Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

36

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Washington [Babelsberg], 16 July 1945
Top secret
SM-2607

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN LIBERATION OF TIMOR

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be advised as follows:

In reply to the State Department memorandum of 11 June 1945 requesting information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regret that no definite information can be given at this time. A draft letter on this subject, CCS 462/19, for transmission to the Department of State and Foreign Office was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval on 3 January 1945. A copy of the paper was sent to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which advised on 13 January 1945 (JCS 953/9) that the draft letter was considered satisfactory by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.

The British Chiefs of Staff have deferred action on CCS 462/19 pending the receipt of information from Australia on its ability to accommodate the Portuguese force for training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to revise the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in CCS 462/19 along broader lines which they hope the British Chiefs of Staff will be able to approve without further delay. The British Chiefs of Staff are being urged to take prompt action on this revised paper and it is hoped that the desired information will be forthcoming shortly.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA, Secretary

[Appendix]

The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to Col. John S. Wise, of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff

[Washington,] June 11, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum

An urgent telegram has been received from our Ambassador at Lisbon stating that Dr. Salazar believed that we should submit very soon the details of the plan for Portuguese participation “in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor” to use the language in our Note to him of November 28, 1944. You will recall that the British furnished similar assurances at the same time and that these assurances constituted practically the only consideration given by us in exchange for the facilities at Santa Maria. These facilities have been said by a high military authority to be “of incalculable importance.”

A review of the history of the Santa Maria negotiations suggests that the principal reason for the delay in obtaining the Portuguese assent to the use of Santa Maria was our delay in giving the assurances as to Timor, which were desired by Dr. Salazar. This is mentioned in order to emphasize the vital interest of the Portuguese in this matter.

The Department understand] that active discussions are being held by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the complexity of the shipping, supply and training questions involved is fully appreciated. However, the Department believes that it is highly important to furnish promptly evidence of our good faith in carrying out the plan to which we are committed. This is particularly important, in view of impending negotiations for long term post-war military rights in the Azores. The Department does not feel that it can start such negotiations until the Portuguese are fully satisfied on the question of Timor.

Therefore, the Department hopes that it will be possible to communicate to the Portuguese in the very near future the details of our plans as they now stand for Portuguese participation in any Timor expedition. If for any reason, it is not possible within the next few days to give information of this nature, the Department hopes that it will be given information on which to base an explanation to Dr. Salazar of the present state of the matter and the reasons for the delay in communicating to him the final plans.

PAUL T. CULBERTSON

37

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 462/25

Staff Conversations with Portugal

Reference: CCS 462 SERIES

  1. The report by the Combined Administrative Committee in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners in CCS 462/19 on the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission (CCS 462/15) relative to proposals for Portuguese participation in Allied operations for the recapture of Timor was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1945. This report recommended that a letter be dispatched to the Department of State and Foreign Office setting forth the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conversations with the Portuguese. Action on CCS 462/19 has been deferred at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result the Department of State and Foreign Office have not as yet been advised of the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conferences held with the Portuguese although these conversations were held some nine months ago. The Department of State is pressing the United States Chiefs of Staff for information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in any operations directed toward liberation of Timor.

  2. The United States Chiefs of Staff understand that the British Chiefs of Staff’s delay in acting on CCS 462/19 is due to lack of information from Australia on that country’s ability to provide accommodations for the Portuguese contingent. The end of the war in Europe makes out of date the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” of CCS 462/19 in two particulars. The United States Chiefs of Staff have therefore revised the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” to CCS 462/19 along broader lines. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office.4 In view of the urgency of the matter, the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate prompt consideration of this paper by the British Chiefs of Staff.

38

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War

Washington, 16 July 1945
Top secret
urgent

War 32887

For Colonel Kyle’s Eyes Only from Harrison for Mr. Stimson.

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.

39 
740.00119 EW/7-1645: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy

[Washington,] July 16, 1945
Secret
us urgent

33. (For Collado.)

In telegram 2250 of June 24, Pauley suggested that certain (unspecified) commodities received by Soviet Union on reparation account from satellite countries might be made available to American occupation forces through reverse-lend-lease arrangements. Dept drafted reply to effect that US waived none of its claim to reparations from satellites (though expecting none), that prospects of obtaining commodities from Soviet Union for US forces were so small as to preclude an approach to Soviet Union, and that US interest in exportable surpluses of the satellite countries centered on deliveries to UNRRA beneficiaries for relief of UNRRA and in turn US. This draft was taken by the Secretary.

When reply was drafted, Dept was thinking in terms of agricultural products, including food. It is apparent from later telegrams that Pauley is deeply interested in obtaining oil from Rumania, Hungary and Austria and has corresponded with PAW and SHAEF on this subject. His latest telegram to PAW asks for information on tanker requirements for Anglo-American oil for western and Mediterranean oil requirements from Anglo-American sources, and tanker savings possible if Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian sources could be used.

Suggest you consider asking the Secretary to enlarge the draft reply to 2250 of June 24 to indicate the interest of the US in obtaining oil from this area, and in paying dollars for such oil (if necessary) to Rumania and Hungary rather than USSR with understanding that these dollars be used primarily to satisfy US claims on these countries.

You may recall that Dept has already asked Embassy in Moscow for information on prospects of obtaining oil from Russian sources, or from Rumanian and Hungarian fields dominated by the Soviet Union. A long reply was received from Harriman to the effect that the Soviet Union position in oil continued to show a deficit. This exchange took place before Pauley’s arrival in Moscow.

[GREW]

40 
881.00/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 11 a.m.
Secret

5814

It is not clear from your 6984, July 11, whether British have definitely decided to raise Tangier question at Big Three meeting or whether Hoyer Millar was merely sounding us out on the idea. (Sent London 5814, rptd to Paris 3311, Tangier 155, and Moscow 1615)

Our own feeling is that this should not be done in view of the fact that France will not be represented at the meeting. If the British so desire however we would see no objection to their endeavoring through normal diplomatic channels to ascertain what views the Russians may have for the solution of the Tangier problem.

GREW

41 
740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1645: Telegram

The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State

Budapest, July 16, 1945 — 6 p.m.
Secret
priority

291

My telegrams 281 and 286, July 13.

Key tells me meeting of ACC is scheduled for tomorrow night when he expects to seek further clarification of Voroshilov’s note regarding changes in ACC procedure. Key does not intend to commit himself to acceptance of Soviet proposal pending further clarification and possible instructions, He is particularly desirous of securing statement from Voroshilov as to meaning of third paragraph of first section of latter’s note July 11 which seems to make directives of ACC on principal questions dependent on agreement with American and British representatives as proposed in your 57, May 28.

Sent Dept repeated to Moscow as No. 26 and London as No. 7.

SCHOENFELD

42

The Pittsburgh Press (July 16, 1945)

TRUMAN, CHURCHILL TOUR BERLIN; STALIN DELAYS BIG THREE SESSION
Russian late in arriving for meeting

President blames German for ruins
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

POTSDAM, Germany (UP) – President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill toured Berlin today while awaiting tomorrow’s opening session of the Big Three conference, for which the stage was set by the reported arrival of Premier Stalin this afternoon.

Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill took two hours out from pre-conference business to inspect the devastation of Berlin in separate whirlwind tours of the capital’s battered heart where Nazism rose and throve.

Has armored escort

Mr. Truman left Potsdam at 3:30 p.m. CET with an armored escort. For two hours he traveled through the streets of Central Berlin, critically viewing the destruction wrought by the Allied armies and air forces.

It was a serious study of destruction which Mr. Truman said was due to a man “who overreached himself.”

The President wedged his Berlin tour into a crowded schedule, which included a formal call by Mr. Churchill and a steady round of conferences with other leaders of the American delegation.

Blames Germans

When he stopped before the shattered, burned-out shell of the Chancellery, Mr. Truman observed with a pensive shake of his head: “It’s a terrible thing, but they brought it on themselves.”

He looked up at the jagged remains of a balcony where Adolf Hitler enflamed the world with his ranting speeches and said: “It’s just a demonstration of what can happen when a man overreaches himself. I never saw such destruction. I don’t know whether they’ll learn anything from it or not.”

Blank stares from Germans

As Mr. Truman looked and spoke, ragged Germans stumbled through the rubble still littering sections of the city. The Germans paid little attention to him. When they did, it was mostly blank, sullen stares.

Mr. Truman, confident and in excellent spirits after his eight-day sea voyage from Washington, was ready to brush aside as much formality as possible and get down to business immediately.

His two main objectives were a speedy end to the Pacific War and an agreement on the future world peace which would be at least the forerunner to a full-dress peace conference sometime after Japan’s complete surrender.

Discussions secret

The Big Three discussions were cloaked by a strictly-enforced censorship that even banned reporters from the immediate conference scene and the only current news while they last – perhaps three weeks or more – was expected to come from periodic official communiqués.

But informed observers believed the agenda would cover at least these major topics:

  • Russia’s plans in the Pacific and the results of her interrupted discussions with China.

  • The joint administration of Germany.

  • The reparations to be exacted from beaten Germany: whether in money, goods or manpower or all three. Russia reportedly is asking for four million German men to rebuild her ruined cities.

  • Settlement of the various territorial claims now being advanced by France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.

  • The Anglo-Russian conflict over Middle Eastern oil resources, including the tie-in problem of the Arab-Jewish impasse in Palestine.

  • Russian territorial demands on Turkey and the Soviet request for revision of the Montreux agreement of 1936, under which the Turks were Permitted to fortify the Dardanelles.

  • Reorganization of the Soviet-sponsored Austrian government, which Britain and the United States have refused to recognize.

  • The still-unsolved question of the hundreds of thousands of Polish troops who have reiterated their loyalty to the defunct exile government in London and have refused to return to Poland.

Canal control up

More remote is the possible discussion of a Russian seat on the control board of the Suez Canal and future joint control of the Panama Canal which neither Britain nor the United States is likely to concede.

The Levant states’ demand for complete independence from France also may come before the Big Three, although in the light of French resentment at Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s exclusion from the conference no definite action on that point appeared likely.

Unconfirmed reports reaching London said Gen. de Gaulle might be invited to join the conference later.

Docks at Antwerp

The President stepped down the gangway of the cruiser USS Augusta at Antwerp at 11:10 a.m. yesterday (5:10 a.m. ET), to become the first Chief Executive to set foot on Western European soil since Woodrow Wilson went to Paris 26 years ago for the peace that failed.

Accompanied by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Fleet Adm. William F. Leahy and a small party of advisers. the smiling man from Missouri was met by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Adm Harold R. Stark, Charles Sawyer, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium Charles Sawyer and local British and American military commanders.

Flies to Potsdam

The presidential party motored to the Melsbroeck Airdrome on the outskirts of Brussels and Mr. Truman boarded Gen. Eisenhower’s special plane, arriving in Potsdam at 4:15 p.m. (10:15 a.m. ET).

At Potsdam, he was greeted by Soviet Marshal Gregory K. Zhukov’s deputy, Gen. Alexander Sokolovsky, and Col. Gen. Alexander Gorbatov, Red Army commandant of Berlin.

Immediately after the arrival ceremonies, he was whisked 15 miles away to his official residence, a 30-room house expropriated from a wealthy Berliner and furnished by the Red Army, within 10 minutes’ drive of the meeting place.

Churchill also flies

Mr. Churchill, fresh from a week-long vacation in Southern France, flew into Potsdam about two hours after the President, accompanied by his daughter, Mary.

Wearing the uniform of an army colonel, the 73-year-old Prime Minister lit up his inevitable cigar as soon as he touched the ground tucked his stuck under his arm and went briskly through the reception ceremony. He broke off the official inspection of the honor guard abruptly, however, apparently to avoid undue strain.

Throughout the late hours yesterday, planes were shutting in continually with new arrivals for the meeting, including most of the top-ranking American and British military staff officers whose presence suggested strongly that the Pacific War might play an important part in the discussions.

Stimson there

Among the American arrivals were Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Air Forces commander, and Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Services of Supply.

Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, was already in Berlin, along with W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, and Presidential Envoy Joseph E. Davies.

In Mr. Churchill’s entourage were virtually all the top army, navy and air force commanders who helped direct the defeat of Nazi Germany, plus Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Labor Party Leader Clement Attlee, who was invited by Mr. Churchill against the possibility of a reversal in the still-untallied general election that might unseat the present Conservative government.

Belgians greet Truman

From the moment the USS Augusta poked her nose into the Scheldt estuary and started upriver toward the battle-scarred port of Antwerp, cheering crowds of Belgians were on hand to greet President Truman.

Throughout the brief plane trip from Brussels to Potsdam, the President was interested in the utter destruction wrought on the German cities below and the apparent fertility of the surrounding farm lands.

The latter raised the question of whether Europe could produce more food for its own peoples with a resultant lowering of the feeding burden on the United States and other Allied countries. It was expected the President would bring that issue up at the Big Three meeting.

Mr. Truman was hopeful that the entire world could be given a fairly comprehensive picture of the day-to-day negotiations and said he favored issuance of regular communiqués during the discussions.

43

Truman likely to rush home from Berlin

Believed to have canceled tour plans
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer

WASHINGTON – President Truman is believed to have canceled plans for a Western European tour to return to Washington immediately after the Big Three conference.

There have been published reports that he would visit Denmark, Norway and Great Britain before returning here.

Less definite, but certainly under consideration, were plans for further extensive air travel. There was reason to believe the party might have gone at least into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dinner coats ordered

It was to have been a strictly plush operation, too. Astonished press association reporters chosen to accompany the presidential party across the Atlantic were directed to take with them not only dinner coats but white ties and tails. There was suspicion at first that it was a gag. Then there was despair because tailcoats were hard to find in Washington.

Other correspondents who desired to fly to Europe after the Big Three conference to join the presidential party were advised that the cost of their journey might reach $5,000.

Enthusiasm dims

The enthusiasm and number of travel-candidates immediately began to diminish. Now the few who are willing to lay out the $5,000 are being told that post-conference travel plans are being reconsidered and probably will be abandoned.

The President reversed himself in mid-ocean, which was approximately his position when word spread that he might curtail his journey.

The most inviting speculation about the President’s new plans concerned the possibility that Japan may be nearer unconditional surrender than has been assumed. Supporting this theory is the U.S. fleet bombardment of Japan which has been going on for several days.

Early victory doubted

Opposing that line of thought is the fact that several senior military officers have said recently that the Pacific war is far from over.

If Mr. Truman decided to hurry home in expectation of the early collapse of Jap resistance, then there evidently has been some authoritative communication from Japan within the last few days. If so, that fact scarcely can be long concealed.

Congressional recess plans presumably would have to be changed if Japan is about to quit. The House will recess Saturday until October 1, according to the present schedule. The Senate will quit when it has disposed of the United Nations Charter, perhaps by the end of next week.

44

Simms43

Simms: History’s greatest decisions slated at Big Three meeting

Potsdam session to test workability of United Nations conference rules
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

WASHINGTON (SHS) – Through President Truman at the Big Three meeting at Potsdam, the people of the United States are about to make some of the most important decisions in all their history.

Not even the 1815 Congress of Vienna faced such tremendous issues. The Napoleonic wars of 130 years ago left Europe comparatively intact. Today nearly the entire continent is a shambles, materially, morally and politically. And the world’s future depends on whether President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin can lay the foundations for a new structure.

Must agree on rules

This means, so far as the American people are concerned, that the President must commit the United States to international cooperation far beyond anything ever before contemplated, let alone attempted.

Actually the Big Three meeting at Potsdam is more important than the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. At San Francisco, rules were formulated for safeguarding the future peace. Potsdam will largely determine whether or not the San Francisco rules will, in fact, be workable

What is widely overlooked is that peace terms have yet to be agreed upon. In fact, there is considerable doubt that a full-dress peace conference will be held. Already some of the Allies have made unilateral and bilateral decisions vitally affecting the peace, often without bothering to consult other interested parties. Potsdam will have to review these faits accompli and reconcile them, if possible, with decisions yet to be made.

8 points to consider

The Big Three must also consider:

  • What is to be done with Germany and the German people; Europe’s new boundaries; whether vast populations are to be shifted from one area to another and, if so, where and how; how to govern what is left of Germany and whether it will be Sovietized or democratized.

  • Allied policy with regard to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Lativa, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Middle East, Hungary and Austria.

  • The role of France in Europe. Up to the present, France has been absent from these meetings despite the fact that she will play a vital role in the world, especially in Western Europe.

  • Problems presented by Italy and Italian colonies.

  • Allied policy toward Spain, Switzerland and other neutrals.

  • The question of lifting the news blackout now virtually complete in zones occupied or controlled by Soviet Russia.

  • European relief – social, financial and economic; and possibly–

  • Russo-Japanese neutrality. This would entail a review of the Cairo pronouncement of Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek regarding Manchuria, Korea and other Japanese conquests and also of Russia’s China policy in the light of the recent Soong discussions in Moscow.

Small nations voiceless

Setting the fate of small nations without letting them be heard admittedly is an anachronism after a war which presumably was fought partly in defense of the sovereignty of small nations. And much has been said about the autocratic behavior of the Big Fur (Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia) at the Congress of Vienna. But there the little nations were at least permitted to talk, even if they were not always listened to.

At Potsdam, it seems, the little peoples of the world will be more or less voiceless – unless, that is, President Truman speaks up for them as some believe he may. He knows public opinion in America would not long support the use of force to perpetuate an unjust peace.

45

Shapiro: Who’s ‘the brain’?

By L. S. B. Shapiro

BERLIN, Germany – Security precautions instituted for the Big Three Conference have been intensified as a result of sinister underground developments uncovered among the apparently prostrate and docile German population.

American war crimes investigation officers working closely with British and Canadian field security sections have discovered the existence of several Nazi underground movements, at least one of which is nationwide in scope and is organized on the imaginative scale of a Conan Doyle thriller.

Somewhere in Germany there is one man whose identity is camouflaged as thoroughly as is humanly possible, and who alone knows all the ramifications of this nationwide secret organization.

Allied authorities are aware of his existence and of that or this movement. As yet, he has not begun operations, but his influence is being felt and German democrats are freely warning the Allies that the current quiet may be replaced by highly organized violence on the part of the underground before the end of this war.

Patriots ‘spill the beans’

The known history of this organization reveals its potential danger. as far back as 1942, a special Gestapo commission was formed to study the resistance methods of the French, Russian and Polish undergrounds, to examine the reasons for their success and analyze the failure of German countermeasures against them in order that a foolproof German underground might be quickly organized if and when necessary.

The report of this commission has now become the bible and constitution of the new Nazi terroristic underground being prepared for action.

Allied investigators have come up against the first concrete results of the Gestapo study. Experience taught the Gestapo that “properly interrogated” French or Polish patriots often revealed the whole network of their organizations and made possible crushing countermeasures.

Now, in the new German organization, the cardinal rule is that each cell works in complete independence of the others, and knows nothing of the identity or even of the existence of other cells who may be operating close by. Only one supreme leader knows all and directs all.

Not being underestimated

This melodramatic arrangement is not being underestimated by the Allied authorities. In addition to many unapprehended SS and Gestapo thugs assumed to be in hiding, there is one other frightening fact: stock-taking of captured or surrendered German armament reveals that one-third of the nation’s small arms – from pistols to heavy machine guns – have, as yet, been unaccounted for. Undoubtedly the men of the new Nazi underground movement will be heavily armed, and because they know the death penalty must inevitably follow their capture, they will snoot it out to the finish if caught.

This already has happened when our security troops discovered a buried munitions dump.

A great army of Allied police is now scouring Germany in an effort to uproot this organization before it can get started. For these men, the last and most desperate battle of Germany has not yet really begun.

46

Youngstown Vindicator (July 16, 1945)

Dorothy Thompson1

ON THE RECORD —
Uncertainties of the Big Three meeting

By Dorothy Thompson

The Big Three conference in Potsdam is considerably more important than the one held in San Francisco, for the course of the world is not determined by generalities and overall formulas, but by specific actions. In Potsdam, very important and definite political problems have to be solved in agreement. Yet the conference contains political elements of great uncertainty.

The United States and Russia do not know what, in a few weeks’ time, will be the political situation in Britain. Britain and Russia have no experience whatsoever of President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes. There has been no preliminary conference between Britain and the United States in contrast to the condition of permanent conference which existed between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

In all previous conferences, the military situation occupied the foreground. Political issues tended to be postponed, or settled in rather ambiguous agreements, Now the European war is over, political issues are preeminent, and every further postponement increases the number of faits accompli.

Labor Party’s policy

A change of government in Britain would, theoretically, lessen the possibilities of friction between the Soviet Union and Britain. Clement R. Attlee is accompanying Churchill in order to make agreements satisfactory to the Labor Party. But every change in government brings in new personalities and new imponderables, and it is doubtful whether Mr. Attlee can fully foresee the results of a victory for his own party. A party in opposition is never the same as a party in power.

The foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes, and their negotiation capacities, are still an “X.” Mr. Byrnes was at Yalta – but not as Secretary of State. Mr. Truman has never participated in an international conference. Both are pledged to continue the Roosevelt policy – though Mr. Truman has said he would not be bound by verbal agreements made by his predecessor. But in any case Mr. Roosevelt made his policy as he went along. He died in a most critical moment, and left no testament or blueprint for his successors.

What we do know is the temperament and general attitude of the new President and Secretary of State. Though they may “agree” with Roosevelt and Stettinius, they are quite different men.

Mr. Byrnes, for instance, is a logical successor, not to Mr. Stettinius, but to Cordell Hull. In fact, the similarity is striking. Both are Southern Democrats whose experience has been in Congress and the world of politics, and not in the world of business. Both have solid support in the Senate which makes them invulnerable in the administration.

However other men around President Roosevelt might have disagreed with Mr. Hull, Mr. Roosevelt neither could or would have dismissed him. Mr. Byrnes’ position is equally strong. He will not be a satellite in the presidential solar system, but an equal star, and, for the time being, he is next in line for the presidency. President Roosevelt was his own foreign minister, Mr. Truman will not be.

President Roosevelt, also, was a much more subtle and versatile personality than his successor, inclined always to fit himself into situations as they arose and finesse his way among his allies. He had unlimited faith in his own capacity to adjust himself and the American policy to each successive change and crisis. He believed less in fixed principles and firm agreements than in the “climate” of human relationships and in his own capacity to steer with the wind in off-reef directions. That was both his talent and his weakness. Neither Mr. Truman nor Mr. Byrnes has that talent, so they must and will try to avoid the weaknesses.

No preliminary meeting

Mr. Roosevelt liked preliminary conferences, because he liked to sniff out which way the wind was blowing. It is interesting that Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes have avoided one. Apparently they do not want previous commitments, and are jealous for American independence and freedom of action.

As far as I can sense things, after a long absence from home, I expect a more stubborn attitude, a greater insistence on principles and on agreements that would “stand up in a court of law,” less tendency to leave matters to wide interpretation, and insistence on less ambiguity.

Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes are politicians, who may be presumed to have an eye on the presidential elections of 1948, and are susceptible to American public opinion. Mr. Roosevelt was a master at making public opinion. They are not. We may expect, therefore, a greater instinct for those constants in the American mind that are essential for the policies of the parties.

1 Like
47

U.S. State Department (July 16, 1945)

871.6363/6-2945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
us urgent

1621

Embassy may have received Dept’s Instruction No. 678 of July 2 containing purported text Russo-Rumanian economic agreement of May 8 summarized in Bucharest’s tel May 17 reported [repeated?] to Moscow as 97. Dept’s A-276 June 29 contains instructions for protest to Soviet Govt on removal of oil equipment from Rumania and gives general guidance for further discussions with Soviets on petroleum matters. Bucharest’s telegram of July 8 repeated to Moscow as 121 indicates possibility of new “fait accompli” based on agreement of May 8.

Dept now feels that strong presentation of views of this Govt both about the economic pact and the oil arrangement foreshadowed in Bucharest 121 to you should not be delayed pending receipt of A-276. You are therefore requested immediately inform appropriate Soviet authorities of this Govt’s concern over the possible application of the Russo-Rumanian trade pact in view of the policy of United States Govt of conducting trade with every nation free of discrimination arising from exclusive economic arrangements between nations, and also in view of our common interest in an equitable allocation of products in short supply in reconstruction period during which Soviet presumably wishes United States’ cooperation.

Please further inform Soviet authorities that conclusion of any arrangement affecting Rumanian oil or other industries such as indicated in Bucharest 121 July 8 would by same token be of equal concern to this Govt and should be deferred pending forthcoming tripartite discussions. This issue and the principles involved therein are on the United States agenda.

With specific reference to petroleum, please point out sacrifices accepted by American people in rationing of fuel oil and gasoline substantially restricting their military, industrial, and civilian consumption and sacrifices accepted by U.S. oil industry in allocation of equipment to the USSR. You should point out that oil picture in Rumania is only one aspect of a worldwide problem and that conclusion of treaties granting exclusive rights and of monopolistic corporate arrangements between Soviet and Rumanian Governments as well as arbitrary measures such as removing equipment, monopolizing petroleum supplies and delaying entry of American petroleum experts may force the United States to reconsider its policies which have hitherto been so favorable to Soviets with respect to supplying petroleum, technical data, equipment and products.

Please inform Harriman.

Repeated to Bucharest as 354 of July 16.

GREW
J[OHN] A. L[OFTUS]

48

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Monday, July 16:

During the forenoon the President worked on his mail and conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.

At 1100 Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Commander C. R. Thompson, RN (Naval Aide to the Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister’s daughter (Junior Commander Mary Churchill of the ATS) called on the President. After exchanging greetings, the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Cadogan conferred for some two hours.

A White House mail pouch arrived this afternoon. It had been sent from Washington by a JCS courier. The President signed this mail, which included legislative bills S134, S233, S234, S574, S672 and S956.

Generalissimo Stalin had not arrived at Potsdam, so the opening session of the conference scheduled for this afternoon was postponed to await his arrival.

The President took advantage of the delay in the opening of the conference and made an unscheduled visit to Berlin. He left the Little White House by motor car at 1540, accompanied by Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy…

The President and his party returned to the White House at 1735.

The three Foreign Secretaries held regular daily meetings to prepare the work of the conference. The first of these meetings was held this afternoon at Cecilienhof with Secretary Byrnes presiding. It was agreed, however, that the chairmanship of these planning meetings would be rotated.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings in their conference hall at Babelsberg.

After returning to the Little White House the President worked on his mail. He approved legislative bills S.J. Res. 31 and H.E. 3368.

2000: Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley and Mr. Davies were dinner guests of the President this evening. A band from the Second Armored Division played a concert on the lower White House grounds during and after dinner.

At 2200 Mr. Davies returned to the Little White House to deliver an urgent message to the President.

49

The Syonan Shimbun (July 17, 1945)

Potsdam confab

LISBON (Domei, July 16) – The opening of the “3-power” meeting at Potsdam was postponed until tomorrow, owing to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin’s delay in arriving at the scene of the talks, according to a United Press dispatch from Potsdam.

50

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 17, 1945)

Konferenz von Potsdam eröffnet

…

51

L’Aube (July 17, 1945)

Dix semaines après la victoire –
La première conférence de paix s’ouvre à Potsdam

Devant l’ordre du jour très chargé on prévoit au mins 15 jours de débats

Berlin, 15 juillet – L’aérodrome où devaient avoir lieu les atterrissages était interdit au public depuis huit jours. C’est à 16 heures 30 que le président Truman arrivait de Bruxelles, avec une escorte de douze avions de chasse qui resplendissaient au soleil. Outre le secrétaire d’État, M. James Byrnes, le chef d’État était accompagné des généraux Marshall et Arnold, de l’amiral Leahy, de MM. Stimson, secrétaire à la Guerre, Harriman, ambassadeur américain à Moscou, et de l’ancien ambassadeur Joseph Davies. Le général Eisenhower descendit d’avion peu après.

Plus tard, arrivait à son tour M. Churchill, avec une autre escadrille d’avions. Le premier ministre, qui était en uniforme de colonel des hussards, fumait son traditionnel cigare et souriait à sa fille Mary qui l’accompagne.

Toute la région où se tiendra la conférence est sévèrement gardée.

De leur côté, MM. Eden, Attlee et leur suite ont gagné Potsdam.

Entretiens préliminaires et visite des ruines de Berlin

Berlin, 16 juillet – On croit savoir que M. Churchill et le président Truman se sont rencontrés à Potsdam aujourd’hui. Leur entrevue n’a eu aucun caractère officiel.

Les chefs d’états-majors sont également réunis pour des discussions préliminaires.

Il n’y a toujours pas de confirmation officielle du fait que le maréchal Staline est ou n’est pas à Berlin.

Le président Truman, visitant Berlin dans la journée, a vu notamment les ruines du Reichstag, celles de la porte de Brandebourg et « Unter den Linden », Son itinéraire était jalonné d’une très nombreuse garde et les civils allemands étaient maintenus à distance. M. Churchill a suivi exactement la même route que le président des États-Unis.

Selon la radio britannique, la conférence proprement dite ne commencerait que demain.

52

Les conseillers des « Grands » joueront aussi leur rôle

Or, depuis Yalta, changements sont intervenus

…

53

Il n’y a pas de juges à Berlin

par Maurice Schumann

…

54

U.S. State Department (July 17, 1945)

800.796/7-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State

London, July 17, 1945 — 10 a.m.
Secret
7182

With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams reporting various efforts on the part of the British to have steps taken which would lead to a fairly early agreement on the commercial aspects of air transport with the United States, Sir William Hildred informed the Civil Air Attaché that he hoped and expected to be able to go to the United States between now and August 2 (when the Civil Aviation Radio Conference opens) partly in connection with setting up of the Interim Council but primarily to discuss the Fifth Freedom with Pogue and Warner. The Department will observe that Sir William made this statement a day or two after the closing of the Empire Aviation conference and that the suggestion is now not that Pogue come to England but that Hildred go to the United States. He said frankly that he believed he would be more successful in obtaining Swinton’s approval for the trip, which he had been unable to do before, in view of the “progress in thinking” which the Empire Aviation Conference developed. He said he thought that the British Government would agree to an arrangement with the United States and with other countries which set forth the principle that (1) the more international air transportation the better for mankind, (2) all economic and other burdensome restrictions on civil aviation should be removed and (3) the principle of the Fifth Freedom in general was necessary to the successful development of air transportation. He felt that where it could be demonstrated that the unrestricted exercise of short-range pickup traffic by strong nations destroyed or seriously upset some regional airlines, the Interim Council should be able to rectify such obvious injustices. He thought that the major international airlines would recognize sufficiently the value to them of prosperous feeder line services along their routes so that they would be careful not to put them out of business. Sir William stressed the necessity of keeping the foregoing strictly confidential.

WINANT

55 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1745

The Secretary General of the British Delegation to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal

Berlin, July 17th, 1945
FO 11 (1)

Dear Cannon, It is very good news that you are here as the expert on South-east Europe. I am supposed to be the same for our delegation, and we must get together soon.

Meanwhile I enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador at Belgrade, which you may find interesting. The reference in the last paragraph is to the proposal, which your Embassy has I think also reported, that this meeting should issue a reminder that the Three Powers expect the Tito-Šubašić agreement to be fully carried out in the near future. I know that Mr. Eden is very anxious to get this through, and perhaps we could meet and discuss it. Could you give me a ring?

Yours very sincerely,
W G HAYTER

[Enclosure]

Telegram From His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade, 11 July

It was recently reported in Belgrade press that it was intended to hold in the near future a congress of national liberation fronts of various states in Yugoslav Federation. The aim of the congress would be to weld these national liberation fronts into a national front for the whole of Yugoslavia.

I heard this morning that Dr. Šubašić had been invited to become a member of Steering Committee of this congress and I took an opportunity to question him about it in the course of private conversation this afternoon.

He confirmed to me that he had received such an invitation. He had, however, not yet returned a reply. He intended to discuss the matter with M. Kardelj and to take the line that if he were being invited as an individual he could not accept. This would mean that he was merely being used as a figurehead. If however he were permitted first to call a meeting of the executive of Croat Peasant Party and secure a mandate to represent the party he would then be in a position to take a constructive part in the congress. A possible alternative might be that he should meet Dr. Maček, ascertain his views and seek a mandate of some kind from him.

The idea at the back of Dr. Šubašić’s mind in this is that a national front which would be a coalition of the parties each having a separate existence, would probably be the best solution of the country’s political problems; even though a dominant position in such a coalition was held by the Communist party.

As he sees the position the present régime have all physical power in their hands. A national front is therefore inevitable. The only alternative to it would be civil war. This would only be possible with foreign armed assistance which is out of the question. It is equally inevitable that a transitory role in political life of this country will be played for some time at any rate by the Communist party. The problem therefore is to prevent the national front from becoming a thinly disguised one-party régime. This could be done by creating it as a true coalition of the parties even though Communist party’s influence in the coalition was preponderant.

It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Šubašić terms for his participation in the congress are accepted by Marshal Tito. If so, it may be that some kind of a coalition will emerge from proposed congress. Kardelj assured him that after the congress complete freedom of the press and of political activity would be granted. The present idea is that the congress should precede meeting of broadened AVNOJ.

It is Dr. Šubašić’s impression that at the moment leaders of this regime are manoeuvring and waiting for the results of the Big Three meeting. He is therefore doubly anxious that some kind of a reminder about Tito-Šubašić agreement should issue from it.