America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

6669 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

The Secretary General of the British Delegation to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal

Berlin, July 17th, 1945
FO 11 (1)

Dear Cannon, It is very good news that you are here as the expert on South-east Europe. I am supposed to be the same for our delegation, and we must get together soon.

Meanwhile I enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador at Belgrade, which you may find interesting. The reference in the last paragraph is to the proposal, which your Embassy has I think also reported, that this meeting should issue a reminder that the Three Powers expect the Tito-Šubašić agreement to be fully carried out in the near future. I know that Mr. Eden is very anxious to get this through, and perhaps we could meet and discuss it. Could you give me a ring?

Yours very sincerely,
W G HAYTER

[Enclosure]

Telegram From His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade, 11 July

It was recently reported in Belgrade press that it was intended to hold in the near future a congress of national liberation fronts of various states in Yugoslav Federation. The aim of the congress would be to weld these national liberation fronts into a national front for the whole of Yugoslavia.

I heard this morning that Dr. Šubašić had been invited to become a member of Steering Committee of this congress and I took an opportunity to question him about it in the course of private conversation this afternoon.

He confirmed to me that he had received such an invitation. He had, however, not yet returned a reply. He intended to discuss the matter with M. Kardelj and to take the line that if he were being invited as an individual he could not accept. This would mean that he was merely being used as a figurehead. If however he were permitted first to call a meeting of the executive of Croat Peasant Party and secure a mandate to represent the party he would then be in a position to take a constructive part in the congress. A possible alternative might be that he should meet Dr. Maček, ascertain his views and seek a mandate of some kind from him.

The idea at the back of Dr. Šubašić’s mind in this is that a national front which would be a coalition of the parties each having a separate existence, would probably be the best solution of the country’s political problems; even though a dominant position in such a coalition was held by the Communist party.

As he sees the position the present régime have all physical power in their hands. A national front is therefore inevitable. The only alternative to it would be civil war. This would only be possible with foreign armed assistance which is out of the question. It is equally inevitable that a transitory role in political life of this country will be played for some time at any rate by the Communist party. The problem therefore is to prevent the national front from becoming a thinly disguised one-party régime. This could be done by creating it as a true coalition of the parties even though Communist party’s influence in the coalition was preponderant.

It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Šubašić terms for his participation in the congress are accepted by Marshal Tito. If so, it may be that some kind of a coalition will emerge from proposed congress. Kardelj assured him that after the congress complete freedom of the press and of political activity would be granted. The present idea is that the congress should precede meeting of broadened AVNOJ.

It is Dr. Šubašić’s impression that at the moment leaders of this regime are manoeuvring and waiting for the results of the Big Three meeting. He is therefore doubly anxious that some kind of a reminder about Tito-Šubašić agreement should issue from it.

6670

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

JCS 196th Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Stone
Major General Gross Colonel Donnelly
Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

Military Aspects of Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (JCS 1275/5)

Admiral Leahy stated that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the memorandum which had been prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments, but suggested a change in the next to the last paragraph. He said that this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question. It was Admiral Leahy’s view that it was suitable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment upon the paper from a military point of view and he asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the military features of the proposed draft.

General Marshall stated that from a purely military point of view he considered that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be that nothing should be done prior to the termination of hostilities that would indicate the removal of the Emperor of Japan, since his continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside of Japan proper.

General Marshall proposed that paragraph 3 of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be used as the basis for the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President which would express the military implications and would include the proposed changes in the draft of the statement prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The memorandum to the President should also include the views he had previously expressed in regard to doing nothing to indicate that the Emperor might be removed from office upon unconditional surrender.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Secretary to prepare for consideration a suitable memorandum for the President in the light of the discussion.

Retention of U.S. Forces in Italy (JCS 1411/1)

Admiral Leahy asked what the President might do with the memorandum which it was proposed to send to him in regard to the retention of U.S. forces in Italy.

General Marshall said that since the Secretary of State had cautioned the President that this matter might be brought up by the Prime Minister, he believed that the President should give the memorandum to the Secretary of State.

General Marshall also said that the Prime Minister had approached him on this subject of the retention of U.S. forces in Italy in a conversation on the preceding night.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President in the enclosure to JCS 1411/1, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall.

British Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 889; JCS 1424)

Admiral Leahy explained the relationship of the two papers under consideration.

General Marshall referred to the comment of General MacArthur on the employment of Commonwealth forces in CORONET and furnished Admiral Leahy with a copy of the dispatch containing the comment referred to.

General Arnold, in connection with this paper, asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the small contribution of aircraft by the British would add little to the effectiveness of air operations in the Pacific area and would complicate the problems of operation and support.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1424 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 889/1)

Command and Control in the War Against Japan (CCS 890, JCS 1407/2 and JCS 1407/3)

General Marshall said that he desired to make clear the difference in viewpoint of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff in regard to command and control in the war against Japan. He said that our insistence on retaining the present command relationship in the Pacific area might induce the British to ask for the same authority over the Southeast Asia Theater. He said we should offer no objections to a British proposal of this nature.

Admiral Gardner pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control the coordination of effort in the U.S. and British areas particularly in regard to timing. In this connection, Admiral Leahy said we should not refuse to consider any suggestions by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to the problems of coordination and timing.

The proposed draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and minor amendments were made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1407/3 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 890/1)

U.S. Policy Concerning the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal (JCS 1418/1)

Admiral Leahy said that the President had not given any consideration to this matter as yet.

Admiral King read a digest of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, indicating the differences in points of view of the Army members and the Navy member.

Admiral Leahy said that the attitude of the State Department was to agree with the views of Admiral Willson to the effect that the Dardanelles should be a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia. He said that although there had not been much discussion of the Kiel Canal, the general view of the State Department was that it should be open to all nations.

Admiral Leahy asked if it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that free passage of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal would meet military requirements.

Admiral King pointed out that the Cattegat was in the same status as the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, since it was a waterway through both Danish and Swedish territorial waters. He thought therefore that the free passage of the Cattegat should be taken up at the same time.

Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the fortifying of the Cattegat by the Danes or the Swedes on the ground of national defense could not be prevented. He said that the difficulty in regard to the Dardanelles would be that Russia would want to fortify it.

Admiral King expressed the view that there was a good argument for demilitarizing the Dardanelles, Kiel Canal and the Cattegat, to which Admiral Leahy replied that there was also a good argument for demilitarizing the Panama Canal.

General Marshall proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Admiral Willson’s paper.

The draft of Admiral Willson’s paper was discussed and minor amendments made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the reply to the Secretary of State in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “B” of JCS 1418/1, as amended during discussion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6671 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union

[Tokyo,] July 17, 1945 — 4:20 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret        
urgent

910

The Domei news dispatches from your area on the 14th reported on your meetings with Lozovsky and Molotov respectively on the 10th and the 11th. With respect to the present important negotiations which are taking place, those concerned include only the members comprising the Supreme War Council: The Prime Minister, this minister, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Army, and the two Chiefs of Staff. In handling this matter, if this should ever leak out, the results would be most dire, I fear.

Therefore, on your side also this matter is limited to you, Mr. Ambassador, and I would like to ask you to observe particularly strict security measures in dispatching and receiving telegrams and the like so that we may have nothing to regret.

6672 
740.00119 PW/7-1745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 17, 1945
Top secret

Subject: DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF STATE
Participants: Mr. Cordell Hull;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

I telephoned Mr. Hull this morning to tell him that a reply had been received from Mr. Byrnes to the message from Mr. Hull which I had cabled to the Secretary yesterday with respect to the proposed proclamation by the heads of state setting forth what unconditional surrender would mean to Japan. I read the text of Mr. Byrnes’ reply to Mr. Hull as follows: “I agree that the issuance of statement should be delayed and, when made, should not contain commitment to which you refer.” Mr. Hull said he was not sure what Mr. Byrnes meant by “commitment.” I replied that I would not have interpreted it as a commitment, but I thought what he had in mind was paragraph 12 of the proposed statement. Mr. Hull stated that he had thought that point over carefully – the political side – and he appreciated the other side as well. He thought, however, that we would have a very difficult time there, and that was the reason he suggested that we wait for other developments, to see if something wouldn’t happen. I replied that I understood his feeling in this matter and agreed that the issuance of the statement should be delayed.

Mr. Hull inquired whether I would send him a copy of the telegram I had sent to Mr. Byrnes transmitting Mr. Hull’s message, as well as a copy of Mr. Byrnes’ reply. I said that I would be glad to get copies of those messages off to him at once.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

6673 
860c.01/7-945

The Acting Secretary of State to Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg

[Washington,] July 17, 1945

My Dear Senator Vandenberg: I have received your letter of July 9, 1945 in which you raise several questions concerning the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recently established in Warsaw, and the United States Government’s policy toward that Government. For greater convenience to you, I have considered individually, in the order of their appearance in your letter, your several statements and questions:

  1. “There still seems to be no clear assurance that the Polish people will themselves have the final opportunity of untrammeled self-determination under this new Provisional Government which is imposed upon them by Britain, Russia and the United States, within Polish boundaries similarly dictated by these external powers.”

    Since the rival Polish groups in Poland and in London were unable to settle their differences, it was decided at Yalta to set up a Commission, composed of Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to the USSR, and Mr. W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the USSR, which would be empowered to bring these groups together in order that members of the Polish provisional government then functioning in Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad could consult with a view to the reorganization of the provisional government on a broader democratic basis, and the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could establish, diplomatic relations. Arrangements were finally made to bring the three groups of Poles together and they met in Moscow between June 17 and June 21 to discuss the composition of the new government. On June 21 the leaders informed the Commission established by the Crimea Conference that complete accord had been reached by them regarding the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. After studying the report submitted by the Polish leaders, the three Commissioners concluded that the Polish groups represented had set up a government in conformity with the Crimea decisions. The Commission’s decision was accepted by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

    Thus, since this Government was set up by the Poles themselves, the new Government was not imposed upon the Polish people by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

  2. “I wish to inquire whether our responsibility, under the Yalta Agreement, is presumed to have been discharged by the creation of this new Provisional Government or whether the three-power obligation continues until the promised ‘free elections’ have actually occurred?”

    The formation of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity constituted a positive step in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions. The decisions will be further implemented when the new Government carries out its pledge to hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In this connection the Crimea decisions also provide that the Ambassadors in Poland of the three powers shall keep their respective Governments informed about the situation in Poland. It is clear, therefore, that the creation of the new Government does not alone discharge us from the responsibilities we assumed at Yalta.

  3. “When the new Provisional Government begins to operate, will the United States be permitted to send full diplomatic and consular representatives into Poland?”

    Mr. Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in his message to President Truman requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations with his Government stated:

    I have the honor in the name of the Provisional Government of National Unity to approach the Government of the United States of America with a request for the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations and for the exchange of representatives with the rank of Ambassador.

    On the basis of the assurances given by the United States at the Crimea Conference, President Truman established diplomatic relations with the new Government and informed the Prime Minister that he had chosen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Poland the Honorable Arthur Bliss Lane. Ambassador Lane and initial members of his staff are making arrangements to proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible and, thus in accordance with the Crimea decisions, the Ambassador will be in a position to keep this Government “informed about the situation in Poland.”

  4. “Will the American Press be permitted to send its uncensored correspondents into Poland?”

    In the discussions relative to the recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the United States Government made it clear that it expected American correspondents to be permitted to enter Poland in order that the American public may be informed of the situation in that area. You may be assured that the United States Government will use its full influence to attain this desired end.

    In addition to these conversations regarding the entry of American correspondents into Poland, the Department of State has for some time been pressing the Soviet authorities for authorization for American correspondents to enter eastern and southeastern Europe in order to be in a position to report accurately to the American public on developments there. The Department will continue its efforts to obtain permission for American correspondents to operate freely in all areas.

  5. “Will the United States participate, on an equality with the other powers, under their Yalta obligation, in a general supervision of these ‘free elections’ to make certain they are ‘free’ in fact as well as name?”

    President Truman in his message to the Polish Prime Minister stated that “I am pleased to note that Your Excellency’s Government has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question thereby confirming the intention of Your Excellency’s Government to proceed with the holding of elections in Poland in conformity with the provisions of the Crimea decisions.” This undertaking with regard to the holding of free and unfettered elections was one of the vital points considered in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between this Government and the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

    As indicated above, the American Ambassador and his staff will make reports on the situation in Poland and on the basis of these reports this Government will give consideration to the question of whether supervision of elections would be advisable. If it is decided to supervise the elections, the United States Government will, of course, insist upon its right to participate on an equal basis with the other powers.

    In conclusion, I wish to point out that American policy with regard to Poland continues to be based on the decisions of the Crimea Conference. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman have gone on record that the United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state.

    I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you, since I believe it is of vital importance that the members of the Congress be afforded a clear understanding of questions relating to our foreign relations and policy. Under such conditions the State Department can best carry out the foreign policy of the United States as determined by the President and the Congress.

Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH C. GREW

6674

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/1

Control and command in the war against Japan

With reference to the proposed boundaries for the extension of command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff have no objection from the military viewpoint to the inclusion of Indo-China south of latitude 15 degrees N. in the new area. This, however, is a matter primarily for decision by the Generalissimo and a shift does not appear practicable until such time as his agreement is obtained. Until that time it appears operations can go forward on the present basis.

As to the boundaries of the Australian command, this is a matter on which the solution worked out between the British and Australian Chiefs of Staff should be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

On the matter of the northern boundary of the area, the United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the necessity for retaining control by the United States of the Admiralty Islands for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of CCS 852/1.

The proposal to extend the British sphere of responsibility east of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area does not appear necessary or desirable until United States activities are cleared from the area, at which time the transfer should be effected. Aside from United States military resources in the area which must continue to be rolled up under United States military control, there are no military objectives or problems in the area except Ocean and Nauru Islands. At such time as British forces are prepared to recapture these islands, the United States will offer no objection.

The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and commanders from the responsibility for containing and mopping up the Japanese forces in the area in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have proposed 15 August as the date of turnover. Their objective would not be achieved by delaying the turnover until such time as Admiral Mountbatten is in position to advance through the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, it does not appear that retention of the area under United States responsibility until the end of the year will result in any activity additional to that which would occur if the area passed to Admiral Mountbatten on 15 August. The forces employed in the area are already primarily Australian. It is possible that if the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to take over the area shortly, the Australian Chiefs of Staff might be able to do so with subsequent adjustment with Admiral Mountbatten within the British Empire.

In summary, with regard to the matter of the Southeast Asia Command and the Southwest Pacific Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate action should be to pass to the British Chiefs of Staff as of 15 August or very shortly thereafter the area with boundaries as outlined in CCS 852/1.

Concerning the matter of higher strategic control in the war against Japan, the thought of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that the role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the European war cannot appropriately be applied to the Pacific war. In the Pacific war there exist two clearly delineated areas that, commanded by Admiral Mountbatten with the extensions proposed in the foregoing paragraphs, constitute an area of British Empire responsibility associated with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and perhaps eventually the French. The initial operational interest of the United States in this area has now greatly decreased. The Pacific area is devoted to the main effort, is organized under a command-and-control set-up peculiar to the United States, and has forces and resources overwhelmingly United States unless the Chinese, and possibly Russian, contribution is considered. Any change in the present control system which would involve added complications and more cumbersome procedures is unacceptable.

It appears that the interest of the United States in Admiral Mount-batten’s expanded theater now includes little more than sufficient review of operations to determine their impact on Allied operations and from the standpoint of lend-lease requirements, that they are adjusted to the main effort, and that they do not have an unduly adverse effect on the supply line to China through India and Burma. In line with this thought the British Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider some readjustment of the status of the Southeast Asia Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff, perhaps along the line of the present status of the Pacific Theater.

In summary, the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that increased participation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theater is impracticable.

6675

Truman-Stalin meeting, noon

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Vyshinsky 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

Bohlen notes

12. July 17.

M. S. late.

Truman—[blank]

S—Chinese—delayed fly—no doctors

Tr: glad to—looking forw—

S—Personal relationship

Truman no difficulty in agreeing—

S—added—questions

T—no.

M—reads—some already on agenda—i e 1 division on German fleet. 2 Reparations. 3 Polish Question—continued of continued—Art—London Govt—western frontiers of Poland—(on list)

S—Yalta—did not decide frontiers of7

M—trusteeships for USSR.

S—no question of changing regime of trusteeship—settled S.F.—but maybe stupid—division of Italian colonies—other nationals—roughly [one word illegible]

M—relations with Axis satellite—

T—on ours

M—Spain Franco regime

T—ready—

B—trusteeship—other than Italian

M—yes—

S—Italian & other colonies.

T—what time

S—5 proposed—M & Eden

B—I know habits of rise late—getting—opportunity

T 5 today—4—after that

S—I have changed my habits since

B—[blank]

T—Gen Marshall like your Chiefs—they ready to discuss—Antonov—Air Marshal.

T—Chiefs of staff—no.

S—ours in Berlin could not attend. Re Franco—I should like to explain—F. regime not result of internal conditions of Spain—imposed on Spain—by Ger—Italian—thus a danger to Uni. Nations This regime harmful—by giving shelter to different fascist remnants—we thought it proper to break off with present regime & give change

T—I hold no brief for Franco study

S—right.

T—I would like—certain matters—first to US—take into consider—orderly—way—but—reasons

T—pleasure to meet for am—your present—welfare Soviet reps—& U J I am here to—be yr friend—deal directly yes—or no—no diplomat

S—good—help—work—USSR—always go along with US.

T—Byrnes.

B—[blank]

T—friends—all subject differences settle—frankly

S—good of course difference—but.

T Churchill—called—

S [one word illegible]

B—[blank]

S—I think so—Labor—surprise

T—expressed same 2 to 1 80 majority

S—yes—people won’t throw out W Ch—self Preservation

T—yes—1944 R

S—clever—Eng less clear Jap war—for—Russians & Amer—do their duty Eng think war mainly

T—P.M offered—

S—peculiar—mentality—bombed by Ger—not Japan war over for them—these feelings may work vs P.M. US people—give power to finish task—can Brit ask that—they believe war over—little interest in war vs Japan—may be

T—we are—not in dire straits as Eng was in re Germany—

S—we ready Aug mid of Aug needs agreement with China [one word illegible]

T—I think that

S—O M agreed—long negations—R. R. Dairen. P.A —differences. Soong—not hopeful by cable—I noticed S understood us than Chungking

T—yes—I had long talk He understands

S—he prepared to return to Chungking—& persuade return end of July—He asked a statement assurance re M—part of China—sovereignty—gave that assurance

S—asked assurances deal only with central govt & not with any nucleus. one Army—he had in mind Com army we shall give full assurances

T—very happy to hear that—settle matter

S—National 1 govt 1 army Treaty agreed—not. Ch 30 in place of 20 as Czech. agree—non-interference Ch internal affairs Soong—Sinkiang—Conflict—Ch author. & local pop—no assistance to rebels—[one word illegible]—special provisions—vs. interference could not do it help—suggested concession—Ch [one word and figure illegible] %—rest non Chinese local native schools set up. Soong agreed—won’t be able to calm by stick—improvements—Soong agreed.

T Soong—reasonable.

B—pts of difference—failure on—misunderstanding.

S—in Yalta agreement said—re RR. joint preeminent interests. be safeguard—same in Dairen & P.A. The Chinese don’t recognize preeminent int & get around it—what is our preeminent interests—no profits—equally divided—altho built by Russian money—no guards as Japs had—Chinese protect RR themselves—old treaty 80 yrs—back to China we suggest 30 yrs—agreed satisfaction—but what preem int lie—like to 1 maj vote on board of RR—Russian director they want Chinese director—& no maj—Dairen Chinese administration

B—jt administration

S—yes—but 1 Chinese maj—we propose—City Council—jt—board. Russian part

T—effect on our right—

S—free port—open—[one word illegible].

T—open door

S—not all smooth with Chinese—that is why he went home

S—mid August—as agreed at Yalta—we keep word

M } keep words
T

B—in accordance—with Yalta—OK—if in excess difficult

S—our wishes—more liberal than Yalta—restoration of Russian rights—entitled to station troops—80 yrs exclusively Russian—we have formal right—not done so we do not wish to add or deceive Chungking don’t understand horse trading—slow. try to wangle every thing—big pictures—very

T—big—Chin

B— } main interest free port
T—

B—when here from Soong

S—end July—to finish negotiation—Chinese 22 years no ties—no repre—can’t lose what one does not have.

6676 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 17, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for Mr. Dunn

Molotov this morning outlined to the President and the Secretary the following additional points which the Soviet Government intends to place on the Agenda:

  1. Question of Tangier.

  2. The Levant.

  3. The Disposition of the Captured German Naval and Merchant Vessels.

  4. Franco Regime.
    On this point Stalin says that in the view of the Soviet Government the Franco Government was not native to Spain but had been imposed by the Axis Government[s] and as such was harmful to the United Nations. Some measure should be devised whereby the Franco Regime would be eliminated.

  5. Polish Question.
    (a) The continued existence of the London Government.
    (b) The western frontiers of Poland.

  6. Reparations.

  7. Trusteeship for the USSR.
    Stalin said that this is not a question of changing the regime of trusteeship which was set up at San Francisco but the question of the division under trusteeship of Italian colonies and perhaps certain mandated areas.

  8. Relationship with the Former Axis Satellite States.

The Secretary would like to have you study these questions in preparation for the Soviet presentation.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

6677

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

[Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945
Secret
Draft

Memorandum for the Secretary

Subject: APPROVAL OF THE TWO AGREEMENTS ON AUSTRIA

The four-Power Agreement on control machinery in Austria was approved by the European Advisory Commission on July 4 and transmitted to the four governments for their consideration and approval. Similarly the agreement on the zones of occupation in Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna was approved by European Advisory Commission on July 9. (The texts of the two agreements are attached).

On July 12 the British representative on the European Advisory Commission stated that his Government had approved both agreements. The French representative stated that his Government approved the agreement of July 4 and would shortly approve the agreement of July 9.

Since April the American Government has been pressing for the conclusion of these two agreements. The Zones Agreement comes into force as soon as it is approved by the four Governments and the control machinery agreements comes into force at the same time, provided it too has been approved by the four governments.

The two agreements conform in every respect to the instructions which were despatched to Ambassador Winant in the course of the negotiations. In view of our interest in expediting the establishment of Allied control and occupation in Austria I suggest that you will wish to approve the attached telegram instructing Ambassador Winant to inform the representatives of the other three Governments of American approval of the two agreements. I have consulted Mr. McCloy who concurs in this recommendation on behalf of the War Department.

6678

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following statement of policy in regard to the disposition and distribution of captured German merchant shipping.

a. In view of the urgent requirement for personnel shipping in the further prosecution of the war, captured or surrendered enemy vessels capable of being used to transport troops should be made available as quickly as possible for the U.S. military use.

b. All captured or surrendered German vessels should be divided among the Allied Nations, first as to immediate use and later as to final disposition, except for such coastwise and inland water craft as are determined to be essential for the minimum German economy. No ocean-going vessels (i.e., ships over 4,000 deadweight tons) designed for foreign trade should be left in the hands of the Germans.

c. All captured and surrendered German and other enemy ships should be placed in a common pool. In this connection, every effort should be made to persuade the Russians to enter the United Maritime Authority agreement covering the handling of the Allied Nations pool of ships.

d. In the final disposition all ex-German personnel shipping should be divided among the Allied Nations.

Further details in regard to the U.S. needs for personnel shipping were given in a memorandum to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 7 July 1945.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

740.00119 Control (Italy)/7-1745

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President dated 4 July 1945 on the subject of “Retention of Allied Forces in Italy.”

In his memorandum the Secretary of State proposed that five Allied divisions, in addition to the two in Venezia Giulia, be retained in Italy until major problems are settled. This will require the retention in Italy of one U.S. division in addition to the present estimate of one for the Venezia Giulia commitment.

Under present redeployment plans there will be excess U.S. forces in Italy until December, 1945 and in Europe until April, 1946. It is thus not necessary at this time to accept a commitment to retain additional forces in Italy, and it is militarily undesirable to make a commitment for their retention until the situation requiring the presence of those forces becomes more apparent. Sufficient air forces remain in Europe even after redeployment to provide any necessary show of air forces in Italy.

In view of the above it is suggested that the question of the desirability of retaining additional United States forces in Italy be reexamined late in 1945, in the light of the situation as it will have developed.

In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the position with the Combined Chiefs of Staff that a review of the situation in Italy should be made about 1 September 1945, with a view to early dissolution of the Allied Command, Mediterranean.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

6679

Stimson-Churchill conversation, early afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Attlee
Lord Leathers

Stimson’s diary entry: “I returned to Potsdam and lunched with the Prime Minister, Attlee, and Lord Leathers, … We had some talk about ships – the distribution of the German merchant marine, Europe and others. We discussed the coal situation in Great Britain and the United States – supplies of both were going to be short this winter. As he walked down to the gate I told him of Harrison’s message. He had not heard from his own people about the matter. He was intensely interested and greatly cheered up, but was strongly inclined against any disclosure. I argued against this to some length.”

6680 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Potsdam, 17 July 1945
Top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the problem of the administration of Germany. This is the memorandum referred to in my note delivered to you yesterday evening.

At your earliest convenience I would very much like to see the President with you about this memorandum and the memorandum on Japan sent to you yesterday.

Faithfully yours,
HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The matters with which I am primarily concerned, namely the administration of Germany and the conduct of the war with Japan, are, upon analysis, inextricably related to the general problem of post war rehabilitation and the achievement of the strategic aims for which we have been fighting.

The condition of Central Europe
We have occupied Germany following a devastating conquest which has laid waste wide areas of middle Europe, extending from France to well within the boundaries of Russia, and extending from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Germany, which has been responsible for loosing the forces which resulted in the two World Wars, is herself laid waste and is in the geographical center of the area of devastation.

This area in the main was a highly industrialized one, its industrialization being evidenced by the number of large and prosperous cities within it. All who have visited Germany and the portions of Poland and Russia overrun by the war, testify to the great destruction visited upon those cities. Almost without exception, cities large and small have been torn by explosives of greater power than have been developed in any previous wars. It may be true, as was stated before the Kilgore Committee of the Senate, that many of the plants could, with industry, be restored or set in motion with relatively little or no repair. But there is a great difference between the mere physical existence of a plant and its capacity to operate as a going concern. That capacity has been destroyed, at least temporarily, by the destruction of the means of communication to and from the plant, and by the general collapse following defeat. A paralysis of commerce has set in due to the lack of transportation, raw materials, and the means of trade. This paralysis is not limited to Germany, but may grip all western Europe as well.

As occupiers of portions of this area, we shall have many serious administrative problems to cope with, problems which will be greatly accentuated by lack of food and fuel. For this reason alone it should be our policy to make it possible for the people we control to work, and thus relieve us to the maximum possible extent of the burden of their idleness and want. I take it that all our objectives are included in one fundamental purpose – the achievement of security and peace under conditions which preserve to us our concepts of liberty. While it is our object to disarm Germany, it should not be our purpose to make it impossible for the German people to live and work. We should not remove their capacity for aiding in the restoration of stable conditions in Europe and the world.

On the one hand it is clear that Germany has created, and twice misused, a swollen war industry – one substantially beyond her peaceful needs, and even though this capacity has been greatly impaired by defeat, certain physical steps can and should be taken to hamper the regrowth of her industrial capacity to more than reasonable peacetime needs.

On the other hand from the point of view of general European recovery it seems even more important that the area again be made useful and productive. Considering Germany alone, the figures show that the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated upon her industry. There was a period, substantially before the war, when Germany became the largest source of supply to ten European countries – viz. Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria, and the second largest supplier of Great Britain, Belgium and France. At the same time she became the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, and the second best of Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark.

Germany, according to estimates we now have, will continue to have about the same number of people she had before the war, and they will have to be fed, clothed, and housed in some manner. Of her approximately 70,000,000 people (including Austria), about 25,000,000 have been supported by industrial rather than agricultural activity. England and France, at the moment, do not have sufficient production to take care of their own needs by a long measure. There will be a scarcity of products which will plague all Europe for a substantial period to come, and the effects of it are bound to be felt by the other countries of the world.

The problem which presents itself therefore is how to render Germany harmless as a potential aggressor, and at the same time enable her to play her part in the necessary rehabilitation of Europe.

The impracticability of destroying German industry
It is my view that it would be foolish, dangerous and provocative of future wars to adopt a program calling for the major destruction of Germany’s industry and resources. Not only would any reasonable prospect for the reestablishment of European industry be dissipated by such action, but such destruction would be bound to leave a focus of economic and political infection which might well destroy all hope we have of encouraging democratic thinking and practices in Europe. What elements of German industry can be destroyed or removed as unnecessary for peacetime needs is a matter of [for?] expert determination. The balance must be put to work as soon as practicable and subjected to some system of security control. It is a task requiring perseverance, application and intelligence over a long period of time, but I am certain that mere destruction is neither effective as a security measure, nor, in the light of European, including German needs, possible as an economic one.

The need of all Europe includes the prompt stimulation of production within Germany, of food, coal, clothing, and housing. Production of these items is not capable of independent development. It must be based on other items and services, in short, general industry and trade. Without freedom of internal trade and communication, no one of these items can be produced on the scale which will be required. It follows that we cannot afford to operate Germany as if she were four separate water tight compartments.

Recommendations
Accordingly, as a first step, I would urge the adoption by the Great Powers at the Conference of a policy which would treat Germany as an economic unit so as to permit her to contribute to her own and to general European rehabilitation. To this end I would urge that the three Powers instruct their representatives in the Control Council to adopt a uniform policy in respect to such matters of nation-wide importance as transportation and communication, rationing and control of critical prices. I would urge that the Control Council also be instructed to adopt a uniform currency and a uniform fiscal and taxation system. They should also be instructed to decree a free exchange of commodities and persons, (subject to feeding and housing limitations) between the zones, and the full recognition of the principle that the cost of any imports shall be a first charge against any exports. And at the same time, in order to accomplish the future security, I would urge that the Control Council be instructed to:

a) Institute a system of control over imports and exports which will eliminate the importation of any article not clearly needed for peacetime necessities and commerce.

b) Decentralize the political authority of the Germans, giving encouragement to the local administrative units, and by the popular selection of local administrators through free but Nazi-purged elections. For the time being there should be no central political government of Germany other than the Control Council itself acting through such German administrators as it cares to select.

c) Completely abolish the German General Staff and submit a plan whereby the world may be assured that neither it, nor anything like it, will again become a factor in the government of Germany.

d) Determine and report the extent to which German industrial activity may safely be resumed, considering (1) rehabilitation needs, and (2) the necessity of reducing Germany’s overdeveloped war making powers.

The above are not all-inclusive, but I believe they are essential and would constitute a good common start toward achieving the economic and strategic objectives which we seek. I assume of course, that the process of punishment of war criminals will, in coordination with the Control Council, be prosecuted vigorously.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

6681 
841.24/5-2945

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

[Babelsberg, July 17, 1945]
Secret

Memorandum for the Prime Minister

I have gone into the question that you raise in your telegram of May 28 in regard to Lend-Lease during the Japanese War. We intend to furnish Lend-Lease to the British Commonwealth for the prosecution of the war against Japan generally in accord with the schedules of requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany and other terms worked out between British and American supply representatives in October and November 1944.

You, of course, realize that the policy I have indicated does not necessarily mean that either the munitions or the non-munitions program for the present year will be equal in total or individual items to the Lend-Lease requirements as estimated in the meetings of last fall. Those estimates were subject to changing strategic demands as well as to supply, procurement, and allocation considerations, and to the provision of the necessary funds by the Congress. Individual requisitions are of course handled by the usual administrative and allocation channels, with full discussion between our supply representatives.

In connection with the foregoing, it has come to my attention that the British gold and foreign exchange holdings are now considerably higher than was anticipated at the time of the Phase II discussions. I do not wish to propose reopening the Phase II discussions on this account. However, I would like to request that your Government relax its position with respect to permitting dollar payments on certain items, particularly those where the unwillingness of your Government to make payments leads to political criticism in the United States. For example, it would be of considerable assistance if your Government relaxed its restrictions on dollar payments for the proceeds of property sales in the Middle East and elsewhere; if the United Kingdom continued to take its share of the burden of the military relief and UNRRA programs in Europe; and if dollar payments were allowed on other items which arise from time to time in our relationships. I urge that you provide this flexibility in the long-term interests of both your country and mine.

[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

6682 
761.91/7-1745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 17 [1945]
Secret
39

During personal conversation between Ambassador Murray and Shah of Iran July 13, Shah expressed frankly his growing concern-over Iran’s future, emphasizing his fear as to Soviet intentions towards Iran. He stated he is greatly disturbed over entire question of Russian policy towards Iran, and feels incapable of appointing strong premier because of inevitable Soviet opposition. Iran accordingly is forced to submit to rapid succession of weak and ineffective governments.

British Ambassador to Iran, according to Murray, telegraphed Foreign Office July 11, expressing opinion that Russians are apparently making determined effort to obtain dominant position in Iran prior to withdrawal of forces.

Ambassador Murray states it is impossible not to be alarmed at present situation and ruthlessness of Russian tactics. He compares present Soviet official and press attitude towards Sadr Government to Soviet policy towards Saed Government last autumn, and believes Soviet is determined to have favorable cabinet in office during course of forthcoming elections.

These statements indicate progressive deterioration of Iranian internal affairs, which is being hastened by intense Soviet-British rivalry in Iran. This rivalry is producing critical internal schism in which exercise of effective Iranian administrative control and rehabilitation of economy are impossible.

Since continuation or development of this situation is prejudicial to Iranian sovereignty, Allied solidarity, and international security, you may wish to discuss entire Iranian problem fully and frankly at Conference. (See four background memoranda on Iran prepared by Department for Conference and in particular memorandum entitled “Anglo-Soviet Rivalry in Iran.”)

[GREW]

6683

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

CCS 194th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Lieutenant-General Macready
Major General Norstad Major-General Laycock
Captain McDill Major-General Hollis
Captain Oster
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the CCS 193rd Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 193rd Meeting and approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to any later minor amendments.

British Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 889 and 889/1)

Sir Alan Brooke referred to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff concerning British participation in the war against Japan. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to see that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed in principle to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to the resolution of certain operational problems with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and to the clarification of certain factors with which he then proposed to deal.

Considering each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of CCS 889/1, Sir Alan Brooke made the following points:

a. The land forces which were being offered would not be involved in operations in Southeast Asia prior to CORONET. The force envisaged contained one Australian division which was now completing operation in Borneo; one New Zealand division which was re-forming in Italy; a British division which had been already withdrawn from the fighting in Southeast Asia, and an Indian division probably from Italy. This Indian division had operated in conjunction with Allied troops in Italy for some time and had, on one occasion, been under command of General Clark. It was considered a first-class division, and he thought that the difficulties incident to its employment and due to language complications would not prove insurmountable. The division had already been acclimatized.

Sir Alan Brooke, continuing, said these forces might be used as three divisions in the initial assault with a follow-up of two divisions a good deal later on. This delay was necessitated by shipping limitations. The British Chiefs of Staff would very much like to participate in the assault as opposed to taking part only in the follow-up. The administrative factors could perhaps be discussed with General MacArthur.

b. This question had been dealt with in a. above and Sir Alan Brooke hoped that it would be found possible to overcome any difficulties in this connection.

c. When the question of British participation in the final assault had first been considered, the inclusion of Canadian forces had been envisaged. It had since been learned, however, that a Canadian division had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff, to be equipped with American equipment, with a view to operating under American command. Although the British Chiefs of Staff would like to include a Canadian element in the Empire forces, it was not desired to upset these plans and he therefore suggested that the matter might be left open to discussion. The Canadian division might be used in a follow-up role. Detailed discussions on this matter could be carried out with General MacArthur.

d. It was hoped that answers would be received from the Dominions concerned in the near future.

e. It was entirely agreed that the inclusion of a British force in the final phase of the war against Japan would lead to complicated logistical problems. These problems could be considered in detail with commanders on the spot.

f. The question of where the forces should be concentrated prior to the operation would have to be carefully considered. The Australian division was at present well placed and it should be found possible to concentrate one or two additional divisions in a suitable area. This also could be discussed in detail with the force commanders.

g. It had always been the intention of the British Chiefs of Staff to provide, from British resources, sufficient assault lift for two divisions. The provision of certain close-support craft, was, however, likely to be most difficult owing to the distances involved.

h. Sir Charles Portal said that while it was realized that there would be adequate United States tactical air forces available, he very much hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consider the inclusion of a small tactical air force consisting of about 15 squadrons (about 250 aircraft in all). He made this request as he felt that the Commonwealth forces would like to have supporting them some of their own tactical reconnaissance and fighter-bomber units. The forces he had in mind should not cause complications as they would be Mustangs similar to those operated by United States forces.

General Arnold undertook to investigate the possibility of the inclusion of a force as indicated by Sir Charles Portal, and asked to be supplied with the necessary details to carry out this investigation.

i. Sir Alan Brooke said that the effect of these proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command would be to limit the capacity to undertake amphibious operations, as the proposals would necessitate the use of landing craft. It was proposed to submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, for land operations across the Thailand-Burmese frontier and small amphibious operations to Sumatra and Java with the object of establishing small bridgeheads on those islands which could be developed later as the opportunity arose. The provision of shipping and assault craft was the limiting factor.

Sir Alan Brooke explained further that in approaching this problem it had been the aim of the British Chiefs of Staff to produce the maximum effort against Japan, continuing meanwhile such operations in Southeast Asia Command as could be conducted without detracting from the effort against Japan. The limiting factors affecting the British proposals were the provision of shipping and administrative troops. Hence three alternative suggestions had been included in CCS 889.

As the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the proposals in principle, it was suggested that a force commander and his staff (of the nature of a corps commander and staff) should be appointed and sent out to discuss details with General MacArthur and to draw up concrete proposals for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the dispatch of a corps commander and staff to the Pacific was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur would be informed accordingly.

General Marshall then read extracts from a dispatch from General MacArthur on the subject of the participation of a Commonwealth force in the final phase of the war against Japan. He undertook to make available to the British Chiefs of Staff suitable extracts from the dispatch.

General Hull said that tentative proposals had been made by the Australian Government to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the inclusion of an Australian force in the operation against Japan and for the inclusion of a small token force in Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Mountbatten. The proposal had merely expressed the desire of the Australian Government to participate in these operations and no details had as yet been discussed.

Admiral King said that there were two factors concerning the employment of Australian forces with which he presumed the British Chiefs of Staff were familiar. The first was that the Australian military establishment was being reduced to approximately three divisions. The second was the question of the possible return to New Zealand of the New Zealand division concerned.

Sir Alan Brooke said that while it had at one time been suggested that the New Zealand division should be returned to New Zealand, it had subsequently been agreed that the division consisting of two brigades would be available for operations in Southeast Asia Command. Arrangements had been made to send replacements to Italy and it would therefore not be necessary for the New Zealand division to return to New Zealand for rehabilitation. The views of the New Zealand Government on the present proposal had, however, not yet been received.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff fully recognized that the participation of British troops in the final phase of the war against Japan would lead to certain complications and he expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the proposal had been received by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff welcomed the proposals and would be pleased to make room for the employment of British forces, within the limitations of shipping and logistic support.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed in principle to the participation of a British Commonwealth land force in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational problems and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling.

b. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should send out appropriate commanders and staff to visit General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would keep the United States Chiefs of Staff informed of the reactions of the Dominions to the proposals.

d. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would take up with the appropriate theater commanders the possibility of establishing a small British tactical air force in support of the proposed Commonwealth land force.

6684

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 889/1

British Participation in the War Against Japan

The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous agreement to the proposals in subparagraphs 3a and b of CCS 889. In connection with the latter proposal it should be noted that there is little prospect that airfield space for more than ten squadrons of a British very long range (VLR) bomber force will become available at least before 1 December 1945.

As to paragraph 3c, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to satisfactory resolution of operational problems by Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling. Their views on some of these factors follow:

a. It is essential that a firm commitment be received as to dates of availability and composition of forces in order to plan for their participation in the final effort and to effect adjustments of the United States redeployment program. It is not practicable to plan on using forces whose availability is contingent upon their release following the conclusion of a separate major operation. Hence it appears these forces cannot at present be planned for use earlier than the build-up phase of CORONET.

b. The difficulties incident to the employment of Indian troops (language complications and the necessity for prior acclimatization) make it doubtful that the Indian division can be effectively employed.

c. Arrangements have already been made with the Canadian Government to organize and equip along United States lines one Canadian division, to operate as a part of a United States corps.

d. It is noted that agreement of the Dominions concerned has not yet been obtained.

e. A solution must be found to the complicated logistical problems involved.

f. The forces should be concentrated in the Pacific or in the United States well in advance of the date scheduled for their participation in the campaign.

g. The question of the provision of assault lift requires clarification.

h. It is considered impracticable to superimpose upon the already adequate U.S. tactical air forces a small British tactical air force, since this would overload prospective airfields and introduce complications resulting from additional aircraft types.

i. The effect of the proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command requires further examination.

6685

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War

Washington, 17 July [19]45
Top secret
priority

War-33556

TopSec Secretary of War from Harrison.

Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the Little Boy is as husky as his big brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here to Highhold and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm.

6686 
871.6363/7-1745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1945 — 4 p.m.
Secret
2597

By letter to Vyshinski of July 11, British Ambassador stated British Government could not accept Soviet Government views expressed in February 26 Foreign Office note on removal oil field equipment from Rumania. (To Dept, repeated Bucharest 91, London 368) Clark Kerr protested continued Soviet requisitioning and removal British equipment.

KENNAN

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945
Top secret
SM-2610

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING DARDANELLES AND KIEL CANAL

It is assumed that the request of the State Department for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the future of the Dardanelles is based upon the fact that we have agreed to discuss the Montreux Convention at TERMINAL. A similar request concerning the future of the Kiel Canal indicates that that subject may also be brought up for discussion.

The problem presented is twofold. First, whether or not the United States should agree to decide these matters at this time, and second, if they are to be decided what should be the position of our government.

In approaching this problem it is essential that we first establish in clear perspective, the place of these questions in relation to the overall problem of the general peace settlement which alone can establish and stabilize the boundaries, rights and responsibilities of nations in the immediate post-war era, and thus provide a sound basis for solving the military problems of national and international security.

The problems of the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal are basically merely two of a score of similar problems which in the aggregate constitute the over-all problem of the peace settlement. Among these problems are agreement on numerous boundaries and bases in Europe, disposition of Italian colonial areas, areas detached from Japan, strategic islands in the Pacific, restitution of territory to China, and the establishment of the trusteeship system, which will of necessity be directly involved in many problems of the general settlement.

While there has been no formal agreement to that effect, the principle has been generally accepted that most of these problems should await the end of the war, or, at least until they can be decided, not separately, but as an integrated whole. The single but important exception in the application of this principle has been Russia.

By agreement or at least by acceptance on the part of her allies, Russia has already established her claims to eastern Poland, to the Baltic States, to parts of Finland and to Bessarabia and Ruthenia There is reason to believe she has also obtained agreement as to her claims in the Far East. Whatever the justification of these agreements, the fact remains that, while the other great powers await the peace settlement to negotiate their proposals and establish their rights and responsibilities, Russia has received preferred treatment, both as regards intrinsic values and as regards priority of settlement.

Russia’s reaction to this favored treatment has been to demand further special consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that at present Russia is pressing the question of the Dardanelles, including the right to bases in that area, has demanded certain Turkish areas in northeast Turkey, is agitating the question of access to the Persian Gulf, has occupied the Island of Bornholm and has made proposals to Norway looking to establishing Russian bases in Bear Island and Spitsbergen.

Russia has so far succeeded in obtaining her demands because she has had the might, if not always the right, on her side and has convinced the other powers that in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, she would seize by force what was not granted her by agreement.

The current demands and proposals of Russia, however, are not in exactly the same category. While it is true that the United States and Great Britain could not successfully oppose a determined Russian effort to seize these desired areas by force, it is also true that as Russian demands progress farther afield, her power to seize her objectives progressively declines, and there is a diminishing ratio of return to risk and effort. Furthermore, in estimating Russian intentions, we should give full weight to the fact that she is war-weary, over-extended by her great efforts and in need of years to reestablish her economy, consolidate her gains and recoup her losses, a process in which she requires the substantial support and assistance of the United States. We should also question whether she would be willing to break with the World Organization, before it is established, or with the United States in particular, on the issue that her current demands be accepted now, rather than being decided later as a part of the general peace settlement.

In view of the considerations outlined above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that from the long range and over-all security point of view the United States, in so far as consistent with commitments already made, should limit and postpone discussion of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal questions and in any case, should insist that final decisions on these matters should be delayed until they can be made as part of the general peace settlement.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

If, notwithstanding the considerations previously stated, it is necessary, due to previous commitments or other compelling reasons to discuss and possibly reach a decision concerning the Dardanelles, then it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the long range and over-all security point of view, the position of the United States should be:

a. The United States would agree to a revision of the Montreux Convention substantially along the lines suggested by the State Department in its recent memorandum on this subject.

b. We should support the demilitarization of the Straits, and failing that should oppose any proposals granting a nation, other than Turkey, bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A J MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA, Secretary

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945
[Extracts]
Top secret
SM-2610

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING DARDANELLES AND KIEL CANAL

It is assumed that the request of the State Department for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the future of the Dardanelles is based upon the fact that we have agreed to discuss the Montreux Convention at TERMINAL. A similar request concerning the future of the Kiel Canal indicates that that subject may also be brought up for discussion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

If, however, notwithstanding the above considerations, it is necessary to discuss and possibly reach a decision concerning the Kiel Canal, then it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the long range and over-all security point of view, the position of the United States should be that in any case, the Kiel Canal should be demilitarized, and:

a. Preferably – the Kiel Canal should be placed under the United Nations Organization and be operated by a mixed commission appointed by and reporting to the Security Council.

b. As the first alternative – the German State of Schleswig-Holstein, which includes the Kiel Canal, should be constituted a strategic area under the trusteeship system with Denmark accepting responsibility as the administrating authority, the Kiel Canal then to be operated by Denmark under supervision of the Security Council.

c. As the second alternative – the German State of Schleswig-Holstein, which includes the Kiel Canal, should be annexed to Denmark, with that nation’s consent, and the responsibility for the operation of the Kiel Canal should then be assumed by Denmark.

d. Any proposal by Russia giving her control of or a preferred position concerning the Kiel Canal should be firmly opposed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A J MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA, Secretary

6687 
840.811/7-1745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Confidential
2598

Creation of a Danube commission (to Dept as 2598 rptd London 369 Bucharest 92 Belgrade 24 Budapest 26 Sofia 68) is a question still under study by Soviet authorities, Vyshinski told Brit Amb in letter of July 11 replying (Embs 1931, June 6) to Brit query on subject.

KENNAN

6688 
740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 17, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Charles of Hapsburg requested the Ambassador in Paris to accept the enclosed sealed letter for transmission to the President. When the Ambassador raised a question as to whether the President was prepared to receive such communications Charles stated that a similar message had been sent from Brussels and that a reply had been delivered to his brother the Archduke Felix.

In accordance with the instructions of President Roosevelt the State Department had authorized certain missions to transmit sealed material to President Roosevelt. Does the President wish this practice continued?

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

The Archduke Otto of Austria to President Truman

July 2, 1945

Dear Mr. President, In view of the impending international decisions I take the liberty to write to you on the Austrian situation. I believe that I can do so as I am in daily contact not only with the former Austrian Resistance Movement, but also with the majority political parties and local administrations.

The situation after two months of liberation is certainly not as it should be. Divided into four zones of occupation, the living body of the Austrian State is cut to pieces. There is no overall economic and no overall political planning. The economic situation is almost desperate. The Allied troops of occupation, despite orders, are living on the country. The Provincial Administrations are receiving no authority – with the exception of the one in the French occupational zone – and have thus no means to fight the spreading doom. Owing to the inactivity of the Allied military authorities there is no harvesting, the factories do no longer run. There is general unemployment. Inflation is spreading. All this will lead to an unprecedented catastrophe in a few weeks. In the Russian zone the Russian troops of occupation have carried away the complete industrial equipment and are looting systematically the private dwellings.

To top the economic difficulties the Americans and British have issued a policy of non-fraternisation, in contrast to the French. This policy of non-fraternisation, which creates a feeling that the Allies are treating the Austrians as if they were Germans, is considered by the Austrians as a grave injustice. To this are added general interdictions to travel or to ship goods, suppression of the mails, the telephone and the telegraph, general abuses in the requisition and a curfew for the population, all things justified in conquered aggressor countries, but not for liberated friends. We were the first country to fight the Germans, and if we collapsed in 1938 it was because we were hopelessly outnumbered and abandoned by the Western Powers. Our Resistance Movement was as strong, considering the situation, as in other countries.

The political freedom has not been re-established. We have no free press and no means of creating a healthy democratic public life.

The Russians have been sponsoring a communist-dominated regime of their own in Vienna. There have been rumours that the Allies will eventually recognize this communist regime, the so-called “provisional Government.” I can assure you that the overwhelming majority of the Austrians would refuse to accept such a Government, because they do not want the elections controlled by the Austrian Communists, who avowedly strive for dictatorship and would do anything to impair the honesty of the elections. They furthermore will not accept to be ruled by the communist party.

This is the situation. May I take the liberty to suggest a few measures that ought to be taken in order to bring Austria again to a life of freedom and to do justice to the Austrian people.

  1. Authorization of the establishment of strong Governments in each of the Provinces, who can act under their own responsibility. (These Provinces are: Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Kaernten, Oberoesterreich and Steiermark. This does not include Niederoesterreich, Burgenland and Vienna, who are under Russian occupation).

  2. Liberty for the Austrian Governments of the Provinces to communicate with each other and to come to understandings on common matters.

  3. Assurance that the self-styled provisional Government of Vienna, presided by Dr. Renner, will not be recognized by the Allies.

  4. Abolishment of the policy of non-fraternisation by the American and British forces.

  5. Authorization of the establishment of a free press.

  6. Stoppage of the present inflation through a united plan for the whole Austrian area.

  7. Inclusion of Austria in the general Allied relief program.

  8. Liberty for the Governments of the Austrian Provinces to deport German citizens who are at this time a major scourge for the country.

I am certain, Mr. President, that these measures would permit a rapid consolidation inside Austria. They would give Austria the start it needs to rise from its ruins. On the other hand, a continuation of the present policy will lead the country to anarchy.

Knowing your generous sympathies for my country, I am bringing these problems before you because I am convinced that in pursuance of the great policy of America with regards to Austria you will order that my country be started as soon as possible on the way to consolidation and freedom.

Wishing you the blessings of the Almighty in these days when one of the greatest responsibilities in human history will lie on your shoulders, I am [etc.]

OTTO OF AUSTRIA