Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

The Pittsburgh Press (August 17, 1943)

Push on France reported near

Invasion may result from Québec Conference
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
An invasion of Western Europe by way of the English Channel may be one of the first tangible results of the sixth war conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, it was believed here today.

This city was marking time awaiting the President’s arrival. Meanwhile, the military staffs of Great Britain, Canada and the United States continued at work in the Château Frontenac, completely inaccessible to all outsiders.

The London Daily Mail printed a dispatch from its Québec correspondent that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces in the Mediterranean Theater, was expected to arrive in Québec soon.

It was believed that the military staffs had long since completed plans for the Mediterranean Theater and were now concerned exclusively with an offensive based upon Great Britain utilizing the British, Canadian and U.S. troops gathered there, which could include attacks on Norway as well as against France with Paris as the first objective.

As far back as January 1942, Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill considered throwing the Allied weight against Western Europe, it was said, but their military advisors told them the probable casualties made the cost prohibitive.

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Churchill denies victory forecast

Québec, Canada –
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, through a British Information spokesman, denied yesterday that he had predicted an end of the war with Germany within six months.

Assertions that he had made statements to this effect were published in two leading French-Canadian newspapers.

Their circulation provoked a statement from M. Burge, British Information Service spokesman, who, after calling reporters together, said:

The Prime Minister of Great Britain denies having made a statement that the war will be over in six months and would like the widest possible circulation of this statement.

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U.S. State Department (August 17, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral Noble
Major General Fairchild Lieutenant General Macready
Brigadier General Kuter Air Marshal Welsh
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Captain Lambe
Commander Freseman Brigadier Porter
Commander Long Air Commodore Elliot
Brigadier Macleod
Brigadier Wingate
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 17, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

Secret

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (CCS 303 and 303/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed in closed session the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted the extract from CCS 303 which is set forth in CCS 303/2 as a brief and concise statement of their agreed strategic concept for operations in the European Theater in 1943-44.

b. Directed the Secretariat to put CCS 303/2 in proper form with a view to its being submitted to the President and Prime Minister. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 303/3.)

Italian Peace Feelers

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum7 for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved with certain amendments, for submission to the President and Prime Minister, a paper setting out the action suggested on the Italian peace feelers. (Subsequently published as CCS 311.)

b. Directed that a signal should be sent at once to General Eisenhower warning him to hold two staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon. (Message sent as FAN 195.)

Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 109th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East 1943-1944 (CCS 301)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff outlining their views on operations to be undertaken in 1943-1944 in the Pacific and Far East.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had read this memorandum with great interest. There were certain points he would like to raise. Was not the assumption that Russia would remain at peace unnecessarily pessimistic? Was an actual invasion of Japan necessarily essential; might we not obtain the collapse of Japan without invasion?

In a discussion on these two subjects, it was pointed out that while Russia had everything to gain by attacking Japan, it might well be that she would wait to do so until the defeat of Japan had been almost completely accomplished.

It was also generally agreed that while blockade and air bombardment might produce the collapse of Japan without invasion, it was necessary to plan on the assumption that the country itself would have to be attacked by land forces.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke as to the forces required to obtain the objectives outlined in CCS 301, Admiral Cooke explained that an estimate of the forces required for the various operations had been prepared and was being handed over to the British Planning Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should return to a further consideration of CCS 301 and to the plan for operations from India after a review of the report by the Combined Planning Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of Japan. Each set of operations could then be considered in relation to the whole war against Japan and to the forces required.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed that it was hoped that the report by the Combined Staff Planners would be ready on the following day.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that it was essential for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take decisions with regard to the specific operations in 1943-1944 during the Conference.

In a further discussion of CCS 301, Sir Alan Brooke asked whether it was considered essential, in order to retain the initiative, that both the advance into the Mandated Islands and New Guinea should be pressed forward with vigor. Might this not prove too costly, and a better course be to restrict operations in New Guinea, thus possibly releasing resources for Operation OVERLORD?

Admiral King said that he considered that if forces were so released, they should be concentrated on the island thrust in the Pacific. However, he believed that both advances were complementary and equally essential. The western advance through Truk, could, after the capture of that base, be swung either north or continue to the westward. Thus the two thrusts would either converge on the Philippines, or one would be directed to the Marianas.

General Marshall pointed out that the troops to be employed in New Guinea were either already there or in transit. Thus, no saving could be made, and the only decision with regard to the troops was whether or not we could afford to take the heavy casualties which might be incurred. Supplies in the New Guinea area, owing to Japanese air action, were maintained almost entirely by 150-foot vessels, and thus no saving in cargo ships or combat loaders would be effected by limiting these operations. Landing craft might be saved, but not tank landing craft. With regard to air, though a small saving might be achieved, all the heavy bombers required for the operations had already been deployed in the area.

Sir Charles Portal said that it was not considered that operations in New Guinea should be discontinued, but rather that they should be limited to a holding role. The Island advance would cut across the Japanese lines of approach to the south.

Admiral Kino explained that the landing craft used in the Kiska operation were required for operations in the Central Pacific. For this reason, it had been essential not to delay the operations in the Aleutians.

General Marshall explained that certain landing craft were still being sent to the Southwest Pacific to meet attrition. He believed that the New Guinea operations were causing very important losses to the Japanese, particularly in aircraft.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that CCS 301 should include a reference to the air route through Burma into China.

It was generally agreed that a reference to the air route should be inserted, since it was the only existing line of supply into China and must also be considered in relation to the limited capacity of the lines of communication through Assam.

With regard to the value of Chinese troops, General Marshall said that there were some 60 or 70 thousand at Ramgarh and about 200,000 in Yunnan. He believed that they might have great value in the land operations in China provided that they were properly trained and led. He did not visualize a vast Chinese Army being built up.

These troops would have to be led by U.S. officers even though the nominal control of the army, for “face saving” purposes, would be in Chinese hands. They must also be provided with adequate air and artillery support. He believed that if these conditions were met, and if their first operations were crowned with success, they would be of considerable value.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Directed the Secretariat to draft a subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of CCS 301 on the subject of the development of the air route into China.

b. Agreed to defer action on this paper until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

Operations Against Japan from India, 1943-1944

Sir Alan Brooke said that though the recent floods might force us to change our strategy in this area, he would suggest that the discussion should start on the basis of our present plans. The British Chiefs of Staff had been examining the possibilities of the use of long-range penetration groups which, operating well ahead of the main advances, would by long outflanking movements cut the enemy’s supply lines. They themselves would be largely maintained by air. It was proposed to expand the number of these units now available to some six brigade groups. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might ask Brigadier Wingate to explain his recent operation with a long-range penetration group and to set out his views on their future employment. After this the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to hear the report of General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster on the repercussions on planned operations of the recent floods.

Brigadier Wingate explained the tactical employment of long-range penetration groups and the reason for their introduction. He then outlined the course of the operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and put forward his views with regard to the future employment of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with main advances aimed at the recapture of Northern Burma.

In summing up, Brigadier Wingate pointed out that there were two main features in the employment of these groups; firstly, their whole object must be to prepare the way for the follow-up of the main advance and their employment, based on the object of dislocating enemy communications, must fit into the main plan; secondly, plans for the use of these groups must be elastic and open to alteration in the light of enemy reactions.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had decided to form six long-range brigade groups and to this end a comb-out of suitable personnel from the Indian Army would be undertaken. One of the difficulties was the lack of trained officers who had served with native troops and could speak their language. The operations outlined by Brigadier Wingate would enable us to seize sufficient of North Burma to open a road to China. These operations must continue until the break of the monsoon in order to avoid a Japanese reaction before the rains started. It was possible that in the second phase, long-range penetration groups might be used, operating from the coast through to the Mandalay-Rangoon line of communication. He suggested that on the following day General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster’s report on the effect of the flood should be studied, together with operations against Akyab or Sumatra, which latter might prove necessary were it found that the floods would seriously hamper operations in Burma.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

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Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 17 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 303/3

Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis power in Europe, 1943-44.

Operation POINTBLANK

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

Operation OVERLORD

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944) After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. Balanced ground and air force buildup for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

c. As between operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Operations in Italy

a. First Phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second Phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

c. Third Phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France.

Operations in Southern France

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD.

Air Operations

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.
b. Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.
c. Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.
d. Air supply of Balkan guerrillas.

Operations at Sea

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the Azores.
b. Security of our sea communications.
c. Continued disruption of Axis sea communications.
d. Support of amphibious operations.

Operations in the Balkans

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, arid to the bombing of Ploești and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix “A” to CCS 303) in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE

Combined Secretariat

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Québec, 17 August 1943.

Secret
Urgent

Reference FO telegrams from Madrid 1404 to 1407 repeated to you from London. Instructions as to how you are to deal with the Italian peace feelers are being concerted between the President and the Prime Minister. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 195, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile you should hold 2 staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon immediately on receipt of these instructions to meet General C and should make the necessary transportation arrangements with London for their entry into Portugal. General C has to leave Lisbon on the night of the 20th at latest.

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The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Algiers, 17 August 1943.

Secret
Urgent

The following message is personal to General McNarney for Eyes Only from Eisenhower. I request that the following message be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the least possible delay.

I have seen messages number CONCRETE 231, 232, 233, and 234 from the Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister. I have the following suggestions to offer.

1st, If the Combined Chiefs of Staff should direct me to send a staff officer to Lisbon, I believe he should go with the following general instructions:

  • (a) To collect information and check it against that already in his possession.
  • (b) To inform General C that the Allied force here make no promise in advance but that if the Italian army is really anxious to speed up the date when an Allied force lands in Italy, it should proceed at once with widespread sabotaging operations, particularly directed against all communications, airfields and public utilities useful to the Germans.
  • (c) That the Italian Government and army have no recourse except to depend upon the decency and sense of justice of the Allied governments when once we have arrived in Italy.

My second suggestion is that if I am not directed to send a staff officer to Lisbon that the British Military Attaché at that place be directed to secure every possible item of information he can from General C and forward it to this headquarters by early cable.

If I am directed to send a staff officer to Lisbon, the individual will be Brigadier Strong of the British Army, head of my Intelligence Division. He will travel in civilian clothes with passport duly issued by the local British Consulate.

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740.00119 EW/8–1743: Telegram

The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the United States

London, August 17, 1943.

Most secret

Following telegram has been sent to Québec:

Manzini, Secretary of the Italian Legation in Lisbon, has passed the following information to us through most secret channels at the request of d’Ajeta, new Counsellor with whom he is collaborating on peace moves.

  1. Statements made by d’Ajeta to Sir R. Campbell on August 3 were modified by last-minute instructions from Guariglia and an essential part was completely omitted. For unknown personal reasons Guariglia is evidently favouring German game and is impeding the intentions of the Supreme Command and the King to surrender immediately. The Supreme Command desires to establish forthwith technical details of surrender and Allied occupation, without the knowledge of the Germans, in order to frustrate their reprisals. [Garble] it has full assent of the King, General Staff, the Pope and the Government except Guariglia. To achieve this end Supreme Command decided to send their fully authorized delegate, General Castellano, to Lisbon to meet a specially authorized British delegate. Castellano is pro-British and is described as the brains of the Italian General Staff and as the man who prepared the way whereby Badoglio took over the Government.
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740.0011 European War 1939/30775: Telegram

The Chargé at Vatican City to the Secretary of State

Vatican City, August 17, 1943.

155.

I have received a first person note dated August 15 from Cardinal Secretary of State. This is Tittmann’s 155, August 17. My 153 [bis], August 13. Summary follows.

Note begins by reciting arguments already used by Holy See against bombing of Rome and states that unfortunately they went unheeded with result that there was painful surprise when the very nations that wished to spare Athens and Cairo from bombardment undertook to bombard Rome in whose favor certainly no less pressing reasons militate than those advanced for the other two cities. The first raid, note continues, caused very considerable damage to Basilica of San Lorenzo while second destroyed one church and damaged another; at this rate it will be difficult to avoid danger of most serious and irreparable destruction.

Note goes on to say that the newly formed Italian Government at instance of Holy See decided to declare and render Rome an open city and that to this end suitable negotiations were begun with Allied governments through agency of Holy See. Note states that although no reply yet received from British Government, American Under Secretary of State in a letter dated August 8 informed Apostolic Delegate Washington that matter was receiving most earnest consideration of the highest U.S. authorities and that in meantime he was authorized by President to make known that in conformity with the principles of international law and treaties nothing prevented Italian Government from proceeding unilaterally to declare Rome an open city. In view of the foregoing note states at this point:

You are in a position to judge whether repetitions of bombings of Eternal City are opportune while these negotiations are pending.

Note continues that if attempts are made to justify future bombings on grounds of so-called military exigencies it may be said in reply that considerations of military objectives (which in Rome would not seem to be of great importance) ought not to prevail over (he very serious superior reasons of religion, civilization and humanity and that repetition of deadly bombardments of Rome and of so many other Italian cities with even greater intensity is because of the exasperation it causes among the masses keeping peace away instead of shortening war and is rendering impossible understanding and collaboration among peoples which alone is the guarantee of common tranquility.

After lamenting fact that the Pope has not been spared pain of witnessing his Diocese and his children that are nearest to him so cruelly tried the note concludes:

As you well know last night the Italian Government, to which I felt it my duty to communicate the reply of the Under Secretary of the United States made public the fact that it declares Rome the center of Catholicism an open city and that ‘the necessary measures are being taken according to international law’. Since it appears that matters are now well advanced the Holy See would be grateful if further negotiations could take place with the greatest possible speed in order that the desired agreement on so serious a question may be reached as soon as possible. The Holy See does not doubt that in the meantime any sort of fresh bombardment of Rome will be avoided.

My British colleague has received a similar note from Cardinal Maglione and is telegraphing a summary thereof to London.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30776: Telegram

The Chargé at Vatican City to the Secretary of State

Vatican City, August 17, 1943.

U.S. urgent
156.

At 1 p.m., August 16, Italian Government made the following official declaration to the Holy See:

High Command has given orders to be carried out immediately to anti-aircraft batteries Rome not to react in case of air bombardments.

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Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill held discussions after dinner “until a late hour.”

The Pittsburgh Press (August 18, 1943)

Peace feelers reported –
Parley boosts enemy jitters

Roosevelt, Churchill view victory blueprint
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill today inspected a newly-drawn blueprint for the conquest of Europe today, amid indications that their sixth war conference was already paying dividends in a war of nerves against the Axis.

Reports from both Germany and Italy of new peace trial balloons came at a time when the two leaders were deep in a heavy schedule of talks with their war chiefs plotting what was generally regarded here as the body wallop against the German Army.

To visit Ottawa

As the two chiefs resumed discussions which started last night and continued past midnight, the White House staff here announced that the President would visit Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King in Ottawa at the conclusion of the wear talks here, probably making the trip sometime early next week.

Meanwhile, the arrival of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, was imminent and when they meet, they will undoubtedly explore with Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill new questions of foreign policy which must be considered in the light of the military situation.

Makes second proposal

The effect on the Axis of the growing assembly of Allied war leaders in this ancient city was reflected by reports of a second proposal from Marshal Pietro Badoglio to have Rome declared an open city, and Berlin radio broadcasts that the German people might favor a negotiated peace and the removal of Nazi extremists.

Both proposals will fall on deaf ears, it was believed by observers close to the conference here, since both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill are definitely committed to accept nothing short of “unconditional surrender.”

Lunch with Athlone

The President and the Prime Minister lunched with the Earl of Athlone, Governor General of Canada, and tonight, Mr. Mackenzie King will entertain them at a dinner for about 50 guests.

The President and Mr. Churchill were together well after midnight, according to White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early, and in conference again shortly after both arose this morning.

The President arrived yesterday afternoon.

May presage action

Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill had before them the fruits of a week’s intensive preparations by the best army, navy and air brains of both countries. Their endorsement probably means action in the near future.

Harry Hopkins, Mr. Roosevelt’s No. 1 adviser, came here with the President and with him is Isador Lubin, ranking statistical expert of the U.S. government and Mr. Hopkins’ principal assistant.

Mr. Lubin preceded the presidential party and has presumably been sitting in on some of the “spade work” conferences that have been in progress for days at Château Frontenac, not far from the Citadel where both the President and the Prime Minister are staying.

Work nearly done

Two of the men who drafted the plans for the President and Mr. Churchill met more than 100 reporters late yesterday, and expressed the hope that the heavy work – the drafting of detailed plans – was near an end.

The belief that Mr. Roosevelt would have an important public statement to make – perhaps a radio address – while he is here was strengthened by the fact that he brought with him his stenographer.

The members of his party included Adm. Wilson Brown, his naval aide and Miss Grace Tully, the President’s personal secretary.

W. Averell Harriman, American Lend-Lease “expediter” in London, and Adm. William D. Leahy, Mr. Roosevelt’s chief of staff, were at the train to greet him.

Nazis see no invasion soon, Russia reports

Moscow, USSR (UP) –
Red Star, the Russian Army newspaper, offering the first Soviet comment on the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in Québec, said today that disposition of German reserves indicated that the Axis expected no large-scale Allied operations in the near future.

Red Star observed:

The main enemy effort is being concentrated against the Red Army which for more than two years has been continuing to beat the entire brunt of the struggle against main German forces.

Konstantin Goffman, the newspaper’s political commentator, noted that the British and American oppress was speculating on the form of Allied aid to Russia.

He wrote:

The Soviet standpoint on this question has long been well known. It has been repeatedly pointed out that by a second front we understand such action which would divert from the Russian front 50 or 60 German divisions. Only such action would considerably shorten the war. This is what the peoples of all freedom-loving nations desire.

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U.S. State Department (August 18, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral Noble
Major General Handy Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Fairchild Air Marshal Welsh
Brigadier General Kuter Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Freseman Brigadier McNair
Commander Long Captain Tollemache
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 18, 1943, 3 p.m.

Secret

Conclusions of Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 110th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Italian Peace Feelers

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Representative at the Vatican had received a signed document from Marshal Badoglio informing him that General Castellano was authorized to speak on his behalf.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the above statement.

Operations Against Japan from India, 1943-1944 (CCS 305/1)

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that it appeared from the memorandum (CCS 305/1) prepared by the special committee that from the figures available, the Ledo or Imphal advances might have to be abandoned as a result of the floods. A telegram had, however, been dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief, India, offering him certain assistance to improve the capacity of the line of communication. He proposed that further consideration of operations from India should be deferred pending a reply from the Commander-in-Chief, India.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the interim report of the ad hoc committee, set out in CCS 305/1.

Production of Landing Craft

Admiral King informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he was examining the possibility of increasing the production of landing craft by stopping production of 110-foot submarine-chasers and slowing up production of destroyer escorts. The steps he was examining might produce an increase of 25 percent in the landing craft program, but this must not, however, be taken as a firm figure.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of Admiral King’s statement.

Southeast Asia Command (CCS 308)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the concepts laid down in Part I of CCS 308.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were certain specific points which he would like to discuss with regard to Part II. It had been found difficult to cut the Southeast Asia Command from India, since the former was dependent on India as its main base. However, there were constitutional difficulties in linking the two. The logistic and administrative side of the command set up was most important and a new post of Chief Administrative Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, India had been set up in order that the Chief Administrative Officer of the Southeast Asia Command should have only one individual to deal with in logistic and administrative matters.

With regard to the Deputy Supreme Commander, the British Chiefs of Staff were distressed by the multitude of functions which this officer would have to carry out, necessitating his presence in many widely separated places.

In the course of discussion, the following points were made:

  1. It would be difficult for one officer to combine the functions of Deputy Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and Commander of the U.S. and Chinese forces in the area.

  2. The Deputy Commander’s main task must be to insure that the Chinese forces play their part in operations into Burma. This would be no easy task and to insure it, it was essential that General Stilwell, who must control the Chinese forces, should have the standing of Deputy Commander.

  3. The command arrangements might be expected to follow the same pattern as in the North African theater, i.e., there would be ground, air and naval commanders. If General Stilwell commanded the ground forces, difficulties would arise since it was essential that control of all ground forces should be centralized in one commander. Only thus could the various operations be effectively controlled and coordinated. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that the Chinese forces could be under the direct control of a British officer, and it was, therefore, necessary that General Stilwell should, at least nominally, control these forces and that all orders to these forces should pass through him.

  4. General Marshall said that he visualized this necessarily abnormal organization working on the following lines: General Stilwell’s function as Deputy Supreme Commander would be limited, since his other functions would occupy the majority of his time. It must be his major task, and that not an easy one, to insure not only that the Chinese forces played their part in the operations, but also that, to the maximum extent possible, the 14th Air Force should cooperate in operations in Burma. It must be remembered that politically, all U.S. forces in China, or in the Southeast Asia Command, were regarded as being there for the sole purpose of supporting China, and therefore a system must be evolved whereby, while retaining this political principle, the maximum support could be obtained for operations into Burma.

  5. Sir Charles Portal said that he appreciated that while the 10th Air Force was regarded as a source of reinforcement to the 14th Air Force, it also had possibilities for offensive action in the Burma theater. Its operations in Burma must, however, be coordinated with those of the Royal Air Force by the Air Commander, Southeast Asia Command. It was therefore essential that these two commanders should occupy the same headquarters.

  6. General Arnold pointed out a further complication in that the operation of the air ferry route into China was under a separate command. It was not controlled either by General Chennault, by the commander of the 10th Air Force, or by General Stilwell, though the latter decided what supplies were flown into China.

  7. It would seem to be necessary, once operations were in progress, for General Stilwell or his representative to be situated at the Army Commander’s headquarters with United States officers attached to each Chinese force through whom he could issue instructions to the Chinese forces concerned, in accordance with the policy of the army commander.

  8. Finally, it was pointed out that the proposals for the employment of Chinese forces and the command arrangements would still have to be negotiated with the Generalissimo.

General Arnold and Sir Charles Portal then presented draft proposals covering the command arrangements on the lines discussed. Certain amendments put forward by Admiral Leahy to paragraph 8 (b) were discussed and agreed to.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Combined Staff Planners to revise paragraph 8 (a) and paragraph 8 (b) of Part II of the paper, on the basis of the suggestions put forward during the course of the meeting.

Deception Plan for the War Against Japan (CCS 284/3/D)

Sir Alan Brooke said that CCS 284/3/D set up the machinery for deception planning for the war against Japan. It remained to prepare plans. The responsibility for the formulation, for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of overall deception plans for the war against Japan had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Leahy said that the United States Staff was now engaged on this matter. They felt, however, that plans could not be finalized until the decisions taken at the present Conference were known. It was hoped that the plan would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 15 September.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the U.S. Planners were engaged in preparation of an overall deception plan for the defeat of Japan but that it would have to be premised to some extent in the QUADRANT decisions and therefore would not be ready for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to 15 September.

The U-Boat War (CCS 272/1)

Sir Dudley Pound referred to a report by the Anti-Submarine Survey Board, putting forward certain recommendations with regard to the mobility of air units. He was in general agreement with the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff, though he would like to examine further the detailed proposals put forward in the report itself.

Admiral King gave a brief résumé of the present position with regard to the anti-submarine war. His latest information went to show that 429 U-boats were operating, of which 166, including 23 in far northern waters, were in the Atlantic. Of the original 12 refueling U-boats, 10 had been sunk and one or two were working up in the Baltic, but there were undoubtedly others under construction. The United States was now operating five auxiliary carriers. To meet new U-boat tactics of fighting it out on the surface, aircraft were being equipped with heavier forward mountings. The United States Army Air Corps had recently made a much-appreciated loan of B-25s fitted with 75-millimeter cannon. It might be found that the best weapon was the 37-millimeter cannon, which could carry more rounds. There were a very large number of anti-submarine weapons and projects in the course of experiment and development.

Sir Charles Portal mentioned the rocket weapon which could fire eight projectiles in one salvo, and which was particularly effective.

Sir Dudley Pound said that at present U-boats were operating largely in the Central Atlantic, off the Cape, and in the Indian Ocean. It was possible to divert escort vessels from the North Atlantic only as far as the Bay of Biscay since it was essential that any craft diverted should be capable of rapidly reinforcing the North Atlantic route should the Germans decide to concentrate in that area. He believed that the U-boats now in the Baltic were refitting with new antiaircraft weapons and radar equipment and that the Germans might, when these were ready, revert to pack attacks in the North Atlantic, having fought their way out of the Bay on the surface in groups, using their new and heavier antiaircraft weapons.

Sir Dudley Pound then outlined the steps which were being taken to reinforce the escorts in the Cape of Good Hope area.

In reply to a question by Sir Dudley Pound, Admiral King said that the proposals, to which he had earlier referred, with regard to increasing the output of landing craft would not have any material effect on the production of anti-submarine craft. It was not proposed to stop the building of any anti-submarine craft except for the 110-foot submarine-chasers. Destroyer escorts already laid down would be completed and only a proportion of new construction foregone to allow for stepping up the production of landing craft. Thus, no effect on important anti-submarine craft output would be felt for at least six months.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff contained in CCS 272/1.

Operation ALACRITY (CCS 270/5-270/6)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had only received the United States Chiefs of Staff’s views as set out in CCS 270/6 after their arrival at QUADRANT. Negotiations undertaken by the Foreign Office in consultation as necessary with the British Chiefs of Staff were then almost reaching a conclusion. The British Cabinet had given a ruling that the facilities required must, if possible, be obtained on the basis of our treaty with Portugal (our oldest Ally) and not by force. Negotiations had been very protracted. Portugal’s main fear was an attack by Spain. They asked for assistance and guarantees for their defense against such an attack and had suggested that a Portuguese Staff should proceed to London to discuss these terms. This would obviously have taken too long. The Portuguese had felt strongly that our initial entry into the Islands in too great strength would produce reactions from the Spaniards and that it must therefore be on a small scale. It had been felt possible to give the guarantee required by the Portuguese since the risk of invasion of that country appeared to be remote. The Portuguese had now agreed to the entry of a small British force into the Azores on the 8th of October. The Prime Minister had informed him that the President had agreed to this arrangement. As soon as the British were in the Islands the policy would be to build up and arrange for the necessary facilities for United States forces.

General Arnold stressed the importance of the ferry route through the Azores, particularly during the coming winter months when weather conditions will greatly restrict ferrying operations over the northern route, forcing a transfer of these operations to the South Atlantic crossing – 5,400 miles longer to the U.K. than the Azores route would be. It was expected that by early 1944 some 1,800 aircraft per month would be ferried across the Atlantic. During 1944 it is estimated that air transport Atlantic crossings will reach 3,500 per month. The use of the Azores for these operations would effect a monthly saving of approximately 15,000,000 gallons of gasoline, and substantially expedite the movement of aircraft and air cargo to the European-Mediterranean, Middle East and Far Eastern areas. Grave inconvenience will be caused if this ferry route is not available by the winter. Negotiations by Pan-American Airways had almost achieved the desired result but had been discontinued when British negotiations got under way.

Sir Charles Portal said that the original decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to obtain the use of the Azores had been based on their value in the anti-submarine war. The air facilities available were limited and he believed that ‘anti-submarine requirements must take priority. He fully appreciated, however, the value of these Islands as a staging point in the air ferry route. A clause in the agreement allowed for further development and General Arnold could be assured that every effort would be made, and pressure put upon the Portuguese, to afford the use of all facilities to the United States as soon as possible.

Admiral Leahy said that he felt that once an entry had been effected, the required facilities for United States aircraft might be made available without reference to the Portuguese, but it was generally felt by the British Chiefs of Staff that some reference would be necessary.

After further discussion,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That the negotiations with the Portuguese regarding the use of the Azores had been brought to a successful conclusion as regards their use by the British, with effect from October 8.

b. That the President had agreed that the negotiations between the British and Portuguese Governments with regard to the use of facilities in the Azores should not be prejudiced by insisting that the facilities be made immediately available to the United States.

c. That the British Chiefs of Staff gave an assurance that everything would be done by the British as soon as possible after entry had been gained into the Azores, to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

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Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Wing Commander Gibson

The principal subject was presumably the attack led by Gibson which had destroyed the Möhne and Eder Dams.


Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Brigadier Wingate

The principal subject was presumably the possibility of effective jungle warfare against Japan through the use of long-range penetration groups landed by air behind the enemy lines.

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 301/1

Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-44

At their 110th Meeting, 17 August 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that a paragraph be drafted by the Secretaries for inclusion in paragraph 8 of CCS 301. A suggested paragraph follows:

Air Route into China

Present plans provide for the concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

  1. Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
  2. Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
  3. Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

H. REDMAN
J. R. DEANE

Combined Secretariat

Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 305/1

Interim Report by the Committee Appointed to Examine CCS 305

  1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we have examined the telegram from the Commander-in-Chief India contained in paper CCS 305, and submit this interim report.

  2. From the information at our disposal, which is confined to the telegrams received from the Commander-in-Chief India, there is a shortfall of 600 tons per day foreshadowed on the Assam line of communications out of the estimated capacity of 3,400 tons per day. This shortfall is expected to continue up to 1st March 1944.

  3. In respect of priority for allotment of capacity on this line of communication we consider that the air transport service to China should retain its present overriding priority.

  4. We have examined the detailed allocation of tonnage as planned by the Commander-in-Chief India on the basis of 3,400 tons per day, and agree that this allows no margin if the operations are to take place as planned.

  5. We assess that a saving of approximately 500 tons per day might be made by calling a halt to one of the offensives as planned either at Ledo or at Imphal.

  6. It would therefore appear from the figures available that one of these projects should be cancelled if the other is to be carried out.

  7. We have, however, addressed a cable to the Commander-in-Chief India offering him certain assistance which should begin to have an effect in improving capacity by late November or December 1943. This assistance, coupled with the postponement of the date of active operations till 15th February, 1944, may permit of both projects being continued though with some loss of preparedness.

  8. Having regard to the above factors, we do not consider that the abandonment of either project should be definitely decided upon. The importance of continuing work on the Ledo Road is manifest, and with a lower target of road construction in the Imphal area, due to the later date of operations, the continuance of the Ledo Road may well be possible with little delay.

  9. We make this forecast with some reserve, and we cannot definitely state what will be practicable until we receive a reply from the Commander-in-Chief India, to the cable which we have dispatched.

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Report by the U.S. Joint Administrative Committee

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 312
References: a. CCS 107th Meeting
b. JCS Memo Directive, 14 August 1943

Pipeline From India to China

The problem

Prepare a study on the construction of a pipeline from India to China via Calcutta, Ledo and Fort Hertz, to Kunming.

Facts bearing on the problem

Description of Project: The project is divided into two parts which can be executed simultaneously:
a. The construction of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Dibrugarh (Project C, attached map) to provide gasoline (1) for U.S. air transport operations in Assam, (2) for further transportation to Kunming, and (3) to supplement the supply of the Imphal Force. The Calcutta-Dibrugarh pipeline is 900 miles long and will have a capacity of 36,000 tons per month. The line is easily accessible from railroads for the entire length. Time required for construction is estimated at five months.

b. The construction of a four-inch pipeline from Dibrugarh via Fort Hertz to Kunming (Project A, attached map), to provide gasoline for air operations in China. This line is 1,000 miles long and will have a capacity of 18,000 tons per month. Approximately 400 miles of this line traverses territory accessible by road, the remainder is accessible only via foot trails or air. In order to speed construction by building several sections simultaneously, materials should be flown in to airfields along the route. Time required for construction is estimated at eight months.

Military Necessity:
a. U.S. air transport operations require 15,000 tons of gasoline per month in Assam.

b. The amount of aviation fuel available in the Kunming area will be a limiting factor which will restrict the size of the air force which can be supported from Chinese bases, for attacks against Japanese shipping, shore installations, naval forces and ground forces during the year 1944.

c. There are additional military requirements, other than gasoline, for the support of ground establishments and ground forces, which are essential to the securing of the airbase area in China. The delivery of gasoline to the Kunming area by pipeline will permit the devotion to these requirements of much of the capacity of the U.S. air transport facilities previously used for gasoline.

Requirements for Construction: The requirements for construction are as follows:

900 miles six-inch pipeline and accessories 29,000 short tons
1,000 miles four-inch pipeline and accessories 18,000 short tons
Signal supplies 400 short tons
4,000 troops (15 Petr Dist Cos & misc dets) 2,600 short tons
50,000 short tons

Capacity to Meet Requirements:
a. Cargo shipping is available for movement of equipment and supplies.

b. Equipment and supplies are available as required to implement this project.

c. Additional shipping for the transportation of 4,000 troops must be made available or an equal number of troops destined for the same theater must be deferred.

d. Troop units are available as required.

Difficulties to Be Overcome:
a. In order to execute the project in a minimum of time, it will be necessary to transport, over a period of several months, 15,000 tons of pipeline material by air to points along the pipeline east of Ledo.

b. It will be necessary to transport over the line of communications from Calcutta, over a period of several months, an aggregate of:
(i) 20,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material to Assam.
(ii) 30,000 tons of six-inch material along the route between Calcutta and Assam.

c. It will be necessary to provide adequate protection to prevent enemy action from interrupting the construction and operation of the pipeline.

Conclusions

a. The project is feasible from an engineering point of view.

b. The project can be initiated at once and promises considerable and early aid to China.

c. The air delivery of 15,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material invested in the Assam-Kunming pipeline project over a period of several months, will be returned in terms of tons of aviation gasoline delivered in Kunming in the first month of pipeline operation.

d. The distribution along the Calcutta-Assam line of communications of 30,000 tons of six-inch pipeline material over a period of several months will increase the capacity of that line of communication by 36,000 tons per month.

e. Without adequate ground protection, it is within the capabilities of the Japanese to interrupt the Assam-Kunming section of the pipeline project.

Recommendation

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposed pipeline project.

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The Combined Staff Planners to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 313

Memorandum

Subject: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan (CPS 83)

In their 90th Meeting on 20 May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

…directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

In their 102nd Meeting on 16 July 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to place an appreciation and plan for the war against Japan before the Combined Chiefs of Staff during QUADRANT.

Combined planning teams, working in London in June and in Washington in July, completed CPS 83 on 8 August with the exception of certain Tables of Forces which are under preparation and should be completed prior to the end of QUADRANT. A summary of CPS 83 is attached.

On the basis of the premises adopted, the Combined Staff Planners consider that the measures set forth as being necessary for the defeat of Japan, namely, the retention of China as an effective ally, the destruction of Japanese sea and air forces, the blockade of Japan, and the large-scale bombing of the Japanese homeland as a preliminary to the possible invasion of Japan, are sound.

The general lines of advance – through the Central and Southwest Pacific, and possibly in the Northwest Pacific by United States’ forces; and through the Straits of Malacca and China Sea by British forces, with the development of a line of supplies to China through Burma, are concurred in.

The dates on which operations are to be undertaken, with the consequent prolonged duration, envisages, as set forth by the Planning Team, the least favorable conditions to be anticipated. The Planning Teams state that conditions less unfavorable will permit the expediting of the contemplated operations.

Even on this conditional basis the Combined Staff Planners consider that the plan contemplates a war in the Pacific so prolonged as to be unacceptable to the United Nations. They feel that the situation existing at this time is that the Japanese have won the war and that operations which do not contemplate the complete nullification of Japanese gains before 1947 will produce the serious hazard that the war against Japan will not, in fact, be won by the United Nations.

The United Nations’ overall objective, as approved in CCS 242/6 during the TRIDENT Conference, states:

The overall objective of the United Nations is, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

The Combined Staff Planners feel that the conduct of the war to bring about the defeat of Japan must be in consonance with the overall objective, as well as with the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war against Japan, which reads (CCS 242/6, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3):

  1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about by the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

  2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

  3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

At the present time a great preponderance of the United Nations Forces is deployed against the Axis Powers in Europe. At the time of the defeat of Germany large forces will become available for redeployment against Japan. This redeployment will require a long period of time. During this period the will to prosecute the war to the defeat of Japan will suffer from the stultifying effect caused by long delays in the increase of offensive action in the Pacific and Far East.

The Combined Staff Planners feel, therefore, that, if we are to comply with the approved overall objective and strategic concept and are to ensure the complete defeat of Japan, we must contemplate the start of the reorientation of forces from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of Germany, adjusting the tempo and scale of the reorientation to the progress of the war in Europe, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

The U.S. Planners feel that our plans and preparations should contemplate the defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany. This timing should itself now be established as a more or less controlling objective with which our efforts, measures, and courses of action should conform. If, in the future, the measures set forth in the proposed plan do not prospectively provide for this desired rate of progress of the war, other measures should be sought – as, for instance, inducing Russia to enter the war. The British Planners, however, while fully conscious of the need to shorten the war against Japan and to take all possible measures so to shorten it, cannot accept such a target date. In their opinion such acceptance would necessitate an entirely new concept of operations involving an assault on the Japanese homeland without the preparatory bombing from bases in China and/or Formosa which they believe will be required. This course, though worthy of consideration nearer the time, is insufficiently certain to provide a basis for long term planning.

The chief value of an overall plan of this kind is the guidance of action now and in the immediate future. Operations now underway in the North, Central, South, and Southwest Pacific, as well as those Pacific operations set forth in CCS 301 – Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-1944 – are in conformity with the plan. Operations for the seizure of Burma are in conformity with the plan, but the date that they should be undertaken is in dispute.

The U.S. Planners consider that the Southwest Pacific operations, through New Guinea, and to the Northwest of New Guinea, provide for a line of advance which at this time must be considered concurrent and coordinated with the advance in the Central Pacific and in this respect do not agree with the plan that these operations should he considered subsidiary in character.

The British Planners however consider that operations in New Guinea will be slow and very expensive in resources. They therefore support the view set out in the summary that when we turn to our main Pacific effort, through the Marshalls and Carolines, operations in New Guinea should become subsidiary and should only be pursued in so far as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

The U.S. Planners assume that the operations in North Burma, as approved at the TRIDENT Conference – advance from Ledo and Imphal, and increase of supplies by air to China, and the Akyab and Ramree operations – will be firmly carried out in 1943-1944. Beyond these operations the plan submitted by the British Members does not contemplate offensive operations from the West (other than further operations in North Burma) until March, 1945. In other words, during the period March, 1944, to March, 1945, the efforts from the West to “maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced” would be only those possible to the forces deployed in North Burma. The U.S. Planners feel that a more extensive contribution to the war effort is necessary along this line of advance during this period. They feel that the support rendered in 1944, even though smaller than could be afforded in 1945, will give better and more needed support to the Pacific Theater.

The U.S. Planners consider that Course B, the capture of South Burma, beginning in November, 1944, should be carried out. This operation is regarded as necessary not only for the improved line of supplies to China through Rangoon, but as a preliminary to the further movement of the advance from the West through the Strait of Malacca. In this they are in disagreement with the British Planners who concur with Course C, the attack against Singapore to bypass South Burma, and to be inaugurated in March, 1945.

The British Planners feel that the question of whether or not China remains in the war will not be decided by the choice between Course B (the prior capture of Burma) and Course C (the prior capture of Singapore) since China’s darkest hours will be in the early half of 1944, before Germany is defeated. Thereafter, the obvious weight of the United Nations offensive against Japan in general and the prospect of an early opening of the sea route in particular will do more to sustain morale than the arrival of limited additional material through Burma, always provided supply by the air route continues at the maximum.

The British Planners feel strongly that the recapture of Southern Burma and Rangoon would be a small strategic gain for the expenditure of great effort. At best it would:
a. Produce limited pressure on Japanese land and air forces for two dry seasons with little attrition during the intervening wet seasons.

b. Open the Burma Road. As this cannot in any case be in full operation before some time in 1946, whether we go for Rangoon or Singapore first, the results are long term. In the unlikely event of the Japanese in the meantime occupying Kunming, all our efforts in Burma would be nullified.

On the other hand, the British Planners feel that the recapture of Singapore before Rangoon is a full and correct application of sea and air power. It will electrify the Eastern world and have an immense psychological effect on the Japanese. It will threaten the Japanese communications to Thailand and so to Burma, enable direct attack to be brought to bear on the Dutch oilfields, and in fact flank and undermine the whole Japanese defense structure in Southeast Asia. It provides a base for the great naval and air forces available for deployment against Japan from the West. Above all, it provides for an advance complementary to that being undertaken by the USA from the East, and converging upon the same objectives, i.e., the capture of Hong Kong or Formosa and the control of the South China Sea. It thus accelerates the opening of a sea supply route to China. Operations against Singapore will, moreover, provoke intense Japanese reaction to preserve the material gains of the Japanese Empire in the West as opposed to its strategical position and gains in the East, thereby relieving Japanese pressure on China and stretching Japanese ability to resist the Eastern advance possibly to the limit.

Recommendations

To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:

Recommendations By U.S. Planners Recommendations By British Planners
(a) Approve the general objectives and the general lines of advance set forth in the plan, as a basis for planning and preparation. (a) Agreed.
(b) Disapprove, as unacceptable those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or 1948. (b) Agreed.
(c) Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall have as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany. (c) Direct that intensified study of ways and means for shortening the war should be undertaken at every stage; and that theater commanders should be so instructed.
(d) Approve, in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East Theaters from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of Germany, the scope and timing of reorientation to be adjusted to the requirements of the European Theater, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time. (d) Agreed.
(e) Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the overall objective and strategic concept defined in CCS 242/6, Sections I and II. (e) Agreed.
(f) Reaffirm the TRIDENT decision that approved operations in North Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed during the coming dry season. (f) The British Planners consider that the form of this decision must await the outcome of discussion on CCS 301.
(g) Reaffirm the TRIDENT decision to undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan. (g) Agreed.
(h) Direct the maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into China. (h) Agreed.
(i) Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version of CCS 301. (i) Agreed.
(j) Make a decision at this time as to operations to be undertaken in the west (South Burma or toward Singapore) in 1944. (j) Approve planning and preparations for the start of operations for the capture of Singapore with a target date of 1945, followed by the recapture or reoccupation of Southern Burma during the season 1945-46. This decision to be reviewed in the spring of 1944 in the light of the then existing German situation.
(k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by the U.S., Australia and New Zealand; operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. (k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by U.S.[;] operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter for discussion between all the Governments concerned.
Appendix
Secret

Summary of Appreciation and Outline Plan for the Defeat of Japan

The following is a summary of CPS 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best evaluation of what may have to be undertaken.

We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese people or fighting services. Nevertheless, we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. Even if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of weakening the enemy’s forces and reducing his war potential will cause a rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our advance. Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage.

Basic conclusions

We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation:

To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan.

The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon as we can.

Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war effort. It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. In any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude to bring about the defeat of Japan.

To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our long-range bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting our requirements for mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases.

To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be the most suitable port to open initially.

We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the interruption of the enemy’s lines of communication thereto. This will entail control of the South Japan and South China Seas. The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seas or north of Luzon. The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits of Malacca.

In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain principles, which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan:
a. We should attack Japan along as many lines of advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy defense.

b. Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be adopted. The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and the opportunities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be taken without unacceptable risk.

c. Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. We should therefore take the first opportunity of securing additional bases from which to deploy our superior strength.

d. Our strength, particularly in the air, should be concentrated against Japan’s weaknesses, which lie in her shortage of aircraft, warships, shipping and oil.

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage, should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and support from the Japanese navy and air forces.

Whenever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces.

e. Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable.

f. Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of Germany, our lines of advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take the shortest route from the U.S. or U.K. to our ultimate objective, but rather the one most easily established and protected.

g. We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the vast technical and numerical air superiority which we shall enjoy over the Japanese after the defeat of Germany.

h. Whilst recognizing that every effort must be made to retain China in the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than we now hope.

i. Whilst being prepared to achieve our aims without Russian assistance, our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage.

j. We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To minimize the delay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for reorganization and redeployment made without delay.

General concept of the war

Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the general concept of the war which emerges is as follows:

First phase – Action prior to capture of a port in China and/or Formosa

In the East, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the Solomons-New Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa.

In the West, we should maintain China and build up our air forces there by stepping up the air supply route from Assam and by operations to clear Northern Burma, thus permitting the opening of a land route to China.

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching of the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore.

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa.

Coordination

To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the timing of the various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage.

For our advance from the East, & very large fleet, but comparatively small land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively little shipping, until we have completed our advance through the Mandates, when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very large order.

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet than in the case of our advance from the East.

Our advance from the East should provide opportunities for bringing the Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the Yellow Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advances from the west by forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their home area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west.

In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma (Course A), two courses of action remain open to us in the west.

Course B – (Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and would receive little aid from the west.

Course C – (Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the main enemy naval strength in Japan.

On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the development of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay if all operations go according to plan.

Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai direct. In conjunction with shore-based air support from China, and Chinese land forces, we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently taking Formosa.

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon.

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and if possible one of the Ryukyus.

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations against the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or Formosa.

Second phase – Action subsequent to the capture of a port in China and/or the capture of Formosa

This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in China and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will probably culminate in the invasion of Japan.

If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China, secure the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan at long range.

If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing, the bombing of Japan can start from Formosa.

It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber offensive has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible from Hong Kong.

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha.

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland and coastwise.

If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far northwards as necessary.

Subsidiary and alternative lines of advance

Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance, we should:
(i) undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring increased pressure to bear on the Japanese;

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to Russia in the event of her entering the war;

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should the opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion of Japan from this direction, possibly in conjunction with Russian action from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk.

Outline plan

Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan:

Action in the West Action in the East
Serial 1 – Up to November 1943
Development of air routes to China. Holding operations in North Burma and China. Offensive operations against Solomons and New Guinea. Offensive operations against the Aleutians.
Serial 2 – November 1943 to May 1944
Offensive operations in Northern Burma and on Arakan coast. Developing Northern routes leading to China. Offensive operations against Gilberts and Marshalls. Subsidiary operations in Solomons and New Guinea and air operations from the Aleutians.
Serial 3 – June 1944 to November 1944
Holding operations in Burma. Offensive operations against Carolines. Subsidiary operations in New Guinea area.
Action in the West Action in the East
Serial 4 – November 1944 to May 1945
Course B (favored by U.S.) Course C (favored by British)
Offensive operations in North Burma and capture of Rangoon. Offensive operations in North Burma. Offensive operations against Northern Sumatra and Malaya. Offensive operations against the Pelews and possibly Marianas. Subsidiary operations in the New Guinea area. Commence offensive operations against South Philippines.*
Serial 5 – June 1945 to November 1945
Holding operations in Burma. Holding operations in North Burma. Continue offensive operations in Malaya and against Japanese communications to Burma. Continue offensive operations against the South Philippines. – or Offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa or Ryukyus.
Serial 6 – November 1945 to May 1946
Complete offensive operations to clear Burma. Offensive operations against N. Sumatra and Malaya. Offensive operations against North Burma and Rangoon, subsequently clearing the whole of Burma. Offensive operations against Camranh Bay.† Continue offensive operations [against the] South Philippines. – or Launch offensive operations against Hong Kong or Formosa (if not already captured).
Serial 7 – During the remainder of 1946
Complete capture of Malaya. Launch offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan and/or Ryukyus from East and West. – or Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.

Serial 8 – From 1947 onwards
Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.

  • Bomb Japan.
  • Invade Japan.

*If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to bypass this objective.
If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to bypass this objective.

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Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
Enclosure to CCS 314/1

Allocation of Landing Ships and Craft – American Production

It will be remembered that in April 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed (CCS 105/4) that future allocations of additional landing craft from U.S. production to the United Kingdom, as could be made available and as would be needed for specific employment and specifically projected operations, be accomplished by arrangement between the United States and British Naval Staffs, and formally processed through the Munitions Assignments Committee, Navy, subject to the approval of the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington.

No specific operations for the War against Germany, after OVERLORD, have yet been decided upon. For the War against Japan, it is hoped that decisions will shortly be taken on the scope and extent of British participation. In order to prepare the British Assault Fleet and to estimate British manning commitments for 1944/45, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to formulate their programme without waiting for specific operational decisions.

We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree:
a. To modify the policy previously accepted.
b. That the British should now work out and submit requests for a share of U.S. production in 1944-45.


Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
Enclosure to CCS 315

HABBAKUKS

We are impressed with the possibilities of constructing “floating airfields” as a type of aircraft carrier, and we are of the opinion that, research and design have now reached a stage when we should proceed with the production of certain types. A Technical Note is given in Annex I.

Three types of vessel have been designed on paper by naval architects:

HABBAKUK I

A vessel made of wood was designed in the hope that it could be ready in 1944 and would not use much strategic material. This, we have learned is not the case, as there is a shortage of timber. Consequently, in view of the limited requirement for this type, it has been decided not to proceed with it.

HABBAKUK II

This vessel could be made of steel but would require about 150,000 tons per vessel as well as a great deal of shipyard space and skilled labor. Alternatively, it could be made of pykrete (frozen pulp and water), but the feasibility of this depends on the completion of full-scale tests during the winter 1943-44. These experiments have been in progress in England and Canada since December 1942. The proposed design has a speed of about seven knots; is self-propelled; and has a length of 1,700-2,200 feet; the beam would be sufficient to operate and park medium bombers and transport aircraft and, if assisted take off could be employed, heavy bombers. If orders for the above full-scale tests are given immediately, and if these are successful, the first pykrete HABBAKUK might be operational by the middle of 1945, but there are a large number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome.

HABBAKUK III

This would be a smaller and faster type made of steel; about 70,000 tons per vessel; speed 12 knots; self-propelled; length 1,000-1,200 feet; beam sufficient to operate fighters, naval aircraft and light twin engine bombers. If a definite order is given in the near future, and if the material can be made available, the first could be operational by the spring of 1945. The construction of this type would, however, conflict with other ship construction, e.g. escort carriers.

Arrester gear will be necessary on all types and the employment of assisted take-off methods would be of great value.

In the war against Japan, we see considerable possibilities in Types II and III, particularly the latter. They could not, of course, in any way fulfill the functions of an aircraft carrier operating with the fleet, but there are a number of other ways, details of which are described in Annex II in which we think they would be of great value. Indeed, we feel that after a certain number of escort carriers have been constructed, it would probably be better to build a few of these HABBAKUKS rather than devote all our efforts to further escort carriers. (See paragraphs 40 and 41 of Annex II.)

Recommendations

We suggest that we should now take steps as follows:
a. To construct at least two HABBAKUKS III, which is the more promising type for use both in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean;

b. To continue experiments and construct during the coming winter sections of pykrete for HABBAKUK IIs for experimental purposes. Subject to success in this, we should construct a number of HABBAKUK IIs in pykrete during the following winter for use in the Pacific.

We cannot undertake construction in the United Kingdom because neither labor nor the material can be made available. If, therefore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with our proposals, we suggest that they should invite the appropriate United States and Canadian authorities to set up a board forthwith to press on with this matter. We shall be glad to place British experts at the disposal of both.

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Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 286/3

Formation of U.S. Assault Forces for Operation OVERLORD

The British request that the Americans man all the craft allocated to Assault Force “O,” the American Naval Assault Force for OVERLORD based in the Plymouth Command, was considered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff who declined to undertake this commitment for the reasons given in CCS 286/2.

There has been an opportunity during Quadrant for this matter to be further investigated by the Combined Staffs. As a result, we now wish to put forward a modified proposal. We withdraw the request that the U.S. should man the shipborne types of landing craft, namely 16 LCS(M), 15 Hedgerow fitted LCA and 60 ordinary LCA, as these will be carried in British ships. However, in view of the fact that the remaining craft will be assigned to, and will train with, the American Naval Assault Force under a U.S. Naval Commander, we suggest that it would be reasonable that U.S. crews be provided. The craft involved are 12 LCT(R), 5 LCG(L), 11 LCF(L), 48 LCP(L) fitted for smoke-laying and not hoistable, and the personnel required amount to 135 officers and 1,511 men.

We ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the decision conveyed in 286/2 to this extent.

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Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 314

Allocation of Landing Craft (Operation OVERLORD – Vehicle Lift)

We have been examining the landing craft position for Operation OVERLORD. It appears probable that there will be a shortage of vehicle lift of 870 vehicles, or 13 per cent of the total lift, compared with the calculations made at TRIDENT. This shortage is made up as follows:

  • LCT (3 or 4) – 57
  • LCT (5) – 15

The reasons for this shortage are as follows:
a. 164 LCG (M) which it was hoped to build in the United Kingdom, will not be ready in time. In order to compensate to some extent for this and in order to provide supporting fire for the U.S. assaults, it has been necessary to convert 43 LCT (3 and 4) to LCT(R) or LCG(L).

b. In the TRIDENT calculations it was assumed that the 44 LCT (4 and 5) employed in close mobile net protection duties with the Fleet at Scapa Flow, would all be available for OVERLORD. Recent developments in anti-ship weapons make it impossible to dispense with this type of protection. Every effort is being made to substitute other types of craft and 15 LCTs have been released. The Admiralty are going to try and release more, but at present they must retain 14 LCT (4) and 15 LCT (5).

Under the TRIDENT decisions, 18 LCTs were to be brought back from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. It will be necessary for these to sail before bad weather starts in the Bay of Biscay. Admiral Cunningham has been asked whether these craft are taking part in AVALANCHE and when they can be released. The importance of ensuring their passage home has been emphasized. Owing to the casualties in HUSKY having been less than expected, we may get more back from this source, which would help us reduce the deficit. But we cannot count on this yet.

We have studied various methods by which the shortage in lift for OVERLORD could be wiped out. It seems that the only practicable method would be to arrange by some means an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from American sources. The British Chiefs of Staff ask that the possibility of this should be explored.

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