Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m.
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Present |
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| United States |
United Kingdom |
Soviet Union |
| President Truman |
Prime Minister Churchill |
Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes |
Foreign Secretary Eden |
Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy |
Mr. Attlee |
Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Harriman |
Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Pauley |
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr |
Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Davies |
Sir William Strang |
Mr. Novikov |
| Mr. Dunn |
Major Birse |
Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Clayton |
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Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Cohen |
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| Mr. Matthews |
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| Mr. Bohlen |
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| Mr. Thompson |
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Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret
STALIN announced that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Austria had begun today. He said that they would have to withdraw for a distance of about 100 kilometers and that the movement would be completed by July 24.
MR. CHURCHILL said that he was very gratified that Marshal Stalin had so quickly carried out his agreement.
THE PRESIDENT said that he was also appreciative.
STALIN replied that it had merely been their duty.
THE PRESIDENT called upon Mr. Eden to present his report of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
MR. EDEN then read the following report:
The Foreign Ministers this morning had discussed the following subjects:
1. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
The meeting had before it a memorandum submitted by the United States delegation on July 21st. This memorandum dealt with three questions:
- The observation of elections in certain European countries.
- Facilities for press representatives in liberated and former Axis satellite states.
- Procedure of Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
The British delegation expressed agreement with the United States memorandum.
The Soviet delegation was unable to agree with the proposal in regard to the observation of elections. As regards the second and third questions it was agreed that these should be referred to a subcommittee for discussion.
The Soviet delegation undertook to provide a memorandum showing recent improvements in the status of the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also agreed to prepare a memorandum showing the changes which they felt desirable in regard to the procedure of the Allied Commission in Italy.
2. German Economic Questions
The Foreign Secretaries had before them a report by the Economic Sub-Committee. The United States Delegation asked for discussion on reparations to be postponed to a subsequent meeting and the Soviet Delegation asked that discussion should be confined to the economic principles which had been agreed by the Sub-Committee. The Foreign Secretaries therefore decided to discuss the agreed principles and not the principles in dispute or reparations questions. It was agreed that reparations should figure as the first item on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries for their meeting on July 23rd.
Paragraph 10 was slightly amended and agreed to. The wording of paragraph 13 is still under discussion.
Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17 of the principles were agreed subject to agreement on the points remaining in dispute. Paragraphs 16 and 18 were reserved.
MR. MOLOTOV interrupted to state that this was not accurate as paragraphs 13 and 18 remained.
MR. EDEN pointed out that he had said that paragraph 13 was still under discussion.
Continuing the reading of his report MR. EDEN said that the only other questions discussed were:
3. Removal as Booty of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania
A general discussion took place on this question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 19th. No agreement was reached and the question was adjourned for further consideration.
4. Agenda for the Plenary Meeting
The Foreign Secretaries agreed to recommend as the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting the following items:
- The Western Frontier of Poland (resumption of discussion).
- Trusteeship (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).
- Turkey (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting).
- Partial change of the Western Frontier of the Soviet Union (proposal of the Soviet Delegation).
- Persia (memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21st).
Certain further topics were proposed for remission to the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting on July 22nd. These were as follows:
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Cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems (proposal of U.S. delegation).
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Directive from heads of Governments for the control of Germany in accordance with the principles heretofore agreed (proposal of U.S. delegation).
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Tangier (proposal of Soviet delegation).
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Syria and Lebanon (proposal of Soviet delegation).
It is hoped that it may be agreed to refer these at once to the Committee of Foreign Secretaries without discussion at this stage by the plenary meeting.
THE PRESIDENT asked if the agenda as proposed was accepted.
STALIN said he had no objection.
CHURCHILL said he did not know what the proposals were with regard to Syria and Lebanon. These matters affected the British very much. Only British troops were involved. They were ready to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon; they did not want anything there. There was difficulty in doing this at the present time as their withdrawal would be followed by the massacre of the French. He would like to know what was proposed before he made up his mind.
MOLOTOV said that what they had in mind was that the Government of Syria had approached the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government had addressed a note on this matter to the United States, British and French Governments.
CHURCHILL inquired if a communication had been sent to China.
MOLOTOV replied that it had not. He went on to say that they would like to have some information in the matter since it affected Soviet interests. He thought that a preliminary discussion could be held in the Foreign Minister’s meeting.
STALIN said that the Soviets had made no proposals with regard to the removal of the troops of any country.
CHURCHILL said he persisted that the discussion be opened up at the present meeting.
THE PRESIDENT suggested that the first three of the four topics proposed for remission to the Foreign Ministers be referred to them and that the fourth question relating to Syria and Lebanon be discussed by the Heads of Government at the next meeting.
This was agreed to.
Western Frontier of Poland
THE PRESIDENT said that he had already stated the case so far as the United States was concerned.
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation wished to place another matter on the agenda of the meeting today. They wished to make a statement with regard to the prisoner-of-war camp in Italy in which Soviet prisoners were held.
This was agreed to.
CHURCHILL inquired if the camp were under British or American control.
STALIN replied that it was under British control.
CHURCHILL said that he had nothing to add to his statement on Poland.
STALIN inquired if his colleagues had seen the statement made by the Polish Government.
THE PRESIDENT and CHURCHILL said that they had read the Polish statement.
STALIN then observed that all delegations maintained their views which meant that the question remained unsettled.
THE PRESIDENT proposed to proceed to the next question.
CHURCHILL inquired if this meant that nothing would be done.
THE PRESIDENT said that the question could be brought up again at any time while they were in session.
CHURCHILL said that they must hope that the matter would be ripe for discussion sometime before their departure. It would be very unfortunate if they parted with an important question like this unsettled, leaving the matter to be discussed in the parliaments of the world.
STALIN then suggested that they comply with the request of the Polish Government.
CHURCHILL rejoined that this was totally unacceptable.
STALIN asked why.
CHURCHILL said he had given a number of reasons the day before, the chief of which were:
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that it had been agreed that boundaries should be determined at the peace settlement.
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that it was not advantageous to Poland to take so much German territory.
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that it would rupture the economic position of Germany and throw an undue burden on the occupying powers.
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that they would have a grave moral responsibility for the transfer of enormous populations. The British had accepted in principle the transfer of the population from the east of the Curzon line. He was bound to state, however, that he considered that to transfer a population of from 8½ to 9 million people would be wrong.
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that the data on this subject was not agreed. The British information was that from 8 to 9 million Germans were in this area. The Soviet delegation said that they had already gone. This should be cleared up. The British did not now have any opportunity to know what the facts were but until they had some evidence to the contrary they would have to use their own estimates.
CHURCHILL said there were other reasons for opposing the proposal but he did not wish to burden the Conference with them now.
STALIN said he was not undertaking to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all the points he had raised but there were two that were particularly important. With regard to the question of fuel, he said that Germany would have fuel in the Ruhr and the Rhineland. There was no great difficulty for Germany caused by the loss of Silesia for Germany’s main base for coal was in the west.
The second important point was the question of the transfer of populations. There were neither 8 nor 6 nor 3 million Poles [Germans] in this area. There had been several call ups of troops in this area and many of these people had been killed. Very few Germans had remained there and those who remained had fled before the Red Army. He said that this could be checked. They can arrange for representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to come to the Conference where they could hear what they had to say.
CHURCHILL said he hesitated to support this proposal because of the views expressed by the President the other day with regard to representatives of the Yugoslav Government.
STALIN then proposed that they let the Council of Foreign Ministers which was being set up call in the Polish representatives and hear them.
THE PRESIDENT said he did not object.
MR. CHURCHILL pointed out that the Council would not meet until September 1.
STALIN said that all three parties would be able to collect information by that time.
CHURCHILL said that this would merely transfer the difficulty from this Conference to the Council of Foreign Ministers. They were in a better position at this meeting to decide the matter.
STALIN said that under the Crimean decisions they were bound to hear the Poles on the question of frontiers.
CHURCHILL inquired if the President agreed to send this whole matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
THE PRESIDENT said that doing this would not prevent further discussion at this meeting. They could not agree now and he proposed that they take up something else.
STALIN said he continued to urge that they adopt the decision that the Council of Foreign Ministers should call representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to hear their point of view on the frontier question.
CHURCHILL inquired how this could be decided in that way when it was a question which had to be decided at the peace conference.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers would not take a final decision. Their discussions would, however, be helpful.
STALIN said that this was correct.
CHURCHILL said he would regret that this grave matter should be sent to a body of less importance.
STALIN rejoined that they should then invite the Poles to come to this meeting.
CHURCHILL said he would prefer this because the matter was urgent. He added however that the Poles would ask for more than he could accept.
STALIN pointed out that if they invited the Poles, the Poles would not be able to accuse the Big Three of not hearing them.
THE PRESIDENT said he did not see the urgency of the matter. It would be helpful to have a preliminary discussion and the matter would not finally be settled until the peace conference.
CHURCHILL said that with great respect he wished to explain the urgency of the matter. If the settlement of the question were delayed the present local situation would be consolidated. Poles would be digging themselves in and taking effective steps to make themselves the sole masters of this territory. The longer the problem waited the more difficult it would be to settle it. They should at least see where they stood. There was no use of Poles coming to London when the great powers did not even know the broad outline of where they stood. Meanwhile the whole problem of food remained unsettled and the burden of feeding fell upon them. He pointed out that the British zone had the largest concentration of people and the smallest supply of food of any other zone. He suggested that they suppose that the Council of Foreign Ministers having heard the Poles could not agree, which was a possibility, and said that in this case there would be indefinite delay. The matter could not then be settled until there was another meeting of the Heads of Government. He was anxious to meet the practical difficulties which Stalin had put forward yesterday and which had resulted from the movement of troops. He was ready to suggest a compromise solution to cover the provisional period, that is, the period between the present time and the final conclusion of peace. He had in mind a line which might be drawn east of which the territory would be occupied by the Poles as a part of Poland. West of that line they would be working as agents of the Soviet Government which would be dealing with the zone in accordance with the agreement which had been reached with regard to the zones of occupation in Germany. He had had several talks with Marshal Stalin since the Tehran meeting and they were broadly in agreement on the line of the Oder. Of course the matter could not be so simply expressed. The difference between Marshal Stalin and himself was that the British did not want to go so far as the Soviets but they agreed that the Poles should have a large amount of territory. He said that when he referred to the line of the Oder he was using an expression which had been used when they had discussed the matter two years before. This was a very rough description but the British had a line which they were prepared to submit for the consideration of the Conference.
To adjourn until September and then have long discussions with the Poles would leave the matter unsettled by which time winter would be upon them. He thought that they should have some agreement on principle. He would like the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet and consider the matter on something like a general understanding between the three powers. Otherwise they would be left with all of their difficulties unsolved and after several months had elapsed a solution would be virtually impossible. He repeated that the line of the Oder was an approximate line and that it would be necessary to look at a map to see the line which the British had in view. He urged that they persevere in considering this matter. He inquired what would be the situation in Berlin if this matter were referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Berlin had obtained a portion of its coal from the Silesian mines. This was an important matter for the British. What would happen if the Governments were of the same opinion in September?
STALIN interrupted to say that it was Zwickau in Saxony from which Berlin drew its coal. He suggested that they let the Ruhr supply the coal, but he thought that Zwickau would be enough. He said there was good coal there and that they made briquettes out of brown coal.
CHURCHILL pointed out he had only said that a portion of the Berlin coal came from the Silesian mines.
THE PRESIDENT then read the pertinent portion of the Yalta Declaration concerning Poland’s western frontier. He said that this agreement had been reached between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. He was in complete accord with it. His point was that Poland had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany and that there were now five occupying powers. They could agree to assigning a zone to Poland but he did not like the manner in which Poland had occupied a zone without any discussion of the matter between the three powers concerned. He appreciated the difficulties mentioned by Churchill and Stalin and he also had these difficulties in mind. The main problem was that of their occupation of Germany. That was his position yesterday, that was his position today, and that would be his position tomorrow.
STALIN said that if they were not bored with the question of frontiers, he would like to make a further statement. He also proceeded on the basis of the Crimean Conference decision. The exact character of this decision was that after the Government of National Unity was formed in Poland they were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish Government on the question of Poland’s western frontiers. There were two possibilities. One was to approve the Polish proposal and in this case it would not be necessary to call in the Poles. If they did not approve the Polish proposal, they could hear the Poles and then settle the question. He thought it was expedient to settle the matter now. As they were not in agreement with the Polish Government’s proposals they should hear their representatives. The view had been expressed that it would not be worthwhile to hear the Poles now. Then, they should send the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
He wished to remind Mr. Churchill as well as others who were at the Crimea that the view held by the President and Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where the Eastern Neisse joins the Oder. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. The plan proposed by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill left the town of Stettin on the German side as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau (At this point Stalin walked around the table and showed the President this line on a map). The question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. They could settle the matter and they could put it off, but they could not ignore it.
CHURCHILL said he agreed that they could not settle the matter without the Poles, unless, of course, they accepted the Polish proposal.
STALIN said that with regard to the President’s observation that a fifth country had been brought in to occupy Germany and that he was displeased by the manner in which Poland had been brought in, he wished to state that if the President thought that anyone was to blame it was not just the Poles – circumstances and the Russians were to blame.
THE PRESIDENT remarked that he agreed and said that this was what he had been talking about.
CHURCHILL said he withdrew any objection to the Poles coming here and to their attempting to reach some kind of practical solution which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference.
THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that they could come here and be heard by the Foreign Ministers. He did not wish to go into the matter.
STALIN remarked that this was satisfactory.
CHURCHILL said that the Foreign Ministers should then report to the Big Three.
This was agreed to.
CHURCHILL inquired as to who would issue the invitation.
STALIN said that it should be issued by the Chairman.
This was agreed to.
Trusteeship
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet proposals had been submitted in writing. He said that the statement made by the Soviet Delegation arose as a result of the San Francisco Conference. The trusteeship system had been settled in principle by the Charter. There was now the question of specific territories. It would not be possible to give a detailed consideration of the matter at this conference, but they could make some progress. He said that in the first place they could discuss Italy’s colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. They had put forward two alternative proposals. These could be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Secondly, there was the question of territories under mandate from the League of Nations.
EDEN inquired what ones he had in mind and pointed out that there were only a few left to England and France.
MOLOTOV replied that it was a question worthy of the attention of the three Governments in accordance with the decision that had been taken at the San Francisco Conference. He said he thought they should also exchange views on the question of Korea.
CHURCHILL said he was ready to exchange views on any subject, but if they reached no agreement there would simply have been an interesting discussion. His impression was that the case of the existing mandates had been dealt with at San Francisco.
THE PRESIDENT then read Article 77 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations which deals with the question of trusteeships. He said that he took it that it was under section 2 of this Article that the Soviet Government wished to discuss this matter. He was ready to agree to refer it to the Foreign Ministers.
CHURCHILL said they had agreed to the project brought up at San Francisco and nothing more. He said that if the matter was in the hands of the World Organization he doubted if expressions of opinion around this table would be the best way to deal with it.
THE PRESIDENT said it was just as appropriate to discuss this matter as it was to discuss Poland or anything else.
CHURCHILL observed that Poland was not being dealt with by the International Organization.
THE PRESIDENT rejoined that it would be.
MOLOTOV said that his point was that the matter should be given some preliminary consideration. The final decision should be taken at the peace conference, the same as the case of Poland.
CHURCHILL said that their position had been settled secretly at Yalta and publicly at San Francisco and that it was not capable of being changed.
THE PRESIDENT remarked to Churchill that the British position was amply protected by another Article of the Charter and that he did not see why it could not be discussed.
MOLOTOV said that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies once and for all. The question was “who had received them and where had this matter been decided.”
CHURCHILL replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British army had achieved by conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis.
THE PRESIDENT inquired “all?”
MOLOTOV pointed out that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army.
CHURCHILL replied that when he referred to the Italian colonies he meant those of Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. They had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, at least during the early part.
STALIN replied that no one denied this.
CHURCHILL continued that they were not expecting gain out of this war. They had suffered terrible losses. Their losses had not been so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet allies. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. There was no possibility of their regaining naval equality with the United States. During the war they had built only one capital ship and had lost ten or twelve. In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no territorial claims – no Koenigsberg – no Baltic states – nothing. It was, therefore, having acted with complete rectitude, that they approached the question of the Italian colonies. With regard to these colonies Mr. Eden had said he regarded Italy as having lost these colonies, but that meant that Italy had no claim of right to these colonies. This did not preclude the peace conference from considering that some of these colonies should not be [should be?] restored to Italy. He did not say he favored that proposal but it was entirely open for discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers when they were dealing with the peace with Italy and, of course, in the final peace settlement as well. Having visited Tripoli and Cyrenaica, he had seen reclamation work done by the Italians which was of an admirable character. While they did not declare themselves in favor of restoration, neither did they say that it was precluded from discussion. At present the British held these colonies. Who wanted them. If there were claimants they should put forward their claims.
THE PRESIDENT said that the United States did not want them nor did the United States want a trusteeship over them for ourselves. We had enough poor Italians to feed.
CHURCHILL said that they had wondered if any of these colonies were suitable as a place of settlement for the Jews, but those with whom they had discussed the matter had not been interested. He said, of course, the British had great interests in the Mediterranean and that any marked alteration in the status quo in the Mediterranean would need long and careful examination.
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet proposal[s] had been submitted in writing and that they would like the Conference to consider them.
CHURCHILL said he did not see what their Soviet allies wanted. Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies.
STALIN replied that they would like to learn whether the meeting would consider whether Italy would lose her colonies and that in such an event they could decide to what states they would be transferred for trusteeship. If it were premature to deal with the matter, they could wait.
CHURCHILL said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring to acquire a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems.
STALIN said that at San Francisco the Soviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, in a communication to Secretary Stettinius.
CHURCHILL said that the British did not seek territory.
STALIN repeated that the question was who would receive the colonies.
CHURCHILL said they would have to decide if they should be taken, as they had a right to do, and then to decide to whom they would be assigned to under trusteeship. This question belonged to the discussion of the peace treaty. The ultimate administration belonged to the United Nations Organization.
STALIN inquired if Mr. Churchill was suggesting that the present conference was not competent to settle this question.
CHURCHILL replied that it was not competent to settle the matter; that was for the peace conference. Of course, if they agreed here, that would facilitate matters.
STALIN said they were proposing not to settle the matter but to consider it.
CHURCHILL rejoined that they were considering the matter now.
STALIN inquired then why he objected to the Soviet proposal to have it discussed.
CHURCHILL said he was not objecting, that if Stalin could say what he wanted, he, Churchill, would address himself to the question.
STALIN said the matter did not lie with him. The question was set forth in the Soviet paper.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Soviet proposal was for the Foreign Ministers to discuss the matter and he had no objection on his part.
CHURCHILL said he also had no objection but pointed out that they were throwing much work on the Foreign Ministers. He said there were many more urgent matters to discuss here. They had decided that the question of the Italian peace terms were [was] to have priority at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He was against burdening the present meeting of the Foreign Ministers but the matter could be put on their agenda for consideration after they had disposed of more urgent business.
STALIN proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers.
CHURCHILL added the reservation “provided it does not delay more urgent business.”
STALIN said that such a reservation was not acceptable.
CHURCHILL said that if they insisted he would give way.
It was agreed that the matter be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers.