| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden |
Byrnes expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Molotov and had subsequently informed Eden of this talk.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Prime Minister Churchill |
Churchill: “Mr. Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T. V. Soong advising him not to give way on any point to the Russians, but to return to Moscow and keep on negotiating pending further developments.
“It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan.”
740.00119 Potsdam/8-745: Telegram
[Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945
Top secret
Number 310, personal and top secret, from the President for Ambassador Hurley.
Please deliver the following message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:
I refer to your message of 19 [20] July quoting your telegram to Generalissimo Stalin.
I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement. If you and Generalissimo Stalin differ as to the correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement, I hope you will arrange for Soong to return to Moscow and continue your efforts to reach complete understanding. TRUMAN
TRUMAN
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir William Strang | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Murphy | Mr. Ward | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Pauley | Mr. Novikov | |
| Mr. Matthews | ||
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Russell |
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
Top secret
The sixth session of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:30 a.m. on July 23, 1945. MR. MOLOTOV was in the Chair.
MR. MOLOTOV first announced that he wished to state the questions which were up for discussion. They were:
MR. EDEN pointed out that Iran was on the Big Three agenda.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed and suggested that it be passed over.
MR. MOLOTOV then suggested Tangier, and MR. EDEN agreed.
MR. MOLOTOV then suggested the proposed text of the invitations to China and France and added that the morning agenda would conclude with the preparation of an agenda for the Big Three. He asked whether there were any other questions. If so, they should be stated. He remarked that several questions now before subcommittees were not yet ready for discussion. These included the questions of Italy and Spain and several others.
MR. MOLOTOV then brought up the matter of reparations and circulated a paper containing the principal suggestions of the Soviet delegation on this matter. The first paper was entitled “Plan for Reparations from Germany.” He then mentioned the draft considered by the Commission regarding advance deliveries from Germany and submitted a Soviet draft. He stated that there were other reparations questions which could not be raised now. There was need for time to study them and consideration could be postponed until tomorrow.
MR. BYRNES agreed that it was best to postpone consideration since documents had been received only now and time would be needed to study them.
MR. EDEN remarked that he was certainly not now prepared to comment on the Soviet proposals.
MR. MOLOTOV accepted this position but asked whether informal conversations could not be held on the matter in the present meeting.
MR. EDEN asked that the Economic Subcommittee work at the drafts.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed.
MR. BYRNES agreed that the papers should not be considered during the present meeting.
MR. EDEN then asked about Molotov’s reference to informal conversations.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the question of reparations is linked with other economic questions, such as war booty, and it would be a good idea to have informal exchanges of view. However, he is ready to accept any proposal.
MR. BYRNES then asked for postponement until tomorrow and that there should be no informal conversations.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed.
MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the second question concerned economic principles, which was not finished yesterday. He stated his readiness to withdraw his amendment to paragraph 13 and hoped that his colleagues could agree on 18.
MR. BYRNES replied that it was the American position that paragraph 18 should remain in the document.
MR. EDEN agreed and pointed out that paragraph 18 is linked with paragraph 5 of the report of the Committee.
MR. MOLOTOV then made a statement regarding the paragraph mentioned by Mr. Eden. He maintained that the subcommittee report was not accurate. The present Conference should not discuss how to deal with German territory. He knew that the idea is to supply Germany as far as possible from territories where supplies were drawn before the war. However, heavy damage in some areas has radically changed the situation. He did not believe that it was possible for the Conference to know where conditions have changed and to what degree. This matter should be referred to the Council. It was the affair of our representatives and should be referred to them. They can deal with the questions specifically. He mentioned the opposing views of Stalin and Churchill on this matter and therefore concluded that nothing could be accepted as being generally binding. He wished to decide these matters by means of our representatives in Germany who if they did not agree could refer questions to their governments. If they attempted to write a paper applicable to Germany as it was before the war, the Soviet Union could not agree. He suggested that the question in paragraph 18 should not be decided either way at this meeting. There should be no binding decision taken at this time. It should be decided in accordance with future developments in Germany.
MR. EDEN doubted that it would help much to pass the question on to the Control Council. There were already differences of opinion in the Council on temporary problems on how to fuel Berlin. A temporary arrangement had been reached on this matter in order to tide it over this Conference.5 A common solution must now be found in order to meet the situation adequately.
MR. MOLOTOV insisted that if he did accept this suggestion, it would make no practical difference since all disagreements would remain. He pointed out that there are no figures on how much coal, food and other materials are available or are necessary. This must be decided by the Control Council when data is available. The Control Council at that time will be able to reach a common agreement or will refer the matter to their governments. If this article is accepted there would still be no practical solution. The question would still go back to the governments. He suggested that if agreement could not be reached, the matter be referred to the Big Three.
MR. EDEN admitted the truth of Mr. Molotov’s contention to the effect that agreement on this principle would not solve the practical problems of coal and food. On the other hand, this principle would constitute a good basis upon which the Control Council could make decisions; otherwise, there would be no basis to guide them.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Soviet Union could not accept now because of differences in conception of the German problem. He suggested that the question be studied in a business-like fashion for several weeks or for several days.
MR. BYRNES inquired whether Mr. Molotov would object to a statement of general principles to the effect that in the absence of a specific reason, supplies would as far as possible be drawn from the same areas as before the war. He pointed out that the statement actually says “so far as practicable.” Such a statement would be a guide to assist the Control Council in their determinations of such questions. If we simply referred the matter to them Mr. Byrnes feared that they would be unable to decide and would only send the question back to their governments.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that he could not agree now because he had no data. Time was needed. When the study had been made the matter might be reconsidered. He suggested reference to the Big Three, and all agreed.
MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of the relative priority of exports and reparations. He asked for consideration of the Soviet draft which he distributed and inquired whether his suggestion was clear.
MR. BYRNES replied that the American position is clear. It is the position of the United States that there will be no reparations until imports in the American zone are paid for. There can be no discussion of this matter. We do not intend, as we did after the last war, to provide the money for the payment of reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV gave an example of the sense of his suggestion. He supposed the possibility that 2 million tons of coal would be produced, and the total requirements for internal use, export and reparations would amount to 2,200,000 tons. In this case he suggested that exports and reparations be reduced 10 percent to make up the difference. It would mean that both exports and reparations would be little less and that over a period of a year’s time the situation might be balanced. If during the whole year there was still a shortage of 10 percent, all three factors, including internal consumption, would be reduced 10 percent.
MR. MOLOTOV considered this to be a simple and fair solution. He stated that if production were increased over the figure set the reparations amount would not change. This would mean a surplus either for internal use or for export as the Control Council should decide. He asked whether this was not a fair arrangement.
MR. EDEN stated that it seemed to him that either imports should be a first charge or reparations should be a first charge or that as now suggested they should have an equal status. He considered it certain that if exports were not sufficient to cover imports someone must make deliveries without payment therefor.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that imports could be reduced.
MR. EDEN pointed out that the Soviet Union had agreed to a minimum import program which must be fulfilled and which cannot be cut to meet reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV thought that shortages in coal exports might be compensated by increased exports of other commodities.
MR. BYRNES remarked that he had stated his position. Imports must be a first charge and not a dollar will be paid on reparations until imports are paid for.
MR. MOLOTOV then made another suggestion. Such German exports as had been agreed to by the Control Council should have a first priority. On other exports reparations would have first priority. All exports approved by the Control Council would be carried out in the first instance.7 He suggested that if the Foreign Ministers were unable to agree, that the matter be referred to the Big Three.
MR. EDEN asked for permission to clarify the situation. He pointed out that the Control Council has agreed to a minimum export program. If this program is cut in any way it can only be done at the expense of someone, say the miners who are producing coal. In order to avoid such a situation someone must bring in supplies without payment. Therefore, imports must be a first charge.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that this was not quite clear to him and asked Mr. Eden to repeat the statement.
MR. EDEN did so.
MR. BYRNES stated that if we lessened food supplies we lessened production.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested the possibility of cutting internal consumption.
MR. BYRNES stated that we have started with a program of minimum import needs and it was therefore impossible to reduce internal consumption in order to provide for reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that he had made the suggestion that where the Control Council had approved imports they would be a first charge although they might possibly affect reparations.
MR. EDEN stated that everything must be approved by the Control Council.
MR. MOLOTOV gave another example of his meaning. Say the Control Council had decided on the export of 500,000 tons of coal at a time when it was planned to produce 2,000,000 tons. Suppose the British then wanted to export 700,000 tons. His suggestion would mean that the 500,000 tons would be a first charge and the supplementary 200,000 tons would be subject to reparations needs. To summarize, the exports approved by the Control Council for the payment of imports is to be a first charge. In other cases reparations have priority. In the example cited the 500,000 ton exports would have priority but the 200,000 additional would be subject to a reparations priority. However, if the Control Council agreed that the 200,000 tons should be exported in order to pay for imports then they would also have priority over reparations. He again suggested reference of the matter to the Big Three.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that there was a final draft on the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had no comment and after asking for comment asked that the draft be considered as approved.
MR. MOLOTOV then raised the subject of trusteeship and asked for comments on the Soviet draft. He pointed out that the Soviet draft deals in the first place with the Italian colonies and suggested that a definite determination be made of the future status of these colonies. If they are to be separated from Italy, a joint trusteeship under the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should be established.
MR. EDEN pointed out there were two problems in regard to the Italian colonies. The first problem is whether Italy lost the war or not. The British have said that Italy has no right to get her colonies back but have not gone beyond that point. The British believe that this question should be considered in connection with the settlement of a peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. When our minds are made up whether colonies go back to Italy or not, then it is probable that the United Nations organization would decide on the form of trusteeship, if any.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the American position had been stated by the President yesterday afternoon. At the President’s suggestion it was tentatively agreed that the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy would be the first business of the Council of Foreign Ministers. As a result the Foreign Ministers and their governments must determine the disposition of the colonies and the Trieste boundaries and any other decisions in regard to Italian territory. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the Conference could decide what territories should be taken from Italy and what trusteeships should be established. It is true that the Charter provided that there can be an agreement as to trusteeships. The colonies referred to by the Soviet Union are now in the custody of the United Kingdom. If there was an agreement between them the matter could be considered here; but there is no agreement and there can be no disposition until peace is concluded. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the conference could decide this question.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to make a statement. Eden had publicly stated in Parliament several times the British position. Therefore their position can be clearly seen; but it has not been disclosed to the Allies, The colonies are now in the custody of the British Army. Under these conditions there was ground to believe that the British might wish to express an opinion. If they do not wish to do so now perhaps they will later. The trusteeship question had been raised in San Francisco and even in Moscow by the United States. Mr. Molotov had no doubt that the American Government has considered this question. He hoped that the United States Government would give an expression of its views to the Allies. The Soviet Government will express their views. If the matter is not to be discussed now, he would agree. That is why the Soviet Government had suggested discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The matter will be referred to the first meeting in London.
MR. BYRNES stated that the United States had presented both at Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco its general views on trusteeships. However, it did not state its views on specific colonies. The Council of Foreign Ministers at its first meeting would pass on this and must necessarily make a decision regarding the disposal of the colonies. If it was determined that the colonies or some of them were to be taken from Italy, it was proper and necessary to decide the question of administration.
MR. EDEN added that the British Government has not yet decided whether some or all of the colonies should be taken from Italy. He agreed that this should be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers in the London meeting at the time they drew up the peace treaty with Italy. Until then it was not worthwhile to talk about trusteeships. However, he thought that the new world organization should decide this question.
MR. BYRNES asked whether it was agreed that this question would not be disposed of here.
MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the Soviet memorandum be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration at its first meeting in London.
MR. EDEN remarked there was no point in referring the Soviet memorandum since the first task of the Council will be the preparation of peace terms for Italy and the matter would come up automatically.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he of course fully agreed. However, the question of the western frontiers of Poland was a question to be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers in their preparation of peace treaties. Despite this the matter is being dealt with now. In any event, Mr. Molotov asked that note be taken of the fact that the matter would be raised in the first meeting of the Council.
MR. BYRNES stated that this is fully understood.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the next subject up for discussion was the proposed directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany.
MR. BYRNES stated that this paper was proposed because in the opinion of the American representative on the Control Council it was desirable to have such a directive issued giving instructions to the Commanders in each zone to carry out whatever agreement was reached at this Conference. Therefore, he suggested that the matter be referred to a committee in order that the Soviet and British Delegations could make any suggestions they desired regarding the proposal. The directive would simply give the Commanders instructions from their Heads of State and each Commander would have the same instructions.
MR. EDEN stated that he was a little puzzled regarding the need for this directive. He pointed out that they had had before them principles on [of?] agreement in the handling of Germany. The political principles had been approved. They were based on an American draft which he considered to be extremely well set up. He had assumed that these principles would go to the British Commanders in order to guide them. He thought that this would be enough. The proposed discussion [directive?] covers to some extent similar grounds. Some things are left out and some added. Some very good things had been left out.
MR. BYRNES stated that his purpose is to have the matter referred to a committee in order that past and future agreements of the Conference could be put into a directive from the Heads of States to the Commanders. We should transmit to each Commander everything decided at this Conference. This should be done before the Conference ends.
MR. MOLOTOV believed that there was some point in Mr. Eden’s remarks. The proposed directive repeats what has been said in the document on political principles plus some economic. He asked whether it was advisable to have two wordings on the same points a ad stated that he did not know how to solve this difficulty. If the purpose is to give additional direction, the Soviet Government might consider; but decisions have already been taken on political directives and are to be taken on economic matters. These would be sent to the Commanders and the advantage of the directive is not clear.
MR. BYRNES agreed that the language should be the same. His only idea was to make certain that the Commanders would know what had been decided at this Conference. He suggested the appointment of a committee to incorporate the language previously approved plus any that may be approved in the future, into a directive. Either we can do this or let the Commanders read about it in the press or perhaps they could be sent a copy of the communiqué. Army people generally want written directives and General Eisenhower has asked for this.
MR. EDEN thought General Eisenhower might not have known that we had adopted a set of political principles based on the draft submitted by the United States. Mr. Eden agreed entirely that the directives given to the Commanders must be written and the British had intended to send their Commander all agreed principles. Mr. Eden suggested that before agreements were communicated to the Commanders, France should be consulted in order that the directive should be uniform in all four zones.
MR. BYRNES agreed to this proposal and restated his desire for some machinery to send to the Commanders whatever was decided at the Conference.
MR. EDEN asked whether consideration would be given to bringing France in line.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed and inquired about the composition of the subcommittee.
MR. BYRNES named Mr. Murphy and Mr. Riddleberger.
MR. EDEN named Mr. [Sir William] Strang and Mr. Harrison.
MR. MOLOTOV named Mr. Gusev and Mr. Sobolev.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the next question concerned cooperation in solving urgent European economic problems. He thought it advisable to establish a subcommittee to consider this matter.
MR. BYRNES agreed that this was the best thing to do.
MR. MOLOTOV named Mr. Arutunian and Mr. Goroshenko.
MR. EDEN named Mr. Brand and Mr. Phillips [Coulson].
MR. BYRNES suggested that the matter be referred to the Economic Committee [Subcommittee].
MR. MOLOTOV replied that this committee was not suitable.
MR. BYRNES then named Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley.
MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Iran.
MR. EDEN stated that this would be considered at another time.
MR. MOLOTOV then brought up the question of Tangier.
MR. EDEN stated that there was to be a preliminary discussion of this matter in Paris soon and that we would welcome Soviet participation in the discussion. He stated that he was in entire agreement with the principles contained in paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft to the effect that the Zone should remain international and that steps should be taken to put an end to Spanish occupation. It was to consider how best this could be done that the suggestion was made that the meeting should be convened in Paris. Mr. Eden stated the hope that all governments signatory to the Act of Algeciras would meet before final decisions were taken. He did not feel that the four powers could ignore the interests of the small powers. He hoped that a full conference could meet before long. He did not think that it was right for the Conference to consider the subject since there was to be a meeting soon and the French have considerable interest in the matter. The position of Spain would of course have to be considered in the Paris meeting.
MR. MOLOTOV asked what was suggested.
MR. EDEN replied that he suggested an early Paris meeting between the representatives of the three powers here and the French.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested the adoption of paragraph 1 and agreement that the four powers would meet.
MR. EDEN replied that he must say that he had told the French that the British would not join in a settlement of the Tangier situation without the French.
MR. BYRNES asked whether it was agreed that the four powers should work out an agreement. He stated his assumption that Mr. Eden would prefer no publicity in the press.
MR. EDEN wondered whether such a paradise was possible.
MR. BYRNES then asked whether the Soviet Union wanted an announcement.
MR. EDEN stated that it would be unwise to make an announcement that we are going to the French capital in order to decide the Tangier question. Also, there were the other signatories of the Act to be considered. It is enough that we here agree to have conversations.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Union would not insist on an announcement. He suggested agreement among the Foreign Ministers without publicity that we accept paragraph 1 of the Soviet paper and that we will meet in Paris.
This was agreed to.
MR. MOLOTOV brought up the subject of the proposed invitations to China and France. He suggested that after the words “members of Council” there should be added the words “by agreement between them.” After looking at Mr. Byrnes’ draft he agreed that it was all right without this change.
MR. MOLOTOV then asked for consideration of an agenda for the Big Three.
MR. BYRNES intervened to suggest that a time should be set for sending the invitations to China and France. He remarked that if they were sent now they might become known to the press. He suggested sending the invitations the day before the issuance of the communiqué and the end of the Conference.
MR. EDEN thought that there should be a little more notice than one day in order to give a chance for an answer to be received. He suggested 48-hour notice.
This was agreed to.
MR. MOLOTOV again asked for the formulation of an agenda for the afternoon Big Three meeting. He stated that there would be:
MR. MOLOTOV mentioned the question of reparations from Germany and Italy, but it was agreed that this should not go on the agenda but should be discussed in the next day’s meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
MR. MOLOTOV also raised the question of economic principles but this was put over until the next day.
MR. BYRNES then brought up the fact that the question of the admission of Italy into international organizations and the exclusion of Spain from them had been referred to a committee, which had not yet reported. He understood that part of the paper had been agreed to and suggested that the committee report back if it was unable to agree. There had been a suggestion that there would be two separate papers and then a proposal that they be combined into one paper. At the present time they were incorporated in one paper. He thought that this matter might be disposed of.
MR. MOLOTOV asked what suggestions Mr. Byrnes had.
MR. BYRNES replied that he suggested that the matter be acted on now and disposed of. He understood that there was no difficulty about the matter except whether there should be two papers or one. He was willing to take either.
MR. EDEN suggested the drafting committee have one more try and that otherwise the matter would be considered tomorrow.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that it was not entirely a question of whether there should be one or two documents.
MR. BYRNES then asked for a report from the subcommittee either for or against the paper tomorrow.
MR. EDEN then circulated a note by the Prime Minister on the Greek situation.
The meeting then adjourned.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2345
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Monday Morning, July 23, 1945
1. Reparations by Germany, Austria and Italy
Discussion of this question was postponed in order to enable the Economic Subcommittee to study two new papers on the subject presented by the Soviet Delegation.
2. German Economic Questions
The Soviet [Delegation] objected to paragraph 18 of the proposed agreement on economic principles, stating that each occupation zone should so far as practicable draw its supplies from the areas in Germany from which it had drawn before the war. It was agreed that this question should be referred to the Heads of Governments.
The Soviet Delegation presented a draft of a new paragraph 19 dealing with comparative priority between reparations and exports from Germany in payment of imports. Since no agreement could be reached on this question it was also referred to the Heads of Governments.
3. Council of Foreign Ministers
The revised text on this subject was given final approval.
4. Trusteeship
It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in connection with the negotiation of the peace settlement with Italy.
5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany
A subcommittee was named to prepare directives to the respective military commanders in Germany embodying the decisions of this conference and to make recommendations as to the manner of consulting the French in regard thereto.
6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
A subcommittee was named to deal with this problem.
7. Iran
It was agreed that this question should be discussed by the Heads of Governments.
8. Tangier
The Foreign Ministers agreed to the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that Tangier should remain international. It was also agreed that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future and that the other matters raised in [the] Soviet paper would be discussed at that time.
9. Telegram to the Chinese and French Governments concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers
The draft telegram on this subject was approved without change. It was agreed that these telegrams should be dispatched 48 hours before the issuance of the communiqué at the conclusion of this Conference.
10. Agenda for this afternoon’s meeting of the Heads of Governments
It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of Governments that the following subjects should constitute their agenda this afternoon.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2345
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
[Translation]
Agenda of the meeting of the three Ministers was as following:
1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy
V. M. Molotov handed to Secretary of State Byrnes and Minister for Foreign Affairs Eden the draft proposals of the Soviet Delegation on reparations from Germany and on advance deliveries from Germany in [on] account of reparations.
It was decided to charge the Economic Commission [Subcommittee] with preliminary examination of the both drafts and to discuss them at the next meeting of the three Ministers.
2. Economic principles in regard to Germany
Paragraphs 13 and 18 were discussed same [as well] as paragraph 19. proposed by the Soviet Delegation. V. M. Molotov said he withdrew the proposed by him amendment to paragraph 13 and proposed to exclude paragraph 18, questions related to this paragraph to be examined by the Allied organs in Germany with subsequent solution in the Control Council; in case no agreement is reached in the Control Council the questions are to be agreed upon by the Governments. On this point there was no agreement reached and it was decided to submit the question of paragraph 18 to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon.
V. M. Molotov submitted to Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes the draft of new paragraph 19 proposed by the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated this draft cannot be accepted by the United States Delegation. V. M. Molotov proposed an alternate draft of paragraph 19 according to which the approved by the Control Council export from Germany to cover the import is realized prior to all other deliveries. In all other cases priority is given to reparations. The agreement was not reached and it was decided to submit this question to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon.
3. On the Council of Foreign Ministers
Presented by the Drafting Committee draft was approved without amendments.
4. On trust territories
The draft of the Soviet Delegation was discussed. Mr. Eden stated that first of all should be solved the question of whether the Italian colonies should be detached from Italy and if so, which ones specifically. This question should be solved simultaneously with the drafting of the peace agreement with Italy. The question of who should be given the trusteeship over all former Italian colonies to be detached from Italy, must be solved by the International Organization of United Nations. Mr. Byrnes proposed to postpone the decision on this question until the signing of the peace agreement with Italy, when all territorial problems concerning Italy would be solved.
V. M. Molotov proposed to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers that will take place in London next September. Mr. Eden said that he thought that there was no necessity to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the Council of the Foreign Ministers because in working out the Peace Treaty with Italy question of the Italian colonies will be automatically brought up.
V. M. Molotov asked to take into account that the questions Soviet Memorandum is dealing with will be put by the Soviet Government before the September meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers in London.
5. On directives to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany (proposal of the US delegation)
It was decided to inform all Commanders in Chief of the Allied occupational forces in Germany of all concerning them decisions of the Conference upon securing confirmation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on these decisions.
For this objective [it] was decided to organize a Committee composed of:
| United States | Murphy and Riddleberger, |
| Great Britain | Strang and Harrison, |
| Soviet Union | Goussev and Sobolev. |
6. On cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems
For preliminary examination of the memorandum submitted by the United States Delegation to organize a Committee composed of:
| United States | Clayton and Pauley |
| Great Britain | Brand and Coulson |
| Soviet Union | Arutiunian and Geraschenko. |
7. On Tangier
The Soviet draft was discussed.
Resolved:
To approve the first paragraph of the Soviet Delegation’s draft which reads as the following:
International Zone of Tangier.
Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we agreed that this zone which includes the town of Tangier and the area adjoined to it shall owing to it[s] special strategic importance remain international.
It was decided to discuss in immediate future the whole question on [of?] Tangier at the meeting in Paris of the representatives of the Four Governments – USSR, USA, Great Britain, and France.
8. Approval of the text of address to Governments of China and France
Text of address proposed by the Committee is approved without amendments.
It is decided to send the address forty-eight hours before communiqué on the results of the Conference is published.
9. On agenda of the meeting of the Heads of the Three Governments
It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of the Three Governments the following agenda:
[Babelsberg, July 23, 1945]
[Translation?]
Article 19 of ‘Economic Principles’
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3145
[Babelsberg, July 23, 1945]
[Translation?]
Article 19 of ‘Economic Principles’
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3145
[Translation?]
Top secret
[Undated]
Plan of Reparations from Germany
The total sum of Reparations 20 billion dollars which is accepted for consideration has to be covered approximately 50% by the way of once for all removals from the national wealth of Germany within two years after the capitulation and approximately 50% by the way of the annual deliveries in kind within 10 years after the capitulation.
The once for all removals from the national wealth of Germany are to be exacted from the following branches of her economic life:
| Billion dollars | ||
|---|---|---|
| 1. | War and chemical industries (aircraft production, tank production, naval shipbuilding, arms and ammunition production, production of powder and explosives, synthetic rubber and fuel, artificial fibre, cellulose, Koke-Chemie) | 2,0-2,2 |
| 2. | Iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, engineering (including electrical industry), coal, power stations | 2,3- 2,7 |
| 3. | Building industry, textiles, food industry, printing, transport (including water transport), communications (radio, telephone, telegraph), equipment of ports, warehouses, etc. | 1,8- 2,0 |
| 4. | Foreign investments and claims of Germany | 1,1- 1,4 |
| 5. | Shares of German enterprises (railways, ports, canals, etc.), foreign currency, precious metals | 1,9- 2,3 |
| 6. | Miscellaneous | 0,9- 1,2 |
| 10,0- 11,8 |
For the purpose of removals German property situated on the territory of Germany in 1937 frontiers as well as German property abroad.
| Coal, brickets | Sugar |
| Chemicals (drugs, dyes, potassium etc.) | Cattle, agricultural products Ceramics |
| Machinery, tools | Medical instruments |
| Cement, building materials | Optical apparatus |
| Timber, paper | River shipbuilding |
To fix the total sum of annual deliveries in kind [at] 1 billion dollars per annum or 10 billion dollars in 10 years. To ask Allied Commission on Reparations to make more detailed calculations concerning these deliveries.
The basis of calculations are prices of 1938 plus 15% on equipment and 10% on raw materials and finished goods.
The rate of exchange: 1 dollar equals 3.5 marks.
740.00119 Potsdam/6-1945
[Translation?]
Secret
[Undated]
On Advance Deliveries from Germany
Pending the establishment of a permanent allied reparation agency, advance deliveries (removals) should be based upon the urgency of need of suffered Nations [nations which have suffered?] for rehabilitation purposes and should be made as advance deliveries with subsequent accounting of these deliveries as reparations or restitution, or for purchase account of the recipient nations.
With respect to advance deliveries of capital goods to all United Nations, the following procedure should be adopted:
a. Immediate establishment of a sub-commission of the Allied Commission on Reparations to be situated in Berlin, and to be composed of representatives of the nations participating in the Allied Commission on Reparations. This sub-commission should keep in constant consultation with the Control Council and should keep the Control Council informed of all its activities.
b. The Allied Commission on Reparations will transmit to its sub-commission a list of industries from which advance deliveries of equipment will be allowed.
c. Advance deliveries (removals) of capital equipment from those industries up to an agreed percentage of the movable assets, expressed in physical terms, may be made upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission. Shipping documents covering such advance deliveries (removals) shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries (removals) may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on account of reparations or restitution.
d. Each of the occupying powers may remove or permit to be removed from its zone of occupation plant and equipment from any industries in such list, subject to the following conditions:
With respect to any removal by an occupying power for its own account, the respective zone commander shall notify the sub-commission of the contemplated removal, giving the sub-commission2 an opportunity to enter such removal in the plan of advance deliveries.
With respect to any removal from the zone of one occupying power for the account of another United Nation (whether or not such United Nation be an occupying power) such removal shall only be permitted upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission.
With respect to advance deliveries to all United Nations of raw materials out of current production or inventories, such deliveries may be made upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission on the basis of the need of the claimants after due regard to the supplies available and the requirements of the occupation forces. Shipping documents covering such advance deliveries shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on (1) export account to be paid for in acceptable currencies, (2) reparation, or (3) restitution.
Adequate and uniform accounting controls shall be instituted with respect to all deliveries effected under the above proposed plan.
Claimant nations should be notified of the establishment of the foregoing procedures for effecting urgently needed advance deliveries.
It shall be mutually agreed that each of the occupying powers shall submit, within six months of the date hereof, a statement of all property removed from Germany after the termination of war with Germany.
881.00/7-2345: Telegram
[Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945
Secret
Victory 230
To Acting Secretary of State, Washington.
Information American Embassy, Paris, to American Legation, Tangier.
British are telegraphing to London today suggesting that the French and British Embassies in Moscow invite the Soviet Government to send representatives to Paris for the discussions regarding Tangier. They hope that the discussions may begin by August 6. We are in accord with this action.
[Undated]
The three Governments consider that the time has come to terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. She gives promise of becoming a firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression.
The three Governments have therefore resolved that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and have included the preparation of this among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization.
As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.
The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
868.00/7-2245
Potsdam, 22nd July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 25
Secret
Greece
In view of the reference to Greece in the Soviet Memorandum, I circulate the following two papers to the Conference. The first is the report of Field Marshal Alexander. The second is the report on the visit of the British Trades Union Delegation to Greece, which was headed by Sir Walter Citrine and composed of leading Trades Unionists. This I believe gives a true picture of the rights and wrongs of the Greek position.
I am puzzled at the reference on paragraph 4, Sub-section 2 of the Soviet Memorandum to “the representatives of Greek democracy.” According to the information I have, the EAM-ELAS elements in Greece in no way represent Greek democracy or the vast majority of Greeks. Their conduct in Athens during their attempt to seize and dominate the city have made a gulf between them and the Greek people which will last for many years. The report of the Trades Union Delegation should be read in this connection.
W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]
CCS 199th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | Lieutenant-General Macready | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Major-General Laycock | |
| Major General Norstad | Major-General Holmes | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Major-General Hollis | |
| Captain McDill | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Captain Moore |
Potsdam, July 21, 1945
Top secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 198th Meeting and approved the detailed report, subject to any later minor amendments.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered CCS 679/9 and regretted that the amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff were not acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff. It appeared to be the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that if the seven captured German ships were moved to the Pacific they would be unable to make more than one trip before the 31st of December, 1945. If then, as a result of the review of the combined requirements and combined resources for the first half of 1946, it was decided that these seven captured ships should no longer be allocated to the United States, their initial assignment to the Pacific in 1945 would prove uneconomical. He said he appreciated the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff.
SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out, however, that the very fact that these ships had been moved to the Pacific would be a strong argument for retaining them there. This argument would be weighed with all the other arguments when it came to the combined review which the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed in paragraph 6 of CCS 679/8. To exclude these ships from the review at this stage seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff to be wrong.
ADMIRAL KING proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept CCS 679/8, provided that the combined study on the lines suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff be undertaken as a firm commitment to be completed by mid-September.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6 for United States employment up to 31 December 1945.
b. Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.
c. Directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, to submit by 15 September 1945 a report, on the lines of CCS 679/1, of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946, the study to cover the recommendation in paragraph 7 of CCS 679/7 and the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in Enclosure “A” to CCS 897, subject to amendments agreed in discussion, and directed that it be dispatched to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendation in paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3, and directed that the statement contained in that paragraph, as amended in discussion, be included in their final report to the President and Prime Minister.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 900, as amended in discussion.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that upon the dissolution of the U.S. Seventh Fleet pursuant to the reallocation of areas and change in command in the Southwest Pacific, as proposed in CCS 890/1, it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet to release to British control those Allied naval units other than U.S. at present incorporated in the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
[Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 679/9
Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946
The United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the provisions of CCS 679/8 except for the date of 31 December 1945 given in paragraph 5 as terminating the use by the United States of the six of the seven captured German ships destined for the Pacific.
After moving these ships great distances to the Pacific we shall be fortunate to obtain one trip from them before the 31 December date. By then our deployment will not have ended and the main operation will yet have to be undertaken. It would be uneconomical to remove this shipping from the Pacific after just one run. When ships may be withdrawn from the Pacific, less adaptable shipping such as the converted Victory ships should be first transferred back to the Atlantic. The lift of these ships of course will be included in the proposed review of personnel shipping to be completed by mid-September.
Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 5 and 6 of CCS 679/8 be modified as indicated in the Enclosure.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in CCS 679/6 for to the United States employment up to 31st December 1945 for employment as follows: the Europa until 31 December 1945; and the Caribia, Patria, Vulcania, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee until 30 June 1946. In return, they ask that the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us very strongly in this matter.
The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on the lines of CCS 679/1 of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in CCS 679/7 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships to which reference is made in CCS 679/6 subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 above.
740.00119 Control (Austria)/7-2345: Telegram
Verona, July 23, 1945 — 2 p.m.
Secret
126
July 21 Koniev sent letter to United States, British, and French commanders stating he had been instructed facilitate occupation of various sectors Vienna by our forces. Gruenther, Winterton and Cherrière invited to Vienna meeting 1 p.m., July 24, to settle problems discussed at July 16 conference re taking over and they have accepted. US reconnaissance party moving to Vienna July 22 and July 24.
Soviet began evacuating Styria July 22 but were not quite ready to move into Upper Austria north of Danube. Soviet Genl who went to Linz for preliminary arrangements was reported as most cooperative.
ERHARDT
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Morse | Mr. Weston | |
| Mr. Bissell | Mr. Nicholson |
The principal subject covered was the discussion of Swedish requisitioning of shipping which was expected to take place at a forthcoming meeting of the United Maritime Authority.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir David Waley | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Pauley | Mr. Harrison | Mr. Golunsky |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Coulson | Mr. Potrubach |
| Major Theakstone |
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret
THE SECRETARY said that he had expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Mr. Molotov this morning and had subsequently informed Mr. Eden of this talk. He said it would not, therefore, be necessary for him to repeat all that he had said but he merely wished to state that in our view it was difficult to reconcile certain positions of the Soviet Government with the principle of an overall plan of reparation. He said that since Mr. Maisky was here he would like to have confirmation or clarification of the Soviet definition of “war booty.” As it had been reported to him by the American representative on the Separations Committee it covered all supplies and equipment, including plants and other materials.
MR. MOLOTOV then handed in what he said was the true definition from the Soviet point of view of “war booty.” (Annex 1)
THE SECRETARY then said he would like to ask Mr. Molotov a question not in any attitude of hostility but with the simple desire of ascertaining the facts in the situation, and that was, whether it was true that the Soviet authorities had taken large quantities of equipment and materials out of their zone. He said that they had even heard that household equipment, such as plumbing, silver, furniture, etc. had also been removed.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that “Yes, this was the case,” that a certain quantity of property had been removed. He said that if this was what was worrying the Secretary that they agree to deduct from their reparation plans a suitable figure to cover removals already made. He said in this connection it should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union had suffered direct losses of many billions of dollars. He offered to knock off 300 million for miscellaneous removals.
THE SECRETARY said that every country had suffered in this war, that the United States had spent 400 billion dollars so far in the war and its national debt had risen to 250 billion dollars, but we were not talking about that and he felt it was idle to discuss it on that basis.
MR. MOLOTOV said that they would be prepared to reduce their claims from 10 billion to 9 billion in order to cover removals already made and thus dispose of the question.
THE SECRETARY said that according to our estimates approximately 50% of the present wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone.
MR. MOLOTOV said that that was not their figure.
THE SECRETARY then said that our figures did not agree and it would be difficult to establish agreed figures on this subject.
There was some discussion between Mr. Maisky and Ambassador Pauley as to the figures of German resources in the Soviet zone.
MR. MOLOTOV then remarked that having agreed to give Poland compensation in the west he could not believe that at Yalta any of us had had in our minds to strip the territory of everything in reparations before turning it over to the Poles. He felt that such a step would be impossible. He added, however, that it was possible to consider the equipment and materials in the area as Poland’s share of reparations.
MR. EDEN then remarked that since this territory was to go to Poland only at the time of the peace treaty, until that time it should be considered part of Germany for the purposes of economics.
MR. MOLOTOV said that he had meant that the treatment of the part to go to Poland must of necessity be considered differently; he did not mean that it should be entirely excluded from consideration.
MR. EDEN said that a part of the question was that during the period of occupation we had a problem of feeding and retaining approximately the same number of Germans, but under the Soviet suggestions on conditions which would cut off the source or a large part of the source from which this same population formerly drew its sustenance.
THE SECRETARY then remarked that even if the Soviet plan was put at 9 billion, thus making the total 18 billion, it was still a mystery to him where any such amount of reparations was to come from.
MR. MOLOTOV remarked that this had been the figure accepted as the basis for discussion at Yalta.
THE SECRETARY replied that since then our armies have invaded Germany and have destroyed literally billions of dollars worth of property and that this would inevitably alter the situation. He added that we were faced with a terrible problem with regard to feeding the German population in our zone, that we had 800,000 more people in our zone [sector] in Berlin than had lived there before and approximately 4 million more in our zone as a whole. He said that counting fifty cents per day per person it would cost the United States in the first year some billion and a half dollars to maintain this excess population. They would, of course, work but they would work for the production of reparations for others and that was what we could not agree to. He said under the suggestion he had made this morning, that if each country should take reparations from its own zone, it would be possible to exchange goods between the zones. In this manner the Soviet Union would get its share from its own zone and the United States and Great Britain from theirs and would be able to take care of the needs of France, Belgium, Holland, etc. He repeated that according to our figures, approximately 50% of German resources were in the Soviet zone, 30% in the British and 20% in the American and French zones combined.
MR. MOLOTOV then inquired what about the Ruhr; that the Soviet Union desired in the form of reparations certain industrial equipment and machines from the Ruhr. He said they would be prepared to reduce their reparation figure even to 8½ or 8 billion, but they must insist on a fixed amount, say two billion, from the Ruhr. He said they could agree to no plan which did not contain such a provision.
MR. EDEN remarked that they were thinking of the immediate problem which faced them this winter, which was either to have wholesale starvation in their zone or to pay for the necessary imports, since it was apparent from the discussion that the Soviets were unwilling to turn over food and coal from the zone which they wished to give to Poland.
MR. MOLOTOV said this was a question that could be discussed.
THE SECRETARY remarked that he was worried that quarrels would develop between the Soviet, British and American Governments over these matters since there would obviously be a disposition on the part of the Soviet authorities to question the need for imports which would reduce the amount available for reparations from the western zones.
MR. MOLOTOV in conclusion repeated his willingness to reduce their figure but repeated Soviet insistence on a fixed quantity of reparations from the Ruhr. He reiterated his belief that agreement could be reached. He inquired as to what was to be the future status of the Ruhr, whether it was to be internationalized or not.
Both MR. EDEN and THE SECRETARY said that this was another subject of great political importance, but that they were thinking now of the immediate situation confronting the United States and Great Britain in their tasks of occupying Germany.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Vice Admiral Land | Lord Leathers | |
| Mr. Morse |
The following subjects were discussed: the use of British vessels in the Pacific for CORONET; United States agreement not to request the conversion of 18 British cargo vessels to troopships, subject to the allocation of the Milwaukee to the United States; the allocation of captured German passenger vessels to the United States; the question whether the Milwaukee should be converted in the United States or the United Kingdom and whether this vessel should be manned by American or British crews; the inability of the United Kingdom to supply France with coal during the coming winter and the allocation of American shipping for this purpose; United States support of British coal requirements for bunkering, either on a lend-lease or a pay basis; possible British payment of charter hire for Italian vessels; possible Italian membership in the United Maritime Authority; shipping aspects of a possible revision of the Italian armistice terms and of a peace treaty for Italy; disposition of captured German vessels, the use of the Soviet share in the war against Japan, and the possibility that the Soviet Union might wish to man these vessels; possible Soviet membership in the United Maritime Authority; the relationship of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the United Maritime Authority; British consent to United States participation in the work of the Capcraft commission in the light of needs of the United States Navy for sea-going tugs for use in CORONET; the mechanism in London to be used for the division of captured German vessels as between the United States and the United Kingdom; and a draft British paper on shipping programs intended for submission to the August meeting of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
Babelsberg, 23 July 1945
Secret
priority
Victory 233
To Conway from Land and Bissell reference your War 34607 of 19 July.
Have discussed with British use of their ships in the Pacific. They are assuming substantial commitments there in connection with developments in military plans and will also assist with redeployment sailings. Following arrangements agreed.
In connection with separation of Australia, New Guinea, and NEI from MacArthur’s Theater and placing of these areas under British military command MWT have agreed to assume responsibility for retentions in British area as well as maintenance from U.S. and U.K. Estimate this will involve about 30 MWT retentions and corresponding relief to MacArthur.
3 to 5 British divisions expected to take part in Pacific operations under MacArthur’s command replacing equivalent number of U.S. divisions. MWT have agreed to provide all shipping required for organizational equipment and maintenance these forces. If U.S. Army undertakes supply responsibility, MWT will put number of vessels required for support of British divisions into WSA Pacific pool. British Army estimates total shipping required to support 5 divisions including retentions and long voyages would be 80 to 100 vessels employed for 3 months smaller number permanently employed thereafter.
In addition to commitments paras 2 and 3 MWT is providing 100 military retentions in SEAC.
MWT has agreed to provide minimum of 25 sailings for ammo cargoes from ETO to Pacific. Up to 20 can be provided in August thereby covering most or all of August requirements. Total of 25 may be increased sufficiently to cover most of September requirement as well.
We have agreed that provision British shipping for military purposes in Pacific as described above is more important than blowup of 18 Sam ships to carry troops and we expect to drop request for conversions.
If you have any comments or recommendations please cable soonest to Bissell London. Otherwise will assume you authorize Monroe to arrange for use of MWT vessels on above basis for August loadings in U.K.
Babelsberg, 23 July 1945
Confidential
priority
Victory 221
To Monroe and Carnwath, War Shipping Administration, London, England. Repeat to Conway, WSA, Washington, D.C. from Vice Admiral Land and Morse. Reference your Wsa 3844 July 21.
Have discussed matter with State Department here and Weston. UMA papers should not be sent to officials of former Polish Government and they should not be invited to attend meetings or communicated with further on UMA matters.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Davies | Mr. Attlee | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse | Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Allen | Field Marshal Alexander | |
| Mr. Cohen |
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret
MR. MOLOTOV presented the following report as Rapporteur of the Morning Meeting of the Foreign Ministers:
The following questions were discussed by the Foreign Ministers:
1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy
It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission [Subcommittee] to give preliminary examination to the two drafts which had been submitted and to have the matter considered by the Foreign Ministers.2. Economic principles in regard to Germany
There was a discussion of paragraphs 13 and 18, as well as a new paragraph 19, submitted by the Soviet Delegation. At the meeting Molotov said that he withdrew his amendment regarding paragraph 13 and he suggested that paragraph 18 be deleted on the understanding that the matter would be given study by the Allied authorities in Germany and that in case no agreement was reached in the Control Council the matter be decided by the Governments concerned. Agreement was not reached on this matter and it was referred to the Big Three. Molotov had submitted to the British and Americans a new paragraph 19. Secretary Byrnes said it was not acceptable. Molotov then submitted a new paragraph dealing with the question of priority between reparations and exports in payment for German imports. No agreement was reached and this matter was referred to the Heads of Government.3. Council of Foreign Ministers
The text submitted by the Drafting Commission [Committee] was approved without amendment.4. Trusteeship
The draft of the Soviet Delegation on this question was discussed. Mr. Eden said that in the first place they should settle the question as to whether colonies should be detached from Italy and if so which. He had argued that this should be settled when the peace treaty is drawn up. The question of to whom the trusteeship of any Italian colonies should be given should be settled by the United Nations Organization. Secretary Byrnes proposed that the matter be put off until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Molotov had proposed to refer the Soviet memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September. Eden had stated that there was no need to refer the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers, since the question of the Italian colonies would arise automatically when the peace treaty with Italy was drawn up. Molotov asked that notice be taken that all of the questions in the Soviet memorandum would be raised at the September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany
On the proposal of the American Delegation it was agreed to convey to the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied troops in occupation of Germany all decisions of this Conference relating to them after they had been agreed upon with the Provisional Government of France. It was decided to set up a sub-committee to deal with the matter, consisting of Messrs. Murphy, Riddleberger, Strang, Harrison, Gusev and Sobolev.6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
A commission was appointed to give preliminary consideration to the memorandum of the United States Delegation, consisting of Messrs. Clayton and Pauley, Brand and Coulson, and Arutunian and Garachin [Gerashchenko].7. Tangier
The Soviet draft was discussed and it was agreed to accept the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that the area including the city of Tangier and the zone adjacent to it should remain under international control. It was also agreed that the whole question of Tangier should be discussed at the next conference in Paris of the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.8. Approval of Telegram to China and France
The text submitted by the commission to consider this matter was approved with no amendment. It was decided that the telegram should be sent forty-eight hours before the publication of the communiqué on the results of the Conference.9. Agenda for the Meeting of the Heads of Governments
The following agenda was agreed upon for the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Governments:
- Turkey.
- Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area.
- Syria and the Lebanon.
- Iran.
STALIN said that it appeared that what had been approved by the Foreign Ministers was automatically approved by the Big Three.
THE PRESIDENT said that this was satisfactory to him.
STALIN inquired if the decisions of the Foreign Ministers was [were] regarded as accepted.
THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative.
Returning to the subject of Turkey, THE PRESIDENT remarked that he did not think that the Prime Minister had finished his remarks when they had adjourned at the last meeting.
CHURCHILL replied that he had finished his remarks at the last meeting when he had stated that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the Straits and that he did not think that Turkey would agree to that proposal.
STALIN remarked that yesterday Churchill had said that the Russians had frightened the Turks and that one of the chief points was that the Russians had concentrated too many troops in Bulgaria. He considered it necessary to give information on this point. Churchill’s information was out of date. He did not know what information Churchill had been given by the Turks, but Russia had less troops in Bulgaria than the British had in Greece.
CHURCHILL inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece.
STALIN replied: “Five divisions.”
CHURCHILL said there were only two.
STALIN inquired with respect to armored units, and asked how strong the British divisions were.
CHURCHILL said they had about 40,000 troops altogether.
STALIN replied that they had about 30,000.
CHURCHILL said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander as he preferred that he give the figures.
STALIN replied that he was not seeking for accuracy but that he believed Churchill 100%. He said that should it prove necessary General Antonov could make a detailed report, but one thing was clear—the Turks had nothing of which to be afraid. The Turks had about twenty-three divisions and there was nothing to be afraid of. That was the Russian information.
As to the rectification of the frontiers, which might have frightened the Turks, he said that perhaps it was the possible restoration of the pre-war frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia. He pointed out that this question of the restoration of frontiers would not have been brought up if the Turks had not brought up the question of an alliance. An alliance meant that they would defend the frontiers of Turkey, just as Turkey would defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet opinion the frontiers in the area mentioned was [were] incorrect and they had told the Turks that if there was to be an alliance the frontiers had to be rectified. If this were not done the question of an alliance would be dropped. What was there to be afraid of?
The third question was that of the Straits. He drew their attention to the fact that the position of such a great state as the Soviet Union was the following. The Montreux Convention had been decided against Russia. Russia considered it inimical. Turkey had the right under this treaty to block the Straits to any shipping not only if Turkey were at war but also if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The Convention also left it to Turkey to decide when this threat appeared. Thus, an impossible situation was created in which Turkey was free to block the Straits when she thought they were threatened. The situation at the moment was that the Russians had the same rights in the Straits as the Japanese Emperor. This was ridiculous, but it was a fact. The result was that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He said that they could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. Hence, the point at issue was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force.
CHURCHILL, who appeared to misunderstand, said: “Not law?”
STALIN replied that force was necessary just as in the case of the Panama Canal, which was defended by the American navy and for shipping through the Suez Canal, which was guaranteed by the British navy. He said that if they thought that naval bases in the Straits were unacceptable to the Turks, then let them give the Soviet Union some other base where the Russian fleet could repair and refuel and where in cooperation with its allies the Russian fleet could protect the Straits. For the situation to continue as it was would be ridiculous.
THE PRESIDENT said that the attitude of the American Government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised, thought, however, that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. He had come to the conclusion after a long study of history that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned; by Austria in the case of the previous war, and by Germany in the case of this war. He thought it should be the business of this Conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again. He thought that to a great extent this could be accomplished by arranging for the passage of goods and vessels through the Straits on the basis of free intercourse just as was the case in American waters. He said that he was presenting a paper and that he wanted to see Russia and England and all other countries have free access to all the seas of the world. The President then read his paper on the free and unrestricted navigation of inland waterways.
THE PRESIDENT then continued that he did not want to engage in another war twenty-five years from now over the Straits or the Danube. He said that our ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and which could support itself. He wanted a Europe that would make Russia, England, France and all other countries in it happy and with which the United States can trade and be happy as well as prosperous. He thought that his proposal was a step in that direction.
He said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the Marshal had said he was willing to do, but he pointed out that the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States and the whole world.
CHURCHILL said that he strongly supported Stalin’s wish for a revision of the Montreux Convention with the object of securing for Soviet Russia free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits by merchant and war ships alike in peace or war. He entirely agreed with the President when he said that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the Great Powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the Marshal would consider this alternative in contrast to that of a base in close proximity to Constantinople. With regard to the other waterways, they were in full accord with the general line that the President had taken in his statement. He thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the Great Powers. He also attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement between the Three Powers represented at the Conference.
THE PRESIDENT said there was no doubt regarding their agreement on the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention.
CHURCHILL added “and on the purpose of that revision.”
STALIN said that he would have to read attentively the proposal made by the President, which was now being translated, before he could discuss it.
STALIN said that this question had been discussed at the Tehran Conference. The Russians had complained that all ports of the Baltic freeze. They froze for a shorter or longer period but they froze. The Russians had stated that it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin’s arguments in favor of this were that the Russians had suffered and had lost so much blood that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory so as to give some small satisfaction to the tens of millions of their inhabitants who had suffered in this war. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister had raised any objections and this question had been agreed upon by the three of them. He said they were anxious to see this agreement approved at this Conference.
THE PRESIDENT said he was ready to agree in principle although it would be necessary to study ethnographic and other questions, but in principle he agreed.
CHURCHILL said that Stalin was right in saying that the matter had been raised at Tehran and he added that it had also been discussed between Stalin and himself in October 1944 in Moscow in connection with the question of the Curzon line. He had made a speech in Parliament on September [December] 15, 1944 in which he had mentioned the Soviet wish to secure the ice-free port of Koenigsberg and that the Soviet frontier should run south of that point. He had made it clear that His Majesty’s Government was in sympathy with this wish. The only question which arose was that of the legal occasion to transfer. At the present time the position was that the Soviet draft as put in would require each of them to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. It would also commit them to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement. So far as His Majesty’s Government was concerned they should support the Soviet wish to have this port of Germany incorporated into the Soviet Union. He made this statement as one of principle. They had not examined the Soviet line on a map. This could be examined at the peace conference but he would like to assure the Marshal of their continued support of the Russian position in this part of the world.
STALIN replied that they were suggesting nothing more than this at the present time. Of course, the matter would be settled at the peace conference. He said they were satisfied that the British and American Governments approved.
CHURCHILL said that there would have to be certain redrafting of the Russian statement and in the communiqué which would be issued at the end of the Conference he recommended that more general terms be used. The agreement of the Three Powers would be recorded in the minutes of this meeting.
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation wished to present a short paper on this subject (annex 2).
CHURCHILL said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. They did not wish to receive any advantage there not enjoyed by other powers. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France with these countries the British had said that they would not object to France having a favored position there if this were satisfactorily arranged with the new independent Governments of those countries. The British had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon which was satisfactory to those countries, the British would withdraw their troops. If they withdrew their troops now it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. They would not like to see this happen and he pointed out that it would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world. He also said that it would affect their task of keeping the peace in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There would be a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare which might affect Egypt too. There could not have been a worse moment than this for creating such a disturbance in the Arab world because it would endanger their lines of communication through the Suez Canal which was being used in the war against Japan by both the United States and Great Britain. The line of communications for the war against Japan was important to the United States as well as to Great Britain. General de Gaulle had acted very unwise[ly] in this region. Against their advice and entreaties about 500 men had been sent to Syria and this had caused a serious outbreak which had still not died away. How silly this was for what could 500 men do? They had, however, been a spark and this uprising had followed immediately. The Government and people of Iraq had wanted to go to the help of the Syrians. All of the Arabic world was convulsed with excitement in regard to this matter. Later, however, General de Gaulle had agreed to hand over the so-called “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian Government. He trusted that they should be able to reach an agreement with the French. He could not say agreement but a settlement with de Gaulle which would guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some recognition of their cultural and commercial interests which they had built up over such a long period of time. He wished to repeat before this council that Great Britain had no wish to remain there one day longer than necessary. The British would be delighted to withdraw from what was a thankless task assumed in the interest of the Allies. Having regard to the fact the matter rested between them and the French, and of course Syria and Lebanon, and the British did not welcome a proposal to have the Conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France and come to a decision. The whole burden had been borne by them, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place that would be a different matter.
THE PRESIDENT replied “no thanks”. He added that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and himself. The Prime Minister had said that the British had sufficient troops to keep peace in this area and to stop the outbreak of war in that region. He had asked the British to do so immediately for the United States was also much interested in this line of communications to the Far East through the Suez Canal. The President said, however, that we thought that no country should have special privilege. The French did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All should have equal rights.
STALIN inquired if he might infer of this that his colleagues did not recognize any privileged position of the French in this area.
CHURCHILL replied that the British position was that they wanted to see France have a special position and that he had promised this to the French at a time when the British were weak. This promise was made of course only so far as the British were concerned. They had no power to bind others nor had they undertaken to make serious exertions to procure special rights for the French. If they could get them the British would not object and would smile benignly on their achievements.
STALIN inquired from whom the French could obtain these special rights.
CHURCHILL replied that they could obtain them from Syria and Lebanon.
STALIN queried, “them alone?”
CHURCHILL replied in the affirmative. He added that the French had many schools there, and archeological institutes, etc.; many French live there and the French even had a song which went “Nous partous tour La Syrie” [Partant pour la Syrie?]. They dated their claims back to the Crusades. But he pointed out that the British were not embarking on a serious quarrel with the great powers on this matter.
The President said that the United States stood for equal rights for all.
CHURCHILL asked the President if he would endeavor to prevent the Syrians from giving special rights to the French.
THE PRESIDENT replied that he had no qualms in this respect as he was sure that the Syrians would not want to grant special rights.
STALIN observed that they were reluctant. He said that the Russian delegation thanked Mr. Churchill for the information that he had given and that they withdrew their proposal.
CHURCHILL and THE PRESIDENT said they wished to thank STALIN for this action.
CHURCHILL said they had submitted a paper to the Council and he would be very glad to hear the views of the other great powers.
STALIN said that the British proposals were based on the presumption that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired. The Soviets proceeded on the assumption that the term had not expired and that it would do so only after the termination of the war against Japan. He pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation concurred with paragraph 1 of the British paper that their troops be withdrawn from Tehran and he suggested that they let it go at that.
THE PRESIDENT said that we had been ready for a long time to withdraw but pointed out that we had many supplies in Iran and that we wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan.
STALIN said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran but he agreed that troops from Tehran might be withdrawn.
THE PRESIDENT said he thought that there were no American troops in Tehran.
STALIN said that even if there were the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Tehran.
CHURCHILL said that the British were anxious to proceed to the other points raised in the British paper. Of course only two and one-half months had elapsed since the termination of the war against Germany. The British would like for the removal of troops to continue on both sides because they had promised that they would go when the German war was over. They would, therefore, like to withdraw when the other two stages were completed.
STALIN said that they would like to have time to think this over. The treaty said that the troops should be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates. That included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave them plenty of time.
CHURCHILL suggested that they accept the proposal to withdraw from Tehran and that they let the Foreign Ministers take another look at the matter when they met.
THE PRESIDENT said that we were proceeding with our withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. He said that we expected to be out within sixty days.
STALIN said that the United States was fully entitled to look after their supplies. He added, “So as to rid the United States of any worries we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.”
THE PRESIDENT said he thanked Stalin for this statement.
(Field Marshal Alexander entered the room at this point and Stalin walked around the table to shake hands with him after which he greeted the President.)
CHURCHILL said that with respect to the zones [sectors?] allotted to British and American troops it appeared that so far as the British were concerned that in the principal zone of Vienna there were 500,000 people. As the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of Vienna, they would not be able to undertake the feeding of those 500,000 persons. What they suggested, therefore, was a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. He called upon Field Marshal Alexander to speak.
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that there were about 500,000 people in Vienna to be fed. He did not have the food to send from Italy. There was a small reserve in Villach in the Klagenfurt area. This could be provided but he thought he was correct in stating that it would be enough for only about three weeks or one month. If they took on the obligation to feed these people the food would have to come from the United States.
CHURCHILL pointed out that this would be in addition to the population in the United States zone of Vienna.
THE PRESIDENT said that there were about 375,000 in our zone. He said that our transport was almost totally engaged in transporting supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe.
STALIN asked what about the French zone.
THE PRESIDENT said he did not know.
STALIN said he would have to talk with Marshal Konev. He was acquainted with the matter. He would like to know what period they had in mind. Was it until the next harvest?
CHURCHILL said the difficulty was that the people in Vienna had always drawn their food from the East.
STALIN said that they had made an arrangement with the Austrian Government that they would undertake to provide a small quantity of food for money until the next harvest. This would continue until August or September. He would have to talk, however, with Marshal Konev.
CHURCHILL pointed out that Field Marshal Alexander was entering Styria with his troops but was reluctant to enter Vienna because of the difficulty in regard to food.
STALIN asked if the food situation in Vienna was so bad now.
CHURCHILL replied that they had not been there.
STALIN said that it wouldn’t seem to be so bad so far as the population was concerned.
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that if the Generalissimo could help them with food they were ready to go forward and take up their work.
STALIN said that he would let them know that evening or the next day.
CHURCHILL thanked the Marshal for this.
STALIN said it would be well if the British and American Governments would agree to extend the authority of the Renner Government to their zones. This would not imply diplomatic recognition but they should be placed in the same position as Finland. The authority of the Renner Government should be extended to the British and American zones in order to help them in the collection of food.
THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that as soon as we had moved in and had looked into the matter we would be able to agree to this.
CHURCHILL referred to his remark of the previous day [earlier today] when he had said that they had two divisions in Greece and he proposed to ask Field Marshal Alexander to speak on this subject.
STALIN interrupted and said he disagreed and as he had said at the previous meeting a Churchill statement could not be impugned.
CHURCHILL said he wished to raise a question of procedure. He had drawn the attention of his colleagues to the fact that Mr. Attlee and he had interests to attend to in London on Thursday. They, therefore, had to leave by lunch time on Wednesday, taking the Foreign Secretary with them, and that they would be back for the evening sitting on the 27th. He added, “or some of us will be back”. Could they not meet on Monday [Wednesday] morning before his departure. This was agreed to.
CHURCHILL suggested that the Foreign Ministers continue to meet and that in Mr. Eden’s absence Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him. This was agreed to.
The meeting adjourned.
Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m.
MOLOTOV reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries.
The economic subcommittee was instructed to consider Soviet proposals on reparations.
Economic principles for Germany were discussed. Russia withdrew her proposed amendment to paragraph 13 thereof. Russia asked the deletion of paragraph 18 for further study by the Allied Control Commission. No agreement was reached, and the question was referred to the Big Three.
Proposal for council of Foreign Ministers was approved with verbal amendments.
Trusteeships were discussed. It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies should be taken up by the council of Foreign Ministers.
It was agreed that all decisions of the conference affecting the work of the Allied commanders in Germany should be communicated to them, and that a committee should be empowered to draft such communication.
The matter of collaboration of the three powers in European economic problems was discussed.
Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should be returned to its international status, and that the question should be discussed in a conference of the four powers, including France, in the near future. The invitation to China and France to participate in the council of Foreign Ministers was approved, and it was agreed that this should be sent 48 hours before the release of the final communiqué.
The agenda proposed for the Big Three discussion today included Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran.
TRUMAN: First subject is Turkey.
CHURCHILL: I thought we would renew the discussion of the problem of feeding Germany.
(It was agreed that matters referred to the Foreign Secretaries and agreed to by them could be regarded as accepted by the Big Three, unless some objection was raised.)
CHURCHILL: Before I finished talking yesterday, I made it clear that we could not support Russia’s claim against Turkey for a military base in the Black Sea.
STALIN: Yesterday, Mr. Churchill asserted Russia had frightened Turkey, particularly by concentrating troops in Bulgaria. Mr. Churchill’s information is out of date. Russia has very few troops in Bulgaria, but the British have more in Greece.
CHURCHILL: We have only 40 thousand troops in Greece.
STALIN: Russia has less. The Turks have nothing to be afraid of. The Turks have 23 divisions on the frontier. As to rectification of the frontier, I refer to the two provinces [Kars and Ardahan]. This question of the rectification of the frontiers would not have come up if the question of an alliance had not come up. If the alliance is dropped, the rectification of the frontiers will lapse.
So far as the Straits are concerned, the position of Russia is deplorable. The Montreux Convention is inimical to Russia. Turkey has a right to block our ships. More than that, Russia has less rights than Japan. Small states controlled by Britain have real control of the Straits. Turkey is not capable of keeping control of the Straits. The Straits must be defended by force, the same as the [Panama Canal is defended by the] American navy, the same as the British navy defends the Suez.
TRUMAN: The Montreux Convention should be revised. Most of the wars in the last twenty years have arisen in this area. It should be the business of the peace conference to see that that does not happen again. There must be freedom of intercourse in all that section. I want to see Russia, Britain and the United States have access to all the seas in the world. I will distribute a paper on this subject.
(The President reads the paper. He emphasizes that there should be free and unrestricted traffic on inland waterways, and such waterways should be controlled by the representation of all states concerned. As initial step, there should be international agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The function of these agencies should be the development of navigation on the rivers in question. The membership of these agencies should include the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Riparian States. The same procedure should apply in the case of the Kiel Canal, and the Montreux Convention should be similarly revised.)
TRUMAN: I do not want to fight another war in twenty years because of a quarrel on the Danube. We want a prosperous, self-supporting Europe. A bankrupt Europe is of no advantage to any country, or to the peace of the world. The territorial dispute between Russia and Turkey should be settled by themselves, but the waterways are of interest to the whole world.
CHURCHILL: I strongly support Marshal Stalin’s wish for the revision of the Montreux Convention, with the objective of security for Russia, and free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean by merchant ships and by warships, whether in time of peace or war. I agree with the President that that freedom should be guaranteed by all of us. I earnestly hope that the Marshal will consider that alternative to the establishment of a Russian base in close proximity to Constantinople.
As to the other waterways, we are in full accord with the general lines of the President’s statement. The Kiel Canal should be free and open, and guaranteed by the great powers. We also attach great importance to free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine.
TRUMAN: There is no disagreement on the revision of the Montreux Convention.
CHURCHILL: Nor on the purpose for which it is to be revised.
STALIN: I must read attentively the President’s paper. Perhaps in the meantime we might consider the next question.
TRUMAN: The Koenigsberg area.
STALIN: This was brought up at Yalta. We stated it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Too much blood has been spilled by the Soviet Union not to have some piece of German territory. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister raised any objection at Yalta, so the question was agreed upon. We are anxious to have that agreement confirmed at this conference.
TRUMAN: No objection in principle, but technical and ethnic details must be considered.
CHURCHILL: I spoke in the Commons in 1944, and referred to the Soviets’ wish to have Koenigsberg, which would mean that Poland’s frontier would run to the south of that. I made it clear that the British government sympathized with the Russian desires.
TRUMAN: The next question is Syria and the Lebanon.
MOLOTOV: The Soviet delegation submits a short draft on this question.
CHURCHILL: The burden of maintaining order falls on our shoulders. We are seeking no advantage for ourselves which will not go to all other countries. Both France and Britain have recognized the independence of this area, when a troop settlement was made. In consideration of France’s long, historic connection with Syria and the Lebanon, we agreed not to object to France having a favored position, if that could be satisfactorily arranged with the governments of Syria and the Lebanon. We have told General de Gaulle that as soon as he makes a satisfactory treaty with Syria and the Lebanon, we will withdraw our troops. The withdrawal of our troops now would lead to the massacre of French civilians and French troops there. We should not like to have that happen. It would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world, and make the maintenance of peace more difficult in Palestine and Iraq. It might affect Egypt, too. We could not have a worse moment for this disturbance. It would endanger lines of communication through the Suez Canal through which both British and American supplies are proceeding for the war against Japan.
General de Gaulle has acted very unwisely in this region, against our advice and entreaty. The outbreak was caused by 500 troops being sent on the ship. They could do nothing but strike a spark. Lately, de Gaulle has agreed to hand over the “Troupes Spéciales” to the Syrian government, and I trust we shall be able to reach, if not an agreement then some sort of settlement with him which would guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and secure some recognition for the French – their cultural and commercial interests, which they have built up over so many years.
Let me repeat, Britain will not remain there one day longer than necessary. We will be delighted to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed in the interest of our Allies, as well as ourselves. In view of the states interested, we do not welcome the proposal to have a conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France. The whole burden has been borne by us.
EDEN: (interrupting) Except for the diplomatic approval of the United States.
CHURCHILL: (continuing) If the United States desires to take our place, it might open a new question.
TRUMAN: No thank you, Mr. Churchill. The British reported to us on the disorders in Syria, and advised us that they had troops to protect the situation affecting the lines of communications. The United States told the Prime Minister to go ahead.
We might, however, be in disagreement on one point. We do not think any country entitled to special privilege. We are for equality for all.
STALIN: I may assume that my colleagues do not recognize privileged rights in Syria and the Lebanon?
TRUMAN: Yes.
CHURCHILL: We promised France a favored position when we were very weak. We cannot bind others. If France cannot get them, we would not object.
STALIN: From whom can France obtain these privileges?
CHURCHILL: From the Syrian and Lebanese republics.
STALIN: From them alone?
CHURCHILL: Yes.
TRUMAN: We shall stand for equal rights.
CHURCHILL: Would you prevent the Syrians from giving privileges?
TRUMAN: That will not be necessary.
STALIN: The Soviet delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for his information, and withdraws their paper on this subject.
TRUMAN: Iran is the next subject on our agenda.
STALIN: The British proposals are based on the assumption that the term for Allied troops in Iran has expired. We proceed on the contrary assumption. The term expires only after the war with Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviets accept the first paragraph of the British proposal, that troops should be immediately withdrawn from Tehran.
TRUMAN: We would be willing to withdraw at any time, but we have vast quantities of supplies to protect.
STALIN: The Russian delegation has no objection to American and British troops in Tehran, but our troops will be withdrawn.
TRUMAN: We have no troops in Tehran.
STALIN: We would not object, but let us withdraw from Tehran.
CHURCHILL: We would like the movement to continue. We promised to go out. We would like the other two phases to proceed.
STALIN: I think we still have time to think. The treaty says six months after all hostilities with Germany and her associates. That implies Japan.
CHURCHILL: Shall we agree to withdraw from Tehran now, and look at the problem again in September, when the council of Foreign Ministers meets?
TRUMAN: We will be out in sixty days. We need the troops and supplies in Japan.
STALIN: Of course, the United States has the right to do so. We promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.
(Field Marshal Alexander arrives, and is greeted by Marshal Stalin and President Truman).
CHURCHILL: We are unable to undertake the feeding of the population in our zone in Vienna. We suggest Russia continue to feed this zone until more permanent arrangements can be worked out.
ALEXANDER: There are 500 thousand Viennese to be fed. I have not the food to send from Italy. The reserves available will not last three weeks. So if we undertake to feed, the food must come from the United States.
TRUMAN: There are 375 thousand in our zone.
STALIN: Let me have a talk with Marshal [Konev]. The situation does not appear to us to be so bad, and I will let you know tonight or tomorrow.
CHURCHILL: I thank the Marshal.
STALIN: It will be a good thing if the American and British governments would allow the Renner government to extend its authority to their zones. This need not imply recognition. This will facilitate the distribution of food.
TRUMAN: We will be glad to consider this.
CHURCHILL: We also.
CHURCHILL: Field Marshal Alexander will give the figures of our troops in Greece.
STALIN: The Prime Minister has given the figures, and his figures cannot be impugned.
CHURCHILL: My memory may have been bad.
ALEXANDER: 40 thousand.
STALIN: The Prime Minister’s figures cannot be impugned.
CHURCHILL: We must leave Wednesday at lunch-time, and will [be] back in the evening of the 27th; so we would suggest a morning session Wednesday, and we will be back for the Friday session.
I also suggest the Foreign Secretaries continue to meet with Sir Alexander Cadogan, acting as Eden’s Deputy.
TRUMAN: That is satisfactory.