Throne informed of gallantry of Balikpapan, Ternate defenders
Foe continues to be fiercely attacked
…
Potsdam confab
LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The opening of the “3-power” meeting at Potsdam was postponed until tomorrow, owing to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin’s delay in arriving at the scene of the talks, according to a United Press dispatch from Potsdam.
U.S. destroyer blown up after bombing
LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The United States destroyer Gamble was blown up and sunk outside Apra Harbour yesterday when it was decided that the damage she suffered from Japanese bobs during the battle for Iwojima was irreparable, according to a Guam dispatch.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 17, 1945)
In zwei Monaten 50.000 Nazis verhaftet
Drei Millionen werden Daktyloskopiert
…
L’Aube (July 17, 1945)
Dix semaines après la victoire –
La première conférence de paix s’ouvre à Potsdam
Devant l’ordre du jour très chargé on prévoit au mins 15 jours de débats
Berlin, 15 juillet – L’aérodrome où devaient avoir lieu les atterrissages était interdit au public depuis huit jours. C’est à 16 heures 30 que le président Truman arrivait de Bruxelles, avec une escorte de douze avions de chasse qui resplendissaient au soleil. Outre le secrétaire d’État, M. James Byrnes, le chef d’État était accompagné des généraux Marshall et Arnold, de l’amiral Leahy, de MM. Stimson, secrétaire à la Guerre, Harriman, ambassadeur américain à Moscou, et de l’ancien ambassadeur Joseph Davies. Le général Eisenhower descendit d’avion peu après.
Plus tard, arrivait à son tour M. Churchill, avec une autre escadrille d’avions. Le premier ministre, qui était en uniforme de colonel des hussards, fumait son traditionnel cigare et souriait à sa fille Mary qui l’accompagne.
Toute la région où se tiendra la conférence est sévèrement gardée.
De leur côté, MM. Eden, Attlee et leur suite ont gagné Potsdam.
Entretiens préliminaires et visite des ruines de Berlin
Berlin, 16 juillet – On croit savoir que M. Churchill et le président Truman se sont rencontrés à Potsdam aujourd’hui. Leur entrevue n’a eu aucun caractère officiel.
Les chefs d’états-majors sont également réunis pour des discussions préliminaires.
Il n’y a toujours pas de confirmation officielle du fait que le maréchal Staline est ou n’est pas à Berlin.
Le président Truman, visitant Berlin dans la journée, a vu notamment les ruines du Reichstag, celles de la porte de Brandebourg et « Unter den Linden », Son itinéraire était jalonné d’une très nombreuse garde et les civils allemands étaient maintenus à distance. M. Churchill a suivi exactement la même route que le président des États-Unis.
Selon la radio britannique, la conférence proprement dite ne commencerait que demain.
Les conseillers des « Grands » joueront aussi leur rôle
Or, depuis Yalta, changements sont intervenus
…
Le colonel Elisarov nous parle de l’occupation russe de Berlin
« Les Allemands ont trop rapidement oublié le sort de nos populations ukrainiennes décimées et déportées »
De notre correspondant de guerre Roger Baschet
…
U.S. State Department (July 17, 1945)
800.796/7-1745: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State
London, July 17, 1945 — 10 a.m.
Secret
7182
With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams reporting various efforts on the part of the British to have steps taken which would lead to a fairly early agreement on the commercial aspects of air transport with the United States, Sir William Hildred informed the Civil Air Attaché that he hoped and expected to be able to go to the United States between now and August 2 (when the Civil Aviation Radio Conference opens) partly in connection with setting up of the Interim Council but primarily to discuss the Fifth Freedom with Pogue and Warner. The Department will observe that Sir William made this statement a day or two after the closing of the Empire Aviation conference and that the suggestion is now not that Pogue come to England but that Hildred go to the United States. He said frankly that he believed he would be more successful in obtaining Swinton’s approval for the trip, which he had been unable to do before, in view of the “progress in thinking” which the Empire Aviation Conference developed. He said he thought that the British Government would agree to an arrangement with the United States and with other countries which set forth the principle that (1) the more international air transportation the better for mankind, (2) all economic and other burdensome restrictions on civil aviation should be removed and (3) the principle of the Fifth Freedom in general was necessary to the successful development of air transportation. He felt that where it could be demonstrated that the unrestricted exercise of short-range pickup traffic by strong nations destroyed or seriously upset some regional airlines, the Interim Council should be able to rectify such obvious injustices. He thought that the major international airlines would recognize sufficiently the value to them of prosperous feeder line services along their routes so that they would be careful not to put them out of business. Sir William stressed the necessity of keeping the foregoing strictly confidential.
WINANT
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745
The Secretary General of the British Delegation to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal
Berlin, July 17th, 1945
FO 11 (1)
Dear Cannon, It is very good news that you are here as the expert on South-east Europe. I am supposed to be the same for our delegation, and we must get together soon.
Meanwhile I enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador at Belgrade, which you may find interesting. The reference in the last paragraph is to the proposal, which your Embassy has I think also reported, that this meeting should issue a reminder that the Three Powers expect the Tito-Šubašić agreement to be fully carried out in the near future. I know that Mr. Eden is very anxious to get this through, and perhaps we could meet and discuss it. Could you give me a ring?
Yours very sincerely,
W G HAYTER
[Enclosure]
Telegram From His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade, 11 July
It was recently reported in Belgrade press that it was intended to hold in the near future a congress of national liberation fronts of various states in Yugoslav Federation. The aim of the congress would be to weld these national liberation fronts into a national front for the whole of Yugoslavia.
I heard this morning that Dr. Šubašić had been invited to become a member of Steering Committee of this congress and I took an opportunity to question him about it in the course of private conversation this afternoon.
He confirmed to me that he had received such an invitation. He had, however, not yet returned a reply. He intended to discuss the matter with M. Kardelj and to take the line that if he were being invited as an individual he could not accept. This would mean that he was merely being used as a figurehead. If however he were permitted first to call a meeting of the executive of Croat Peasant Party and secure a mandate to represent the party he would then be in a position to take a constructive part in the congress. A possible alternative might be that he should meet Dr. Maček, ascertain his views and seek a mandate of some kind from him.
The idea at the back of Dr. Šubašić’s mind in this is that a national front which would be a coalition of the parties each having a separate existence, would probably be the best solution of the country’s political problems; even though a dominant position in such a coalition was held by the Communist party.
As he sees the position the present régime have all physical power in their hands. A national front is therefore inevitable. The only alternative to it would be civil war. This would only be possible with foreign armed assistance which is out of the question. It is equally inevitable that a transitory role in political life of this country will be played for some time at any rate by the Communist party. The problem therefore is to prevent the national front from becoming a thinly disguised one-party régime. This could be done by creating it as a true coalition of the parties even though Communist party’s influence in the coalition was preponderant.
It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Šubašić terms for his participation in the congress are accepted by Marshal Tito. If so, it may be that some kind of a coalition will emerge from proposed congress. Kardelj assured him that after the congress complete freedom of the press and of political activity would be granted. The present idea is that the congress should precede meeting of broadened AVNOJ.
It is Dr. Šubašić’s impression that at the moment leaders of this regime are manoeuvring and waiting for the results of the Big Three meeting. He is therefore doubly anxious that some kind of a reminder about Tito-Šubašić agreement should issue from it.
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
JCS 196th Meeting
| Present | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Jamison | |||
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Lincoln | |||
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Esposito | |||
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain McDill | |||
| General Somervell | Captain Stroop | |||
| Lieutenant General Hull | Captain Oster | |||
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Peck | |||
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Dean | |||
| Rear Admiral Gardner | Colonel Stone | |||
| Major General Gross | Colonel Donnelly | |||
| Major General Norstad | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |||
| Brigadier General Cabell | ||||
| Secretariat | ||||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret
Military Aspects of Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (JCS 1275/5)
Admiral Leahy stated that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the memorandum which had been prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments, but suggested a change in the next to the last paragraph. He said that this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question. It was Admiral Leahy’s view that it was suitable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment upon the paper from a military point of view and he asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the military features of the proposed draft.
General Marshall stated that from a purely military point of view he considered that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be that nothing should be done prior to the termination of hostilities that would indicate the removal of the Emperor of Japan, since his continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside of Japan proper.
General Marshall proposed that paragraph 3 of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be used as the basis for the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President which would express the military implications and would include the proposed changes in the draft of the statement prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The memorandum to the President should also include the views he had previously expressed in regard to doing nothing to indicate that the Emperor might be removed from office upon unconditional surrender.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Secretary to prepare for consideration a suitable memorandum for the President in the light of the discussion.
Retention of U.S. Forces in Italy (JCS 1411/1)
Admiral Leahy asked what the President might do with the memorandum which it was proposed to send to him in regard to the retention of U.S. forces in Italy.
General Marshall said that since the Secretary of State had cautioned the President that this matter might be brought up by the Prime Minister, he believed that the President should give the memorandum to the Secretary of State.
General Marshall also said that the Prime Minister had approached him on this subject of the retention of U.S. forces in Italy in a conversation on the preceding night.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President in the enclosure to JCS 1411/1, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall.
British Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 889; JCS 1424)
Admiral Leahy explained the relationship of the two papers under consideration.
General Marshall referred to the comment of General MacArthur on the employment of Commonwealth forces in CORONET and furnished Admiral Leahy with a copy of the dispatch containing the comment referred to.
General Arnold, in connection with this paper, asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the small contribution of aircraft by the British would add little to the effectiveness of air operations in the Pacific area and would complicate the problems of operation and support.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1424 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 889/1)
Command and Control in the War Against Japan (CCS 890, JCS 1407/2 and JCS 1407/3)
General Marshall said that he desired to make clear the difference in viewpoint of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff in regard to command and control in the war against Japan. He said that our insistence on retaining the present command relationship in the Pacific area might induce the British to ask for the same authority over the Southeast Asia Theater. He said we should offer no objections to a British proposal of this nature.
Admiral Gardner pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control the coordination of effort in the U.S. and British areas particularly in regard to timing. In this connection, Admiral Leahy said we should not refuse to consider any suggestions by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to the problems of coordination and timing.
The proposed draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and minor amendments were made thereto.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1407/3 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 890/1)
U.S. Policy Concerning the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal (JCS 1418/1)
Admiral Leahy said that the President had not given any consideration to this matter as yet.
Admiral King read a digest of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, indicating the differences in points of view of the Army members and the Navy member.
Admiral Leahy said that the attitude of the State Department was to agree with the views of Admiral Willson to the effect that the Dardanelles should be a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia. He said that although there had not been much discussion of the Kiel Canal, the general view of the State Department was that it should be open to all nations.
Admiral Leahy asked if it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that free passage of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal would meet military requirements.
Admiral King pointed out that the Cattegat was in the same status as the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, since it was a waterway through both Danish and Swedish territorial waters. He thought therefore that the free passage of the Cattegat should be taken up at the same time.
Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the fortifying of the Cattegat by the Danes or the Swedes on the ground of national defense could not be prevented. He said that the difficulty in regard to the Dardanelles would be that Russia would want to fortify it.
Admiral King expressed the view that there was a good argument for demilitarizing the Dardanelles, Kiel Canal and the Cattegat, to which Admiral Leahy replied that there was also a good argument for demilitarizing the Panama Canal.
General Marshall proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Admiral Willson’s paper.
The draft of Admiral Willson’s paper was discussed and minor amendments made thereto.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the reply to the Secretary of State in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “B” of JCS 1418/1, as amended during discussion.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union
[Tokyo,] July 17, 1945 — 4:20 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent
910
The Domei news dispatches from your area on the 14th reported on your meetings with Lozovsky and Molotov respectively on the 10th and the 11th. With respect to the present important negotiations which are taking place, those concerned include only the members comprising the Supreme War Council: The Prime Minister, this minister, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Army, and the two Chiefs of Staff. In handling this matter, if this should ever leak out, the results would be most dire, I fear.
Therefore, on your side also this matter is limited to you, Mr. Ambassador, and I would like to ask you to observe particularly strict security measures in dispatching and receiving telegrams and the like so that we may have nothing to regret.
740.00119 PW/7-1745
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
[Washington,] July 17, 1945
Top secret
Subject: DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF STATE
| Participants: | Mr. Cordell Hull; |
| Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew |
I telephoned Mr. Hull this morning to tell him that a reply had been received from Mr. Byrnes to the message from Mr. Hull which I had cabled to the Secretary yesterday with respect to the proposed proclamation by the heads of state setting forth what unconditional surrender would mean to Japan. I read the text of Mr. Byrnes’ reply to Mr. Hull as follows: “I agree that the issuance of statement should be delayed and, when made, should not contain commitment to which you refer.” Mr. Hull said he was not sure what Mr. Byrnes meant by “commitment.” I replied that I would not have interpreted it as a commitment, but I thought what he had in mind was paragraph 12 of the proposed statement. Mr. Hull stated that he had thought that point over carefully – the political side – and he appreciated the other side as well. He thought, however, that we would have a very difficult time there, and that was the reason he suggested that we wait for other developments, to see if something wouldn’t happen. I replied that I understood his feeling in this matter and agreed that the issuance of the statement should be delayed.
Mr. Hull inquired whether I would send him a copy of the telegram I had sent to Mr. Byrnes transmitting Mr. Hull’s message, as well as a copy of Mr. Byrnes’ reply. I said that I would be glad to get copies of those messages off to him at once.
J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]
860c.01/7-945
The Acting Secretary of State to Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg
[Washington,] July 17, 1945
My Dear Senator Vandenberg: I have received your letter of July 9, 1945 in which you raise several questions concerning the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recently established in Warsaw, and the United States Government’s policy toward that Government. For greater convenience to you, I have considered individually, in the order of their appearance in your letter, your several statements and questions:
-
“There still seems to be no clear assurance that the Polish people will themselves have the final opportunity of untrammeled self-determination under this new Provisional Government which is imposed upon them by Britain, Russia and the United States, within Polish boundaries similarly dictated by these external powers.”
Since the rival Polish groups in Poland and in London were unable to settle their differences, it was decided at Yalta to set up a Commission, composed of Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to the USSR, and Mr. W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the USSR, which would be empowered to bring these groups together in order that members of the Polish provisional government then functioning in Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad could consult with a view to the reorganization of the provisional government on a broader democratic basis, and the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could establish, diplomatic relations. Arrangements were finally made to bring the three groups of Poles together and they met in Moscow between June 17 and June 21 to discuss the composition of the new government. On June 21 the leaders informed the Commission established by the Crimea Conference that complete accord had been reached by them regarding the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. After studying the report submitted by the Polish leaders, the three Commissioners concluded that the Polish groups represented had set up a government in conformity with the Crimea decisions. The Commission’s decision was accepted by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Thus, since this Government was set up by the Poles themselves, the new Government was not imposed upon the Polish people by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
-
“I wish to inquire whether our responsibility, under the Yalta Agreement, is presumed to have been discharged by the creation of this new Provisional Government or whether the three-power obligation continues until the promised ‘free elections’ have actually occurred?”
The formation of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity constituted a positive step in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions. The decisions will be further implemented when the new Government carries out its pledge to hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In this connection the Crimea decisions also provide that the Ambassadors in Poland of the three powers shall keep their respective Governments informed about the situation in Poland. It is clear, therefore, that the creation of the new Government does not alone discharge us from the responsibilities we assumed at Yalta.
-
“When the new Provisional Government begins to operate, will the United States be permitted to send full diplomatic and consular representatives into Poland?”
Mr. Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in his message to President Truman requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations with his Government stated:
I have the honor in the name of the Provisional Government of National Unity to approach the Government of the United States of America with a request for the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations and for the exchange of representatives with the rank of Ambassador.
On the basis of the assurances given by the United States at the Crimea Conference, President Truman established diplomatic relations with the new Government and informed the Prime Minister that he had chosen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Poland the Honorable Arthur Bliss Lane. Ambassador Lane and initial members of his staff are making arrangements to proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible and, thus in accordance with the Crimea decisions, the Ambassador will be in a position to keep this Government “informed about the situation in Poland.”
-
“Will the American Press be permitted to send its uncensored correspondents into Poland?”
In the discussions relative to the recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the United States Government made it clear that it expected American correspondents to be permitted to enter Poland in order that the American public may be informed of the situation in that area. You may be assured that the United States Government will use its full influence to attain this desired end.
In addition to these conversations regarding the entry of American correspondents into Poland, the Department of State has for some time been pressing the Soviet authorities for authorization for American correspondents to enter eastern and southeastern Europe in order to be in a position to report accurately to the American public on developments there. The Department will continue its efforts to obtain permission for American correspondents to operate freely in all areas.
-
“Will the United States participate, on an equality with the other powers, under their Yalta obligation, in a general supervision of these ‘free elections’ to make certain they are ‘free’ in fact as well as name?”
President Truman in his message to the Polish Prime Minister stated that “I am pleased to note that Your Excellency’s Government has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question thereby confirming the intention of Your Excellency’s Government to proceed with the holding of elections in Poland in conformity with the provisions of the Crimea decisions.” This undertaking with regard to the holding of free and unfettered elections was one of the vital points considered in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between this Government and the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
As indicated above, the American Ambassador and his staff will make reports on the situation in Poland and on the basis of these reports this Government will give consideration to the question of whether supervision of elections would be advisable. If it is decided to supervise the elections, the United States Government will, of course, insist upon its right to participate on an equal basis with the other powers.
In conclusion, I wish to point out that American policy with regard to Poland continues to be based on the decisions of the Crimea Conference. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman have gone on record that the United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state.
I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you, since I believe it is of vital importance that the members of the Congress be afforded a clear understanding of questions relating to our foreign relations and policy. Under such conditions the State Department can best carry out the foreign policy of the United States as determined by the President and the Congress.
Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH C. GREW
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/1
Control and command in the war against Japan
With reference to the proposed boundaries for the extension of command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff have no objection from the military viewpoint to the inclusion of Indo-China south of latitude 15 degrees N. in the new area. This, however, is a matter primarily for decision by the Generalissimo and a shift does not appear practicable until such time as his agreement is obtained. Until that time it appears operations can go forward on the present basis.
As to the boundaries of the Australian command, this is a matter on which the solution worked out between the British and Australian Chiefs of Staff should be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
On the matter of the northern boundary of the area, the United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the necessity for retaining control by the United States of the Admiralty Islands for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of CCS 852/1.
The proposal to extend the British sphere of responsibility east of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area does not appear necessary or desirable until United States activities are cleared from the area, at which time the transfer should be effected. Aside from United States military resources in the area which must continue to be rolled up under United States military control, there are no military objectives or problems in the area except Ocean and Nauru Islands. At such time as British forces are prepared to recapture these islands, the United States will offer no objection.
The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and commanders from the responsibility for containing and mopping up the Japanese forces in the area in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have proposed 15 August as the date of turnover. Their objective would not be achieved by delaying the turnover until such time as Admiral Mountbatten is in position to advance through the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, it does not appear that retention of the area under United States responsibility until the end of the year will result in any activity additional to that which would occur if the area passed to Admiral Mountbatten on 15 August. The forces employed in the area are already primarily Australian. It is possible that if the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to take over the area shortly, the Australian Chiefs of Staff might be able to do so with subsequent adjustment with Admiral Mountbatten within the British Empire.
In summary, with regard to the matter of the Southeast Asia Command and the Southwest Pacific Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate action should be to pass to the British Chiefs of Staff as of 15 August or very shortly thereafter the area with boundaries as outlined in CCS 852/1.
Concerning the matter of higher strategic control in the war against Japan, the thought of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that the role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the European war cannot appropriately be applied to the Pacific war. In the Pacific war there exist two clearly delineated areas that, commanded by Admiral Mountbatten with the extensions proposed in the foregoing paragraphs, constitute an area of British Empire responsibility associated with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and perhaps eventually the French. The initial operational interest of the United States in this area has now greatly decreased. The Pacific area is devoted to the main effort, is organized under a command-and-control set-up peculiar to the United States, and has forces and resources overwhelmingly United States unless the Chinese, and possibly Russian, contribution is considered. Any change in the present control system which would involve added complications and more cumbersome procedures is unacceptable.
It appears that the interest of the United States in Admiral Mount-batten’s expanded theater now includes little more than sufficient review of operations to determine their impact on Allied operations and from the standpoint of lend-lease requirements, that they are adjusted to the main effort, and that they do not have an unduly adverse effect on the supply line to China through India and Burma. In line with this thought the British Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider some readjustment of the status of the Southeast Asia Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff, perhaps along the line of the present status of the Pacific Theater.
In summary, the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that increased participation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theater is impracticable.
Truman-Stalin meeting, noon
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | ||||
| President Truman | Generalissimo Stalin | ||||
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Commissar Molotov | ||||
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov | ||||
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Mr. Vyshinsky |
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745
Bohlen notes
12. July 17.
M. S. late.
Truman—[blank]
S—Chinese—delayed fly—no doctors
Tr: glad to—looking forw—
S—Personal relationship
Truman no difficulty in agreeing—
S—added—questions
T—no.
M—reads—some already on agenda—i e 1 division on German fleet. 2 Reparations. 3 Polish Question—continued of continued—Art—London Govt—western frontiers of Poland—(on list)
S—Yalta—did not decide frontiers of7
M—trusteeships for USSR.
S—no question of changing regime of trusteeship—settled S.F.—but maybe stupid—division of Italian colonies—other nationals—roughly [one word illegible]
M—relations with Axis satellite—
T—on ours
M—Spain Franco regime
T—ready—
B—trusteeship—other than Italian
M—yes—
S—Italian & other colonies.
T—what time
S—5 proposed—M & Eden
B—I know habits of rise late—getting—opportunity
T 5 today—4—after that
S—I have changed my habits since
B—[blank]
T—Gen Marshall like your Chiefs—they ready to discuss—Antonov—Air Marshal.
T—Chiefs of staff—no.
S—ours in Berlin could not attend. Re Franco—I should like to explain—F. regime not result of internal conditions of Spain—imposed on Spain—by Ger—Italian—thus a danger to Uni. Nations This regime harmful—by giving shelter to different fascist remnants—we thought it proper to break off with present regime & give change
T—I hold no brief for Franco study
S—right.
T—I would like—certain matters—first to US—take into consider—orderly—way—but—reasons
T—pleasure to meet for am—your present—welfare Soviet reps—& U J I am here to—be yr friend—deal directly yes—or no—no diplomat
S—good—help—work—USSR—always go along with US.
T—Byrnes.
B—[blank]
T—friends—all subject differences settle—frankly
S—good of course difference—but.
T Churchill—called—
S [one word illegible]
B—[blank]
S—I think so—Labor—surprise
T—expressed same 2 to 1 80 majority
S—yes—people won’t throw out W Ch—self Preservation
T—yes—1944 R
S—clever—Eng less clear Jap war—for—Russians & Amer—do their duty Eng think war mainly
T—P.M offered—
S—peculiar—mentality—bombed by Ger—not Japan war over for them—these feelings may work vs P.M. US people—give power to finish task—can Brit ask that—they believe war over—little interest in war vs Japan—may be
T—we are—not in dire straits as Eng was in re Germany—
S—we ready Aug mid of Aug needs agreement with China [one word illegible]
T—I think that
S—O M agreed—long negations—R. R. Dairen. P.A —differences. Soong—not hopeful by cable—I noticed S understood us than Chungking
T—yes—I had long talk He understands
S—he prepared to return to Chungking—& persuade return end of July—He asked a statement assurance re M—part of China—sovereignty—gave that assurance
S—asked assurances deal only with central govt & not with any nucleus. one Army—he had in mind Com army we shall give full assurances
T—very happy to hear that—settle matter
S—National 1 govt 1 army Treaty agreed—not. Ch 30 in place of 20 as Czech. agree—non-interference Ch internal affairs Soong—Sinkiang—Conflict—Ch author. & local pop—no assistance to rebels—[one word illegible]—special provisions—vs. interference could not do it help—suggested concession—Ch [one word and figure illegible] %—rest non Chinese local native schools set up. Soong agreed—won’t be able to calm by stick—improvements—Soong agreed.
T Soong—reasonable.
B—pts of difference—failure on—misunderstanding.
S—in Yalta agreement said—re RR. joint preeminent interests. be safeguard—same in Dairen & P.A. The Chinese don’t recognize preeminent int & get around it—what is our preeminent interests—no profits—equally divided—altho built by Russian money—no guards as Japs had—Chinese protect RR themselves—old treaty 80 yrs—back to China we suggest 30 yrs—agreed satisfaction—but what preem int lie—like to 1 maj vote on board of RR—Russian director they want Chinese director—& no maj—Dairen Chinese administration
B—jt administration
S—yes—but 1 Chinese maj—we propose—City Council—jt—board. Russian part
T—effect on our right—
S—free port—open—[one word illegible].
T—open door
S—not all smooth with Chinese—that is why he went home
S—mid August—as agreed at Yalta—we keep word
| M | } | keep words |
|---|---|---|
| T |
B—in accordance—with Yalta—OK—if in excess difficult
S—our wishes—more liberal than Yalta—restoration of Russian rights—entitled to station troops—80 yrs exclusively Russian—we have formal right—not done so we do not wish to add or deceive Chungking don’t understand horse trading—slow. try to wangle every thing—big pictures—very
T—big—Chin
| B— | } | main interest free port |
|---|---|---|
| T— |
B—when here from Soong
S—end July—to finish negotiation—Chinese 22 years no ties—no repre—can’t lose what one does not have.