Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (July 16, 1945)

TRUMAN, CHURCHILL TOUR BERLIN; STALIN DELAYS BIG THREE SESSION
Russian late in arriving for meeting

President blames German for ruins
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

POTSDAM, Germany (UP) – President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill toured Berlin today while awaiting tomorrow’s opening session of the Big Three conference, for which the stage was set by the reported arrival of Premier Stalin this afternoon.

Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill took two hours out from pre-conference business to inspect the devastation of Berlin in separate whirlwind tours of the capital’s battered heart where Nazism rose and throve.

Has armored escort

Mr. Truman left Potsdam at 3:30 p.m. CET with an armored escort. For two hours he traveled through the streets of Central Berlin, critically viewing the destruction wrought by the Allied armies and air forces.

It was a serious study of destruction which Mr. Truman said was due to a man “who overreached himself.”

The President wedged his Berlin tour into a crowded schedule, which included a formal call by Mr. Churchill and a steady round of conferences with other leaders of the American delegation.

Blames Germans

When he stopped before the shattered, burned-out shell of the Chancellery, Mr. Truman observed with a pensive shake of his head: “It’s a terrible thing, but they brought it on themselves.”

He looked up at the jagged remains of a balcony where Adolf Hitler enflamed the world with his ranting speeches and said: “It’s just a demonstration of what can happen when a man overreaches himself. I never saw such destruction. I don’t know whether they’ll learn anything from it or not.”

Blank stares from Germans

As Mr. Truman looked and spoke, ragged Germans stumbled through the rubble still littering sections of the city. The Germans paid little attention to him. When they did, it was mostly blank, sullen stares.

Mr. Truman, confident and in excellent spirits after his eight-day sea voyage from Washington, was ready to brush aside as much formality as possible and get down to business immediately.

His two main objectives were a speedy end to the Pacific War and an agreement on the future world peace which would be at least the forerunner to a full-dress peace conference sometime after Japan’s complete surrender.

Discussions secret

The Big Three discussions were cloaked by a strictly-enforced censorship that even banned reporters from the immediate conference scene and the only current news while they last – perhaps three weeks or more – was expected to come from periodic official communiqués.

But informed observers believed the agenda would cover at least these major topics:

• Russia’s plans in the Pacific and the results of her interrupted discussions with China.

• The joint administration of Germany.

• The reparations to be exacted from beaten Germany: whether in money, goods or manpower or all three. Russia reportedly is asking for four million German men to rebuild her ruined cities.

• Settlement of the various territorial claims now being advanced by France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.

• The Anglo-Russian conflict over Middle Eastern oil resources, including the tie-in problem of the Arab-Jewish impasse in Palestine.

• Russian territorial demands on Turkey and the Soviet request for revision of the Montreux agreement of 1936, under which the Turks were Permitted to fortify the Dardanelles.

• Reorganization of the Soviet-sponsored Austrian government, which Britain and the United States have refused to recognize.

• The still-unsolved question of the hundreds of thousands of Polish troops who have reiterated their loyalty to the defunct exile government in London and have refused to return to Poland.

Canal control up

More remote is the possible discussion of a Russian seat on the control board of the Suez Canal and future joint control of the Panama Canal which neither Britain nor the United States is likely to concede.

The Levant states’ demand for complete independence from France also may come before the Big Three, although in the light of French resentment at Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s exclusion from the conference no definite action on that point appeared likely.

Unconfirmed reports reaching London said Gen. de Gaulle might be invited to join the conference later.

Docks at Antwerp

The President stepped down the gangway of the cruiser USS Augusta at Antwerp at 11:10 a.m. yesterday (5:10 a.m. ET), to become the first Chief Executive to set foot on Western European soil since Woodrow Wilson went to Paris 26 years ago for the peace that failed.

Accompanied by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Fleet Adm. William F. Leahy and a small party of advisers. the smiling man from Missouri was met by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Adm Harold R. Stark, Charles Sawyer, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Charles Sawyer and local British and American military commanders.

Flies to Potsdam

The presidential party motored to the Melsbroeck Airdrome on the outskirts of Brussels and Mr. Truman boarded Gen. Eisenhower’s special plane, arriving in Potsdam at 4:15 p.m. (10:15 a.m. ET).

At Potsdam, he was greeted by Soviet Marshal Gregory K. Zhukov’s deputy, Gen. Alexander Sokolovsky, and Col. Gen. Alexander Gorbatov, Red Army commandant of Berlin.

Immediately after the arrival ceremonies, he was whisked 15 miles away to his official residence, a 30-room house expropriated from a wealthy Berliner and furnished by the Red Army, within 10 minutes’ drive of the meeting place.

Churchill also flies

Mr. Churchill, fresh from a week-long vacation in Southern France, flew into Potsdam about two hours after the President, accompanied by his daughter, Mary.

Wearing the uniform of an army colonel, the 73-year-old Prime Minister lit up his inevitable cigar as soon as he touched the ground tucked his stuck under his arm and went briskly through the reception ceremony. He broke off the official inspection of the honor guard abruptly, however, apparently to avoid undue strain.

Throughout the late hours yesterday, planes were shutting in continually with new arrivals for the meeting, including most of the top-ranking American and British military staff officers whose presence suggested strongly that the Pacific War might play an important part in the discussions.

Stimson there

Among the American arrivals were Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Air Forces commander, and Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Services of Supply.

Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, was already in Berlin, along with W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, and Presidential Envoy Joseph E. Davies.

In Mr. Churchill’s entourage were virtually all the top army, navy and air force commanders who helped direct the defeat of Nazi Germany, plus Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Labor Party Leader Clement Attlee, who was invited by Mr. Churchill against the possibility of a reversal in the still-untallied general election that might unseat the present Conservative government.

Belgians greet Truman

From the moment the USS Augusta poked her nose into the Scheldt estuary and started upriver toward the battle-scarred port of Antwerp, cheering crowds of Belgians were on hand to greet President Truman.

Throughout the brief plane trip from Brussels to Potsdam, the President was interested in the utter destruction wrought on the German cities below and the apparent fertility of the surrounding farm lands.

The latter raised the question of whether Europe could produce more food for its own peoples with a resultant lowering of the feeding burden on the United States and other Allied countries. It was expected the President would bring that issue up at the Big Three meeting.

Mr. Truman was hopeful that the entire world could be given a fairly comprehensive picture of the day-to-day negotiations and said he favored issuance of regular communiqués during the discussions.

[NormanStewart]

Truman likely to rush home from Berlin

Believed to have canceled tour plans
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer

WASHINGTON – President Truman is believed to have canceled plans for a Western European tour to return to Washington immediately after the Big Three conference.

There have been published reports that he would visit Denmark, Norway and Great Britain before returning here.

Less definite, but certainly under consideration, were plans for further extensive air travel. There was reason to believe the party might have gone at least into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dinner coats ordered

It was to have been a strictly plush operation, too. Astonished press association reporters chosen to accompany the presidential party across the Atlantic were directed to take with them not only dinner coats but white ties and tails. There was suspicion at first that it was a gag. Then there was despair because tailcoats were hard to find in Washington.

Other correspondents who desired to fly to Europe after the Big Three conference to join the presidential party were advised that the cost of their journey might reach $5,000.

Enthusiasm dims

The enthusiasm and number of travel-candidates immediately began to diminish. Now the few who are willing to lay out the $5,000 are being told that post-conference travel plans are being reconsidered and probably will be abandoned.

The President reversed himself in mid-ocean, which was approximately his position when word spread that he might curtail his journey.

The most inviting speculation about the President’s new plans concerned the possibility that Japan may be nearer unconditional surrender than has been assumed. Supporting this theory is the U.S. fleet bombardment of Japan which has been going on for several days.

Early victory doubted

Opposing that line of thought is the fact that several senior military officers have said recently that the Pacific war is far from over.

If Mr. Truman decided to hurry home in expectation of the early collapse of Jap resistance, then there evidently has been some authoritative communication from Japan within the last few days. If so, that fact scarcely can be long concealed.

Congressional recess plans presumably would have to be changed if Japan is about to quit. The House will recess Saturday until October 1, according to the present schedule. The Senate will quit when it has disposed of the United Nations Charter, perhaps by the end of next week.

[NormanStewart]

Simms: History’s greatest decisions slated at Big Three meeting

Potsdam session to test workability of United Nations conference rules
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

WASHINGTON (SHS) – Through President Truman at the Big Three meeting at Potsdam, the people of the United States are about to make some of the most important decisions in all their history.

Not even the 1815 Congress of Vienna faced such tremendous issues. The Napoleonic wars of 130 years ago left Europe comparatively intact. Today nearly the entire continent is a shambles, materially, morally and politically. And the world’s future depends on whether President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin can lay the foundations for a new structure.

Must agree on rules

This means, so far as the American people are concerned, that the President must commit the United States to international cooperation far beyond anything ever before contemplated, let alone attempted.

Actually the Big Three meeting at Potsdam is more important than the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. At San Francisco, rules were formulated for safeguarding the future peace. Potsdam will largely determine whether or not the San Francisco rules will, in fact, be workable

What is widely overlooked is that peace terms have yet to be agreed upon. In fact, there is considerable doubt that a full-dress peace conference will be held. Already some of the Allies have made unilateral and bilateral decisions vitally affecting the peace, often without bothering to consult other interested parties. Potsdam will have to review these faits accompli and reconcile them, if possible, with decisions yet to be made.

8 points to consider

The Big Three must also consider:

• What is to be done with Germany and the German people; Europe’s new boundaries; whether vast populations are to be shifted from one area to another and, if so, where and how; how to govern what is left of Germany and whether it will be Sovietized or democratized.

• Allied policy with regard to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Lativa, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Middle East, Hungary and Austria.

• The role of France in Europe. Up to the present, France has been absent from these meetings despite the fact that she will play a vital role in the world, especially in Western Europe.

• Problems presented by Italy and Italian colonies.

• Allied policy toward Spain, Switzerland and other neutrals.

• The question of lifting the news blackout now virtually complete in zones occupied or controlled by Soviet Russia.

• European relief – social, financial and economic; and possibly–

• Russo-Japanese neutrality. This would entail a review of the Cairo pronouncement of Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek regarding Manchuria, Korea and other Japanese conquests and also of Russia’s China policy in the light of the recent Soong discussions in Moscow.

Small nations voiceless

Setting the fate of small nations without letting them be heard admittedly is an anachronism after a war which presumably was fought partly in defense of the sovereignty of small nations. And much has been said about the autocratic behavior of the Big Fur (Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia) at the Congress of Vienna. But there the little nations were at least permitted to talk, even if they were not always listened to.

At Potsdam, it seems, the little peoples of the world will be more or less voiceless – unless, that is, President Truman speaks up for them as some believe he may. He knows public opinion in America would not long support the use of force to perpetuate an unjust peace.

[NormanStewart]

Shapiro: Who’s ‘the brain’?

By L. S. B. Shapiro

BERLIN, Germany – Security precautions instituted for the Big Three Conference have been intensified as a result of sinister underground developments uncovered among the apparently prostrate and docile German population.

American war crimes investigation officers working closely with British and Canadian field security sections have discovered the existence of several Nazi underground movements, at least one of which is nationwide in scope and is organized on the imaginative scale of a Conan Doyle thriller.

Somewhere in Germany there is one man whose identity is camouflaged as thoroughly as is humanly possible, and who alone knows all the ramifications of this nationwide secret organization.

Allied authorities are aware of his existence and of that or this movement. As yet, he has not begun operations, but his influence is being felt and German democrats are freely warning the Allies that the current quiet may be replaced by highly organized violence on the part of the underground before the end of this war.

Patriots ‘spill the beans’

The known history of this organization reveals its potential danger. as far back as 1942, a special Gestapo commission was formed to study the resistance methods of the French, Russian and Polish undergrounds, to examine the reasons for their success and analyze the failure of German countermeasures against them in order that a foolproof German underground might be quickly organized if and when necessary.

The report of this commission has now become the bible and constitution of the new Nazi terroristic underground being prepared for action.

Allied investigators have come up against the first concrete results of the Gestapo study. Experience taught the Gestapo that “properly interrogated” French or Polish patriots often revealed the whole network of their organizations and made possible crushing countermeasures.

Now, in the new German organization, the cardinal rule is that each cell works in complete independence of the others, and knows nothing of the identity or even of the existence of other cells who may be operating close by. Only one supreme leader knows all and directs all.

Not being underestimated

This melodramatic arrangement is not being underestimated by the Allied authorities. In addition to many unapprehended SS and Gestapo thugs assumed to be in hiding, there is one other frightening fact: stock-taking of captured or surrendered German armament reveals that one-third of the nation’s small arms – from pistols to heavy machine guns – have, as yet, been unaccounted for. Undoubtedly the men of the new Nazi underground movement will be heavily armed, and because they know the death penalty must inevitably follow their capture, they will snoot it out to the finish if caught.

This already has happened when our security troops discovered a buried munitions dump.

A great army of Allied police is now scouring Germany in an effort to uproot this organization before it can get started. For these men, the last and most desperate battle of Germany has not yet really begun.

[NormanStewart]

Youngstown Vindicator (July 16, 1945)

ON THE RECORD —
Uncertainties of the Big Three meeting

By Dorothy Thompson

The Big Three conference in Potsdam is considerably more important than the one held in San Francisco, for the course of the world is not determined by generalities and overall formulas, but by specific actions. In Potsdam, very important and definite political problems have to be solved in agreement. Yet the conference contains political elements of great uncertainty.

The United States and Russia do not know what, in a few weeks’ time, will be the political situation in Britain. Britain and Russia have no experience whatsoever of President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes. There has been no preliminary conference between Britain and the United States in contrast to the condition of permanent conference which existed between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

In all previous conferences, the military situation occupied the foreground. Political issues tended to be postponed, or settled in rather ambiguous agreements, Now the European war is over, political issues are preeminent, and every further postponement increases the number of faits accompli.

Labor Party’s policy

A change of government in Britain would, theoretically, lessen the possibilities of friction between the Soviet Union and Britain. Clement R. Attlee is accompanying Churchill in order to make agreements satisfactory to the Labor Party. But every change in government brings in new personalities and new imponderables, and it is doubtful whether Mr. Attlee can fully foresee the results of a victory for his own party. A party in opposition is never the same as a party in power.

The foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, and their negotiation capacities, are still an “X.” Mr. Byrnes was at Yalta – but not as Secretary of State. Mr. Truman has never participated in an international conference. Both are pledged to continue the Roosevelt policy – though Mr. Truman has said he would not be bound by verbal agreements made by his predecessor. But in any case Mr. Roosevelt made his policy as he went along. He died in a most critical moment, and left no testament or blueprint for his successors.

What we do know is the temperament and general attitude of the new President and Secretary of State. Though they may “agree” with Roosevelt and Stettinius, they are quite different men.

Mr. Byrnes, for instance, is a logical successor, not to Mr. Stettinius, but to Cordell Hull. In fact, the similarity is striking. Both are Southern Democrats whose experience has been in Congress and the world of politics, and not in the world of business. Both have solid support in the Senate which makes them invulnerable in the administration.

However other men around President Roosevelt might have disagreed with Mr. Hull, Mr. Roosevelt neither could or would have dismissed him. Mr. Byrnes’ position is equally strong. He will not be a satellite in the presidential solar system, but an equal star, and, for the time being, he is next in line for the presidency. President Roosevelt was his own foreign minister, Mr. Truman will not be.

President Roosevelt, also, was a much more subtle and versatile personality than his successor, inclined always to fit himself into situations as they arose and finesse his way among his allies. He had unlimited faith in his own capacity to adjust himself and the American policy to each successive change and crisis. He believed less in fixed principles and firm agreements than in the “climate” of human relationships and in his own capacity to steer with the wind in off-reef directions. That was both his talent and his weakness. Neither Mr. Truman nor Mr. Byrnes has that talent, so they must and will try to avoid the weaknesses.

No preliminary meeting

Mr. Roosevelt liked preliminary conferences, because he liked to sniff out which way the wind was blowing. It is interesting that Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes have avoided one. Apparently they do not want previous commitments, and are jealous for American independence and freedom of action.

As far as I can sense things, after a long absence from home, I expect a more stubborn attitude, a greater insistence on principles and on agreements that would “stand up in a court of law,” less tendency to leave matters to wide interpretation, and insistence on less ambiguity.

Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes are politicians, who may be presumed to have an eye on the presidential elections of 1948, and are susceptible to American public opinion. Mr. Roosevelt was a master at making public opinion. They are not. We may expect, therefore, a greater instinct for those constants in the American mind that are essential for the policies of the parties.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (July 16, 1945)

871.6363/6-2945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
us urgent

1621

Embassy may have received Dept’s Instruction No. 678 of July 2 containing purported text Russo-Rumanian economic agreement of May 8 summarized in Bucharest’s tel May 17 reported [repeated?] to Moscow as 97. Dept’s A-276 June 29 contains instructions for protest to Soviet Govt on removal of oil equipment from Rumania and gives general guidance for further discussions with Soviets on petroleum matters. Bucharest’s telegram of July 8 repeated to Moscow as 121 indicates possibility of new “fait accompli” based on agreement of May 8.

Dept now feels that strong presentation of views of this Govt both about the economic pact and the oil arrangement foreshadowed in Bucharest 121 to you should not be delayed pending receipt of A-276. You are therefore requested immediately inform appropriate Soviet authorities of this Govt’s concern over the possible application of the Russo-Rumanian trade pact in view of the policy of United States Govt of conducting trade with every nation free of discrimination arising from exclusive economic arrangements between nations, and also in view of our common interest in an equitable allocation of products in short supply in reconstruction period during which Soviet presumably wishes United States’ cooperation.

Please further inform Soviet authorities that conclusion of any arrangement affecting Rumanian oil or other industries such as indicated in Bucharest 121 July 8 would by same token be of equal concern to this Govt and should be deferred pending forthcoming tripartite discussions. This issue and the principles involved therein are on the United States agenda.

With specific reference to petroleum, please point out sacrifices accepted by American people in rationing of fuel oil and gasoline substantially restricting their military, industrial, and civilian consumption and sacrifices accepted by U.S. oil industry in allocation of equipment to the USSR. You should point out that oil picture in Rumania is only one aspect of a worldwide problem and that conclusion of treaties granting exclusive rights and of monopolistic corporate arrangements between Soviet and Rumanian Governments as well as arbitrary measures such as removing equipment, monopolizing petroleum supplies and delaying entry of American petroleum experts may force the United States to reconsider its policies which have hitherto been so favorable to Soviets with respect to supplying petroleum, technical data, equipment and products.

Please inform Harriman.

Repeated to Bucharest as 354 of July 16.

GREW
J[OHN] A. L[OFTUS]

[NormanStewart]

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Monday, July 16:

During the forenoon the President worked on his mail and conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.

At 1100 Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Commander C. R. Thompson, RN (Naval Aide to the Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister’s daughter (Junior Commander Mary Churchill of the ATS) called on the President. After exchanging greetings, the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Cadogan conferred for some two hours.

A White House mail pouch arrived this afternoon. It had been sent from Washington by a JCS courier. The President signed this mail, which included legislative bills S134, S233, S234, S574, S672 and S956.

Generalissimo Stalin had not arrived at Potsdam, so the opening session of the conference scheduled for this afternoon was postponed to await his arrival.

The President took advantage of the delay in the opening of the conference and made an unscheduled visit to Berlin. He left the Little White House by motor car at 1540, accompanied by Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy…

The President and his party returned to the White House at 1735.

The three Foreign Secretaries held regular daily meetings to prepare the work of the conference. The first of these meetings was held this afternoon at Cecilienhof with Secretary Byrnes presiding. It was agreed, however, that the chairmanship of these planning meetings would be rotated.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings in their conference hall at Babelsberg.

After returning to the Little White House the President worked on his mail. He approved legislative bills S.J. Res. 31 and H.E. 3368.

2000: Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley and Mr. Davies were dinner guests of the President this evening. A band from the Second Armored Division played a concert on the lower White House grounds during and after dinner.

At 2200 Mr. Davies returned to the Little White House to deliver an urgent message to the President.

[NormanStewart]

The Syonan Shimbun (July 17, 1945)

Potsdam confab

LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The opening of the “3-power” meeting at Potsdam was postponed until tomorrow, owing to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin’s delay in arriving at the scene of the talks, according to a United Press dispatch from Potsdam.

[NormanStewart]

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 17, 1945)

Konferenz von Potsdam eröffnet

…

[NormanStewart]

L’Aube (July 17, 1945)

Dix semaines après la victoire –
La première conférence de paix s’ouvre à Potsdam

Devant l’ordre du jour très chargé on prévoit au mins 15 jours de débats

Berlin, 15 juillet – L’aérodrome où devaient avoir lieu les atterrissages était interdit au public depuis huit jours. C’est à 16 heures 30 que le président Truman arrivait de Bruxelles, avec une escorte de douze avions de chasse qui resplendissaient au soleil. Outre le secrétaire d’État, M. James Byrnes, le chef d’État était accompagné des généraux Marshall et Arnold, de l’amiral Leahy, de MM. Stimson, secrétaire à la Guerre, Harriman, ambassadeur américain à Moscou, et de l’ancien ambassadeur Joseph Davies. Le général Eisenhower descendit d’avion peu après.

Plus tard, arrivait à son tour M. Churchill, avec une autre escadrille d’avions. Le premier ministre, qui était en uniforme de colonel des hussards, fumait son traditionnel cigare et souriait à sa fille Mary qui l’accompagne.

Toute la région où se tiendra la conférence est sévèrement gardée.

De leur côté, MM. Eden, Attlee et leur suite ont gagné Potsdam.

Entretiens préliminaires et visite des ruines de Berlin

Berlin, 16 juillet – On croit savoir que M. Churchill et le président Truman se sont rencontrés à Potsdam aujourd’hui. Leur entrevue n’a eu aucun caractère officiel.

Les chefs d’états-majors sont également réunis pour des discussions préliminaires.

Il n’y a toujours pas de confirmation officielle du fait que le maréchal Staline est ou n’est pas à Berlin.

Le président Truman, visitant Berlin dans la journée, a vu notamment les ruines du Reichstag, celles de la porte de Brandebourg et « Unter den Linden », Son itinéraire était jalonné d’une très nombreuse garde et les civils allemands étaient maintenus à distance. M. Churchill a suivi exactement la même route que le président des États-Unis.

Selon la radio britannique, la conférence proprement dite ne commencerait que demain.

[NormanStewart]

Les conseillers des « Grands » joueront aussi leur rôle

Or, depuis Yalta, changements sont intervenus

…

[NormanStewart]

Il n’y a pas de juges à Berlin

par Maurice Schumann

…

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (July 17, 1945)

800.796/7-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State

London, July 17, 1945 — 10 a.m.
Secret
7182

With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams reporting various efforts on the part of the British to have steps taken which would lead to a fairly early agreement on the commercial aspects of air transport with the United States, Sir William Hildred informed the Civil Air Attaché that he hoped and expected to be able to go to the United States between now and August 2 (when the Civil Aviation Radio Conference opens) partly in connection with setting up of the Interim Council but primarily to discuss the Fifth Freedom with Pogue and Warner. The Department will observe that Sir William made this statement a day or two after the closing of the Empire Aviation conference and that the suggestion is now not that Pogue come to England but that Hildred go to the United States. He said frankly that he believed he would be more successful in obtaining Swinton’s approval for the trip, which he had been unable to do before, in view of the “progress in thinking” which the Empire Aviation Conference developed. He said he thought that the British Government would agree to an arrangement with the United States and with other countries which set forth the principle that (1) the more international air transportation the better for mankind, (2) all economic and other burdensome restrictions on civil aviation should be removed and (3) the principle of the Fifth Freedom in general was necessary to the successful development of air transportation. He felt that where it could be demonstrated that the unrestricted exercise of short-range pickup traffic by strong nations destroyed or seriously upset some regional airlines, the Interim Council should be able to rectify such obvious injustices. He thought that the major international airlines would recognize sufficiently the value to them of prosperous feeder line services along their routes so that they would be careful not to put them out of business. Sir William stressed the necessity of keeping the foregoing strictly confidential.

WINANT

[NormanStewart]

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

The Secretary General of the British Delegation to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal

Berlin, July 17th, 1945
FO 11 (1)

Dear Cannon, It is very good news that you are here as the expert on South-east Europe. I am supposed to be the same for our delegation, and we must get together soon.

Meanwhile I enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador at Belgrade, which you may find interesting. The reference in the last paragraph is to the proposal, which your Embassy has I think also reported, that this meeting should issue a reminder that the Three Powers expect the Tito-Šubašić agreement to be fully carried out in the near future. I know that Mr. Eden is very anxious to get this through, and perhaps we could meet and discuss it. Could you give me a ring?

Yours very sincerely,
W G HAYTER

[Enclosure]

Telegram From His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade, 11 July

It was recently reported in Belgrade press that it was intended to hold in the near future a congress of national liberation fronts of various states in Yugoslav Federation. The aim of the congress would be to weld these national liberation fronts into a national front for the whole of Yugoslavia.

I heard this morning that Dr. Šubašić had been invited to become a member of Steering Committee of this congress and I took an opportunity to question him about it in the course of private conversation this afternoon.

He confirmed to me that he had received such an invitation. He had, however, not yet returned a reply. He intended to discuss the matter with M. Kardelj and to take the line that if he were being invited as an individual he could not accept. This would mean that he was merely being used as a figurehead. If however he were permitted first to call a meeting of the executive of Croat Peasant Party and secure a mandate to represent the party he would then be in a position to take a constructive part in the congress. A possible alternative might be that he should meet Dr. Maček, ascertain his views and seek a mandate of some kind from him.

The idea at the back of Dr. Šubašić’s mind in this is that a national front which would be a coalition of the parties each having a separate existence, would probably be the best solution of the country’s political problems; even though a dominant position in such a coalition was held by the Communist party.

As he sees the position the present régime have all physical power in their hands. A national front is therefore inevitable. The only alternative to it would be civil war. This would only be possible with foreign armed assistance which is out of the question. It is equally inevitable that a transitory role in political life of this country will be played for some time at any rate by the Communist party. The problem therefore is to prevent the national front from becoming a thinly disguised one-party régime. This could be done by creating it as a true coalition of the parties even though Communist party’s influence in the coalition was preponderant.

It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Šubašić terms for his participation in the congress are accepted by Marshal Tito. If so, it may be that some kind of a coalition will emerge from proposed congress. Kardelj assured him that after the congress complete freedom of the press and of political activity would be granted. The present idea is that the congress should precede meeting of broadened AVNOJ.

It is Dr. Šubašić’s impression that at the moment leaders of this regime are manoeuvring and waiting for the results of the Big Three meeting. He is therefore doubly anxious that some kind of a reminder about Tito-Šubašić agreement should issue from it.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

JCS 196th Meeting

		Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy			Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall			Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King			Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold			Captain McDill
General Somervell			Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull			Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke			Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan			Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner			Colonel Stone
Major General Gross			Colonel Donnelly
Major General Norstad			Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Cabell
		Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland			Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

Military Aspects of Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (JCS 1275/5)

Admiral Leahy stated that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the memorandum which had been prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments, but suggested a change in the next to the last paragraph. He said that this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question. It was Admiral Leahy’s view that it was suitable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment upon the paper from a military point of view and he asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the military features of the proposed draft.

General Marshall stated that from a purely military point of view he considered that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be that nothing should be done prior to the termination of hostilities that would indicate the removal of the Emperor of Japan, since his continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside of Japan proper.

General Marshall proposed that paragraph 3 of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be used as the basis for the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President which would express the military implications and would include the proposed changes in the draft of the statement prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The memorandum to the President should also include the views he had previously expressed in regard to doing nothing to indicate that the Emperor might be removed from office upon unconditional surrender.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Directed the Secretary to prepare for consideration a suitable memorandum for the President in the light of the discussion.

Retention of U.S. Forces in Italy (JCS 1411/1)

Admiral Leahy asked what the President might do with the memorandum which it was proposed to send to him in regard to the retention of U.S. forces in Italy.

General Marshall said that since the Secretary of State had cautioned the President that this matter might be brought up by the Prime Minister, he believed that the President should give the memorandum to the Secretary of State.

General Marshall also said that the Prime Minister had approached him on this subject of the retention of U.S. forces in Italy in a conversation on the preceding night.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President in the enclosure to JCS 1411/1, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall.

British Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 889; JCS 1424)

Admiral Leahy explained the relationship of the two papers under consideration.

General Marshall referred to the comment of General MacArthur on the employment of Commonwealth forces in CORONET and furnished Admiral Leahy with a copy of the dispatch containing the comment referred to.

General Arnold, in connection with this paper, asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the small contribution of aircraft by the British would add little to the effectiveness of air operations in the Pacific area and would complicate the problems of operation and support.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1424 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 889/1)

Command and Control in the War Against Japan (CCS 890, JCS 1407/2 and JCS 1407/3)

General Marshall said that he desired to make clear the difference in viewpoint of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff in regard to command and control in the war against Japan. He said that our insistence on retaining the present command relationship in the Pacific area might induce the British to ask for the same authority over the Southeast Asia Theater. He said we should offer no objections to a British proposal of this nature.

Admiral Gardner pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control the coordination of effort in the U.S. and British areas particularly in regard to timing. In this connection, Admiral Leahy said we should not refuse to consider any suggestions by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to the problems of coordination and timing.

The proposed draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and minor amendments were made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to JCS 1407/3 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 890/1)

U.S. Policy Concerning the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal (JCS 1418/1)

Admiral Leahy said that the President had not given any consideration to this matter as yet.

Admiral King read a digest of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, indicating the differences in points of view of the Army members and the Navy member.

Admiral Leahy said that the attitude of the State Department was to agree with the views of Admiral Willson to the effect that the Dardanelles should be a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia. He said that although there had not been much discussion of the Kiel Canal, the general view of the State Department was that it should be open to all nations.

Admiral Leahy asked if it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that free passage of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal would meet military requirements.

Admiral King pointed out that the Cattegat was in the same status as the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, since it was a waterway through both Danish and Swedish territorial waters. He thought therefore that the free passage of the Cattegat should be taken up at the same time.

Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the fortifying of the Cattegat by the Danes or the Swedes on the ground of national defense could not be prevented. He said that the difficulty in regard to the Dardanelles would be that Russia would want to fortify it.

Admiral King expressed the view that there was a good argument for demilitarizing the Dardanelles, Kiel Canal and the Cattegat, to which Admiral Leahy replied that there was also a good argument for demilitarizing the Panama Canal.

General Marshall proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Admiral Willson’s paper.

The draft of Admiral Willson’s paper was discussed and minor amendments made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the reply to the Secretary of State in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “B” of JCS 1418/1, as amended during discussion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[NormanStewart]

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union

[Tokyo,] July 17, 1945 — 4:20 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret       
urgent

910

The Domei news dispatches from your area on the 14th reported on your meetings with Lozovsky and Molotov respectively on the 10th and the 11th. With respect to the present important negotiations which are taking place, those concerned include only the members comprising the Supreme War Council: The Prime Minister, this minister, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Army, and the two Chiefs of Staff. In handling this matter, if this should ever leak out, the results would be most dire, I fear.

Therefore, on your side also this matter is limited to you, Mr. Ambassador, and I would like to ask you to observe particularly strict security measures in dispatching and receiving telegrams and the like so that we may have nothing to regret.

[NormanStewart]

740.00119 PW/7-1745

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 17, 1945
Top secret

Subject: DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF STATE

Participants:	Mr. Cordell Hull;
	Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

I telephoned Mr. Hull this morning to tell him that a reply had been received from Mr. Byrnes to the message from Mr. Hull which I had cabled to the Secretary yesterday with respect to the proposed proclamation by the heads of state setting forth what unconditional surrender would mean to Japan. I read the text of Mr. Byrnes’ reply to Mr. Hull as follows: “I agree that the issuance of statement should be delayed and, when made, should not contain commitment to which you refer.” Mr. Hull said he was not sure what Mr. Byrnes meant by “commitment.” I replied that I would not have interpreted it as a commitment, but I thought what he had in mind was paragraph 12 of the proposed statement. Mr. Hull stated that he had thought that point over carefully – the political side – and he appreciated the other side as well. He thought, however, that we would have a very difficult time there, and that was the reason he suggested that we wait for other developments, to see if something wouldn’t happen. I replied that I understood his feeling in this matter and agreed that the issuance of the statement should be delayed.

Mr. Hull inquired whether I would send him a copy of the telegram I had sent to Mr. Byrnes transmitting Mr. Hull’s message, as well as a copy of Mr. Byrnes’ reply. I said that I would be glad to get copies of those messages off to him at once.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[NormanStewart]

860c.01/7-945

The Acting Secretary of State to Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg

[Washington,] July 17, 1945

My Dear Senator Vandenberg: I have received your letter of July 9, 1945 in which you raise several questions concerning the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recently established in Warsaw, and the United States Government’s policy toward that Government. For greater convenience to you, I have considered individually, in the order of their appearance in your letter, your several statements and questions:

1. “There still seems to be no clear assurance that the Polish people will themselves have the final opportunity of untrammeled self-determination under this new Provisional Government which is imposed upon them by Britain, Russia and the United States, within Polish boundaries similarly dictated by these external powers.”

   Since the rival Polish groups in Poland and in London were unable to settle their differences, it was decided at Yalta to set up a Commission, composed of Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to the USSR, and Mr. W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the USSR, which would be empowered to bring these groups together in order that members of the Polish provisional government then functioning in Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad could consult with a view to the reorganization of the provisional government on a broader democratic basis, and the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could establish, diplomatic relations. Arrangements were finally made to bring the three groups of Poles together and they met in Moscow between June 17 and June 21 to discuss the composition of the new government. On June 21 the leaders informed the Commission established by the Crimea Conference that complete accord had been reached by them regarding the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. After studying the report submitted by the Polish leaders, the three Commissioners concluded that the Polish groups represented had set up a government in conformity with the Crimea decisions. The Commission’s decision was accepted by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

   Thus, since this Government was set up by the Poles themselves, the new Government was not imposed upon the Polish people by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

2. “I wish to inquire whether our responsibility, under the Yalta Agreement, is presumed to have been discharged by the creation of this new Provisional Government or whether the three-power obligation continues until the promised ‘free elections’ have actually occurred?”

   The formation of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity constituted a positive step in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions. The decisions will be further implemented when the new Government carries out its pledge to hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In this connection the Crimea decisions also provide that the Ambassadors in Poland of the three powers shall keep their respective Governments informed about the situation in Poland. It is clear, therefore, that the creation of the new Government does not alone discharge us from the responsibilities we assumed at Yalta.

3. “When the new Provisional Government begins to operate, will the United States be permitted to send full diplomatic and consular representatives into Poland?”

   Mr. Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in his message to President Truman requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations with his Government stated:

   I have the honor in the name of the Provisional Government of National Unity to approach the Government of the United States of America with a request for the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations and for the exchange of representatives with the rank of Ambassador.

   On the basis of the assurances given by the United States at the Crimea Conference, President Truman established diplomatic relations with the new Government and informed the Prime Minister that he had chosen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Poland the Honorable Arthur Bliss Lane. Ambassador Lane and initial members of his staff are making arrangements to proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible and, thus in accordance with the Crimea decisions, the Ambassador will be in a position to keep this Government “informed about the situation in Poland.”

4. “Will the American Press be permitted to send its uncensored correspondents into Poland?”

   In the discussions relative to the recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the United States Government made it clear that it expected American correspondents to be permitted to enter Poland in order that the American public may be informed of the situation in that area. You may be assured that the United States Government will use its full influence to attain this desired end.

   In addition to these conversations regarding the entry of American correspondents into Poland, the Department of State has for some time been pressing the Soviet authorities for authorization for American correspondents to enter eastern and southeastern Europe in order to be in a position to report accurately to the American public on developments there. The Department will continue its efforts to obtain permission for American correspondents to operate freely in all areas.

5. “Will the United States participate, on an equality with the other powers, under their Yalta obligation, in a general supervision of these ‘free elections’ to make certain they are ‘free’ in fact as well as name?”

   President Truman in his message to the Polish Prime Minister stated that “I am pleased to note that Your Excellency’s Government has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question thereby confirming the intention of Your Excellency’s Government to proceed with the holding of elections in Poland in conformity with the provisions of the Crimea decisions.” This undertaking with regard to the holding of free and unfettered elections was one of the vital points considered in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between this Government and the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

   As indicated above, the American Ambassador and his staff will make reports on the situation in Poland and on the basis of these reports this Government will give consideration to the question of whether supervision of elections would be advisable. If it is decided to supervise the elections, the United States Government will, of course, insist upon its right to participate on an equal basis with the other powers.

   In conclusion, I wish to point out that American policy with regard to Poland continues to be based on the decisions of the Crimea Conference. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman have gone on record that the United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state.

   I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you, since I believe it is of vital importance that the members of the Congress be afforded a clear understanding of questions relating to our foreign relations and policy. Under such conditions the State Department can best carry out the foreign policy of the United States as determined by the President and the Congress.

Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH C. GREW

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/1

Control and command in the war against Japan

With reference to the proposed boundaries for the extension of command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff have no objection from the military viewpoint to the inclusion of Indo-China south of latitude 15 degrees N. in the new area. This, however, is a matter primarily for decision by the Generalissimo and a shift does not appear practicable until such time as his agreement is obtained. Until that time it appears operations can go forward on the present basis.

As to the boundaries of the Australian command, this is a matter on which the solution worked out between the British and Australian Chiefs of Staff should be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

On the matter of the northern boundary of the area, the United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the necessity for retaining control by the United States of the Admiralty Islands for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of CCS 852/1.

The proposal to extend the British sphere of responsibility east of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area does not appear necessary or desirable until United States activities are cleared from the area, at which time the transfer should be effected. Aside from United States military resources in the area which must continue to be rolled up under United States military control, there are no military objectives or problems in the area except Ocean and Nauru Islands. At such time as British forces are prepared to recapture these islands, the United States will offer no objection.

The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and commanders from the responsibility for containing and mopping up the Japanese forces in the area in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have proposed 15 August as the date of turnover. Their objective would not be achieved by delaying the turnover until such time as Admiral Mountbatten is in position to advance through the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, it does not appear that retention of the area under United States responsibility until the end of the year will result in any activity additional to that which would occur if the area passed to Admiral Mountbatten on 15 August. The forces employed in the area are already primarily Australian. It is possible that if the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to take over the area shortly, the Australian Chiefs of Staff might be able to do so with subsequent adjustment with Admiral Mountbatten within the British Empire.

In summary, with regard to the matter of the Southeast Asia Command and the Southwest Pacific Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate action should be to pass to the British Chiefs of Staff as of 15 August or very shortly thereafter the area with boundaries as outlined in CCS 852/1.

Concerning the matter of higher strategic control in the war against Japan, the thought of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that the role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the European war cannot appropriately be applied to the Pacific war. In the Pacific war there exist two clearly delineated areas that, commanded by Admiral Mountbatten with the extensions proposed in the foregoing paragraphs, constitute an area of British Empire responsibility associated with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and perhaps eventually the French. The initial operational interest of the United States in this area has now greatly decreased. The Pacific area is devoted to the main effort, is organized under a command-and-control set-up peculiar to the United States, and has forces and resources overwhelmingly United States unless the Chinese, and possibly Russian, contribution is considered. Any change in the present control system which would involve added complications and more cumbersome procedures is unacceptable.

It appears that the interest of the United States in Admiral Mount-batten’s expanded theater now includes little more than sufficient review of operations to determine their impact on Allied operations and from the standpoint of lend-lease requirements, that they are adjusted to the main effort, and that they do not have an unduly adverse effect on the supply line to China through India and Burma. In line with this thought the British Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider some readjustment of the status of the Southeast Asia Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff, perhaps along the line of the present status of the Pacific Theater.

In summary, the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that increased participation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theater is impracticable.

[NormanStewart]

Truman-Stalin meeting, noon

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

		Present
United States			Soviet Union
President Truman			Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes			Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen			Mr. Pavlov
Fleet Admiral Leahy			Mr. Vyshinsky

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

Bohlen notes

12. July 17.

M. S. late.

Truman—[blank]

S—Chinese—delayed fly—no doctors

Tr: glad to—looking forw—

S—Personal relationship

Truman no difficulty in agreeing—

S—added—questions

T—no.

M—reads—some already on agenda—i e 1 division on German fleet. 2 Reparations. 3 Polish Question—continued of continued—Art—London Govt—western frontiers of Poland—(on list)

S—Yalta—did not decide frontiers of7

M—trusteeships for USSR.

S—no question of changing regime of trusteeship—settled S.F.—but maybe stupid—division of Italian colonies—other nationals—roughly [one word illegible]

M—relations with Axis satellite—

T—on ours

M—Spain Franco regime

T—ready—

B—trusteeship—other than Italian

M—yes—

S—Italian & other colonies.

T—what time

S—5 proposed—M & Eden

B—I know habits of rise late—getting—opportunity

T 5 today—4—after that

S—I have changed my habits since

B—[blank]

T—Gen Marshall like your Chiefs—they ready to discuss—Antonov—Air Marshal.

T—Chiefs of staff—no.

S—ours in Berlin could not attend. Re Franco—I should like to explain—F. regime not result of internal conditions of Spain—imposed on Spain—by Ger—Italian—thus a danger to Uni. Nations This regime harmful—by giving shelter to different fascist remnants—we thought it proper to break off with present regime & give change

T—I hold no brief for Franco study

S—right.

T—I would like—certain matters—first to US—take into consider—orderly—way—but—reasons

T—pleasure to meet for am—your present—welfare Soviet reps—& U J I am here to—be yr friend—deal directly yes—or no—no diplomat

S—good—help—work—USSR—always go along with US.

T—Byrnes.

B—[blank]

T—friends—all subject differences settle—frankly

S—good of course difference—but.

T Churchill—called—

S [one word illegible]

B—[blank]

S—I think so—Labor—surprise

T—expressed same 2 to 1 80 majority

S—yes—people won’t throw out W Ch—self Preservation

T—yes—1944 R

S—clever—Eng less clear Jap war—for—Russians & Amer—do their duty Eng think war mainly

T—P.M offered—

S—peculiar—mentality—bombed by Ger—not Japan war over for them—these feelings may work vs P.M. US people—give power to finish task—can Brit ask that—they believe war over—little interest in war vs Japan—may be

T—we are—not in dire straits as Eng was in re Germany—

S—we ready Aug mid of Aug needs agreement with China [one word illegible]

T—I think that

S—O M agreed—long negations—R. R. Dairen. P.A —differences. Soong—not hopeful by cable—I noticed S understood us than Chungking

T—yes—I had long talk He understands

S—he prepared to return to Chungking—& persuade return end of July—He asked a statement assurance re M—part of China—sovereignty—gave that assurance

S—asked assurances deal only with central govt & not with any nucleus. one Army—he had in mind Com army we shall give full assurances

T—very happy to hear that—settle matter

S—National 1 govt 1 army Treaty agreed—not. Ch 30 in place of 20 as Czech. agree—non-interference Ch internal affairs Soong—Sinkiang—Conflict—Ch author. & local pop—no assistance to rebels—[one word illegible]—special provisions—vs. interference could not do it help—suggested concession—Ch [one word and figure illegible] %—rest non Chinese local native schools set up. Soong agreed—won’t be able to calm by stick—improvements—Soong agreed.

T Soong—reasonable.

B—pts of difference—failure on—misunderstanding.

S—in Yalta agreement said—re RR. joint preeminent interests. be safeguard—same in Dairen & P.A. The Chinese don’t recognize preeminent int & get around it—what is our preeminent interests—no profits—equally divided—altho built by Russian money—no guards as Japs had—Chinese protect RR themselves—old treaty 80 yrs—back to China we suggest 30 yrs—agreed satisfaction—but what preem int lie—like to 1 maj vote on board of RR—Russian director they want Chinese director—& no maj—Dairen Chinese administration

B—jt administration

S—yes—but 1 Chinese maj—we propose—City Council—jt—board. Russian part

T—effect on our right—

S—free port—open—[one word illegible].

T—open door

S—not all smooth with Chinese—that is why he went home

S—mid August—as agreed at Yalta—we keep word

M	}	keep words
T

B—in accordance—with Yalta—OK—if in excess difficult

S—our wishes—more liberal than Yalta—restoration of Russian rights—entitled to station troops—80 yrs exclusively Russian—we have formal right—not done so we do not wish to add or deceive Chungking don’t understand horse trading—slow. try to wangle every thing—big pictures—very

T—big—Chin

B—	}	main interest free port
T—

B—when here from Soong

S—end July—to finish negotiation—Chinese 22 years no ties—no repre—can’t lose what one does not have.