740.00119 European War 1939/1656
Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs
Washington, August 23, 1943.
Memorandum
Mr. Matthews: I attended a drafting session at the War Department this morning in connection with the terms, other than military, to be imposed upon Italy in the event of a surrender. The military terms are already in General Eisenhower’s possession. Representatives of the British Embassy military and naval missions were present. These further terms were drawn up and agreed to by both the British and American representatives for transmission to Quebec today with the exception of four articles nos. 3, 4, 5a and 29. The British representatives were unable to accept these articles and we agreed to send them to Quebec pointing out our differences. Among the articles to which the British could not give their concurrence were:
No. 3, the exercise of the prerogatives of the crown will be suspended in all Italian territories. The powers of the central Italian Government will be suspended in all occupied areas as are designated by the allied commander-in-chief as Military Districts.
No. 4 …
No. 5a. Subject to the supreme authority of the allied commander-in-chief, the Italian Government will exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers in all unoccupied areas, these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country.
The other points on which we agreed to disagree were of a military character and of no particular concern to the Department.
Already approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, under General Hilldring, was the draft instrument of surrender of Italy called the “comprehensive” document because it includes military as well as other terms. This document is designed to supersede the military terms already in General Eisenhower’s hands and give him one complete instrument of surrender. This plan and procedure are generally preferred by the British representatives. It has been agreed to, as stated above, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and in our opinion is all right as far as it goes. We do not feel, however, in spite of its designation as “comprehensive” that it is sufficiently complete.
The American representatives generally favor the alternate plan and procedure which are to supplement the military terms already in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief with the additional terms necessary to define our relationship to the defeated Italian Government. These further terms, we believe, are more complete than the “comprehensive” document and do in fact contain certain political provisions not included in the “comprehensive” document.
When I left the Pentagon Building this noon, it was agreed that both plans would be sent to Quebec by plane today with the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff select the plan and procedure they prefer.
About 2:30 p.m. Colonel Laux of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department called to say that General Hilldring felt that the British reservations on the “American document” prejudiced the entire acceptance of the American plan; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be inclined to take the document on which agreement had been reached and wondered if the Department would not be willing to withdraw the two articles quoted above which caused our British colleagues to withhold their approval. He said that the War Department was prepared to withdraw the two articles of military character to which the British objected. I told the Colonel that the Department felt very strongly about retaining the two political articles referred to; that it was true that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff chose the “British plan” these political provisions would not appear, but that we felt they should be submitted to Quebec for consideration. I said that while I regretted to have to insist on inclusion of certain terms which might jeopardize the acceptance of the whole “American plan,” I felt that we could not omit them and thus leave ourselves open to possible future charges from the military that we had failed to give them proper advice on certain political phases of the highest importance with respect to the Italian situation. He asked if the Department’s position was, then, that we could not agree to have the controversial political provisions withdrawn and I answered in the affirmative.
J WESLEY JONES