740.00119 Potsdam/7-3045
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business, July 30, 1945
I. Problems before the Big Three
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| 1. German Reparations |
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| 2. Western Frontier of Poland |
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| 3. Admission to the United Nations |
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The U.S. has presented proposals on all three of these questions and has insisted that they be considered as a unit. The British also presented yesterday a new proposal on German Reparations. There seemed to be general agreement on the U.S. proposal concerning reparations, made applicable to the entire British and American Zones rather than to the Ruhr alone, with a corresponding reduction in the percentages. The specific question referred to the Big Three was whether or not a definite figure, in dollars or tons, for the Soviet share of reparations from western Germany should be specified.
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Economic Principles for Germany
It was agreed that decision on this question will depend on the decision on German reparations.
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Italian Reparations
Mr. Molotov’s motion on this question was referred back once more to the Big Three.
II. Problems before the Foreign Ministers
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Additional Points for Inclusion in the German Political Principles
The British proposed two additional points the first of which was accepted and the second referred to the Control Commission for Germany. The Soviets also presented a new point which is still before the Foreign Ministers.
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Southeast Europe and Trieste-Istria District
British and Soviet papers on these subjects are still before the foreign ministers.
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War Crimes
The Soviet and British papers on this subject were presented. It was agreed in principle that a statement on the subject should be issued by the Conference. The question of the exact form of this statement is still before the Foreign Ministers.
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Fascist Activities in the U.S., British and French Zones of Germany and Austria
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject.
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German Troops in Norway
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject.
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Disposition of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, the Ukraine and White Russia now in Allied Territories
The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note10 on this subject.
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Ruhr Industrial Area
The Soviet paper on this question is before the Foreign Ministers but the British have stated they could not discuss the subject without the French.
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Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania
The Foreign Ministers have not yet acted on the latest British proposal for dealing with this subject.
III. Problems before subcommittees
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German Fleet and Merchant Marine
British and Soviet papers on this subject are before the subcommittee.
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German External Assets
A U.S. proposal on this subject was referred to the Economic Sub-committee.
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Oil for Western Europe
The Economic Sub-committee has not yet reported on the U.S. proposal on this subject.
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Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.
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Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.
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Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary
The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.
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Directive to the Military Commanders in Germany
The Sub-committee on this subject is awaiting completion of the work of the Conference in relation to Germany.
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Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference
The Sub-committees are engaged in preparation of these documents.
Lane-Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m.
Polish Delegation HQ, 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg
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Present |
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| United States |
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Poland |
| Mr. Lane |
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President Bierut |
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Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk |
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Mr. Modzelewski |
860c.00/7-3145: Telegram
The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State
Babelsberg, July 31, 1945
Secret
Victory 444
To Acting Secretary of State from Lane.
Called yesterday on Modzelewski former Polish Ambassador Moscow now Assistant Minister Foreign Affairs, President Bierut and Mikołajczyk also joined group. Following is summary of Modzelewski’s remarks:
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Newspaper correspondents should be able to enter Poland before end August. Only present obstacle poor quality telegraphic communications. (As Modzelewski mentioned censorship this may also be reason for short delay.)
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Consulates can be established Danzig, Poznan, Lodz and Cracow. (Depending on outcome of western frontier we may suggest Breslau also.)
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Rate of exchange for diplomatic corps will have to be arranged. Present rate of eleven zlotys and fraction impossible for us to subsist on.
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Policing entirely adequate. Polish Government will furnish sufficient guards. Unnecessary for us bring military detachment. (Shall report further on arrival Warsaw.)
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Coal deal being arranged with U.S. here. They want goods in return principally fats, meats and oils.
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Requested my personal advice re Oskar Lange as Ambassador to U.S. I replied I thought it might create unfortunate impression because his U.S. Citizenship.
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Soviet troops being withdrawn from Poland except for portion west of 1939 west frontier. (Repeated to Moscow and Paris for Lovell.)
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Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, French Ambassadors and Swedish and British chargés now in Warsaw.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 30, 1945 — 8 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent
1480
Re your telegram No. 952
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There is no reason to believe that Stalin was not informed beforehand on the Potsdam joint declaration and this must be considered only natural, judging from the present relationship among the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Also, for the most part, we can surmise that the above-mentioned joint declaration had some connection with our plan to send the special envoy, i.e., our first request to the Soviet Union on the 13th regarding the dispatch of a special envoy. It can be suspected that the subject was casually mentioned to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam. I believe we can conclude that the recent joint declaration was based on this information and that the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and China – made a proclamation in an effort to make their stand clear and definite. As to whether or not the declaration of the 26th was made after the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were informed of the first request which I made to Lozovsky on the 25th and also regarding the second request (my telegram No. 1449) on sending the special envoy, all this is not actually too important. Also, in reality, we believe that a discussion was held with Chiang Kai-shek prior to our presentation of the request on the 25th. Nevertheless, it is possible that they have already ferreted out signs of our overtures to conclude a negotiated peace at that time. The only ones who knew the circumstances of that period are Stalin and Molotov, and it is a difficult task to find out the truth. As for our side, I believe there is nothing we can do but to reason as indicated above.
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In connection with the above problems, one important point is that by issuing the joint declaration, the United States and Great Britain made persistent demands on Japan to surrender unconditionally immediately, and another important point which they made clear is that they have no intention of relaxing the terms as stated in the declaration. If Stalin sees that it is impossible to shake the will of the United States and Great Britain regarding the above points, it would mean that our request to send the special envoy cannot be accepted and will be futile, regardless of how we explain that our desire to terminate the miserable war is in accordance with the will of our gracious Emperor and that Stalin will be called the advocate of world peace, etc. As for the United States and Great Britain, their contention will be that the only way for Japan to avoid the bloodshed of war is to surrender immediately. Stalin will also exert sufficient heavy pressure on the United States, Great Britain, and China regarding Manchuria, China, Korea, etc., in the event that Japan surrenders. He is also believed to have made up his mind to push through his claim and actually holds the power to do so. Therefore I believe that Stalin feels there is absolutely no necessity for making a voluntary agreement with Japan. On this point I see a serious discrepancy between your view and the actual state of affairs.
Also, attention should be paid to Australian Foreign Minister Evatt’s announcement, as reported by the BBC on the 30th, that he was opposed to the attitude of the joint declaration against Japan since it tends to be more lenient toward Japan than the stand taken by the Allied nations against Germany in the past.
I request that you read through my telegram No. 1476 together with this telegram.
Mosely-Ward and Mosely-Gusev conversations
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Present |
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| United States |
United Kingdom |
Soviet Union |
| Mr. Mosely |
Mr. Ward |
Mr. Gusev |
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2945
Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
Informed J. G. Ward (UK) and Gousev (USSR) July 30, of U.S. approval and timing arrangement. Telegram to Mr. Winant, July 30.
P[HILIP] E. M[OSELY]
740.00119 EAC/7-3045: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
Babelsberg, July 30, 1945
Top secret
Victory 440
To American Embassy, London, information State Department, Washington, D.C. For Winant.
Re your 65481, July 28, repeated to Department 7606, Comea 345 and re your 65482, July 28, repeated to Department as 7607, Comea 346 and re your 281045, July 28
United States Government has approved three proposed public statements re zones of occupation in Austria, control machinery in Austria and consultation with governments of other United Nations in exercising four-power authority in Austria. US Government approves simultaneous issuance three joint statements in four capitals at a time to be determined in each. Publication of three joint statements should not precede publication of conference communiqué. Each might agree that three joint statements be issued 24 or 48 hours after publication of conference communiqué.
Mosely has informed Gousev of US approval of three statements and of proposal for their issuance immediately after conference communiqué. Gousev has not yet reported re Soviet clearance of three statements and timing of their publication.
BYRNES
The Pittsburgh Press (July 30, 1945)
1500 PLANES BATTER JAPAN
Pre-invasion drive in 21st day
Tokyo region pounded by carriers; warships bombard Hamamatsu
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Gen. Roosevelt asks release from Army
‘Advised’ to retire, Washington hears
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Empire State office looted of thousands
Building escapes structural damage
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Big Three working on communiqué
Military decisions to be kept secret
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer
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Prosecution finishes case against Petain
Roosevelt pledged aid to France, court told
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He tossed dice and lost –
Two-wife captain worries about honor of WAC bride
Can’t find letter on No. 1’s ‘death’
By Nat A. Barrows
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Nazis list losses at 3,625,354
Total does not include men wounded
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U.S. plans drive on tax chiselers
Black markets also to be attacked
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Leaders say ultimatum may shorten Jap war, despite rejection
Army and Navy men hail Truman’s move, hope it means U.S. will keep Pacific bases
By Roy W. Howard
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USS Pittsburgh, with new bow, soon to return to war on Japs
Members of crew now joke about typhoon; captain and men both laud each other
By Elizabeth Ferguson
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Ford 82 years old today; predicts great prosperity
Warns industry must not dawdle
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