Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Turkey

CHURCHILL said this was not the first time he had discussed this matter with Marshal Stalin. It became important because of the admitted need to modify the Montreux Convention. He had agreed with the Marshal in these discussions that insofar as the British Government was concerned they favored revision. Revision could only be made by agreement with the signatories with the exception, of course, of Japan. He had also frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the Black Sea and back. He, therefore, opened the discussion on the basis of a friendly agreement. At the same time he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria; by continuous attacks in the Soviet press and radio; and, of course, by the turn which the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov had taken in which modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire and her power to defend Constantinople. He understood, however, that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet Government but that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. He quite saw that if Turkey asked for an offensive and defensive alliance, this would be the occasion when the Soviets would say what improvement they wanted in the Turkish situation. However, the Turks were alarmed by the mention of these conditions. He did not know what had happened beyond these conversations. What he should like to know was the present Russian position on the subject.

MOLOTOV said that he would circulate a letter to the President and Churchill giving the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question. He would like to explain the origin of the matter. The Turkish Government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance. This question had been brought up before their Ambassador in Ankara and again in Moscow at the end of May by the Turkish Ambassador. Early in June he had had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposals he had stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to a treaty of alliance subject to certain conditions. He pointed out the fact that in doing so they should settle their mutual claims. On the Soviet side there were two. The conclusion of a treaty of alliance meant that they undertook each to defend the frontiers of both states. He had pointed out that there were several sections of their frontiers which they considered unjust. In 1921 a portion of their territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia. He pointed out that he was bound to settle this question before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.

The second question was that of the Black Sea Straits. The Soviet Union had repeatedly let their allies know that they could not regard the Montreux Convention as a correct arrangement and that they were not satisfied with it. The rights of the Soviet Union under this Convention were equal to those of the Japanese Emperor. It seemed to them that this did not correspond to the present situation. On behalf of the Soviet Government he had presented certain proposals which had been set forth in the Soviet paper which he was now circulating. At the same time, he had pointed out to the Turks that if both of these issues were settled the Russians were ready to conclude an alliance. He had also informed the Turks that the Soviet Union was prepared to settle any questions which the Turks raised on their side. He had added that if the Turkish Government were not prepared to settle these two questions the Soviet Government was prepared to make an agreement on the Straits alone between the Black Sea Powers.

CHURCHILL said that this was an important document which went far beyond the conversations between Eden and himself and Stalin and Molotov.

MOLOTOV said that the treaty of alliance with Turkey had not been under consideration at that time.

CHURCHILL inquired whether the words “proper regular procedure” in paragraph one of the Soviet paper meant that all signatories except Japan would be consulted. He repeated [that] different questions were raised in this paper, when a Russian base in the Straits was asked for; also by the proposal that no one had anything to do with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles except Russia and Turkey. He was certain that Turkey would never agree to this proposal that was being made.

MOLOTOV said that similar treaties had existed in the past between Russia and Turkey.

CHURCHILL asked if he meant the question of a Russian base in the Black Sea Straits.

MOLOTOV replied that he meant treaties which provided for the settlement of the Straits question only by Turkey and Russia. He referred to the treaties of 1805 and 1833.

CHURCHILL said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties and added that he had only pointed out the difference between these proposals and those which had earlier been discussed. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept these proposals.

STALIN said that they had not discussed the proposals before but had only had conversations.

MOLOTOV said that they had proposed to submit the matter to the June meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had not taken place.

CHURCHILL said that he stood by his conversations with Stalin in which he, Churchill, expressed the willingness to press for the revision of the Montreux Convention side by side with Stalin. That agreement still stood, but he felt quite free with regard to these new proposals.

STALIN said: “Yes,” he was free.

THE PRESIDENT said he was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that they defer consideration of the question.

This was agreed to.

THE PRESIDENT said that they were sending a telegram to the Polish Government and as the matter was sure to leak out he suggested that they prepare a communiqué.

CHURCHILL inquired whether it would mention the purpose of the visit.

STALIN said it would be better not to mention the purpose of the visit, but it made no difference to him whether they issued a communiqué or not. Stalin thought it better not to release the whole text of the invitation.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed.

MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Delegation would send in its proposal with regard to Koenigsberg in writing.

Treatment of Soviet Prisoners in a British Camp in Italy

MOLOTOV said that the camp referred to was camp no. 5 which was located near Rimini. He said that this camp, which was under British authorities, contained Ukrainians. The first statement they had received from the British stated that there were about 150 prisoners in this camp. When their representatives came to see the camp they found that there were 10,000.

CHURCHILL inquired from whom they had obtained these figures and on what date.

MOLOTOV said he would give particulars.

CHURCHILL said that the British did not make false statements.

MOLOTOV said that he understood that the British had formed a whole division of twelve regiments of these Ukrainians with officers selected from those who had been in the ranks of the German army. When their representatives had visited this camp they had found that 665 persons stated their willingness to return to their native country.

CHURCHILL said they welcomed inspection by the Russians of all of their camps. Perhaps some of these persons were Poles. In any event, he would have an investigation made and obtain a report.

MOLOTOV replied that there were only Ukrainians in the camp. He added that they had received a telegram from General Golikov, who was in charge of the repatriation of Soviet prisoners, only today.

Meeting adjourned.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m.

STALIN: The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the north Soviet zones in Vienna has begun, and should be completed in a few days.

CHURCHILL: The British government is pleased to learn of this prompt action.

TRUMAN: So is the American government.

EDEN: (reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries).

The paper of the American delegation on the southeastern European satellite countries was presented to the Foreign Secretaries. The British agreed with the paper, but the Soviets were unable to agree with the provisions for the reorganization of the government and the election.

The matter of the press and the control exercised by the control commissions were referred to the subcommittee for discussions.

The Soviet delegation agreed to submit a memorandum on the improvement of the control commission in Italy.

The Secretaries considered the economic committee’s report on German economic problems. The United States asked postponement of disputed issues for subsequent meeting. Foreign Secretaries agreed to discuss only principles agreed to by the subcommittee. These agreed principles were accepted, except for the wording of paragraph 13.

The discussions on paragraph 18 and annex to paragraph 16 were also reserved.

The Foreign Secretaries also discussed the removal of Allied industrial equipment in Rumania, on the ground that it was booty, but no conclusions were reached.

The agenda for the Big Three Meeting was submitted. It included the western frontier of Poland, trusteeships, the straits, the western frontier of the Soviet Union, and Iran. It was suggested that certain problems be referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion, to save the time of the Big Three. These problems included cooperation on European economic problems, Tangier, and the problem of Syria and the Lebanon.

STALIN: I agree that we should submit these problems to the Foreign Secretaries without further discussion here.

CHURCHILL: Syria and Lebanon affect us specially. We want to withdraw from there as soon as possible, but our immediate withdrawal would mean the massacre of the French. I should like to hear more on this here. Possibly we can discuss it here.

STALIN: The government of Syria has asked the Soviet [Government] to intervene. We should like some information on this matter. This might be discussed by the Foreign Secretaries. We do not propose the removal of troops from any country.

TRUMAN: I suggest that this matter be deferred until tomorrow and that the other questions go to the Foreign Secretaries.

(This was agreed).

TRUMAN: We now may discuss the western frontier of Poland. I have already stated my views.

MOLOTOV: (First brought up the question of certain Soviet war prisoners held in Italy. He gave notice that he would like to say a few words on this subject at the close of the meeting.)

STALIN: Have you seen the statement by the Polish government on the frontiers?

CHURCHILL and TRUMAN both indicated that they had.

STALIN: That means all the delegations maintain their existing views, and the question remains in suspense.

TRUMAN: Next subject is trusteeships.

CHURCHILL: We must hope that the Polish question will become ripe for discussion before we leave. It would be unfortunate to have all these problems discussed in Parliament.

STALIN: Let us accept the Polish proposal.

CHURCHILL: I am sorry we cannot. The matter, of course, is for the peace table, but the Polish problem is not advantageous for Poland. It destroys Germany’s economic integrity, and puts an undue burden on the occupying powers. I have grave moral scruples regarding great movements and transfers of populations. Nine million people are involved. True, there is no agreement on the population data. The Soviets say only a few million are left. We should clear up the facts. I could give other reasons, but I won’t burden you now.

STALIN: I have undertaken [shall not undertake?] to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all these points, but I will deal here only with two. One, Germany will have resources in the Ruhr and the Rhineland, so there is no great difficulty if Silesian coal basin is taken from Germany. Two, the movement of population does not present the difficulties Mr. Churchill anticipates. There are neither eight nor six nor three million Germans in this area. There have been several call-ups of troops in this area. Few Germans remain. Our data can be checked. Could we not arrange for representatives of the Polish government to come here and be heard?

CHURCHILL: I should hesitate to support that, in view of the strong views of the President regarding hearing the Yugoslavs.

STALIN: Let the Foreign Ministers in London call them and hear them.

TRUMAN: That is satisfactory.

STALIN: The Polish government must be heard in answer to the Crimea decision. I continue to urge the meeting to adopt the decision that the Foreign Ministers in London should hear the Polish government on the western frontier.

CHURCHILL: How can the frontier be discussed that way? I regret that this grave matter should be adjourned to a lesser body.

STALIN: We must not be accused of settling the frontier without hearing the Poles.

TRUMAN: I cannot see the urgency. The question can be settled only by the peace conference.

CHURCHILL: There is urgency, Mr. President. The local situation will be unremedied. The Poles who have been assigned this large area will have digged themselves in. This process will continue and it will be more difficult to settle or to revise as time passes. So I still hope that some arrangement will be made here. The situation will not be improved by hearing the Poles when the great Allies are not agreed on principles.

The burden falls on us, the British in particular. Our zone has the smallest supply of food and the greatest density of population. Suppose the Foreign Ministers, having heard the Poles, cannot agree. Then there will be indefinite delay, at least until another meeting of the heads of government. I am anxious to meet practical problems due to the march of events which the Marshal referred to. We should be prepared to consider a compromise solution to cover the period between now and the peace settlement. We would be ready to suggest a provisional line. The Poles west of that line would be working for the Soviet occupying authority. I think Marshal Stalin and I agree up to this point, that the new Poland should advance to the Oder. But the difficulty between the Marshal and me is that I do not go quite as far as the Marshal. Is there no use for us to look at anything like this suggested compromise, Mr. President? We should not despair of solutions. We should seek a halfway house. Delay now might make it impossible to alter the consolidated position of the Poles later.

Berlin draws its coal from the Silesian mines, which have long been worked by Polish miners. What is to happen to Berlin’s coal during the winter?

STALIN: Berlin draws her coal from Saxony. Let the Ruhr give her coal. There are different opportunities for supplying Berlin with coal.

TRUMAN: May I re-state my view point. The eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line, with slight digression in favor of Poland. The Allies recognize that Poland must receive substantial compensation in the north and west. They believe the new Polish government should be heard, and the final settlement await the peace conference. That was the agreement of Mr. Roosevelt with the Big Three at Crimea. I am in complete accord with it; but Poland has in fact been assigned a zone of occupation contrary to our agreement. We can agree, if we wish to give the Poles an occupying zone, but I don’t like the way the Poles have taken or been given their zone.

STALIN: I also proceed on the decision of the Crimea Conference cited by the President. After the Government of National Unity has been formed, we are bound to seek its opinion. The Polish government have communicated their views. We have two alternatives: one, to approve the Polish proposal; or, two, to hear the Poles and settle the question.

I think it expedient to settle the question now. As we are not in agreement with the Polish government, the Poles should be summoned here. But the view was expressed by the President that the Poles cannot be heard here, so we must remit the question to the Foreign Ministers.

At Crimea, the President and Mr. Churchill suggested the line should be along the Oder until it joined the Neisse. I insisted on the western Neisse. Under Churchill’s plan, Stettin and Breslau would remain German. The question to be settled is the frontier, and not a temporary line. We can either settle the question or ignore it.

CHURCHILL: Or decide it without the Poles.

STALIN: If we disagree with the Poles we cannot decide it without them. It has been said that a fifth country has been brought into occupied Germany, and in a manner contrary to our agreement. If anyone is to blame, circumstances as well as the Russians are to blame.

CHURCHILL: I withdraw my objection to the Poles coming here and trying to work out arrangements pending the peace conference.

TRUMAN: I have no objection to the Poles coming here, and for the Foreign Secretaries to hear them.

STALIN: The Chairman should invite them.

TRUMAN: The matter of trusteeships is now before us. We will hear the Soviet delegation.

STALIN: Mr. Molotov is our expert.

MOLOTOV: The proposals of the Soviets are submitted in writing. The principal question has been settled by the San Francisco Charter. We have before us specific questions regarding the assignments of territorial trusteeships. It is not possible for us to give detailed answers to these questions, but some progress can be made. First, we can discuss Italian possessions in Africa. We can proceed in one of two ways. We suggest that the matter go to the Foreign Secretaries, or we could consider the questions here tomorrow. There is also the question of the mandated territories.

EDEN: Do you want our mandates?

STALIN: There are other mandates. The question deserves the attention of the Big Three. One point more, we could exchange views on Korea.

CHURCHILL: We can exchange views on any subject, but at the end we have had only an interesting discussion. The existing mandates were dealt with at San Francisco.

(TRUMAN reads Articles 77 to 79 of the Charter. He points out that mandated territory cannot be [placed under?] trusteeship without the consent of the mandatory power. He assumes that it is the territory detached from the present enemy powers that the Soviets wish to discuss, and indicates that he is willing to have the matter referred to the Foreign Secretaries.)

CHURCHILL: We have agreed to the San Francisco draft, nothing [Page 265]more. As this matter is in the hands of the world organization, I doubt that this is a matter to be discussed around this table.

TRUMAN: Article 79 gives you complete protection on your mandated territory.

STALIN: Eden said Italy lost her colonies. Who gets them?

CHURCHILL: The British alone conquered the Italian armies.

TRUMAN: Alone?

STALIN: But Berlin was taken by the Red Army.

CHURCHILL: I meant the Italian colonies, Mr. President, were taken by us.

STALIN: No one denies. It is to the honor and glory of Britain.

CHURCHILL: We do not seek territorial aggrandizement. We have suffered grievous losses, though not so great in human life as has Russia. We come out of the war a great debtor. We have no possibility of regaining naval equality with the United States. Yet, in spite of all these losses, we have made no territorial claims. We have no Koenigsberg, nor Baltic States. We claim nothing. Having acted with rectitude and complete disinterestedness, we approach the question of the Italian colonies with good conscience.

Mr. Eden made the statement in Parliament that Italy had lost her colonies. That meant she had no claim to them as a matter of right. That does not preclude the return of certain colonies to her, if the peace conference so decides. I do not say I favor the return of the colonies, but so far as we are concerned, it is a question open for discussion. I have seen the excellent reclamation work done by the Italians in Libya and Cyrenaica. At present we hold these colonies. Who wants them?

TRUMAN: We do not want them. We do not want a trusteeship for them. We have enough “poor Italians” to feed in the United States [in Italy?].

CHURCHILL: We considered them for Jewish settlement, but the Jews are not attracted to them. Of course, we have great interest in the Mediterranean.

STALIN: Our proposals are submitted in writing, and we would like the conference to consider them.

CHURCHILL: Does the Marshal wish to put forward a claim to these colonies, or to a trusteeship for them?

STALIN: Do we consider it necessary for Italy to lose these colonies? If so, to what states do we propose to entrust the trusteeships? If it is premature to deal with this question, we can wait, but we will have to deal with it sooner or later.

CHURCHILL: I am frank to say I have not considered the possibility of Russia claiming territory in the Mediterranean.

STALIN: The Soviet delegation stated at San Francisco that we were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories.

TRUMAN: I have a copy of the statement that Mr. Molotov gave Mr. Stettinius.

CHURCHILL: We have the right to take the colonies from Italy, but to whom shall we give them? That belongs to the discussion of the peace treaty. The administration of trusteeships is for the world organization.

STALIN: Is it your position that the present conference is qualified to settle the question?

CHURCHILL: Of course, if we three agree, it facilitates settlement.

STALIN: Of course the conference is qualified to consider.

CHURCHILL: I make no objection. I am prepared to hear the Marshal’s views.

STALIN: The question has been submitted in writing.

TRUMAN: Let the Foreign Secretaries consider it.

CHURCHILL: I have no objection, but we are over-burdening the Foreign Secretaries. There are more urgent problems. We are agreed that the Italian treaty should have priority when the council of Foreign Ministers meets in September.

STALIN: Let us submit the question to the Ministers.

CHURCHILL: Yes, if they have time after considering more urgent questions.

STALIN: There should be no reservation.

TRUMAN: Let us turn to the British paper regarding Turkey.

CHURCHILL: This comes up because of the need to modify the Montreux Conference [Convention]. At Yalta, I told the Marshal we would favor the revision of the Convention, but that can be done only with the consent of the signatories, except Japan, with whom we are at war. I have also expressed our readiness to welcome the free movement of Russian ships, whether war or merchant ships, in or out of the Black Sea in time of peace or war. So we start on a friendly basis.

Still, I wish to impress on the Marshal the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey is much alarmed, because of the concentration of Russian and Bulgarian troops on her borders, by the attacks on her by the Russian radio, and the course of the conversation between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov, at which a modification of the Turkish eastern frontiers was mentioned. Also, a base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire, and the power to defend Constantinople. I understand that these were not demands made on the Turkish government, but were stated as conditions of alliance proposed by the Turks. I can see that in the consideration of such alliance, the Russians would state what improvements they desired in the Turkish situation. But the Turks were under alarm. What I should like to know is, what is the present Russian position on this subject?

MOLOTOV: I have now circulated the views of the Soviet government as set forth in writing.

I should like to explain the origin of the question. This was brought up by the Turkish government with our Ambassador, and later by the Turkish Ambassador with me. Early in June I had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposal for an alliance, I stated Russia had no objection, subject to certain conditions. We should first settle mutual claims. I mentioned two questions on our side. The treaty of alliance means we jointly undertake to defend the frontiers of two states. I pointed out that we could not undertake to defend certain sections of the frontier which we considered unjust. In 1921 part of this territory was torn from the Soviet Union – part of Armenia and part of Soviet Georgia. I pointed out that these territories should be restored. We should also have an alteration of our rights in the Straits. And a base.

On behalf of the Soviets, I have put forward our claims in the paper circulated. I pointed out to the Turks that if they were prepared to settle the two questions, we were prepared to make an alliance and settle any questions they wished to have settled. If the Turkish government was not prepared, the Soviets were prepared to make an agreement regarding the Straits only.

CHURCHILL: May we have a moment to read your statement?

MOLOTOV: Yes.

CHURCHILL: This is a very important document. It goes far beyond any of our discussions. I presume “regular procedure” in paragraph one means consultation with all signatories but Japan. Quite a different question is raised when Russia asks for a military base and asks that no powers be permitted to participate in control of the Straits but Russia and Turkey. I am quite certain Turkey will never agree to this.

STALIN: Similar treaties existed between Turkey and Russia at other times.

CHURCHILL: What times do you refer to?

STALIN: In 1805 and 1833.

CHURCHILL: These suggestions are wholly different from our previous talks. I stand by my talk with the Marshal when I promised to support revision of the Montreux Convention, but I feel quite free as to these new proposals.

STALIN: You are quite free.

CHURCHILL: I thank you.

MOLOTOV: May we submit our proposals on Koenigsberg to the President and the Prime Minister?

TRUMAN: Certainly, and the invitation to the Poles to appear before the Foreign Secretaries has gone out.

Should we discuss the communiqué before it leaks out?

STALIN: Yes.

CHURCHILL: It is breaking the principle we have followed.

STALIN: It is agreeable to me one way or the other.

TRUMAN: We will drop it.

767.68119/7-545

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg], 7/22/45
[Translation?]
Top secret

The Black Sea Straits

With regard to the regime of the Black Sea Straits, the Conference found necessary that:

  1. The International Straits Convention signed in Montreux shall be abrogated in the proper regular procedure as it no longer corresponds to the present time conditions.

  2. The determination of the regime of the Straits – the only sea passage from and to the Black Sea – shall fall within the province of Turkey and the Soviet Union as the states chiefly concerned and capable of ensuring the freedom of commercial navigation and the security in the Black Sea Straits.

  3. In addition to other measures the new Straits regime should also provide for the following:

In the interests of their own security and maintenance of peace in the area of [the] Black Sea[,] Turkey and the Soviet Union shall prevent by their common facilities in the Straits the use of the Straits by the other countries for the purposes inimical to the Black Sea powers (in addition to Turkish military bases the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits).

First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Cannon Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Golunsky
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2245

The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State

Potsdam, July 22, 1945

Memorandum for Mr. Dunn

The subcommittee to consider sections 2 and 3 of the document “Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe” met this evening (July 22). Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Golunko represented the Soviet Government.

They said that they were not prepared to discuss point 3 because, as Mr. Molotov had agreed, a Soviet paper concerning the recent changes in procedure for the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary will be circulated tomorrow morning, but it was not yet ready this evening, and it of course must be taken into account in considering this subject.

It was accordingly agreed that we would work on point 2 but submit no report to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers until we had also considered point 3 in subcommittee. On point 2 the Soviet Delegation presented a revision reading as follows:

The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures can now be adopted to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and their freedom of movement, and the dispatch of their reports without political censorship or other restrictions than those which result from the security requirements of the occupying forces in those countries which are under the regime of occupation.

In the discussion which followed they receded even from this text and when the meeting closed they left as points of difference the use of the word “entry”, and the specification of “political censorship”. In other words, they hoped not to specify in the text that there were difficulties about entry, on the argument that the other facilities would imply admission, and they wished not to “dot the i’s” of political censorship. They agreed that we would report to our several Ministers that these words need to be worked over in our next session.

They also objected to the last four lines on the first page of our text as mimeographed, to which ad referendum I tentatively agreed, as did the British representative, since this part of the text is not of great substance.

Far more important and the matter which will probably need to be discussed around the Foreign Ministers table is the final provision of Article 2 (see top of page 2 in our text), which applies to domestic freedom of the press in the several countries. They advanced various specious arguments about interference with the sovereignty of other states, and about the authority of the Control Commissions in the satellites, proposing that anything along this line should be handled by a directive to the Control Commissions.

I said that this was a provision to which the American Government attaches great importance, and while for administrative reasons it would probably be necessary in any case to send a directive to the ACCs, it would also be necessary to make some reference to freedom of the press in whatever might publicly be said at the conclusion of the Conference, if the matter is taken up at all. I drew their attention particularly to the phrase “the three Governments express their desire to see removed”, as largely answering the arguments which they had presented.

They asseverated that they had not discussed this question with their top people and the best we could get out of them was an agreement that each of us should report on the details of this meeting to our respective Ministers and receive instructions for the next meeting, which will probably be held after the morning session tomorrow.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 22, 1945)

Big Three nears decision stage at conference

Political, economic problems up first
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Winant snubbed by Big Three parley

By William H. Stoneman

Editorial: America speaks

Youngstown Vindicator (July 22, 1945)

Jap says Truman to ease up on unconditional surrender

Werner: Potsdam parley sets stage for Russia’s part in knockout of Japs

Soviet may help liquidate foe to assure role in Asia
By Max Werner

U.S. State Department (July 22, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Sunday, July 22:

The President, accompanied by his Military and Naval Aides and Captain McMahon, and Colonel Tiernan, attended Protestant church services at 1000. The services were held in the Coliseum building (a former film laboratory) in the “Masterwork” area of the American Army camp and were conducted by Lieut. Colonel Lawrence Nelson, Second Armored Division Chaplain. Captain Ernest M. Northern Jr., 67th Armored Regiment Chaplain, assisted Colonel Nelson. The President returned to the Coliseum at 1130 to attend a Catholic Mass conducted by his old friend, Colonel Tiernan.

Prime Minister Churchill called on the President at 1215. They conferred for a full hour, and Mr. Churchill left the Little White House at 1330. The Prime Minister declined the President’s invitation to lunch as he, himself, was having guests for lunch.

1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington.

1645: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where he arrived at 1655.

1700: The sixth meeting of the conference was called to order. The meeting adjourned at 1950 and the President and party returned to the Little White House immediately.

2030: Private John R. Thomas Jr., USA (Captain McMahon’s nephew) was a dinner guest at the Little White House this evening. Music was furnished during and after dinner by the Headquarters Berlin District (U.S. Army) Band, playing from the lower White House lawn.

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 23, 1945)

Deutschland – Hauptproblem der Dreierkonferenz

U.S. State Department (July 23, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m.

JCS 201st Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly
Major General Gross Colonel Stone
Major General Norstad Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell Colonel Cary
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

. . . . . . .

Command in Indo-China (CCS 890/3)

ADMIRAL KING read a memorandum relating to the approach by the United States and British Governments to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in regard to the reallocation of the southern part of Indo-China to the Southeast Asia area.

GENERAL MARSHALL proposed the amendment of the statement in paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3 which the British had recommended for inclusion in the final report to the President and the Prime Minister.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the amendment to paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3 proposed by General Marshall and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments (CCS 897)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendation of the Combined Military Transportation Committee in paragraph 5b of CCS 897 subject to the amendment of Enclosure “A” as follows:

a. Substitute in paragraph 3c “when satisfactory arrangements in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be” in lieu of “as regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not.”

b. In paragraph 5 delete the words “statement of.”

***Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 900)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered CCS 900 and amended it in several particulars.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff should insist on the inclusion under Section III of the numbered paragraphs now omitted from the final report to the President and Prime Minister, since the report should be complete and since the substitutes for these paragraphs dealing with rehabilitation did not come under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the final report to the President and Prime Minister in the Enclosure to CCS 900 as amended during the discussion.

b. Agreed to recommend the inclusion under Section III of CCS 900 of appropriate paragraphs as set forth by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to CCS 877/5.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy in Regard to Lend-Lease Assignments

GENERAL MARSHALL asked Admiral Leahy if he had discussed with the President the question of Lend-Lease assignments to the United Nations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had discussed the question with the President and was trying to get him to change the basic directive on Lend-Lease to permit General Eisenhower to continue his present course of action. He believed that the President would approve the delivery of maintenance supplies to occupational forces in Europe but that he would not approve the delivery of arms and ammunition.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he had proposed three policies which might be approved by the President, as follows:

  1. The support of that portion of the forces of such nations as in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be profitably employed against Japan in furtherance of our agreed strategy or for such other purposes connected with the war against Japan as may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  2. Supply of maintenance items for United States equipment now in possession of Allied Armies of occupation.

  3. Such exceptional military programs as the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that if the President would approve these three policies as a substitute for the policy he had announced on 5 July 1945, the Chief of Staff of the Army could then issue specific directives for assignment of Lend-Lease to the countries concerned which would accord with the three policies established by the President. He said we are receiving demands from the British for maintenance supplies and that some means of providing them is necessary. He felt that some decision must be reached promptly in regard to the delivery of maintenance supplies in order that the production problem might be controlled.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he recognized that this problem must be settled and that perhaps some basis for barter with the British might be found. Possibly the supply of United States material against reimbursement as provided for in Section 3c of the Lend-Lease Act would be the solution.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 22 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/3

Command in Indo-China

  1. We agree that as a first step in reorganising command in Indo-China, there is advantage in dividing the country into two, leaving the northern portion in China Theatre and allotting the southern portion to Southeast Asia Command. This organisation of command should be subject to review in the light of the development of operations in that area.

  2. We have examined the run of communications in Indo-China and suggest that the most satisfactory dividing line would be latitude 16° N.

  3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include in their final report to the Prime Minister and President, a statement on the following lines:

    We consider it important that there shall be unity of control of major operations in the Indo-China-Siam area when they develop and of previous subversive and para-military operations. As the first step in securing this unity of control, we are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° North in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.

    We recommend that the President and the Prime Minister should approach the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to this arrangement.

Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov because he was deeply concerned at the development of the question of reparation from Germany. He said that as Mr. Molotov knew the United States Government had always favored and still favored the adoption of a friendly overall policy for the Three Powers which would treat Germany as an economic whole. He said, however, after listening to the discussions here and hearing the report of the Reparations Committee he did not see how certain of the positions taken by the Soviet Government could be reconciled by [with?] the adoption of an overall reparation plan. For example, the question of the transfer now to Polish administration of a large part of 1937 Germany would expose the British and Americans in their zones to serious dangers in connection with an overall reparation plan. Another factor which worked against the overall plan was the definition put in by Mr. Maisky of “war bounty [booty?]”. The Secretary said he wished to make it very plain that the United States did not intend to pay out money to finance imports to Germany and thus repeat the experience after the last war when in fact United States funds had been used to pay reparations to others.

MR. MOLOTOV said he fully understood that point of view and he wished to say that Mr. Maisky had not fully made clear the position of the Soviet Government on the definition of “war bounty [booty?].”

THE SECRETARY continued that he was also very much afraid that the attempt to resolve these conditions in practice would lead to endless quarrels and disagreements between the three countries at a time when unity between them was essential.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought that these difficulties could be reconciled here at the Conference and that he intended to put forward at the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers concrete proposals which he hoped would be carefully studied by the British and American Delegations.

THE SECRETARY said that under the circumstances he wondered whether it would not be better to give consideration to the possibility of each country taking reparations from its own zone. For example, according to their estimates, about 50% of the existing wealth of Germany was in the Soviet zone and that, therefore, the Soviet Union could receive its share of reparations from its own zone. He added that if they wished to obtain certain equipment or materials from the British or American zones they could do so in exchange for food or coal needed to feed and warm the German population in the west. He added that Marshal Stalin had indicated some such proposal when he had said yesterday that if the British wished to obtain coal from Silesia they could do so by exchanging other goods with the Poles. He added that his suggestion for zonal as against overall treatment applied only to reparations but that in other matters, such as currency, transport, etc. Germany would be treated as an economic whole.

MR. MOLOTOV said he knew that the Marshal strongly favored an overall plan for reparations and he said that they would be quite prepared to consider reducing their reparation claims.

As it was then time for the meeting, it was agreed that if agreeable with Mr. Eden the three Foreign Secretaries would meet informally this afternoon in order to discuss the matter further.

In conclusion, THE SECRETARY repeated that the United States could not agree to anything which would require them to finance the feeding of Germans in their zone so that the latter could work on behalf of reparations for other countries.

Byrnes-Eden conversation

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden

Byrnes expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Molotov and had subsequently informed Eden of this talk.

Byrnes-Churchill conversation, morning

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Churchill

Churchill: “Mr. Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T. V. Soong advising him not to give way on any point to the Russians, but to return to Moscow and keep on negotiating pending further developments.

“It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan.”

740.00119 Potsdam/8-745: Telegram

The President to the Ambassador in China

[Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945
Top secret

Number 310, personal and top secret, from the President for Ambassador Hurley.

Please deliver the following message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

I refer to your message of 19 [20] July quoting your telegram to Generalissimo Stalin.

I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement. If you and Generalissimo Stalin differ as to the correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement, I hope you will arrange for Soong to return to Moscow and continue your efforts to reach complete understanding. TRUMAN

TRUMAN

Sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Russell

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
Top secret

The sixth session of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:30 a.m. on July 23, 1945. MR. MOLOTOV was in the Chair.

MR. MOLOTOV first announced that he wished to state the questions which were up for discussion. They were:

  1. Reparations from Germany and Italy;
  2. Economic Principles Regarding Germany;
  3. The Report of the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers;
  4. Trusteeships;
  5. The Directive to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany;
  6. Paper on Cooperation in Solving urgent European Economic Problems;
  7. Perhaps Iran.

MR. EDEN pointed out that Iran was on the Big Three agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed and suggested that it be passed over.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested Tangier, and MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested the proposed text of the invitations to China and France and added that the morning agenda would conclude with the preparation of an agenda for the Big Three. He asked whether there were any other questions. If so, they should be stated. He remarked that several questions now before subcommittees were not yet ready for discussion. These included the questions of Italy and Spain and several others.

Reparations

MR. MOLOTOV then brought up the matter of reparations and circulated a paper containing the principal suggestions of the Soviet delegation on this matter. The first paper was entitled “Plan for Reparations from Germany.” He then mentioned the draft considered by the Commission regarding advance deliveries from Germany and submitted a Soviet draft. He stated that there were other reparations questions which could not be raised now. There was need for time to study them and consideration could be postponed until tomorrow.

MR. BYRNES agreed that it was best to postpone consideration since documents had been received only now and time would be needed to study them.

MR. EDEN remarked that he was certainly not now prepared to comment on the Soviet proposals.

MR. MOLOTOV accepted this position but asked whether informal conversations could not be held on the matter in the present meeting.

MR. EDEN asked that the Economic Subcommittee work at the drafts.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the papers should not be considered during the present meeting.

MR. EDEN then asked about Molotov’s reference to informal conversations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the question of reparations is linked with other economic questions, such as war booty, and it would be a good idea to have informal exchanges of view. However, he is ready to accept any proposal.

MR. BYRNES then asked for postponement until tomorrow and that there should be no informal conversations.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the second question concerned economic principles, which was not finished yesterday. He stated his readiness to withdraw his amendment to paragraph 13 and hoped that his colleagues could agree on 18.

MR. BYRNES replied that it was the American position that paragraph 18 should remain in the document.

MR. EDEN agreed and pointed out that paragraph 18 is linked with paragraph 5 of the report of the Committee.

MR. MOLOTOV then made a statement regarding the paragraph mentioned by Mr. Eden. He maintained that the subcommittee report was not accurate. The present Conference should not discuss how to deal with German territory. He knew that the idea is to supply Germany as far as possible from territories where supplies were drawn before the war. However, heavy damage in some areas has radically changed the situation. He did not believe that it was possible for the Conference to know where conditions have changed and to what degree. This matter should be referred to the Council. It was the affair of our representatives and should be referred to them. They can deal with the questions specifically. He mentioned the opposing views of Stalin and Churchill on this matter and therefore concluded that nothing could be accepted as being generally binding. He wished to decide these matters by means of our representatives in Germany who if they did not agree could refer questions to their governments. If they attempted to write a paper applicable to Germany as it was before the war, the Soviet Union could not agree. He suggested that the question in paragraph 18 should not be decided either way at this meeting. There should be no binding decision taken at this time. It should be decided in accordance with future developments in Germany.

MR. EDEN doubted that it would help much to pass the question on to the Control Council. There were already differences of opinion in the Council on temporary problems on how to fuel Berlin. A temporary arrangement had been reached on this matter in order to tide it over this Conference.5 A common solution must now be found in order to meet the situation adequately.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that if he did accept this suggestion, it would make no practical difference since all disagreements would remain. He pointed out that there are no figures on how much coal, food and other materials are available or are necessary. This must be decided by the Control Council when data is available. The Control Council at that time will be able to reach a common agreement or will refer the matter to their governments. If this article is accepted there would still be no practical solution. The question would still go back to the governments. He suggested that if agreement could not be reached, the matter be referred to the Big Three.

MR. EDEN admitted the truth of Mr. Molotov’s contention to the effect that agreement on this principle would not solve the practical problems of coal and food. On the other hand, this principle would constitute a good basis upon which the Control Council could make decisions; otherwise, there would be no basis to guide them.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Soviet Union could not accept now because of differences in conception of the German problem. He suggested that the question be studied in a business-like fashion for several weeks or for several days.

MR. BYRNES inquired whether Mr. Molotov would object to a statement of general principles to the effect that in the absence of a specific reason, supplies would as far as possible be drawn from the same areas as before the war. He pointed out that the statement actually says “so far as practicable.” Such a statement would be a guide to assist the Control Council in their determinations of such questions. If we simply referred the matter to them Mr. Byrnes feared that they would be unable to decide and would only send the question back to their governments.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he could not agree now because he had no data. Time was needed. When the study had been made the matter might be reconsidered. He suggested reference to the Big Three, and all agreed.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of the relative priority of exports and reparations. He asked for consideration of the Soviet draft which he distributed and inquired whether his suggestion was clear.

MR. BYRNES replied that the American position is clear. It is the position of the United States that there will be no reparations until imports in the American zone are paid for. There can be no discussion of this matter. We do not intend, as we did after the last war, to provide the money for the payment of reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV gave an example of the sense of his suggestion. He supposed the possibility that 2 million tons of coal would be produced, and the total requirements for internal use, export and reparations would amount to 2,200,000 tons. In this case he suggested that exports and reparations be reduced 10 percent to make up the difference. It would mean that both exports and reparations would be little less and that over a period of a year’s time the situation might be balanced. If during the whole year there was still a shortage of 10 percent, all three factors, including internal consumption, would be reduced 10 percent.

MR. MOLOTOV considered this to be a simple and fair solution. He stated that if production were increased over the figure set the reparations amount would not change. This would mean a surplus either for internal use or for export as the Control Council should decide. He asked whether this was not a fair arrangement.

MR. EDEN stated that it seemed to him that either imports should be a first charge or reparations should be a first charge or that as now suggested they should have an equal status. He considered it certain that if exports were not sufficient to cover imports someone must make deliveries without payment therefor.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that imports could be reduced.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the Soviet Union had agreed to a minimum import program which must be fulfilled and which cannot be cut to meet reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV thought that shortages in coal exports might be compensated by increased exports of other commodities.

MR. BYRNES remarked that he had stated his position. Imports must be a first charge and not a dollar will be paid on reparations until imports are paid for.

MR. MOLOTOV then made another suggestion. Such German exports as had been agreed to by the Control Council should have a first priority. On other exports reparations would have first priority. All exports approved by the Control Council would be carried out in the first instance.7 He suggested that if the Foreign Ministers were unable to agree, that the matter be referred to the Big Three.

MR. EDEN asked for permission to clarify the situation. He pointed out that the Control Council has agreed to a minimum export program. If this program is cut in any way it can only be done at the expense of someone, say the miners who are producing coal. In order to avoid such a situation someone must bring in supplies without payment. Therefore, imports must be a first charge.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this was not quite clear to him and asked Mr. Eden to repeat the statement.

MR. EDEN did so.

MR. BYRNES stated that if we lessened food supplies we lessened production.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the possibility of cutting internal consumption.

MR. BYRNES stated that we have started with a program of minimum import needs and it was therefore impossible to reduce internal consumption in order to provide for reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that he had made the suggestion that where the Control Council had approved imports they would be a first charge although they might possibly affect reparations.

MR. EDEN stated that everything must be approved by the Control Council.

MR. MOLOTOV gave another example of his meaning. Say the Control Council had decided on the export of 500,000 tons of coal at a time when it was planned to produce 2,000,000 tons. Suppose the British then wanted to export 700,000 tons. His suggestion would mean that the 500,000 tons would be a first charge and the supplementary 200,000 tons would be subject to reparations needs. To summarize, the exports approved by the Control Council for the payment of imports is to be a first charge. In other cases reparations have priority. In the example cited the 500,000 ton exports would have priority but the 200,000 additional would be subject to a reparations priority. However, if the Control Council agreed that the 200,000 tons should be exported in order to pay for imports then they would also have priority over reparations. He again suggested reference of the matter to the Big Three.

Council of Foreign Ministers

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there was a final draft on the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had no comment and after asking for comment asked that the draft be considered as approved.

Trusteeship

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the subject of trusteeship and asked for comments on the Soviet draft. He pointed out that the Soviet draft deals in the first place with the Italian colonies and suggested that a definite determination be made of the future status of these colonies. If they are to be separated from Italy, a joint trusteeship under the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should be established.

MR. EDEN pointed out there were two problems in regard to the Italian colonies. The first problem is whether Italy lost the war or not. The British have said that Italy has no right to get her colonies back but have not gone beyond that point. The British believe that this question should be considered in connection with the settlement of a peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. When our minds are made up whether colonies go back to Italy or not, then it is probable that the United Nations organization would decide on the form of trusteeship, if any.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the American position had been stated by the President yesterday afternoon. At the President’s suggestion it was tentatively agreed that the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy would be the first business of the Council of Foreign Ministers. As a result the Foreign Ministers and their governments must determine the disposition of the colonies and the Trieste boundaries and any other decisions in regard to Italian territory. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the Conference could decide what territories should be taken from Italy and what trusteeships should be established. It is true that the Charter provided that there can be an agreement as to trusteeships. The colonies referred to by the Soviet Union are now in the custody of the United Kingdom. If there was an agreement between them the matter could be considered here; but there is no agreement and there can be no disposition until peace is concluded. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the conference could decide this question.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to make a statement. Eden had publicly stated in Parliament several times the British position. Therefore their position can be clearly seen; but it has not been disclosed to the Allies, The colonies are now in the custody of the British Army. Under these conditions there was ground to believe that the British might wish to express an opinion. If they do not wish to do so now perhaps they will later. The trusteeship question had been raised in San Francisco and even in Moscow by the United States. Mr. Molotov had no doubt that the American Government has considered this question. He hoped that the United States Government would give an expression of its views to the Allies. The Soviet Government will express their views. If the matter is not to be discussed now, he would agree. That is why the Soviet Government had suggested discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The matter will be referred to the first meeting in London.

MR. BYRNES stated that the United States had presented both at Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco its general views on trusteeships. However, it did not state its views on specific colonies. The Council of Foreign Ministers at its first meeting would pass on this and must necessarily make a decision regarding the disposal of the colonies. If it was determined that the colonies or some of them were to be taken from Italy, it was proper and necessary to decide the question of administration.

MR. EDEN added that the British Government has not yet decided whether some or all of the colonies should be taken from Italy. He agreed that this should be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers in the London meeting at the time they drew up the peace treaty with Italy. Until then it was not worthwhile to talk about trusteeships. However, he thought that the new world organization should decide this question.

MR. BYRNES asked whether it was agreed that this question would not be disposed of here.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the Soviet memorandum be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration at its first meeting in London.

MR. EDEN remarked there was no point in referring the Soviet memorandum since the first task of the Council will be the preparation of peace terms for Italy and the matter would come up automatically.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he of course fully agreed. However, the question of the western frontiers of Poland was a question to be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers in their preparation of peace treaties. Despite this the matter is being dealt with now. In any event, Mr. Molotov asked that note be taken of the fact that the matter would be raised in the first meeting of the Council.

MR. BYRNES stated that this is fully understood.

Directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the next subject up for discussion was the proposed directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany.

MR. BYRNES stated that this paper was proposed because in the opinion of the American representative on the Control Council it was desirable to have such a directive issued giving instructions to the Commanders in each zone to carry out whatever agreement was reached at this Conference. Therefore, he suggested that the matter be referred to a committee in order that the Soviet and British Delegations could make any suggestions they desired regarding the proposal. The directive would simply give the Commanders instructions from their Heads of State and each Commander would have the same instructions.

MR. EDEN stated that he was a little puzzled regarding the need for this directive. He pointed out that they had had before them principles on [of?] agreement in the handling of Germany. The political principles had been approved. They were based on an American draft which he considered to be extremely well set up. He had assumed that these principles would go to the British Commanders in order to guide them. He thought that this would be enough. The proposed discussion [directive?] covers to some extent similar grounds. Some things are left out and some added. Some very good things had been left out.

MR. BYRNES stated that his purpose is to have the matter referred to a committee in order that past and future agreements of the Conference could be put into a directive from the Heads of States to the Commanders. We should transmit to each Commander everything decided at this Conference. This should be done before the Conference ends.

MR. MOLOTOV believed that there was some point in Mr. Eden’s remarks. The proposed directive repeats what has been said in the document on political principles plus some economic. He asked whether it was advisable to have two wordings on the same points a ad stated that he did not know how to solve this difficulty. If the purpose is to give additional direction, the Soviet Government might consider; but decisions have already been taken on political directives and are to be taken on economic matters. These would be sent to the Commanders and the advantage of the directive is not clear.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the language should be the same. His only idea was to make certain that the Commanders would know what had been decided at this Conference. He suggested the appointment of a committee to incorporate the language previously approved plus any that may be approved in the future, into a directive. Either we can do this or let the Commanders read about it in the press or perhaps they could be sent a copy of the communiqué. Army people generally want written directives and General Eisenhower has asked for this.

MR. EDEN thought General Eisenhower might not have known that we had adopted a set of political principles based on the draft submitted by the United States. Mr. Eden agreed entirely that the directives given to the Commanders must be written and the British had intended to send their Commander all agreed principles. Mr. Eden suggested that before agreements were communicated to the Commanders, France should be consulted in order that the directive should be uniform in all four zones.

MR. BYRNES agreed to this proposal and restated his desire for some machinery to send to the Commanders whatever was decided at the Conference.

MR. EDEN asked whether consideration would be given to bringing France in line.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed and inquired about the composition of the subcommittee.

MR. BYRNES named Mr. Murphy and Mr. Riddleberger.

MR. EDEN named Mr. [Sir William] Strang and Mr. Harrison.

MR. MOLOTOV named Mr. Gusev and Mr. Sobolev.

Cooperation in Solving Urgent European Economic Problems

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the next question concerned cooperation in solving urgent European economic problems. He thought it advisable to establish a subcommittee to consider this matter.

MR. BYRNES agreed that this was the best thing to do.

MR. MOLOTOV named Mr. Arutunian and Mr. Goroshenko.

MR. EDEN named Mr. Brand and Mr. Phillips [Coulson].

MR. BYRNES suggested that the matter be referred to the Economic Committee [Subcommittee].

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this committee was not suitable.

MR. BYRNES then named Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley.

Iran

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Iran.

MR. EDEN stated that this would be considered at another time.

Tangier

MR. MOLOTOV then brought up the question of Tangier.

MR. EDEN stated that there was to be a preliminary discussion of this matter in Paris soon and that we would welcome Soviet participation in the discussion. He stated that he was in entire agreement with the principles contained in paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft to the effect that the Zone should remain international and that steps should be taken to put an end to Spanish occupation. It was to consider how best this could be done that the suggestion was made that the meeting should be convened in Paris. Mr. Eden stated the hope that all governments signatory to the Act of Algeciras would meet before final decisions were taken. He did not feel that the four powers could ignore the interests of the small powers. He hoped that a full conference could meet before long. He did not think that it was right for the Conference to consider the subject since there was to be a meeting soon and the French have considerable interest in the matter. The position of Spain would of course have to be considered in the Paris meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what was suggested.

MR. EDEN replied that he suggested an early Paris meeting between the representatives of the three powers here and the French.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the adoption of paragraph 1 and agreement that the four powers would meet.

MR. EDEN replied that he must say that he had told the French that the British would not join in a settlement of the Tangier situation without the French.

MR. BYRNES asked whether it was agreed that the four powers should work out an agreement. He stated his assumption that Mr. Eden would prefer no publicity in the press.

MR. EDEN wondered whether such a paradise was possible.

MR. BYRNES then asked whether the Soviet Union wanted an announcement.

MR. EDEN stated that it would be unwise to make an announcement that we are going to the French capital in order to decide the Tangier question. Also, there were the other signatories of the Act to be considered. It is enough that we here agree to have conversations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Union would not insist on an announcement. He suggested agreement among the Foreign Ministers without publicity that we accept paragraph 1 of the Soviet paper and that we will meet in Paris.

This was agreed to.

Invitations to China and France

MR. MOLOTOV brought up the subject of the proposed invitations to China and France. He suggested that after the words “members of Council” there should be added the words “by agreement between them.” After looking at Mr. Byrnes’ draft he agreed that it was all right without this change.

Agenda for Big Three

MR. MOLOTOV then asked for consideration of an agenda for the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES intervened to suggest that a time should be set for sending the invitations to China and France. He remarked that if they were sent now they might become known to the press. He suggested sending the invitations the day before the issuance of the communiqué and the end of the Conference.

MR. EDEN thought that there should be a little more notice than one day in order to give a chance for an answer to be received. He suggested 48-hour notice.

This was agreed to.

Agenda for Big Three

MR. MOLOTOV again asked for the formulation of an agenda for the afternoon Big Three meeting. He stated that there would be:

  1. Turkey
  2. Koenigsberg
  3. Syria and the Levant
  4. Persia

MR. MOLOTOV mentioned the question of reparations from Germany and Italy, but it was agreed that this should not go on the agenda but should be discussed in the next day’s meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV also raised the question of economic principles but this was put over until the next day.

MR. BYRNES then brought up the fact that the question of the admission of Italy into international organizations and the exclusion of Spain from them had been referred to a committee, which had not yet reported. He understood that part of the paper had been agreed to and suggested that the committee report back if it was unable to agree. There had been a suggestion that there would be two separate papers and then a proposal that they be combined into one paper. At the present time they were incorporated in one paper. He thought that this matter might be disposed of.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what suggestions Mr. Byrnes had.

MR. BYRNES replied that he suggested that the matter be acted on now and disposed of. He understood that there was no difficulty about the matter except whether there should be two papers or one. He was willing to take either.

MR. EDEN suggested the drafting committee have one more try and that otherwise the matter would be considered tomorrow.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it was not entirely a question of whether there should be one or two documents.

MR. BYRNES then asked for a report from the subcommittee either for or against the paper tomorrow.

MR. EDEN then circulated a note by the Prime Minister on the Greek situation.

The meeting then adjourned.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2345

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.

Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Monday Morning, July 23, 1945

1. Reparations by Germany, Austria and Italy
Discussion of this question was postponed in order to enable the Economic Subcommittee to study two new papers on the subject presented by the Soviet Delegation.

2. German Economic Questions
The Soviet [Delegation] objected to paragraph 18 of the proposed agreement on economic principles, stating that each occupation zone should so far as practicable draw its supplies from the areas in Germany from which it had drawn before the war. It was agreed that this question should be referred to the Heads of Governments.

The Soviet Delegation presented a draft of a new paragraph 19 dealing with comparative priority between reparations and exports from Germany in payment of imports. Since no agreement could be reached on this question it was also referred to the Heads of Governments.

3. Council of Foreign Ministers
The revised text on this subject was given final approval.

4. Trusteeship
It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in connection with the negotiation of the peace settlement with Italy.

5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany
A subcommittee was named to prepare directives to the respective military commanders in Germany embodying the decisions of this conference and to make recommendations as to the manner of consulting the French in regard thereto.

6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
A subcommittee was named to deal with this problem.

7. Iran
It was agreed that this question should be discussed by the Heads of Governments.

8. Tangier
The Foreign Ministers agreed to the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that Tangier should remain international. It was also agreed that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future and that the other matters raised in [the] Soviet paper would be discussed at that time.

9. Telegram to the Chinese and French Governments concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers
The draft telegram on this subject was approved without change. It was agreed that these telegrams should be dispatched 48 hours before the issuance of the communiqué at the conclusion of this Conference.

10. Agenda for this afternoon’s meeting of the Heads of Governments
It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of Governments that the following subjects should constitute their agenda this afternoon.

  1. Turkey. A Soviet paper on the Black Sea Straits was circulated yesterday.
  2. The Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area in East Prussia. A Soviet paper on this subject was circulated yesterday.
  3. Syria and Lebanon.
  4. Iran. British paper on this subject has been circulated.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2345

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
[Translation]

Agenda of the meeting of the three Ministers was as following:

1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy
V. M. Molotov handed to Secretary of State Byrnes and Minister for Foreign Affairs Eden the draft proposals of the Soviet Delegation on reparations from Germany and on advance deliveries from Germany in [on] account of reparations.

It was decided to charge the Economic Commission [Subcommittee] with preliminary examination of the both drafts and to discuss them at the next meeting of the three Ministers.

2. Economic principles in regard to Germany
Paragraphs 13 and 18 were discussed same [as well] as paragraph 19. proposed by the Soviet Delegation. V. M. Molotov said he withdrew the proposed by him amendment to paragraph 13 and proposed to exclude paragraph 18, questions related to this paragraph to be examined by the Allied organs in Germany with subsequent solution in the Control Council; in case no agreement is reached in the Control Council the questions are to be agreed upon by the Governments. On this point there was no agreement reached and it was decided to submit the question of paragraph 18 to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon.

V. M. Molotov submitted to Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes the draft of new paragraph 19 proposed by the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated this draft cannot be accepted by the United States Delegation. V. M. Molotov proposed an alternate draft of paragraph 19 according to which the approved by the Control Council export from Germany to cover the import is realized prior to all other deliveries. In all other cases priority is given to reparations. The agreement was not reached and it was decided to submit this question to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon.

3. On the Council of Foreign Ministers
Presented by the Drafting Committee draft was approved without amendments.

4. On trust territories
The draft of the Soviet Delegation was discussed. Mr. Eden stated that first of all should be solved the question of whether the Italian colonies should be detached from Italy and if so, which ones specifically. This question should be solved simultaneously with the drafting of the peace agreement with Italy. The question of who should be given the trusteeship over all former Italian colonies to be detached from Italy, must be solved by the International Organization of United Nations. Mr. Byrnes proposed to postpone the decision on this question until the signing of the peace agreement with Italy, when all territorial problems concerning Italy would be solved.

V. M. Molotov proposed to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers that will take place in London next September. Mr. Eden said that he thought that there was no necessity to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the Council of the Foreign Ministers because in working out the Peace Treaty with Italy question of the Italian colonies will be automatically brought up.

V. M. Molotov asked to take into account that the questions Soviet Memorandum is dealing with will be put by the Soviet Government before the September meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers in London.

5. On directives to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany (proposal of the US delegation)
It was decided to inform all Commanders in Chief of the Allied occupational forces in Germany of all concerning them decisions of the Conference upon securing confirmation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on these decisions.

For this objective [it] was decided to organize a Committee composed of:

United States Murphy and Riddleberger,
Great Britain Strang and Harrison,
Soviet Union Goussev and Sobolev.

6. On cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems
For preliminary examination of the memorandum submitted by the United States Delegation to organize a Committee composed of:

United States Clayton and Pauley
Great Britain Brand and Coulson
Soviet Union Arutiunian and Geraschenko.

7. On Tangier
The Soviet draft was discussed.

Resolved:

  1. To approve the first paragraph of the Soviet Delegation’s draft which reads as the following:

    International Zone of Tangier.
    Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we agreed that this zone which includes the town of Tangier and the area adjoined to it shall owing to it[s] special strategic importance remain international.

  2. It was decided to discuss in immediate future the whole question on [of?] Tangier at the meeting in Paris of the representatives of the Four Governments – USSR, USA, Great Britain, and France.

8. Approval of the text of address to Governments of China and France
Text of address proposed by the Committee is approved without amendments.

It is decided to send the address forty-eight hours before communiqué on the results of the Conference is published.

9. On agenda of the meeting of the Heads of the Three Governments
It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of the Three Governments the following agenda:

  1. On Turkey;
  2. On Koenigsberg region;
  3. On Syria and Lebanon;
  4. On Iran[.]