Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Davies Mr. Attlee Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Allen Field Marshal Alexander
Mr. Cohen

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

MR. MOLOTOV presented the following report as Rapporteur of the Morning Meeting of the Foreign Ministers:

The following questions were discussed by the Foreign Ministers:

1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy
It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission [Subcommittee] to give preliminary examination to the two drafts which had been submitted and to have the matter considered by the Foreign Ministers.

2. Economic principles in regard to Germany
There was a discussion of paragraphs 13 and 18, as well as a new paragraph 19, submitted by the Soviet Delegation. At the meeting Molotov said that he withdrew his amendment regarding paragraph 13 and he suggested that paragraph 18 be deleted on the understanding that the matter would be given study by the Allied authorities in Germany and that in case no agreement was reached in the Control Council the matter be decided by the Governments concerned. Agreement was not reached on this matter and it was referred to the Big Three. Molotov had submitted to the British and Americans a new paragraph 19. Secretary Byrnes said it was not acceptable. Molotov then submitted a new paragraph dealing with the question of priority between reparations and exports in payment for German imports. No agreement was reached and this matter was referred to the Heads of Government.

3. Council of Foreign Ministers
The text submitted by the Drafting Commission [Committee] was approved without amendment.

4. Trusteeship
The draft of the Soviet Delegation on this question was discussed. Mr. Eden said that in the first place they should settle the question as to whether colonies should be detached from Italy and if so which. He had argued that this should be settled when the peace treaty is drawn up. The question of to whom the trusteeship of any Italian colonies should be given should be settled by the United Nations Organization. Secretary Byrnes proposed that the matter be put off until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Molotov had proposed to refer the Soviet memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September. Eden had stated that there was no need to refer the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers, since the question of the Italian colonies would arise automatically when the peace treaty with Italy was drawn up. Molotov asked that notice be taken that all of the questions in the Soviet memorandum would be raised at the September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany
On the proposal of the American Delegation it was agreed to convey to the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied troops in occupation of Germany all decisions of this Conference relating to them after they had been agreed upon with the Provisional Government of France. It was decided to set up a sub-committee to deal with the matter, consisting of Messrs. Murphy, Riddleberger, Strang, Harrison, Gusev and Sobolev.

6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
A commission was appointed to give preliminary consideration to the memorandum of the United States Delegation, consisting of Messrs. Clayton and Pauley, Brand and Coulson, and Arutunian and Garachin [Gerashchenko].

7. Tangier
The Soviet draft was discussed and it was agreed to accept the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that the area including the city of Tangier and the zone adjacent to it should remain under international control. It was also agreed that the whole question of Tangier should be discussed at the next conference in Paris of the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.

8. Approval of Telegram to China and France
The text submitted by the commission to consider this matter was approved with no amendment. It was decided that the telegram should be sent forty-eight hours before the publication of the communiqué on the results of the Conference.

9. Agenda for the Meeting of the Heads of Governments
The following agenda was agreed upon for the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Governments:

  1. Turkey.
  2. Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area.
  3. Syria and the Lebanon.
  4. Iran.

Turkey and the Black Sea Straits

STALIN said that it appeared that what had been approved by the Foreign Ministers was automatically approved by the Big Three.

THE PRESIDENT said that this was satisfactory to him.

STALIN inquired if the decisions of the Foreign Ministers was [were] regarded as accepted.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative.

Returning to the subject of Turkey, THE PRESIDENT remarked that he did not think that the Prime Minister had finished his remarks when they had adjourned at the last meeting.

CHURCHILL replied that he had finished his remarks at the last meeting when he had stated that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the Straits and that he did not think that Turkey would agree to that proposal.

STALIN remarked that yesterday Churchill had said that the Russians had frightened the Turks and that one of the chief points was that the Russians had concentrated too many troops in Bulgaria. He considered it necessary to give information on this point. Churchill’s information was out of date. He did not know what information Churchill had been given by the Turks, but Russia had less troops in Bulgaria than the British had in Greece.

CHURCHILL inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece.

STALIN replied: “Five divisions.”

CHURCHILL said there were only two.

STALIN inquired with respect to armored units, and asked how strong the British divisions were.

CHURCHILL said they had about 40,000 troops altogether.

STALIN replied that they had about 30,000.

CHURCHILL said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander as he preferred that he give the figures.

STALIN replied that he was not seeking for accuracy but that he believed Churchill 100%. He said that should it prove necessary General Antonov could make a detailed report, but one thing was clear—the Turks had nothing of which to be afraid. The Turks had about twenty-three divisions and there was nothing to be afraid of. That was the Russian information.

As to the rectification of the frontiers, which might have frightened the Turks, he said that perhaps it was the possible restoration of the pre-war frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia. He pointed out that this question of the restoration of frontiers would not have been brought up if the Turks had not brought up the question of an alliance. An alliance meant that they would defend the frontiers of Turkey, just as Turkey would defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet opinion the frontiers in the area mentioned was [were] incorrect and they had told the Turks that if there was to be an alliance the frontiers had to be rectified. If this were not done the question of an alliance would be dropped. What was there to be afraid of?

The third question was that of the Straits. He drew their attention to the fact that the position of such a great state as the Soviet Union was the following. The Montreux Convention had been decided against Russia. Russia considered it inimical. Turkey had the right under this treaty to block the Straits to any shipping not only if Turkey were at war but also if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The Convention also left it to Turkey to decide when this threat appeared. Thus, an impossible situation was created in which Turkey was free to block the Straits when she thought they were threatened. The situation at the moment was that the Russians had the same rights in the Straits as the Japanese Emperor. This was ridiculous, but it was a fact. The result was that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He said that they could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. Hence, the point at issue was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force.

CHURCHILL, who appeared to misunderstand, said: “Not law?”

STALIN replied that force was necessary just as in the case of the Panama Canal, which was defended by the American navy and for shipping through the Suez Canal, which was guaranteed by the British navy. He said that if they thought that naval bases in the Straits were unacceptable to the Turks, then let them give the Soviet Union some other base where the Russian fleet could repair and refuel and where in cooperation with its allies the Russian fleet could protect the Straits. For the situation to continue as it was would be ridiculous.

THE PRESIDENT said that the attitude of the American Government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised, thought, however, that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. He had come to the conclusion after a long study of history that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned; by Austria in the case of the previous war, and by Germany in the case of this war. He thought it should be the business of this Conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again. He thought that to a great extent this could be accomplished by arranging for the passage of goods and vessels through the Straits on the basis of free intercourse just as was the case in American waters. He said that he was presenting a paper and that he wanted to see Russia and England and all other countries have free access to all the seas of the world. The President then read his paper on the free and unrestricted navigation of inland waterways.

THE PRESIDENT then continued that he did not want to engage in another war twenty-five years from now over the Straits or the Danube. He said that our ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and which could support itself. He wanted a Europe that would make Russia, England, France and all other countries in it happy and with which the United States can trade and be happy as well as prosperous. He thought that his proposal was a step in that direction.

He said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the Marshal had said he was willing to do, but he pointed out that the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States and the whole world.

CHURCHILL said that he strongly supported Stalin’s wish for a revision of the Montreux Convention with the object of securing for Soviet Russia free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits by merchant and war ships alike in peace or war. He entirely agreed with the President when he said that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the Great Powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the Marshal would consider this alternative in contrast to that of a base in close proximity to Constantinople. With regard to the other waterways, they were in full accord with the general line that the President had taken in his statement. He thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the Great Powers. He also attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement between the Three Powers represented at the Conference.

THE PRESIDENT said there was no doubt regarding their agreement on the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention.

CHURCHILL added “and on the purpose of that revision.”

STALIN said that he would have to read attentively the proposal made by the President, which was now being translated, before he could discuss it.

Transfer to the Soviet Union of Koenigsberg

STALIN said that this question had been discussed at the Tehran Conference. The Russians had complained that all ports of the Baltic freeze. They froze for a shorter or longer period but they froze. The Russians had stated that it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin’s arguments in favor of this were that the Russians had suffered and had lost so much blood that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory so as to give some small satisfaction to the tens of millions of their inhabitants who had suffered in this war. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister had raised any objections and this question had been agreed upon by the three of them. He said they were anxious to see this agreement approved at this Conference.

THE PRESIDENT said he was ready to agree in principle although it would be necessary to study ethnographic and other questions, but in principle he agreed.

CHURCHILL said that Stalin was right in saying that the matter had been raised at Tehran and he added that it had also been discussed between Stalin and himself in October 1944 in Moscow in connection with the question of the Curzon line. He had made a speech in Parliament on September [December] 15, 1944 in which he had mentioned the Soviet wish to secure the ice-free port of Koenigsberg and that the Soviet frontier should run south of that point. He had made it clear that His Majesty’s Government was in sympathy with this wish. The only question which arose was that of the legal occasion to transfer. At the present time the position was that the Soviet draft as put in would require each of them to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. It would also commit them to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement. So far as His Majesty’s Government was concerned they should support the Soviet wish to have this port of Germany incorporated into the Soviet Union. He made this statement as one of principle. They had not examined the Soviet line on a map. This could be examined at the peace conference but he would like to assure the Marshal of their continued support of the Russian position in this part of the world.

STALIN replied that they were suggesting nothing more than this at the present time. Of course, the matter would be settled at the peace conference. He said they were satisfied that the British and American Governments approved.

CHURCHILL said that there would have to be certain redrafting of the Russian statement and in the communiqué which would be issued at the end of the Conference he recommended that more general terms be used. The agreement of the Three Powers would be recorded in the minutes of this meeting.

Syria and Lebanon*

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation wished to present a short paper on this subject (annex 2).

CHURCHILL said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. They did not wish to receive any advantage there not enjoyed by other powers. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France with these countries the British had said that they would not object to France having a favored position there if this were satisfactorily arranged with the new independent Governments of those countries. The British had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon which was satisfactory to those countries, the British would withdraw their troops. If they withdrew their troops now it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. They would not like to see this happen and he pointed out that it would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world. He also said that it would affect their task of keeping the peace in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There would be a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare which might affect Egypt too. There could not have been a worse moment than this for creating such a disturbance in the Arab world because it would endanger their lines of communication through the Suez Canal which was being used in the war against Japan by both the United States and Great Britain. The line of communications for the war against Japan was important to the United States as well as to Great Britain. General de Gaulle had acted very unwise[ly] in this region. Against their advice and entreaties about 500 men had been sent to Syria and this had caused a serious outbreak which had still not died away. How silly this was for what could 500 men do? They had, however, been a spark and this uprising had followed immediately. The Government and people of Iraq had wanted to go to the help of the Syrians. All of the Arabic world was convulsed with excitement in regard to this matter. Later, however, General de Gaulle had agreed to hand over the so-called “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian Government. He trusted that they should be able to reach an agreement with the French. He could not say agreement but a settlement with de Gaulle which would guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some recognition of their cultural and commercial interests which they had built up over such a long period of time. He wished to repeat before this council that Great Britain had no wish to remain there one day longer than necessary. The British would be delighted to withdraw from what was a thankless task assumed in the interest of the Allies. Having regard to the fact the matter rested between them and the French, and of course Syria and Lebanon, and the British did not welcome a proposal to have the Conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France and come to a decision. The whole burden had been borne by them, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place that would be a different matter.

THE PRESIDENT replied “no thanks”. He added that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and himself. The Prime Minister had said that the British had sufficient troops to keep peace in this area and to stop the outbreak of war in that region. He had asked the British to do so immediately for the United States was also much interested in this line of communications to the Far East through the Suez Canal. The President said, however, that we thought that no country should have special privilege. The French did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All should have equal rights.

STALIN inquired if he might infer of this that his colleagues did not recognize any privileged position of the French in this area.

CHURCHILL replied that the British position was that they wanted to see France have a special position and that he had promised this to the French at a time when the British were weak. This promise was made of course only so far as the British were concerned. They had no power to bind others nor had they undertaken to make serious exertions to procure special rights for the French. If they could get them the British would not object and would smile benignly on their achievements.

STALIN inquired from whom the French could obtain these special rights.

CHURCHILL replied that they could obtain them from Syria and Lebanon.

STALIN queried, “them alone?”

CHURCHILL replied in the affirmative. He added that the French had many schools there, and archeological institutes, etc.; many French live there and the French even had a song which went “Nous partous tour La Syrie” [Partant pour la Syrie?]. They dated their claims back to the Crusades. But he pointed out that the British were not embarking on a serious quarrel with the great powers on this matter.

The President said that the United States stood for equal rights for all.

CHURCHILL asked the President if he would endeavor to prevent the Syrians from giving special rights to the French.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had no qualms in this respect as he was sure that the Syrians would not want to grant special rights.

STALIN observed that they were reluctant. He said that the Russian delegation thanked Mr. Churchill for the information that he had given and that they withdrew their proposal.

CHURCHILL and THE PRESIDENT said they wished to thank STALIN for this action.

Iran

CHURCHILL said they had submitted a paper to the Council and he would be very glad to hear the views of the other great powers.

STALIN said that the British proposals were based on the presumption that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired. The Soviets proceeded on the assumption that the term had not expired and that it would do so only after the termination of the war against Japan. He pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation concurred with paragraph 1 of the British paper that their troops be withdrawn from Tehran and he suggested that they let it go at that.

THE PRESIDENT said that we had been ready for a long time to withdraw but pointed out that we had many supplies in Iran and that we wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan.

STALIN said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran but he agreed that troops from Tehran might be withdrawn.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that there were no American troops in Tehran.

STALIN said that even if there were the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Tehran.

CHURCHILL said that the British were anxious to proceed to the other points raised in the British paper. Of course only two and one-half months had elapsed since the termination of the war against Germany. The British would like for the removal of troops to continue on both sides because they had promised that they would go when the German war was over. They would, therefore, like to withdraw when the other two stages were completed.

STALIN said that they would like to have time to think this over. The treaty said that the troops should be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates. That included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave them plenty of time.

CHURCHILL suggested that they accept the proposal to withdraw from Tehran and that they let the Foreign Ministers take another look at the matter when they met.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were proceeding with our withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. He said that we expected to be out within sixty days.

STALIN said that the United States was fully entitled to look after their supplies. He added, “So as to rid the United States of any worries we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.”

THE PRESIDENT said he thanked Stalin for this statement.

(Field Marshal Alexander entered the room at this point and Stalin walked around the table to shake hands with him after which he greeted the President.)

Occupation of Vienna

CHURCHILL said that with respect to the zones [sectors?] allotted to British and American troops it appeared that so far as the British were concerned that in the principal zone of Vienna there were 500,000 people. As the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of Vienna, they would not be able to undertake the feeding of those 500,000 persons. What they suggested, therefore, was a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. He called upon Field Marshal Alexander to speak.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that there were about 500,000 people in Vienna to be fed. He did not have the food to send from Italy. There was a small reserve in Villach in the Klagenfurt area. This could be provided but he thought he was correct in stating that it would be enough for only about three weeks or one month. If they took on the obligation to feed these people the food would have to come from the United States.

CHURCHILL pointed out that this would be in addition to the population in the United States zone of Vienna.

THE PRESIDENT said that there were about 375,000 in our zone. He said that our transport was almost totally engaged in transporting supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe.

STALIN asked what about the French zone.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not know.

STALIN said he would have to talk with Marshal Konev. He was acquainted with the matter. He would like to know what period they had in mind. Was it until the next harvest?

CHURCHILL said the difficulty was that the people in Vienna had always drawn their food from the East.

STALIN said that they had made an arrangement with the Austrian Government that they would undertake to provide a small quantity of food for money until the next harvest. This would continue until August or September. He would have to talk, however, with Marshal Konev.

CHURCHILL pointed out that Field Marshal Alexander was entering Styria with his troops but was reluctant to enter Vienna because of the difficulty in regard to food.

STALIN asked if the food situation in Vienna was so bad now.

CHURCHILL replied that they had not been there.

STALIN said that it wouldn’t seem to be so bad so far as the population was concerned.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that if the Generalissimo could help them with food they were ready to go forward and take up their work.

STALIN said that he would let them know that evening or the next day.

CHURCHILL thanked the Marshal for this.

STALIN said it would be well if the British and American Governments would agree to extend the authority of the Renner Government to their zones. This would not imply diplomatic recognition but they should be placed in the same position as Finland. The authority of the Renner Government should be extended to the British and American zones in order to help them in the collection of food.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that as soon as we had moved in and had looked into the matter we would be able to agree to this.

CHURCHILL referred to his remark of the previous day [earlier today] when he had said that they had two divisions in Greece and he proposed to ask Field Marshal Alexander to speak on this subject.

STALIN interrupted and said he disagreed and as he had said at the previous meeting a Churchill statement could not be impugned.

CHURCHILL said he wished to raise a question of procedure. He had drawn the attention of his colleagues to the fact that Mr. Attlee and he had interests to attend to in London on Thursday. They, therefore, had to leave by lunch time on Wednesday, taking the Foreign Secretary with them, and that they would be back for the evening sitting on the 27th. He added, “or some of us will be back”. Could they not meet on Monday [Wednesday] morning before his departure. This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL suggested that the Foreign Ministers continue to meet and that in Mr. Eden’s absence Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him. This was agreed to.

The meeting adjourned.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.

MOLOTOV reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries.

  1. The economic subcommittee was instructed to consider Soviet proposals on reparations.

  2. Economic principles for Germany were discussed. Russia withdrew her proposed amendment to paragraph 13 thereof. Russia asked the deletion of paragraph 18 for further study by the Allied Control Commission. No agreement was reached, and the question was referred to the Big Three.

  3. Proposal for council of Foreign Ministers was approved with verbal amendments.

  4. Trusteeships were discussed. It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies should be taken up by the council of Foreign Ministers.

  5. It was agreed that all decisions of the conference affecting the work of the Allied commanders in Germany should be communicated to them, and that a committee should be empowered to draft such communication.

  6. The matter of collaboration of the three powers in European economic problems was discussed.

  7. Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should be returned to its international status, and that the question should be discussed in a conference of the four powers, including France, in the near future. The invitation to China and France to participate in the council of Foreign Ministers was approved, and it was agreed that this should be sent 48 hours before the release of the final communiqué.

The agenda proposed for the Big Three discussion today included Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran.

TRUMAN: First subject is Turkey.

CHURCHILL: I thought we would renew the discussion of the problem of feeding Germany.

(It was agreed that matters referred to the Foreign Secretaries and agreed to by them could be regarded as accepted by the Big Three, unless some objection was raised.)

CHURCHILL: Before I finished talking yesterday, I made it clear that we could not support Russia’s claim against Turkey for a military base in the Black Sea.

STALIN: Yesterday, Mr. Churchill asserted Russia had frightened Turkey, particularly by concentrating troops in Bulgaria. Mr. Churchill’s information is out of date. Russia has very few troops in Bulgaria, but the British have more in Greece.

CHURCHILL: We have only 40 thousand troops in Greece.

STALIN: Russia has less. The Turks have nothing to be afraid of. The Turks have 23 divisions on the frontier. As to rectification of the frontier, I refer to the two provinces [Kars and Ardahan]. This question of the rectification of the frontiers would not have come up if the question of an alliance had not come up. If the alliance is dropped, the rectification of the frontiers will lapse.

So far as the Straits are concerned, the position of Russia is deplorable. The Montreux Convention is inimical to Russia. Turkey has a right to block our ships. More than that, Russia has less rights than Japan. Small states controlled by Britain have real control of the Straits. Turkey is not capable of keeping control of the Straits. The Straits must be defended by force, the same as the [Panama Canal is defended by the] American navy, the same as the British navy defends the Suez.

TRUMAN: The Montreux Convention should be revised. Most of the wars in the last twenty years have arisen in this area. It should be the business of the peace conference to see that that does not happen again. There must be freedom of intercourse in all that section. I want to see Russia, Britain and the United States have access to all the seas in the world. I will distribute a paper on this subject.

(The President reads the paper. He emphasizes that there should be free and unrestricted traffic on inland waterways, and such waterways should be controlled by the representation of all states concerned. As initial step, there should be international agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The function of these agencies should be the development of navigation on the rivers in question. The membership of these agencies should include the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Riparian States. The same procedure should apply in the case of the Kiel Canal, and the Montreux Convention should be similarly revised.)

TRUMAN: I do not want to fight another war in twenty years because of a quarrel on the Danube. We want a prosperous, self-supporting Europe. A bankrupt Europe is of no advantage to any country, or to the peace of the world. The territorial dispute between Russia and Turkey should be settled by themselves, but the waterways are of interest to the whole world.

CHURCHILL: I strongly support Marshal Stalin’s wish for the revision of the Montreux Convention, with the objective of security for Russia, and free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean by merchant ships and by warships, whether in time of peace or war. I agree with the President that that freedom should be guaranteed by all of us. I earnestly hope that the Marshal will consider that alternative to the establishment of a Russian base in close proximity to Constantinople.

As to the other waterways, we are in full accord with the general lines of the President’s statement. The Kiel Canal should be free and open, and guaranteed by the great powers. We also attach great importance to free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine.

TRUMAN: There is no disagreement on the revision of the Montreux Convention.

CHURCHILL: Nor on the purpose for which it is to be revised.

STALIN: I must read attentively the President’s paper. Perhaps in the meantime we might consider the next question.

TRUMAN: The Koenigsberg area.

STALIN: This was brought up at Yalta. We stated it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Too much blood has been spilled by the Soviet Union not to have some piece of German territory. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister raised any objection at Yalta, so the question was agreed upon. We are anxious to have that agreement confirmed at this conference.

TRUMAN: No objection in principle, but technical and ethnic details must be considered.

CHURCHILL: I spoke in the Commons in 1944, and referred to the Soviets’ wish to have Koenigsberg, which would mean that Poland’s frontier would run to the south of that. I made it clear that the British government sympathized with the Russian desires.

TRUMAN: The next question is Syria and the Lebanon.

MOLOTOV: The Soviet delegation submits a short draft on this question.

CHURCHILL: The burden of maintaining order falls on our shoulders. We are seeking no advantage for ourselves which will not go to all other countries. Both France and Britain have recognized the independence of this area, when a troop settlement was made. In consideration of France’s long, historic connection with Syria and the Lebanon, we agreed not to object to France having a favored position, if that could be satisfactorily arranged with the governments of Syria and the Lebanon. We have told General de Gaulle that as soon as he makes a satisfactory treaty with Syria and the Lebanon, we will withdraw our troops. The withdrawal of our troops now would lead to the massacre of French civilians and French troops there. We should not like to have that happen. It would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world, and make the maintenance of peace more difficult in Palestine and Iraq. It might affect Egypt, too. We could not have a worse moment for this disturbance. It would endanger lines of communication through the Suez Canal through which both British and American supplies are proceeding for the war against Japan.

General de Gaulle has acted very unwisely in this region, against our advice and entreaty. The outbreak was caused by 500 troops being sent on the ship. They could do nothing but strike a spark. Lately, de Gaulle has agreed to hand over the “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian government, and I trust we shall be able to reach, if not an agreement then some sort of settlement with him which would guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and secure some recognition for the French – their cultural and commercial interests, which they have built up over so many years.

Let me repeat, Britain will not remain there one day longer than necessary. We will be delighted to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed in the interest of our Allies, as well as ourselves. In view of the states interested, we do not welcome the proposal to have a conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France. The whole burden has been borne by us.

EDEN: (interrupting) Except for the diplomatic approval of the United States.

CHURCHILL: (continuing) If the United States desires to take our place, it might open a new question.

TRUMAN: No thank you, Mr. Churchill. The British reported to us on the disorders in Syria, and advised us that they had troops to protect the situation affecting the lines of communications. The United States told the Prime Minister to go ahead.

We might, however, be in disagreement on one point. We do not think any country entitled to special privilege. We are for equality for all.

STALIN: I may assume that my colleagues do not recognize privileged rights in Syria and the Lebanon?

TRUMAN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: We promised France a favored position when we were very weak. We cannot bind others. If France cannot get them, we would not object.

STALIN: From whom can France obtain these privileges?

CHURCHILL: From the Syrian and Lebanese republics.

STALIN: From them alone?

CHURCHILL: Yes.

TRUMAN: We shall stand for equal rights.

CHURCHILL: Would you prevent the Syrians from giving privileges?

TRUMAN: That will not be necessary.

STALIN: The Soviet delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for his information, and withdraws their paper on this subject.

TRUMAN: Iran is the next subject on our agenda.

STALIN: The British proposals are based on the assumption that the term for Allied troops in Iran has expired. We proceed on the contrary assumption. The term expires only after the war with Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviets accept the first paragraph of the British proposal, that troops should be immediately withdrawn from Tehran.

TRUMAN: We would be willing to withdraw at any time, but we have vast quantities of supplies to protect.

STALIN: The Russian delegation has no objection to American and British troops in Tehran, but our troops will be withdrawn.

TRUMAN: We have no troops in Tehran.

STALIN: We would not object, but let us withdraw from Tehran.

CHURCHILL: We would like the movement to continue. We promised to go out. We would like the other two phases to proceed.

STALIN: I think we still have time to think. The treaty says six months after all hostilities with Germany and her associates. That implies Japan.

CHURCHILL: Shall we agree to withdraw from Tehran now, and look at the problem again in September, when the council of Foreign Ministers meets?

TRUMAN: We will be out in sixty days. We need the troops and supplies in Japan.

STALIN: Of course, the United States has the right to do so. We promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.

(Field Marshal Alexander arrives, and is greeted by Marshal Stalin and President Truman).

CHURCHILL: We are unable to undertake the feeding of the population in our zone in Vienna. We suggest Russia continue to feed this zone until more permanent arrangements can be worked out.

ALEXANDER: There are 500 thousand Viennese to be fed. I have not the food to send from Italy. The reserves available will not last three weeks. So if we undertake to feed, the food must come from the United States.

TRUMAN: There are 375 thousand in our zone.

STALIN: Let me have a talk with Marshal [Konev]. The situation does not appear to us to be so bad, and I will let you know tonight or tomorrow.

CHURCHILL: I thank the Marshal.

STALIN: It will be a good thing if the American and British governments would allow the Renner government to extend its authority to their zones. This need not imply recognition. This will facilitate the distribution of food.

TRUMAN: We will be glad to consider this.

CHURCHILL: We also.

CHURCHILL: Field Marshal Alexander will give the figures of our troops in Greece.

STALIN: The Prime Minister has given the figures, and his figures cannot be impugned.

CHURCHILL: My memory may have been bad.

ALEXANDER: 40 thousand.

STALIN: The Prime Minister’s figures cannot be impugned.

CHURCHILL: We must leave Wednesday at lunch-time, and will [be] back in the evening of the 27th; so we would suggest a morning session Wednesday, and we will be back for the Friday session.

I also suggest the Foreign Secretaries continue to meet with Sir Alexander Cadogan, acting as Eden’s Deputy.

TRUMAN: That is satisfactory.

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

Berlin Conference, July 23, 1945

Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS

The United States Government proposes that there be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states and that the regulation of such navigation be provided by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned.

As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments.

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

Berlin, July 23, 1945
[Translation]

Syria and Lebanon

Owing to the international importance of the question of the situation in Syria and Lebanon the Conference expresses itself in favour of this question being considered by representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR and France and deems necessary that consent of the Government of France should be first obtained to this proposal.

Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Churchill’s quarters, 23 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Army General Antonov
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Alexander Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Marshal of Aviation Fodalev [Falaleyev?]
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetzov
Mr. Bohlen Sir Edward Bridges
Field Marshal Montgomery
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Field Marshal Brooke
Commander Thompson
Major Birse
Lord Moran

Churchill:
“… There were many speeches, and Stalin, without even ensuring that all the waiters and orderlies had left the room, proposed that our next meeting should be in Tokyo. .… I had another very friendly talk with Stalin, who … seemed to have no inkling of the momentous information about the new bomb the President had given me. He spoke with enthusiasm about the Russian intervention against Japan, and seemed to expect a good many months of war, which Russia would wage on an ever-increasing scale, governed only by the Trans-Siberian Railway.

“… After a pause Stalin said, ‘If you find it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch [Alexandroupolis]?’ I contented myself with saying, ‘I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round.’”


811.001 Truman, H.S./7-2445

The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the President

Babelsberg, July 24, 1945

Memorandum for the President

The following, as near as I can remember it, is the Prime Minister’s toast to you yesterday evening, your reply, and Marshal Stalin’s additions:

The Prime Minister said they had already drunk to the President as Head of State, but he wished now to propose a toast to the President as a man. He said that he had not had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Truman until this Conference, but he was sure that everyone present had been as impressed as he had with the firm, decisive and business-like direction of their deliberations. He said that they had all been struck also with the President’s sincerity, frankness and powers of decision. The President, Mr. Churchill continued, reflected in his character and abilities the best qualities of the great republic which he headed. He said he knew he was speaking for Marshal Stalin when he said they were glad to welcome the President into association and friendship and he wished to raise his glass to a man who was sincere in purpose, clear in speech, and true in deed.

The President, in reply to this toast, expressed his deep appreciation for the kind words of the Prime Minister and said that he was naturally a timid man and that when the Prime Minister had suggested and Marshal Stalin had supported the proposal that he be made presiding officer over this Conference he had been literally overwhelmed. He said he would continue to do his utmost for the success of the Conference and for the future peace and well-being of the world, and he wished to say what a great pleasure and privilege it was for him, a country boy from Missouri, to be associated with two such great figures as the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.

Marshal Stalin then arose to say that in his opinion modesty such as the President’s was a great source of strength and a real indication of character; he added that this was particularly true when it was coupled, as in the case of President Truman, with real strength and character and honesty of purpose. He concluded that he wished to associate himself fully with the remarks of the Prime Minister and was delighted to welcome President Truman into their midst.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening

Present
United States Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Mr. Gusev
740.00119 EAC/7-2345: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Babelsberg, July 23, 1945
Secret
Victory 241

To AmEmbassy London for Winant. Info [Acting] SecState Washington.
(Message has been sent to MA, London.)

Gousev informed Mosely tonight instructions sent Saksin last night or this morning to sign EAC agreement on additional requirements.

BYRNES

The Pittsburgh Press (July 23, 1945)

Truman speeds Big Three sessions

Conference may end this week
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Jap peace feeler reports continue

Editorial: Telling the Japs

Background of news –
Territory Japan will lose

By Bertram Benedict

U.S. State Department (July 23, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Monday, July 23:

Mail arrived from Washington during the forenoon; the President signed this mail shortly after it was delivered to him.

1000: General Parks called on the President and presented him the flag that had been raised at Berlin last Friday.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace H. Graham, Medical Corps, USA (attached to the 24th Evacuation Hospital, Bremen) spent the day visiting with the President and members of his mess.

1100: Secretary Stimson called on the President.

1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington.

At 1640 the President left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where he and his party arrived at 1650.

At 1710 the seventh meeting of the conference was called to order. The meeting adjourned at 1900 at which time the President and his party left to return to the Little White House.

At 2020 the President, Secretary Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy left the Little White House by foot for the Prime Minister’s residence where they attended a State Dinner given by Prime Minister Churchill in honor of the President and Generalissimo Stalin. Those present included: The President, Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Mr. Bohlen, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Army General A. I. Antonov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, Marshal of Aviation F. Ya. Fodalev [Falaleyevf], Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kousnetsov, Prime Minister Churchill, the Right Honorable C. R. Attlee, Mr. Eden, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Sir Edward Bridges, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Commander C. R. Thompson, and Major A. Birse. Music for the occasion was furnished by a stringed orchestra from a Royal Air Force band. The menu included: Cold clear soup, hot turtle soup, fried sole, roast chicken, boiled new potatoes, peas, cold ham, lettuce salad, fruit salad, ice cream, and Scotch woodcock.

The President, Secretary Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy returned to the Little White House at 2330.

The Syonan Shimbun (July 24, 1945)

Tense atmosphere secrecy at Potsdam ‘3-power’ parley

L’Aube (July 24, 1945)

L’Allemagne paiera aux « Trois Grands » 20 milliards de dollars de réparations…

…mais la part de la France n’est pas déterminée

U.S. State Department (July 24, 1945)

890d.00/7-2445

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum

Subject: DISCUSSION IN BIG THREE MEETING ON JULY 23, 1945, REGARDING SYRIA AND LEBANON

When this item on the agenda was reached, STALIN stated that he would circulate a draft of a proposed brief statement to which he hoped the Conference could agree on this subject (a copy of the draft is attached).

CHURCHILL: At present the burden of maintaining order in Syria and Lebanon has fallen on our shoulders. We have no intention or desire to gain advantages there except those enjoyed by other countries. When we entered this area in 1941 to throw out the Germans and Vichy French, we and the Free French both agreed to recognize the independence of Lebanon and Syria. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France in these countries, we agreed not to object to France having a continued favored position there. We have told General de Gaulle that when he makes a mutually satisfactory treaty with these two countries, we shall withdraw our troops. If we withdraw now, it would lead to a massacre of the French civilians and small number of French troops there. The outbreak would affect security in Palestine and Iraq and possibly also in Egypt. There could not be a worse moment than the present for such a disturbance. The area constitutes an important line of communications to the Far Eastern war. The recent troubles started when the French sent 500 reinforcements to the area. This was a ridiculous action. What could 500 men do? But the entire Arab world was immediately convulsed with excitement. Lately General de Gaulle has agreed to hand over to Syria and Lebanon the Troupes Spéciales. I trust that agreement will be reached on independence and some recognition given to the French cultural and commercial position in the area. We repeat, we have no desires except to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed on behalf of the Allies. Since the matter rests between us and the French, we do not welcome the proposal for a conference in which the United States and the USSR would enter. The whole burden has been borne by us with no help (after prompting by Mr. Eden, Mr. Churchill added: “except for the diplomatic approval and support of the United States”). If the United States cares to take our place, that would offer a new consideration.

TRUMAN: No, thank you. When the trouble started, I had some correspondence with the Prime Minister on the subject. Mr. Churchill wrote to me, saying that another war was about to commence in the Near East and he had the troops to stop it. I said: “Please do so by all means. We do not want a war near the Suez route to the Far East.”

We are in slight disagreement with the Prime Minister, however, in one regard. We are in favor of equal treatment for everybody in the area, with no one having a privileged position.

STALIN: Including France?

TRUMAN: Yes.

STALIN: May I infer that my colleagues do not recognize any special privileges for France in the area?

TRUMAN: I certainly do not.

CHURCHILL: We would like to see France have a privileged position there. We agreed to this when we were weak. We cannot change now. This agreement, however, was only as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. We would not make any serious effort to help France obtain privileges. If they do so, we shall smile benignly.

STALIN: From whom can France get these privileges?

CHURCHILL: From Syria and Lebanon.

STALIN: Only Syria and Lebanon?

CHURCHILL: Only. The French have large interests there. They even have a tune: “Pars [Partant?] pour la Syrie.” (Laughter) Their interests go back to the Crusades.

TRUMAN: The United States favors equal rights for everyone.

CHURCHILL: Will you prevent Syria from giving privileges to France?

TRUMAN: No, but we are certain that the Syrians will not give France privileges.

STALIN: The Syrians are reluctant to do so. (Laughter). I welcome the full explanation given to us on this subject by Mr. Churchill and am happy to withdraw my paper.

(This item on the agenda was considered as having been completed with the foregoing discussion).

GEORGE V. ALLEN

Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov
Mr. Matthews Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Russell
Poland
President Bierut Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka
Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski Foreign Minister Rzymowski Mr. Modzelewski
Vice President Grabski Marshal Rola-Żymierski

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m.
Top secret

The Seventh Session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:15 a.m. on Tuesday, July 24, 1945. MR. BYRNES was in the Chair.

MR. BYRNES asked that the meeting review some of the matters pending before the Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers had been requested to hear a statement from the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government. Mr. Byrnes had been informed that these gentlemen have now arrived and he suggested that the Foreign Ministers should proceed with the consideration of other matters before them and fix an hour, say 12:30, to invite the gentlemen to come into this room.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BYRNES stated that he would have a message to this effect communicated to the Polish representatives.

German Economic Questions and German Reparations

MR. BYRNES then raised the matter of German economic questions and German reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV added the question of reparations by Italy.

MR. BYRNES agreed and asked whether the economic subcommittee was ready to report.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether he could suggest something.

MR. BYRNES replied that he was glad to receive the suggestion and asked Mr. Molotov to proceed.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the first question concerned reparations from Germany. He had a suggestion regarding German [Austrian?] reparations here. He was sorry that it is only a Russian text.2 The next paper circulated concerned Italian reparations. Mr. Molotov added that of course the principal question concerned Germany.

MR. BYRNES after reading the paper asked concerning the pleasure of the Foreign Ministers regarding its disposition. He stated that he had been informed that the subcommittee was meeting tonight in order to discuss Austrian and Italian reparations. It might be well to refer these documents to the committee.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. BYRNES stated that this would be done.

MR. BYRNES then referred to German reparations and asked whether there was any reason further to discuss this matter at this table or whether the economic subcommittee should be permitted to continue discussions in hope that they might be able to arrange for some report.

MR. MOLOTOV had no objection to the last suggestion since it might then be possible to discuss the matter tomorrow.

MR. BYRNES stated that the matter would be passed in this session.

European Oil Supplies

MR. BYRNES raised the matter of European oil supplies. He pointed out that a paper had been presented on this subject by the American delegation on July 20. He asked whether the meeting was prepared to discuss it.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether it had been discussed by the economic subcommittee.

MR. BYRNES replied that he was advised that the question was so discussed but that the Soviet representative had asked for further time to consider and that this question is also coming up tonight. Therefore he assumed that this question must also be passed.

Implementation of Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe

MR. BYRNES then stated that the discussion on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe was still pending. He had been informed that the subcommittee on this subject had not met since night before last when the Soviet representative, who was Chairman, stated that he would have a new proposal to submit. He asked whether it could be ascertained whether the subcommittee can meet today.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he could give some information on this question. He had seen the draft of the Soviet representatives which will be submitted to the committee. In connection with the Control Councils he had had to receive the text of the suggested changes mentioned during the last meeting [the meeting on July 22] from Moscow. They had been circulated this morning. He asked whether the American and British representatives had received them.

MR. EDEN stated that they had arrived but were in Russian and were now being translated.

MR. BYRNES added that the paper in Russian had been delivered only a few moments ago. Consideration would have to wait until it had been translated.

Admission of Italy and Non-Admission of Spain into International Organizations

MR. BYRNES stated that the next question remaining open is the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain into international organizations. In regard to this matter the subcommittee had been requested to submit its report. The American representative had advised Mr. Byrnes that the Soviet representative was not able to arrange a meeting. There has been no meeting of this subcommittee since July 21. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the Foreign Ministers could not proceed with the discussion of this question at this table.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not quite familiar with the draft.11 However, he could study it now if MR. BYRNES wished.

MR. BYRNES suggested that he do so. So long as there are five or six questions of this character remaining open, we ought to dispose of them as rapidly as possible.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was always in favor of progress.

MR. EDEN asked for a minute or two to read the paper.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had been informed by the American representative on the committee that part of this paper had been drafted by the subcommittee and agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had not been informed of this.

MR. BYRNES continued that he had been further advised that on the first two paragraphs the reasoning had been suggested by the Soviet representative but that the American and British had not agreed to Mr. Maisky’s language. The language of this draft had been suggested by the American and British representatives.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what it is about. He pointed out that the document mentioned Italy, mentioned the neutrals, but the countries who fought with us against the enemy were not mentioned. This would not do. He suggested reference to the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. EDEN asked whether they would not look at the draft before reference to the Big Three.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would not look at the draft in this form.

MR. EDEN replied that he had wanted to make verbal changes only.

MR. BYRNES stated that he would consider any suggestion, but the best way to dispose of the question was to refer it to the Big Three.

MR. EDEN stated that he would give his changes anyway. He suggested leaving out the last sentence of paragraph [one].

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. EDEN also pointed out that the document talked about peace with Italy and that other nations were concerned with this matter. He would redraft to make this clear.

MR. BYRNES then stated that he had been handed a draft and would read it to see if Mr. Eden agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected to state that he was sorry that he could not take part in these changes since they did not deal with substance.

MR. EDEN stated his assumption that what Mr. Molotov wants is to add to the text something regarding the cobelligerents Rumania and Bulgaria. The changes suggested by Mr. Eden did not deal with this matter.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether mention could be made here of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the question of establishment of diplomatic relations was discussed by the Big Three. THE PRESIDENT has stated that the United States was unwilling to recognize these countries and gave the reasons for that attitude. Therefore, that matter may well be discussed in the Big Three if they wish.

The American Delegation will agree to the language suggested by the British. Therefore, I suggest that this paper be reported to the Big Three as agreed between the British and American Delegations. It should also be reported that the Soviet Delegation was unable to agree because they wish action taken regarding Rumania and Bulgaria.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like it to be mentioned in the report that the Soviet Delegation refused to take part in this discussion because his colleagues had refused to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the choice between Switzerland and Portugal on the one hand and Rumania and Bulgaria on the other hand should be resolved in favor of those who helped us to win the war. He wouldn’t object to steps being taken to make things easier for Italy if similar steps were taken for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did more to help to defeat Germany than Italy, which had played only a small part.

MR. EDEN replied that these governments are not regarded by us as representative and that is why we do not wish to recognize them.

MR. MOLOTOV asked why they were less representative than Italy.

MR. EDEN replied that the Italian Government contained representatives of all parties in the state, while Rumania and Bulgaria were minority governments mainly composed of Communists.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that in all these governments the Communist Party formed a small minority.

MR. EDEN stated that there is another story behind this one.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it was not a Communist story. He pointed out that the King had appointed the government in Rumania.

MR. EDEN interjected, “with a little help from Vyshinski, perhaps.”

MR. VYSHINSKI entered the conversation to state that he had helped many to enter the government who were not Communists.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Delegation would like this question considered in all its phases and not on the basis of the exception of some countries, but that the Soviet suggestion had been ignored.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had a suggestion to propose for consideration by the Russian Delegation. He read:

The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of these peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.

MR. BYRNES pointed out regarding the first sentence that the Council of Foreign Ministers was already charged with that duty. Therefore, the only question concerned the second sentence. He went on to suggest to Mr. Molotov that the language agreed to regarding Italy be changed in a way that he believed would meet Mr. Molotov’s approval. The change would make the language regarding Italy the same as the language regarding the governments in which Mr. Molotov had expressed an interest.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not speaking of the exact wording, but of the essence of the suggestion. His general position was that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland should not be in a position as to the Allies worse than that of Italy. If this principle was accepted he suggested the appointment of a drafting committee to prepare a paper for discussion.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that so far as a subcommittee is concerned there is no change in the position of the United States regarding recognition of these governments. The United States did not regard them as governments having broad representation of all democratic parties.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was not suggesting that the United States now establish diplomatic relations.

MR. BYRNES then said that so far as the statement under consideration is concerned he was satisfied that as now amended it would place Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in the same position as Italy because it says that on the conclusion of peace treaties with representative governments it would be possible to support their admission into the United Nations Organization. The same language as used for Italy would be used in the paragraph referring to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. He reread his suggested amendment.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he thought the wording could be improved. The important thing for the Soviet Delegation is to arrive at an understanding on substance. He asked what the situation was in Italy. The American and Soviet Governments have established diplomatic relations with Italy. The British have not. He asked whether France has an Ambassador there.

MR. EDEN stated that he would check since he did not know. He thought the position of France was the same as the British position.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that perhaps the United States had grounds not to establish relations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The meeting had before it a very complicated question affecting many countries, including Italy, the neutral states and Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He suggested that a wording be worked out in order that Rumania, Bulgaria, [and] Hungary not be placed in a worse position than Italy. This is a condition for the participation of the Soviet Union in this matter. The Delegation had no authority to do otherwise. If this suggestion that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and Finland be not placed in a worse position than Italy is accepted, it would be easy to agree. If not, it would not be possible to arrive at a common decision.

MR. BYRNES repeated that the proposed language did place Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the same position as Italy so far as this statement is concerned.

MR. EDEN interposed to state his belief that we must not try too much to use words to paper over facts. He pointed out that there actually is a real difference between Italy and some of the countries mentioned by Mr. Molotov. The difference is that the British would be willing to make peace with the present Italian Government, and the present British position is that it is not prepared to do so with the governments in Rumania and Bulgaria. This is the fact and Mr. Eden did not think that it should be covered over with words.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that the matter be referred to the Big Three. This would be another good issue. He stated that the Big Three are more reasonable people than we and find a way out.

Rumanian Oil [Equipment]

MR. BYRNES stated that the question of Rumanian oil [equipment] is still pending. The British Delegation wished to make a further statement.

MR. EDEN stated that he had an idea that he thought might help. He circulated a proposal.

MR. BYRNES referred to the proposal that a committee of three Allied nationals be appointed and asked how it would be drawn up.

MR. EDEN stated his idea that it should not be composed of representatives of the three nations here or of Rumania.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what committee and where it would come from.

MR. BYRNES replied that it was on the question of whether the pipes were the property of a British national or Germans.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what the committee’s functions would be.

MR. BYRNES went on to state that the committee’s functions would also include questions of where American citizens said their property had been taken. Therefore, this question could not be decided here but should be decided only after an investigation of the facts. He associated himself with the suggestion for the appointment of representatives of other countries. If this committee said the property was German, then the Russians would have a right to it. If they said it was American, he assumed that the Russians would agree.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there was no such question on the agenda.

MR. BYRNES replied that we had put it on.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that he hadn’t received any such suggestion.

MR. BYRNES stated that the question had been on the agenda and had been discussed for some hours. Since the matter was before the meeting it should be disposed of. Now the British had submitted a proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that he wished to have a Russian text of this paper.

Agenda for Big Three Meeting

MR. BYRNES asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting.

MR. EDEN asked what was on the list.

MR. BYRNES stated that up to now there was very little.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had a short clear paper [two papers] regarding Italian and Austrian reparations.

MR. BYRNES replied that it was his understanding that this matter had been referred to a subcommittee meeting this evening and that the Soviet paper would be considered at that time.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he knew this but that since there was some free time the matter could be considered.

MR. BYRNES remarked that with regard to free time, he had been informed that the delegation of the Polish Provisional Government had arrived.

MR. EDEN then asked whether Mr. Molotov wanted this matter considered in the afternoon meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV withdrew his suggestion.

MR. BYRNES again asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting.

MR. EDEN asked what was on the agenda now.

MR. BYRNES said that he did not know of any questions except that of Italy and the neutral countries. He thought that it had been agreed that this should be discussed. He pointed out that of the questions considered by the Big Three yesterday afternoon one had not been decided. This is the question of the Straits. THE PRESIDENT had submitted a paper to be studied and this paper can be considered this afternoon. He did not recall any other questions on the Big Three agenda not yet decided.

MR. MOLOTOV mentioned the western frontiers of Poland.

MR. BYRNES agreed that this was still undetermined but pointed out that it would be decided by the Foreign Ministers after hearing the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government whether to add it to the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had another question. The question of the German fleet should be settled before the end of the meeting.

MR. BYRNES replied that the question was proposed earlier and therefore should be noted.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished agreement as to when it would be decided.

MR. EDEN stated that according to his notes it had been agreed to keep this matter for settlement at the end of the Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the end is now here and he wanted it discussed.

MR. EDEN asked whether we are at the beginning of the end or at the end of the beginning.

MR. BYRNES replied that he thought that we were at the beginning of the end. The United States Delegation wants to dispose of pending matters so that the Conference can end.

MR. MOLOTOV reverted to his question and asked when the German fleet would be discussed. He suggested tomorrow.

MR. EDEN stated that the matter was really one for the Big Three.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that it be put on their agenda either today or tomorrow.

MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. BYRNES agreed that it should go on tomorrow’s agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the question of the partition of reparations among the Allies must be decided. There had been agreement in the subcommittee, to which the Soviet Delegation did not object.

MR. BYRNES stated his understanding that there is no agreement yet in the economic subcommittee on anything. He thought it might be well to report to the Big Three that they had been unable to reach a decision.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that that was why he said that we should consider the draft submitted by the Reparations Commission.

MR. BYRNES entirely agreed and stated there were some matters in disagreement and that there was no apparent chance of reaching agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that questions on which the Commission has agreed could be discussed here.

MR. BYRNES replied that the American representative, Mr. Pauley, had called attention to certain portions of this draft. He read a brief statement.

MR. MOLOTOV argued that the British and American Delegations had circulated papers as agreed documents.

MR. BYRNES replied that they had but had wound up with the statement just read. This statement means that there is absolutely no agreement so far as the United States Delegation is concerned. He suggested that the matter should not be discussed here but should be reported tomorrow. If in the meantime anything had been agreed to, it could be so stated in the report.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

Western Frontier of Poland

MR. BYRNES announced that the Polish Delegation was waiting and upon his proposal they were invited to come to the table and present their views on the question of the western frontier of Poland. A summary of their statement is attached (Annex 1).

MR. MOLOTOV inquired if any other Polish delegates wished to speak.

MR. BYRNES said that they would certainly invite any other gentlemen present who wished to present his views and if there were any he would ask them to submit them in writing.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the position of the Soviet Union was different from that of the other countries. It was common knowledge that at Yalta they had discussed the eastern as well as the western frontier of Poland. Because of the action taken on the eastern frontier the Soviet Union was in a special position. The question of the Polish border was important not only for Poland and her neighbors but also for the whole world. He said what he would say on the question of the western frontier was not new as the Soviet view was well known. He felt it his duty to say, however, that this was a matter of justice. He considered that the views put forward by the Polish Government were just and that justice required that Germany be turned out of this area in the interests of the people of Europe and the whole world. It would cause a considerable weakening of Germany and permit the correction of the situation of Poland. It would mean that Poland as a racial state would be strong and one of the pillars of peace in Europe. Germany would be weakened from the point of view of her aggressive intentions and strengthened only from the point of view of her legitimate interests. All Poles would be brought together in one state which would be democratic and economically strong. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation hoped that sympathetic intention [attention?] would be given to the request of the Polish Government.

MR. EDEN said that as the matter was before the Big Three he had no comments to make.

MR. BYRNES said that they would present to the Heads of Governments the views expressed by the Polish Delegation.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that the Soviet position was a special one and that they had certain obligations to Poland.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that although the United States was not a neighbor of Poland they had always been a friend of Poland.

MR. EDEN said that it was because of Poland that Great Britain had entered the war.

The meeting adjourned.

[Annex 1]

Summary of Statements Made by Members of the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers

Top secret

MR. BIERUT said that the war had begun in Poland and that Poland had suffered enormous losses in men and material. Poland was losing 180,000 square kilometers in the east to the establishment of the new Polish frontier there. Poland considered that the new eastern frontier which had been regulated on the basis of nationality was correct but their position was that they should acquire territory in the west. They considered the matter from the security and economic points of view.

They considered that the territories in the west were one unit from the economic point of view. They proposed a line running from the Baltic on the north through Swinemünde including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River and thence along the Western Neisse River to Czechoslovakia.

The territory thus included in Poland would be smaller than that which Poland had lost in the east. Under this arrangement the total area of Poland would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers but it would give Poland a sound economy. The population of Poland which had been 34 million would be reduced to 26 million but it would be homogeneous. A great many Germans had fled and he thought many of the other one to [one and] one-half million Germans left would be willing to leave. The population east of the Curzon Line had included many Ukrainians, White Russians and some Lithuanians. It had also included about 4 million Poles which they expected would be repatriated to Poland. The density of the population of Poland before the war was 83 persons to one square kilometer. To preserve the same density they would need to have 314,000 square kilometers but they would get only 309,000 square kilometers. Thus the density would increase but they would be better off from an economic point of view.

If they received the territory proposed it would no longer be necessary for Poles to emigrate to the United States or Germany as was the case before the war. Thousands of Poles had formerly worked in this territory in the west, chiefly on farms. It was prejudicial to Poland that these workers gave their labor whereas their production went to others.

MR. RZYMOWSKI pointed out that the war began with the attack by Germany on Poland, that Poland had been under German occupation longer than any other country, and that the manner in which the Germans had behaved in Poland was proof that they wanted to destroy Polish civilization. It was the only country in which there were so many death camps. The Germans had tried to kill off the population to obtain “Lebensraum” for Germans and had attempted to destroy Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice that a Polish state be created that was powerful and which had the possibility to resist any German aggression. There should be a place in Poland for those Poles who lived east of the Curzon Line and for those who had emigrated elsewhere. There should also be a place for the increase in the population which amounted yearly to 250,000 people. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it was right that Germany should also cede territory for the sake of peace. It was in the interest of peace in Europe that Germany should be deprived of this territory as a “place d’armes” in the east. Poland would be a territory without national minorities which would make for peace. Under Germany the industries of Silesia were an armament factory but in Poland they would be devoted to satisfy the peaceful needs of the Polish people.

Polish rights in Silesia were justified also by the fact that the population would consider themselves as Poles once the German administration and pressure was removed.

The line proposed was the shortest boundary possible between the Germans and Poles and would be the easiest to defend. This would give Poland the opportunity to reconstruct its social and economic structure.

Before the war Polish rural districts were overpopulated. There were about 4 million unemployed living in villages who could not be absorbed in the urban districts. The acquisition of Silesia would enable these people to be employed.

Stettin had always been an outlet under the Germans for the products of Silesia and their claim to Stettin was justified by the fact that it was needed as a Poland [Polish] outlet for Silesian products.

MR. MIKOLAJCZYK agreed with the opinions of his colleagues. It was in the interest of all that Germany should not be able to undertake any aggressions. The Germans had two bases for their imperialism. One was the armament industry and the second the profit which they made as an intermediary between other nations. One of the bases of German armaments was the territory which they claimed for Poland. Among its basic resources were zinc and coal. The Poles thought that these resources should not be in German hands.

With respect to the profits which Germany had made as an intermediary, he said that in 1937 Germany had transported to Czechoslovakia 2,300,000 tons; to Hungary 400,000 tons; to Rumania 500,000 tons; and to Yugoslavia 200,000 tons in addition to the goods transported to Poland.

He argued that the Oder River and its whole basin should go to Poland. Poland had to export and import in large quantities in order to give work to Polish workers. One river system, the Vistula, was not enough for this purpose. It would be necessary to control the whole of resources of water of the Oder. These sources are in the Neisse area and if not controlled by Poland they could be cut off.

Summing up, he said his arguments in favor of the Polish proposal were:

  1. To take from the Germans one of the bases of their armaments.

  2. To take from Germany the control of commerce and her role as an intermediary between other states.

  3. Turning this area over to Poland would not only contribute to security and peace of all nations and of Poland but it would create a new economic and commercial system in which Poland would be able to prosper.

Relatively Germany which had lost the war would lose less territory than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose 18 percent.

He asked for a speedy decision and for full agreement between the powers pointing out the necessity for the repatriation of the Poles from the Soviet Union and the other countries to which they had been driven by the war in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of their country.

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
[Translation]

Regarding Reparations from Austria

  1. To establish the general sum of reparations from Austria of $250,000,000, to be liquidated in equal parts during six years commencing with July 1, 1945.

  2. To exact reparations generally in the form of deliveries of products of Austrian industry.

  3. Reparations to be exacted to compensate for losses caused by the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia.


Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
[Translation]

Regarding Reparations from Italy

  1. To establish the total sums of reparations from Italy at $600,000,000.

  2. Italy must bear the expense of the established reparations over a period of six years with deliveries of products of Italian industry and agriculture.

  3. Reparations from Italy must serve as compensation of losses caused by the participation of Italy in the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445

Text Submitted to the Heads of Government

[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945

Admission to the United Nations

The three Governments consider that the time has come terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions.

The three Governments have therefore resolved that it is desirable that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and they trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share their views. They have, therefore, included the preparation of the treaty as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization.

As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

  1. membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

  2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2445

Proposal by the British Delegation

Potsdam, 24th July, 1945
Secret

Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania

Our case can, I think, be stated simply as follows.

There are only two articles in the Roumanian Armistice under which property can be removed from Roumania.

One of these is Article 11 which provides for the payment of reparations. The Soviet Government do not claim that the oil equipment was removed under this Article, but that it was taken as booty.

The second is Article 7, which provides that the Roumanian Government should hand over as “trophies” war material of Germany and her Satellites located on Roumanian territory. (It is clear from Article 1 that Satellites here exclude Roumania).

It is clear therefore that the only property which can be claimed as booty is German property or the property of another Satellite of Germany.

The question is whether any of the property now in question is German property. The Soviet Delegation have not claimed that any equipment acquired by Allied nationals before the war can be regarded as German property and I cannot understand why this property has not been returned at once without further argument.

The more difficult case is that of property acquired by the companies during the war when they were under German management. But even this is clear if we examine it carefully. The companies at the time when they were seized by the Germans had certain assets (money, equipment, oil concessions). When under German management, they parted with some of these assets (money or oil) and received from Germany other assets in return (equipment). Thus the equipment was indubitably the property of the company at the time of liberation.

If any British company had on its premises property which clearly belonged to Germany and had merely been deposited there for custody, its removal as booty would of course be justified.

As a means of settling this question I now propose that the ownership of the disputed property should be subject to impartial and expert investigation. This might be entrusted to a Committee of three allied nationals drawn from States not interested in this dispute. If the property is found to belong to Germany, we would agree that it should be retained by the Russians. If it is found to belong to one of the British companies the property should be returned by the Soviet Government or compensation paid to the company.

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]

Summary of the Views Expressed by the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 24, 1945, on the Subject of Poland’s Western Frontiers

The delegation considered that Poland’s western frontier should run from the Baltic through Swinemünde, including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River to the Neisse, and along the Western Neisse to Czechoslovakia. The principal arguments they put forward were the following:

  1. Poland would lose 180,000 square kilometers in the east and should be compensated for this in the west.

  2. The territory under consideration was one unit from an economic point of view.

  3. Under the proposed arrangement Poland would acquire less than it had lost in the east. The whole area would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers. The population would be reduced from 34,000,000 to 26,000,000 but would then be homogenous [homogeneous?].

  4. There were about 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Germans left in this area, but they would be willing to return home. This territory would enable Poland to support its population without recourse to emigration. This would enable Poland to enjoy the results of the labor of Poles who had formerly emigrated to work in this area.

  5. From the point of view of security, this was the shortest possible frontier between Poles and Germans and would be easy to defend.

  6. The Germans had attempted to destroy the Polish population and ruin Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice to create a powerful Polish state which could resist any German aggression.

  7. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it would be right that Germany should cede territory for the same purpose.

  8. The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a “place d’armes” in the east.

  9. Poland would be a territory without national minorities.

  10. Before the war Poland had an excess of rural population which could not be absorbed in its urban centers. This territory was necessary to enable them to be employed and to enable the Poles forced abroad by the war to return to Poland and obtain employment.

  11. This area was one of the bases of German armaments and had resources in zinc and coal. This was one of the bases of German imperialism.

  12. Taking this area from Germany would deprive Germany of the other basis of its imperialism, namely, profits made as an intermediary between other countries. In 1937 Germany transported 2,300,000 tons of goods to Czechoslovakia, 400,000 tons to Hungary, 500,000 tons to Rumania, and 200,000 tons to Yugoslavia, in addition to that transported to Poland.

  13. The whole basin of the Oder River should go to Poland to enable Poland to have an economic base which would support its whole population and in order to prevent the possibility of cutting off the source of water supply to the Oder which lay in the Neisse area.

  14. Stettin should be in Polish hands because it was the natural outlet for Silesia.

  15. Germany which had lost the war would lose less than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied, Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose only 18 percent.

  16. A speedy decision and full agreement among the Powers was necessary because of the need to repatriate Poles from abroad in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of Poland.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m.

1. German, Austrian and Italian reparations and German economic questions
The Chairman declared that the subcommittee dealing with the German economic questions and German reparations was not yet ready to present a further report on these matters. Mr. Molotov pointed out that these committees had also been assigned the question of Austrian and Italian reparations. He presented two brief papers in regard to reparations from these two latter countries. It was agreed that these papers should be referred to the economic subcommittee for study. It was also agreed that discussion of German reparations and German economic questions should be postponed until tomorrow.

2. European oil supplies
The Chairman inquired whether a report was ready on the U.S. paper on this subject which had been presented on July 20. He was informed that this paper was still before the economic subcommittee and it was agreed that discussion on this subject should be postponed until that committee reports.

3. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe and satellite states
The subcommittee dealing with this subject was also not yet ready to report and it was agreed to postpone discussion until that report is available.

4. Admission to the United Nations
The Chairman suggested that, since the subcommittee dealing with this matter had also not been able to come to any agreement, the question should be considered at this meeting by the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the document on which the subcommittee had been working. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to take part in the discussion of this document since it omitted reference to the admission to the United Nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the first paragraph of the paper in question be dropped and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden proposed a redraft of paragraph two of the paper which would take into account the interest of other countries concerned with the peace treaty with Italy. This paragraph is embodied in the revised document “Admission to the United Nations” attached to this report.

The Chairman proposed the following additional paragraph to be inserted in the document in order to meet the point which Mr. Molotov had raised:

The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Molotov urged that it be agreed in principle that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland not be put in a worse position than Italy in connection with the matter under discussion. After some further discussion it was agreed that, since full agreement could not be reached, the problem should be referred to the Heads of Government and placed on the agenda for this afternoon.

5. Rumanian oil equipment
The British Delegation circulated a new paper in regard to the disposition of British and U.S. oil equipment in Rumania. The Soviet Delegation asked for time to study this paper and discussion of this question was therefore adjourned.

6. Agenda for meeting of Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for their agenda this afternoon:

  1. Admission to the United Nations. The paper presented to the Foreign Ministers this morning is available to the Heads of Government as a basis for discussion.

  2. The Black Sea Straits and Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. Discussion of this question was adjourned from yesterday’s meeting in order to afford an opportunity for study of the paper on “Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways” which the President circulated.

7. Agenda for tomorrow’s meeting of the Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for the agenda of their meeting tomorrow morning:

  1. Disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine.
  2. German reparations.

8. The Polish Western Frontier
A delegation representing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and headed by President Bierut, which appeared in response to the invitation sent on July 22 by President Truman in accordance with the decision of the three Heads of Government, stated its case in regard to the Polish Western Frontier. A summary of the principal points covered in their presentation is attached to this report.