Québec, 24 August 1943.
Enclosure to CCS 319/5
QUADRANT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
In previous memoranda (CCS 319 and CCS 319/2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.
Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.
j. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
Execution of the overall strategic concept
The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon.
THE U-BOAT WAR
a. Progress Report
We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.
b. Facilities in the Azores Islands
The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.
NOTE: On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the Azores we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the Azores has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.
THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE
We have approved the following operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe.
THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE
The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.
a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.
b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.
c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.
In case circumstances render the execution of OVERLORD impossible, it may be necessary to consider JUPITER as an alternative. Plans for this operation, with particular reference to an entry into Southern Norway, should therefore be made and kept up to date.
OPERATIONS IN ITALY
a. First phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, farther north.
b. Second phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.
c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France.
OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerrilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.
a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.
b. Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.
c. Air supply of Balkan and French guerrillas.
OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS
Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.
GARRISON REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.
EMERGENCY RETURN TO THE CONTINENT
We have examined the plans that have been prepared by General Morgan’s staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operations.
The war against Japan
We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:
a. The dependence of Japan upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan’s air force, naval forces and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.
c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.
We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:
a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an “air road” to China.
b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.
c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.
From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within 12 months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.
The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the overall objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above.
We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.
The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS 1943-44
We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against Japan in 1943-44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.
OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44
We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Pacific in 1943-44 as follows:
The seizure and consolidation of the Gilberts preparatory to a further advance into the Marshalls.
The seizure of the Marshall Islands (including Wake and Kusaie) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central Pacific.
The capture of Ponape preparatory to operations against the Truk area.
CAROLINES (TRUK AREA)
The seizure of the eastern Carolines as far west as Woleai and the establishment of a fleet base at Truk.
The capture of the Palaus including Yap.
OPERATIONS AGAINST GUAM AND THE JAPANESE MARIANAS
The seizure of Guam and the Japanese Marianas.
Consideration of operations against Paramushiru and the Kuriles.
OPERATIONS IN THE NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS SUBSEQUENT TO CURRENT OPERATIONS
The seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured.
OPERATIONS IN NEW GUINEA SUBSEQUENT TO THE WEWAK-KAVIENG OPERATION
An advance along the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop, by step-by-step airborne-water-borne advances.
OPERATIONS IN INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER, 1943-44
To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date mid-February 1944.
It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.
To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.
To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.
To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
a. Keeping China in the war.
b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.
We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.
EXAMINATION OF FUTURE OPERATIONS
We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:
A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:
a. An operation against Northern Sumatra; target date spring 1944.
b. Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date November 1944.
c. Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok; target date to be as early as practicable.
d. Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.
e. The capture of Akyab and Ramree to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in a to d above or the operations in Upper Burma.
A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and China in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the autumn of 1944.
This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 37 and 38.
SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (General)
The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been decided that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below:
COMMAND IN INDIA
The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in GHQ India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.
COMMAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:
a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.
b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three Services and of the Allied forces.
c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three Services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.
The boundaries are set out in detail in CCS 308/3, but, generally, they include Burma, Ceylon, Thailand (Siam), the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.
The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander-in-Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.
DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.
The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the overall plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.
The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander-in-Chief.
General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.
The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, and of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Bequests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.
Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander-in-Chief, India.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.
THE COORDINATION OF AMERICAN AGENCIES SUCH AS OSS, OWI, FCB, ETC., WITH COMPARABLE BRITISH ORGANIZATIONS
In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.
There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.
Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN
We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:
a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements.
b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.
c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.
d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.
e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.
f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.
g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.
h. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY
We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for Turkey to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:
a. We should ask Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.
b. We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.
c. We should ask Turkey to continue:
(1) To improve her internal communications.
(2) To complete the airfields required for HARDIHOOD.
(3) To allow us to install the full RDF and Sector Control facilities which we require.
(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full HARDIHOOD Plan.
(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.
d. Our policy on equipment to Turkey should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb.
REEQUIPPING THE FRENCH FORCES
We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, North African Theater.
General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of PLOUGH force and have been asked to report as to possible uses for it in their respective theaters.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA AND CORSICA
We have asked General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities in Sardinia and Corsica with a view to facilitating entry into those islands.
We have examined the possibilities of constructing “floating airfields” and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments.
We have approved, subject to prior requirements for Military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam. These will facilitate air operations in China and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.
SUPPLY ROUTES IN N.E. INDIA
We have approved, subject to prior requirements of operations in Burma, intensified development of the supply routes into and in Assam and have issued directives to theater commanders concerned with a view to a target of 220,000 tons per month being reached by 31 December 1945.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon
We have carried out an examination of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon. We find in general that these resources will be sufficient to meet our needs. In some cases, however, the availability of resources is dependent upon conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time. The subject therefore should be kept under constant review, and if shortages develop or conflicts of interest arise, they will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.