Youngstown Vindicator (July 16, 1945)
ON THE RECORD —
Uncertainties of the Big Three meeting
By Dorothy Thompson
The Big Three conference in Potsdam is considerably more important than the one held in San Francisco, for the course of the world is not determined by generalities and overall formulas, but by specific actions. In Potsdam, very important and definite political problems have to be solved in agreement. Yet the conference contains political elements of great uncertainty.
The United States and Russia do not know what, in a few weeks’ time, will be the political situation in Britain. Britain and Russia have no experience whatsoever of President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes. There has been no preliminary conference between Britain and the United States in contrast to the condition of permanent conference which existed between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.
In all previous conferences, the military situation occupied the foreground. Political issues tended to be postponed, or settled in rather ambiguous agreements, Now the European war is over, political issues are preeminent, and every further postponement increases the number of faits accompli.
Labor Party’s policy
A change of government in Britain would, theoretically, lessen the possibilities of friction between the Soviet Union and Britain. Clement R. Attlee is accompanying Churchill in order to make agreements satisfactory to the Labor Party. But every change in government brings in new personalities and new imponderables, and it is doubtful whether Mr. Attlee can fully foresee the results of a victory for his own party. A party in opposition is never the same as a party in power.
The foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, and their negotiation capacities, are still an “X.” Mr. Byrnes was at Yalta – but not as Secretary of State. Mr. Truman has never participated in an international conference. Both are pledged to continue the Roosevelt policy – though Mr. Truman has said he would not be bound by verbal agreements made by his predecessor. But in any case Mr. Roosevelt made his policy as he went along. He died in a most critical moment, and left no testament or blueprint for his successors.
What we do know is the temperament and general attitude of the new President and Secretary of State. Though they may “agree” with Roosevelt and Stettinius, they are quite different men.
Mr. Byrnes, for instance, is a logical successor, not to Mr. Stettinius, but to Cordell Hull. In fact, the similarity is striking. Both are Southern Democrats whose experience has been in Congress and the world of politics, and not in the world of business. Both have solid support in the Senate which makes them invulnerable in the administration.
However other men around President Roosevelt might have disagreed with Mr. Hull, Mr. Roosevelt neither could or would have dismissed him. Mr. Byrnes’ position is equally strong. He will not be a satellite in the presidential solar system, but an equal star, and, for the time being, he is next in line for the presidency. President Roosevelt was his own foreign minister, Mr. Truman will not be.
President Roosevelt, also, was a much more subtle and versatile personality than his successor, inclined always to fit himself into situations as they arose and finesse his way among his allies. He had unlimited faith in his own capacity to adjust himself and the American policy to each successive change and crisis. He believed less in fixed principles and firm agreements than in the “climate” of human relationships and in his own capacity to steer with the wind in off-reef directions. That was both his talent and his weakness. Neither Mr. Truman nor Mr. Byrnes has that talent, so they must and will try to avoid the weaknesses.
No preliminary meeting
Mr. Roosevelt liked preliminary conferences, because he liked to sniff out which way the wind was blowing. It is interesting that Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes have avoided one. Apparently they do not want previous commitments, and are jealous for American independence and freedom of action.
As far as I can sense things, after a long absence from home, I expect a more stubborn attitude, a greater insistence on principles and on agreements that would “stand up in a court of law,” less tendency to leave matters to wide interpretation, and insistence on less ambiguity.
Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes are politicians, who may be presumed to have an eye on the presidential elections of 1948, and are susceptible to American public opinion. Mr. Roosevelt was a master at making public opinion. They are not. We may expect, therefore, a greater instinct for those constants in the American mind that are essential for the policies of the parties.