Conference,” Mr. Roosevelt authorized Stephen T. Early, his secretary, to say in the President’s name:

This is a conference to get the best we can out of the combined British and United States war efforts in the Pacific and in Europe. We are working in consonance with the situation in China, the Pacific and in Europe, coordinating our efforts and those of our Allies, particularly the Chinese and the Russians.

Super-command studied

The statement tied in with the basic Pacific theme of the meeting and discussions on establishment of a new super-command to direct the final assaults on the Jap homeland.

Mr. Roosevelt was believed to be urging the selection of a U.S. naval officer – probably either Adm. Ernest J. King (commander of the U.S. Fleet) or Adm. Chester W. Nimitz (now the top commander in the Central Pacific) to head such a new command.

Mr. Early at a news conference said he had no information on the command situation.

Land is on hand

Also fitting in with the Pacific theme of this meeting was the announcement that RAdm. Emory S. Land, head of the U.S. Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration, would join the meeting in a day or so. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. is also coming here from Washington.

The manner in which the President described the overall purposes of the conference here opened new fields of speculation on the question of whether the Pacific allies expect Russian help in finishing off Japan.

Mr. Roosevelt’s mention of Europe made clear that the talks here are not confined to the Pacific, but involve a broader view of the war. There was, however, no way of telling whether the coordination with Russia to which he referred involved only the climactic phase of the war in Europe, or extended also to the war in the Pacific.

End this weekend

Mr. Early said he expected the Anglo-American war talks to conclude this weekend, but he was not specific as to a day. The “Victory Conference” probably will end with a joint statement by the President and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Roosevelt and Churchill were together until a late hour last night and started their conferences again at 11:30 this morning, sitting down in the broad-windowed “map room” of the President’s overlooking the St. Lawrence and examining the war plans submitted by their staff chiefs.

The question of top command was the leading issue of the conference.

British favor MacArthur

Officials said the British were inclined to favor Gen. Douglas MacArthur for the post of Supreme Commander and there was some support for him in the American staff, too. But the President was understood to want a Navy man.

The top post is certain to go to an American because most of the power brought against Japan will be American – although Britain will send more ships, men and planes to the Far East when Germany is whipped, and China’s manpower will be armed increasingly.

Underlying the command question is that of whether the main drive against Japan is to be keyed to naval or to land operations. And there again Mr. Roosevelt was believed to side with the Navy view.

Stilwell to be prominent

Obviously, the ultimate destruction of Japanese power at home and in Asia will require great use of land and air as well as naval and amphibious forces. MacArthur is assured of a continuing prominent place. Mr. Roosevelt will be able to fulfill his promise to return to the Philippines. That may occur soon, and MacArthur probably will go on from there.

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell’s forces in China will play an increasingly important role when more supplies can be delivered to them. And the British, with their special interests in recapturing Singapore, Malaya and Hong Kong, will be in there.

But the prospect now is that these operations will be keyed to a massive seaborne assault – probably to the China coast and then northward.

Perhaps bearing significantly on the decisions being made here was the announcement in Washington that Mr. Roosevelt had nominated Adm. Nimitz to be a full admiral in his own right. Adm. Nimitz now holds the rank only by virtue of his command of the Pacific Fleet. Such nominations usually presage a change in command for the man involved.

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Simms: Stalin absence complicates Québec talks

Our war with Japs hinges on Russia
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Québec, Canada –
The absence of the Soviet Union from the Roosevelt-Churchill conference here complicates the job tremendously. It is like planning the invasion of France without knowing whether or not we could use Britain as a base of operations.

Of course, this is not Russia’s fault. On the contrary, it would have been folly for her to attack Japan while fighting for her life 5,000 miles away against Germany. and to have permitted us to use her Siberian bases would have been tantamount to a declaration of war against Nippon.

But the war in Europe is now drawing to a close. Russia therefore may soon regain her freedom of action in Asia before the Pacific and Far Eastern plans now being made here can be put into practice.

What bases to use?

In any plan of campaign against Japan, the first problem is how to get at her. We have to decide whether to attack her from aircraft carriers or from land bases. If land bases, the question is, what bases? Outside Siberia, Japan holds all the nearby bases and before we can use them, we must capture them.

Thus, the planning of our invasion of Europe was comparatively simple Britain was at hand as an ideal base.

If we could use the maritime provinces of Siberia similarly in our war against the other end of the Axis, the calculations here at Québec would be immensely simplified. Vladivostok is only 600 miles from Tokyo. Siberia envelops Manchuria, which is vital to the Japanese war efforts, on three sides. With Russia in – if only because we could use Siberian bases – the war in the Pacific would be shortened by months at least and innumerable lives saved.

Situation is anomalous

Another irony of the situation here is that today at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, Russia, Britain and America are putting the finishing touches on a tentative plan for world security against post-war aggression. The Big Four, including China, have agreed to the use of force, if necessary, to check outlaw states. For Russia to refuse to help stop the Japanese aggression now, once Nazi Germany is knocked out, would just about rob the Dumbarton Oaks formula of its validity.

Thus, while Marshal Stalin is absent from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting here, Russia cannot be left out of the picture. She will remain the big question mark hovering over the conference.

It is hardly too much to say that were Germany to surrender soon, and allow Russia to change her policy in Asia, most of the military planning here would at once become obsolete. That is, unless two alternate sets of plans are drawn up.

Allies to south cut German escape paths

Thousands of enemy trapped in south
By Eleanor Packard, United Press staff writer


Promotion of Bradley approved by Senate

Belgian King, family carried off to Germany

Trickery of Nazis disclosed by priest
By L. S. B. Shapiro, North American Newspaper Alliance

Allies, Romania sign armistice

Moscow, USSR (UP) –
An armistice agreement was signed by Romania and Russia yesterday. It marked the first time the three major Allies have jointly formulated terms for a defeated mutual enemy.

Unlike the Italian armistice, of which the Russians were informed and consulted at long distance, the Romanian terms were drawn up in face-to-face discussions among Soviet and Anglo-American representatives. They reached a full understanding before the terms were submitted to the Romanians.

Signs for three powers

Another innovation was the fact that Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, one of the two Soviet conquerors of Romania, signed the agreement on behalf of Russia, the United States and Britain.

The terms were not disclosed and may not be for some time, although there was no reason to believe they were harsh.

The Romanian commission, which left Moscow today, declined to comment, but indicated its satisfaction and intimated the Allies had been generous.

Fight side by side

Various representatives of the United Nations attended the nearly two weeks of discussions, including U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman.

Signing of the agreement facilitated full coordination of the Soviet and Romanian armies, who have been fighting side-by-side since Aug. 23, when Romania capitulated and King Michael declared war against Germany.

An Ankara broadcast, reported by London newspapers, said the terms included return of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia; Romania to furnish transport of Soviet troops through Romania; payment of indemnities to Russia; Soviet control of Romania for the duration of military operations; Russian support to Romanian claims for Transylvania.


Million residents evacuated from Tokyo

By the United Press

Kirkpatrick: French living cost has risen 190 percent

Problem is headache to new government
By Helen Kirkpatrick


Hitlerites shamed in Luxembourg

Six fat men marched to jail in capital

Yanks drive along end of Gothic Line

Gain on west coast of Italian front

Gorrell: French cheers for Yanks change to German chill

Children Heil Hitlering Americans across border are shooed away by their mothers
By Henry T. Gorrell, United Press staff writer


Hull urges France be given a voice

Poll: Governor Dewey retains lead in Midwest

Candidate to confer with party leaders
By George Gallup, Director, American Institute of Public Opinion