America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

Jap says Truman to ease up on unconditional surrender

Sudden V-J Day would find America badly off-balance

By Owen L. Scott

American wolf whistle insults Latin girls; but discreet pinch as they pass – that’s OK

By Allen Stewart, Associated Press war editor

Werner: Potsdam parley sets stage for Russia’s part in knockout of Japs

Soviet may help liquidate foe to assure role in Asia
By Max Werner

Air freight is setting pace in supplying Southeast Asia

By Charles A. Grumich, Associated Press staff writer

U.S. State Department (July 22, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Sunday, July 22:

The President, accompanied by his Military and Naval Aides and Captain McMahon, and Colonel Tiernan, attended Protestant church services at 1000. The services were held in the Coliseum building (a former film laboratory) in the “Masterwork” area of the American Army camp and were conducted by Lieut. Colonel Lawrence Nelson, Second Armored Division Chaplain. Captain Ernest M. Northern Jr., 67th Armored Regiment Chaplain, assisted Colonel Nelson. The President returned to the Coliseum at 1130 to attend a Catholic Mass conducted by his old friend, Colonel Tiernan.

Prime Minister Churchill called on the President at 1215. They conferred for a full hour, and Mr. Churchill left the Little White House at 1330. The Prime Minister declined the President’s invitation to lunch as he, himself, was having guests for lunch.

1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington.

1645: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where he arrived at 1655.

1700: The sixth meeting of the conference was called to order. The meeting adjourned at 1950 and the President and party returned to the Little White House immediately.

2030: Private John R. Thomas Jr., USA (Captain McMahon’s nephew) was a dinner guest at the Little White House this evening. Music was furnished during and after dinner by the Headquarters Berlin District (U.S. Army) Band, playing from the lower White House lawn.

The Syonan Shimbun (July 23, 1945)

Unique, deadly new ‘secret arms’ will be used against invaders

Nippon stands ready to deal final blow

Borneo Indonesians assist in battling enemy

Mountbatten confers with MacArthur, returns

Kanto takes big toll of enemy raiders

Point-blank charge scatters foe on Balikpapan front

Dream come true

HANOI (Domei, July 21) – The long-cherished dream of Viet Nam Empire to recover three cities formerly in its possession came true yesterday when Hanoi, Haiphong and Turane were formally taken over by the Viet Nam Government. A proclamation by Bao Dai, Emperor of Viet Nam, announcing the recovery of the three cities, was issued today.


Americans machinegun Dutch internees

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 23, 1945)

Polens Westgrenze an der Oder

Für die Tschechoslowakei gibt es keine Tschenfrage

Alliierte Flotte auf der Lauer

Deutschland – Hauptproblem der Dreierkonferenz

Nachtkriegsprogramm der USA

U.S. State Department (July 23, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m.

JCS 201st Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly
Major General Gross Colonel Stone
Major General Norstad Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell Colonel Cary
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

. . . . . . .

Command in Indo-China (CCS 890/3)

ADMIRAL KING read a memorandum relating to the approach by the United States and British Governments to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in regard to the reallocation of the southern part of Indo-China to the Southeast Asia area.

GENERAL MARSHALL proposed the amendment of the statement in paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3 which the British had recommended for inclusion in the final report to the President and the Prime Minister.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the amendment to paragraph 3 of CCS 890/3 proposed by General Marshall and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments (CCS 897)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendation of the Combined Military Transportation Committee in paragraph 5b of CCS 897 subject to the amendment of Enclosure “A” as follows:

a. Substitute in paragraph 3c “when satisfactory arrangements in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be” in lieu of “as regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not.”

b. In paragraph 5 delete the words “statement of.”

***Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 900)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered CCS 900 and amended it in several particulars.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff should insist on the inclusion under Section III of the numbered paragraphs now omitted from the final report to the President and Prime Minister, since the report should be complete and since the substitutes for these paragraphs dealing with rehabilitation did not come under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the final report to the President and Prime Minister in the Enclosure to CCS 900 as amended during the discussion.

b. Agreed to recommend the inclusion under Section III of CCS 900 of appropriate paragraphs as set forth by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to CCS 877/5.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy in Regard to Lend-Lease Assignments

GENERAL MARSHALL asked Admiral Leahy if he had discussed with the President the question of Lend-Lease assignments to the United Nations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had discussed the question with the President and was trying to get him to change the basic directive on Lend-Lease to permit General Eisenhower to continue his present course of action. He believed that the President would approve the delivery of maintenance supplies to occupational forces in Europe but that he would not approve the delivery of arms and ammunition.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he had proposed three policies which might be approved by the President, as follows:

  1. The support of that portion of the forces of such nations as in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be profitably employed against Japan in furtherance of our agreed strategy or for such other purposes connected with the war against Japan as may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  2. Supply of maintenance items for United States equipment now in possession of Allied Armies of occupation.

  3. Such exceptional military programs as the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that if the President would approve these three policies as a substitute for the policy he had announced on 5 July 1945, the Chief of Staff of the Army could then issue specific directives for assignment of Lend-Lease to the countries concerned which would accord with the three policies established by the President. He said we are receiving demands from the British for maintenance supplies and that some means of providing them is necessary. He felt that some decision must be reached promptly in regard to the delivery of maintenance supplies in order that the production problem might be controlled.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he recognized that this problem must be settled and that perhaps some basis for barter with the British might be found. Possibly the supply of United States material against reimbursement as provided for in Section 3c of the Lend-Lease Act would be the solution.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 22 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/3

Command in Indo-China

  1. We agree that as a first step in reorganising command in Indo-China, there is advantage in dividing the country into two, leaving the northern portion in China Theatre and allotting the southern portion to Southeast Asia Command. This organisation of command should be subject to review in the light of the development of operations in that area.

  2. We have examined the run of communications in Indo-China and suggest that the most satisfactory dividing line would be latitude 16° N.

  3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include in their final report to the Prime Minister and President, a statement on the following lines:

    We consider it important that there shall be unity of control of major operations in the Indo-China-Siam area when they develop and of previous subversive and para-military operations. As the first step in securing this unity of control, we are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° North in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.

    We recommend that the President and the Prime Minister should approach the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to this arrangement.

Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov because he was deeply concerned at the development of the question of reparation from Germany. He said that as Mr. Molotov knew the United States Government had always favored and still favored the adoption of a friendly overall policy for the Three Powers which would treat Germany as an economic whole. He said, however, after listening to the discussions here and hearing the report of the Reparations Committee he did not see how certain of the positions taken by the Soviet Government could be reconciled by [with?] the adoption of an overall reparation plan. For example, the question of the transfer now to Polish administration of a large part of 1937 Germany would expose the British and Americans in their zones to serious dangers in connection with an overall reparation plan. Another factor which worked against the overall plan was the definition put in by Mr. Maisky of “war bounty [booty?]”. The Secretary said he wished to make it very plain that the United States did not intend to pay out money to finance imports to Germany and thus repeat the experience after the last war when in fact United States funds had been used to pay reparations to others.

MR. MOLOTOV said he fully understood that point of view and he wished to say that Mr. Maisky had not fully made clear the position of the Soviet Government on the definition of “war bounty [booty?].”

THE SECRETARY continued that he was also very much afraid that the attempt to resolve these conditions in practice would lead to endless quarrels and disagreements between the three countries at a time when unity between them was essential.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought that these difficulties could be reconciled here at the Conference and that he intended to put forward at the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers concrete proposals which he hoped would be carefully studied by the British and American Delegations.

THE SECRETARY said that under the circumstances he wondered whether it would not be better to give consideration to the possibility of each country taking reparations from its own zone. For example, according to their estimates, about 50% of the existing wealth of Germany was in the Soviet zone and that, therefore, the Soviet Union could receive its share of reparations from its own zone. He added that if they wished to obtain certain equipment or materials from the British or American zones they could do so in exchange for food or coal needed to feed and warm the German population in the west. He added that Marshal Stalin had indicated some such proposal when he had said yesterday that if the British wished to obtain coal from Silesia they could do so by exchanging other goods with the Poles. He added that his suggestion for zonal as against overall treatment applied only to reparations but that in other matters, such as currency, transport, etc. Germany would be treated as an economic whole.

MR. MOLOTOV said he knew that the Marshal strongly favored an overall plan for reparations and he said that they would be quite prepared to consider reducing their reparation claims.

As it was then time for the meeting, it was agreed that if agreeable with Mr. Eden the three Foreign Secretaries would meet informally this afternoon in order to discuss the matter further.

In conclusion, THE SECRETARY repeated that the United States could not agree to anything which would require them to finance the feeding of Germans in their zone so that the latter could work on behalf of reparations for other countries.

Byrnes-Eden conversation

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden

Byrnes expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Molotov and had subsequently informed Eden of this talk.