Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

466

Lane-Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m.

Polish Delegation HQ, 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Lane President Bierut
Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Modzelewski 
860c.00/7-3145: Telegram

The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State

Babelsberg, July 31, 1945
Secret
Victory 444

To Acting Secretary of State from Lane.

Called yesterday on Modzelewski former Polish Ambassador Moscow now Assistant Minister Foreign Affairs, President Bierut and Mikołajczyk also joined group. Following is summary of Modzelewski’s remarks:

  1. Newspaper correspondents should be able to enter Poland before end August. Only present obstacle poor quality telegraphic communications. (As Modzelewski mentioned censorship this may also be reason for short delay.)

  2. Consulates can be established Danzig, Poznan, Lodz and Cracow. (Depending on outcome of western frontier we may suggest Breslau also.)

  3. Rate of exchange for diplomatic corps will have to be arranged. Present rate of eleven zlotys and fraction impossible for us to subsist on.

  4. Policing entirely adequate. Polish Government will furnish sufficient guards. Unnecessary for us bring military detachment. (Shall report further on arrival Warsaw.)

  5. Coal deal being arranged with U.S. here. They want goods in return principally fats, meats and oils.

  6. Requested my personal advice re Oskar Lange as Ambassador to U.S. I replied I thought it might create unfortunate impression because his U.S. Citizenship.

  7. Soviet troops being withdrawn from Poland except for portion west of 1939 west frontier. (Repeated to Moscow and Paris for Lovell.)

  8. Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, French Ambassadors and Swedish and British chargés now in Warsaw.

467

Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Brown

Brown: “… Met with communiqué committee after Foreign Ministers, British and Soviets seemed to like draft. Foote and I had prepared it. All of it had previously been submitted to British. …”

468 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 30, 1945 — 8 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1480

Re your telegram No. 952

  1. There is no reason to believe that Stalin was not informed beforehand on the Potsdam joint declaration and this must be considered only natural, judging from the present relationship among the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Also, for the most part, we can surmise that the above-mentioned joint declaration had some connection with our plan to send the special envoy, i.e., our first request to the Soviet Union on the 13th regarding the dispatch of a special envoy. It can be suspected that the subject was casually mentioned to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam. I believe we can conclude that the recent joint declaration was based on this information and that the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and China – made a proclamation in an effort to make their stand clear and definite. As to whether or not the declaration of the 26th was made after the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were informed of the first request which I made to Lozovsky on the 25th and also regarding the second request (my telegram No. 1449) on sending the special envoy, all this is not actually too important. Also, in reality, we believe that a discussion was held with Chiang Kai-shek prior to our presentation of the request on the 25th. Nevertheless, it is possible that they have already ferreted out signs of our overtures to conclude a negotiated peace at that time. The only ones who knew the circumstances of that period are Stalin and Molotov, and it is a difficult task to find out the truth. As for our side, I believe there is nothing we can do but to reason as indicated above.

  2. In connection with the above problems, one important point is that by issuing the joint declaration, the United States and Great Britain made persistent demands on Japan to surrender unconditionally immediately, and another important point which they made clear is that they have no intention of relaxing the terms as stated in the declaration. If Stalin sees that it is impossible to shake the will of the United States and Great Britain regarding the above points, it would mean that our request to send the special envoy cannot be accepted and will be futile, regardless of how we explain that our desire to terminate the miserable war is in accordance with the will of our gracious Emperor and that Stalin will be called the advocate of world peace, etc. As for the United States and Great Britain, their contention will be that the only way for Japan to avoid the bloodshed of war is to surrender immediately. Stalin will also exert sufficient heavy pressure on the United States, Great Britain, and China regarding Manchuria, China, Korea, etc., in the event that Japan surrenders. He is also believed to have made up his mind to push through his claim and actually holds the power to do so. Therefore I believe that Stalin feels there is absolutely no necessity for making a voluntary agreement with Japan. On this point I see a serious discrepancy between your view and the actual state of affairs.

Also, attention should be paid to Australian Foreign Minister Evatt’s announcement, as reported by the BBC on the 30th, that he was opposed to the attitude of the joint declaration against Japan since it tends to be more lenient toward Japan than the stand taken by the Allied nations against Germany in the past.

I request that you read through my telegram No. 1476 together with this telegram.

469

Byrnes-Attlee meeting [?]

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Attlee
Foreign Secretary Bevin

Byrnes: “As soon as Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin returned I visited them and, after several hours discussion, obtained their agreement in principle to our proposal [on reparations from Germany].”

470

Mosely-Ward and Mosely-Gusev conversations

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Mr. Ward Mr. Gusev 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2945

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]

Informed J. G. Ward (UK) and Gousev (USSR) July 30, of U.S. approval and timing arrangement. Telegram to Mr. Winant, July 30.

P[HILIP] E. M[OSELY]

471 
740.00119 EAC/7-3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Babelsberg, July 30, 1945
Top secret
Victory 440

To American Embassy, London, information State Department, Washington, D.C. For Winant.

Re your 65481, July 28, repeated to Department 7606, Comea 345 and re your 65482, July 28, repeated to Department as 7607, Comea 346 and re your 281045, July 28

United States Government has approved three proposed public statements re zones of occupation in Austria, control machinery in Austria and consultation with governments of other United Nations in exercising four-power authority in Austria. US Government approves simultaneous issuance three joint statements in four capitals at a time to be determined in each. Publication of three joint statements should not precede publication of conference communiqué. Each might agree that three joint statements be issued 24 or 48 hours after publication of conference communiqué.

Mosely has informed Gousev of US approval of three statements and of proposal for their issuance immediately after conference communiqué. Gousev has not yet reported re Soviet clearance of three statements and timing of their publication.

BYRNES

472

The Pittsburgh Press (July 30, 1945)

Big Three working on communiqué

Military decisions to be kept secret
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

473

Leaders say ultimatum may shorten Jap war, despite rejection

Army and Navy men hail Truman’s move, hope it means U.S. will keep Pacific bases
By Roy W. Howard

…

474

Col. Palmer: Attlee won’t alter strategy in Pacific

U.S. still will have to do most of job
By Col. Frederick Palmer, North American Newspaper Alliance

…

475

Youngstown Vindicator (July 30, 1945)

Australia raps Potsdam terms offered Japan

…

476

Editorial: Jap Navy ended, but not Jap war

…

477

U.S. State Department (July 30, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 30, 1945 — 10:31 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1484

Re my telegram No. 1476, item 6

Worried by the delay in the reply from the Soviet side, I met with Lozovsky on the 30th at 5 p.m. and again conveyed our wishes. The following conversation took place:

SATO: I have come to receive your reply concerning our request for assistance by the Government of the Soviet Union to end the war which was presented to your Government on the 25th. Although it was arranged that we should be notified as soon as the reply was ready, since it is now Monday I have come to inquire about your reply.

LOZOVSKY: Since both Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, are now in Berlin, the reply will necessarily take several days to arrive. I regret to say that the reply cannot be delivered yet.

SATO: I fully understand the circumstances. However, the three countries – Great Britain, the United States, and China – issued a joint declaration against Japan on the 26th, pressing unconditional surrender on Japan. Unconditional surrender is, after all, out of the question for the Japanese Government. Our view remains the same as was stated on the 13th, at our meeting before the last. If it is possible to avoid such a formula, however, Japan desires to end the war, with an extremely conciliatory attitude, so long as Japan is guaranteed the nation’s honor and existence. For this purpose we asked the Soviet Government for assistance. I hope that Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, will give special consideration to this point. Although it has not been possible to receive your reply, I shall be happy if you will notify Commissar Molotov that I have come to see the Acting People’s Commissar in order to receive the reply.

LOZOVSKY: I shall do my best to convey Your Excellency’s request to Molotov today by all means.

SATO: I shall be much obliged if you will kindly do so. The Japanese Government has decided to send the Emperor’s most trusted Prince Konoye as special envoy to Moscow. As I explained at previous meetings, the envoy will discuss a wide range of subjects as to how the Japanese Government should work to re-establish peace in the Far East and will seek your Government’s assistance. I shall also appreciate it if you will inform Mr. Molotov that my understanding is that Prince Konoye will be empowered to discuss a wide range of subjects with the Soviet Government. Also, the Japanese Government understands that various reservations and stipulations will be made by the Soviet Union in connection with the Japanese Government’s request for assistance.

LOZOVSKY: I shall arrange as you request immediately.

SATO: The point which I am concerned about is the possibility that the tripartite joint declaration may obstruct the assistance from the Soviet Government which is desired by the Japanese Government. However, since the top leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin, I hope that they will give appropriate consideration to the removal of such obstruction.

LOZOVSKY: I promise again to convey your request.

478

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Monday, July 30:

Secretary Forrestal, General Eisenhower, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Cochrane, General Clay, Commodore Schade and Captain E. B. Taylor, USN, had breakfast with the President. Later they conferred with the President, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed so there was no meeting of the Big Three today.57 The Foreign Secretaries had a very long session however.

1800: Ambassador Pauley called on the President.

1900: Dinner at the Little White House. Sergeant List played a number of Chopin selections – the President’s favorites – during the dinner hour.

479

The Syonan Shimbun (July 31, 1945)

Attlee may request postponement of the Potsdam 3-power conference

…

480

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 31, 1945)

Strengstes Stillschweigen um Potsdam

…

Das Schicksal der Sudetendeutschen

…

481

Australien kritisiert Potsdam

…

482

U.S. State Department (July 31, 1945)

Truman-Rowan conversation, 10 a.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Mr. Rowan
483

Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Vice Admiral Cooke Rear Admiral McCarthy Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov
Mr. Russell
484

Byrnes-Molotov conversation, morning or early afternoon

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov

According to Byrnes, he told Molotov on July 31 that there were three outstanding issues at the Conference: reparations from Germany, Polish administration of a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, and admission of Italy and the Balkan states to the United Nations. He states further that he submitted a proposal containing the only concessions which the United States was willing to make; that he asked Molotov to present “the three proposals” to Stalin so that they might be considered at the meeting of the Heads of Government on July 31; that the United States “would agree to all three or none”; and that he and Truman would leave for the United States the next day.

485

Eleventh plenary meeting, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Golunsky
Mr. Cohen Mr. Maisky
Fleet Admiral Leahy

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m.

Points of Especial Interest to the United States

1. The 3-point Program of the Secretary of State:
(a) U.S. proposal in regard to German reparations (copy attached);
(b) U.S. proposal in regard to Poland’s western frontier (copy attached);
(c) U.S. proposal in regard to admission to the United Nations (copy attached).

2. Economic Principles to Govern Treatment of Germany
Decision on this question was put off until the question of German reparations was settled (copy of the draft under discussion is attached).

3. Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or “War Trophies” (copy attached)
No action has yet been taken on the paper on this question circulated by the U.S. on July 25th.

4. Revised Procedure for Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary
A new paper on this subject to be presented by the President (copy attached).

5. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and, Hungary
A new paper on this subject to be presented by the President (copy attached).

6. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways
The U.S. seeks agreement on the part of the Three Governments to the principles of unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways (a copy of the U.S. proposal on this subject, dated July 23rd, is attached).