British in Jap war to finish
Fuel and food conditions tough but they pitch in on Nips cheerfully
By George R. Reiss
…
ON THE RECORD —
Uncertainties of the Big Three meeting
By Dorothy Thompson
The Big Three conference in Potsdam is considerably more important than the one held in San Francisco, for the course of the world is not determined by generalities and overall formulas, but by specific actions. In Potsdam, very important and definite political problems have to be solved in agreement. Yet the conference contains political elements of great uncertainty.
The United States and Russia do not know what, in a few weeks’ time, will be the political situation in Britain. Britain and Russia have no experience whatsoever of President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes. There has been no preliminary conference between Britain and the United States in contrast to the condition of permanent conference which existed between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.
In all previous conferences, the military situation occupied the foreground. Political issues tended to be postponed, or settled in rather ambiguous agreements, Now the European war is over, political issues are preeminent, and every further postponement increases the number of faits accompli.
Labor Party’s policy
A change of government in Britain would, theoretically, lessen the possibilities of friction between the Soviet Union and Britain. Clement R. Attlee is accompanying Churchill in order to make agreements satisfactory to the Labor Party. But every change in government brings in new personalities and new imponderables, and it is doubtful whether Mr. Attlee can fully foresee the results of a victory for his own party. A party in opposition is never the same as a party in power.
The foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, and their negotiation capacities, are still an “X.” Mr. Byrnes was at Yalta – but not as Secretary of State. Mr. Truman has never participated in an international conference. Both are pledged to continue the Roosevelt policy – though Mr. Truman has said he would not be bound by verbal agreements made by his predecessor. But in any case Mr. Roosevelt made his policy as he went along. He died in a most critical moment, and left no testament or blueprint for his successors.
What we do know is the temperament and general attitude of the new President and Secretary of State. Though they may “agree” with Roosevelt and Stettinius, they are quite different men.
Mr. Byrnes, for instance, is a logical successor, not to Mr. Stettinius, but to Cordell Hull. In fact, the similarity is striking. Both are Southern Democrats whose experience has been in Congress and the world of politics, and not in the world of business. Both have solid support in the Senate which makes them invulnerable in the administration.
However other men around President Roosevelt might have disagreed with Mr. Hull, Mr. Roosevelt neither could or would have dismissed him. Mr. Byrnes’ position is equally strong. He will not be a satellite in the presidential solar system, but an equal star, and, for the time being, he is next in line for the presidency. President Roosevelt was his own foreign minister, Mr. Truman will not be.
President Roosevelt, also, was a much more subtle and versatile personality than his successor, inclined always to fit himself into situations as they arose and finesse his way among his allies. He had unlimited faith in his own capacity to adjust himself and the American policy to each successive change and crisis. He believed less in fixed principles and firm agreements than in the “climate” of human relationships and in his own capacity to steer with the wind in off-reef directions. That was both his talent and his weakness. Neither Mr. Truman nor Mr. Byrnes has that talent, so they must and will try to avoid the weaknesses.
No preliminary meeting
Mr. Roosevelt liked preliminary conferences, because he liked to sniff out which way the wind was blowing. It is interesting that Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes have avoided one. Apparently they do not want previous commitments, and are jealous for American independence and freedom of action.
As far as I can sense things, after a long absence from home, I expect a more stubborn attitude, a greater insistence on principles and on agreements that would “stand up in a court of law,” less tendency to leave matters to wide interpretation, and insistence on less ambiguity.
Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes are politicians, who may be presumed to have an eye on the presidential elections of 1948, and are susceptible to American public opinion. Mr. Roosevelt was a master at making public opinion. They are not. We may expect, therefore, a greater instinct for those constants in the American mind that are essential for the policies of the parties.
Lawrence: Sea power is mighty weapon
Navy makes war history by sailing boldly up to enemy’s coast
By David Lawrence
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Hitler wasn’t woman hater; he liked ‘em
Fuehrer was all but wed to Eva and would even offer pals a drink
By Walter T. Ridder, North American Newspaper Alliance
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U.S. State Department (July 16, 1945)
871.6363/6-2945: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
Washington, July 16, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
us urgent
1621
Embassy may have received Dept’s Instruction No. 678 of July 2 containing purported text Russo-Rumanian economic agreement of May 8 summarized in Bucharest’s tel May 17 reported [repeated?] to Moscow as 97. Dept’s A-276 June 29 contains instructions for protest to Soviet Govt on removal of oil equipment from Rumania and gives general guidance for further discussions with Soviets on petroleum matters. Bucharest’s telegram of July 8 repeated to Moscow as 121 indicates possibility of new “fait accompli” based on agreement of May 8.
Dept now feels that strong presentation of views of this Govt both about the economic pact and the oil arrangement foreshadowed in Bucharest 121 to you should not be delayed pending receipt of A-276. You are therefore requested immediately inform appropriate Soviet authorities of this Govt’s concern over the possible application of the Russo-Rumanian trade pact in view of the policy of United States Govt of conducting trade with every nation free of discrimination arising from exclusive economic arrangements between nations, and also in view of our common interest in an equitable allocation of products in short supply in reconstruction period during which Soviet presumably wishes United States’ cooperation.
Please further inform Soviet authorities that conclusion of any arrangement affecting Rumanian oil or other industries such as indicated in Bucharest 121 July 8 would by same token be of equal concern to this Govt and should be deferred pending forthcoming tripartite discussions. This issue and the principles involved therein are on the United States agenda.
With specific reference to petroleum, please point out sacrifices accepted by American people in rationing of fuel oil and gasoline substantially restricting their military, industrial, and civilian consumption and sacrifices accepted by U.S. oil industry in allocation of equipment to the USSR. You should point out that oil picture in Rumania is only one aspect of a worldwide problem and that conclusion of treaties granting exclusive rights and of monopolistic corporate arrangements between Soviet and Rumanian Governments as well as arbitrary measures such as removing equipment, monopolizing petroleum supplies and delaying entry of American petroleum experts may force the United States to reconsider its policies which have hitherto been so favorable to Soviets with respect to supplying petroleum, technical data, equipment and products.
Please inform Harriman.
Repeated to Bucharest as 354 of July 16.
GREW
J[OHN] A. L[OFTUS]
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Monday, July 16:
During the forenoon the President worked on his mail and conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.
At 1100 Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Commander C. R. Thompson, RN (Naval Aide to the Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister’s daughter (Junior Commander Mary Churchill of the ATS) called on the President. After exchanging greetings, the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Cadogan conferred for some two hours.
A White House mail pouch arrived this afternoon. It had been sent from Washington by a JCS courier. The President signed this mail, which included legislative bills S134, S233, S234, S574, S672 and S956.
Generalissimo Stalin had not arrived at Potsdam, so the opening session of the conference scheduled for this afternoon was postponed to await his arrival.
The President took advantage of the delay in the opening of the conference and made an unscheduled visit to Berlin. He left the Little White House by motor car at 1540, accompanied by Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy…
The President and his party returned to the White House at 1735.
The three Foreign Secretaries held regular daily meetings to prepare the work of the conference. The first of these meetings was held this afternoon at Cecilienhof with Secretary Byrnes presiding. It was agreed, however, that the chairmanship of these planning meetings would be rotated.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings in their conference hall at Babelsberg.
After returning to the Little White House the President worked on his mail. He approved legislative bills S.J. Res. 31 and H.E. 3368.
2000: Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley and Mr. Davies were dinner guests of the President this evening. A band from the Second Armored Division played a concert on the lower White House grounds during and after dinner.
At 2200 Mr. Davies returned to the Little White House to deliver an urgent message to the President.
The Syonan Shimbun (July 17, 1945)
Newest Nippon fighter plane strikes terror into enemy
8 foe warplanes downed in single stroke
…
Throne informed of gallantry of Balikpapan, Ternate defenders
Foe continues to be fiercely attacked
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Potsdam confab
LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The opening of the “3-power” meeting at Potsdam was postponed until tomorrow, owing to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin’s delay in arriving at the scene of the talks, according to a United Press dispatch from Potsdam.
U.S. destroyer blown up after bombing
LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The United States destroyer Gamble was blown up and sunk outside Apra Harbour yesterday when it was decided that the damage she suffered from Japanese bobs during the battle for Iwojima was irreparable, according to a Guam dispatch.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 17, 1945)
In zwei Monaten 50.000 Nazis verhaftet
Drei Millionen werden Daktyloskopiert
…
L’Aube (July 17, 1945)
Dix semaines après la victoire –
La première conférence de paix s’ouvre à Potsdam
Devant l’ordre du jour très chargé on prévoit au mins 15 jours de débats
Berlin, 15 juillet – L’aérodrome où devaient avoir lieu les atterrissages était interdit au public depuis huit jours. C’est à 16 heures 30 que le président Truman arrivait de Bruxelles, avec une escorte de douze avions de chasse qui resplendissaient au soleil. Outre le secrétaire d’État, M. James Byrnes, le chef d’État était accompagné des généraux Marshall et Arnold, de l’amiral Leahy, de MM. Stimson, secrétaire à la Guerre, Harriman, ambassadeur américain à Moscou, et de l’ancien ambassadeur Joseph Davies. Le général Eisenhower descendit d’avion peu après.
Plus tard, arrivait à son tour M. Churchill, avec une autre escadrille d’avions. Le premier ministre, qui était en uniforme de colonel des hussards, fumait son traditionnel cigare et souriait à sa fille Mary qui l’accompagne.
Toute la région où se tiendra la conférence est sévèrement gardée.
De leur côté, MM. Eden, Attlee et leur suite ont gagné Potsdam.
Entretiens préliminaires et visite des ruines de Berlin
Berlin, 16 juillet – On croit savoir que M. Churchill et le président Truman se sont rencontrés à Potsdam aujourd’hui. Leur entrevue n’a eu aucun caractère officiel.
Les chefs d’états-majors sont également réunis pour des discussions préliminaires.
Il n’y a toujours pas de confirmation officielle du fait que le maréchal Staline est ou n’est pas à Berlin.
Le président Truman, visitant Berlin dans la journée, a vu notamment les ruines du Reichstag, celles de la porte de Brandebourg et « Unter den Linden », Son itinéraire était jalonné d’une très nombreuse garde et les civils allemands étaient maintenus à distance. M. Churchill a suivi exactement la même route que le président des États-Unis.
Selon la radio britannique, la conférence proprement dite ne commencerait que demain.
Les conseillers des « Grands » joueront aussi leur rôle
Or, depuis Yalta, changements sont intervenus
…
Le colonel Elisarov nous parle de l’occupation russe de Berlin
« Les Allemands ont trop rapidement oublié le sort de nos populations ukrainiennes décimées et déportées »
De notre correspondant de guerre Roger Baschet
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U.S. State Department (July 17, 1945)
800.796/7-1745: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State
London, July 17, 1945 — 10 a.m.
Secret
7182
With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams reporting various efforts on the part of the British to have steps taken which would lead to a fairly early agreement on the commercial aspects of air transport with the United States, Sir William Hildred informed the Civil Air Attaché that he hoped and expected to be able to go to the United States between now and August 2 (when the Civil Aviation Radio Conference opens) partly in connection with setting up of the Interim Council but primarily to discuss the Fifth Freedom with Pogue and Warner. The Department will observe that Sir William made this statement a day or two after the closing of the Empire Aviation conference and that the suggestion is now not that Pogue come to England but that Hildred go to the United States. He said frankly that he believed he would be more successful in obtaining Swinton’s approval for the trip, which he had been unable to do before, in view of the “progress in thinking” which the Empire Aviation Conference developed. He said he thought that the British Government would agree to an arrangement with the United States and with other countries which set forth the principle that (1) the more international air transportation the better for mankind, (2) all economic and other burdensome restrictions on civil aviation should be removed and (3) the principle of the Fifth Freedom in general was necessary to the successful development of air transportation. He felt that where it could be demonstrated that the unrestricted exercise of short-range pickup traffic by strong nations destroyed or seriously upset some regional airlines, the Interim Council should be able to rectify such obvious injustices. He thought that the major international airlines would recognize sufficiently the value to them of prosperous feeder line services along their routes so that they would be careful not to put them out of business. Sir William stressed the necessity of keeping the foregoing strictly confidential.
WINANT