Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

[NormanStewart]

Third plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:

1. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
2. THE POLISH QUESTION

World Security Organization

The President inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius said it had been decided to insert the word “dismemberment” of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

Mr. Molotov replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

Mr. Stettinius then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word “dismemberment” into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

The Prime Minister said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.

The President said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council:

Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure,

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President’s proposal.

The President suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.

Mr. Stettinius reported as follows:

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

• I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

  1. Admission of new members;
  2. Suspension of a member;
  3. Expulsion of a member;
  4. Election of the Secretary General.

• II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

• III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

  1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

  2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

  3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

  4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

• IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.\

• V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

• VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

• I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

• II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

• III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

• IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

• V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

Marshal Stalin inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius, statement that had not been included in the President’s message of December 5, 1944.

The President replied that there had been no change of any significance.

Mr. Stettinius said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bohlen on the document).

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals. He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President’s latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President’s new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of then grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President’s proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President’s proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.

Mr. Eden replied “yes, but not on the Council unless elected.”

Marshal Stalin then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.

The Prime Minister replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hong Kong.

The Prime Minister said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply. For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.

The President then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:

We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…

The President added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.

The Prime Minister said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.

Marshal Stalin said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the USSR.

The Prime Minister replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.

Marshal Stalin then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius’ explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.

Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.

Marshal Stalin said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.

The Prime Minister replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.

Marshal Stalin said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.

The Prime Minister answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Marshal Stalin said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.

The Prime Minister answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.

The President then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

The Polish Question

The President inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.

The President said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties – Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.

The President said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn’t know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.

The Prime Minister said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line—he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the USSR, and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government [Polish people?] by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President’s suggestion.

At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.

Marshal Stalin then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland’s own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:

In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill’s reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin’s position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland’s frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.

As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted – the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski [Arciszewski] and Raskiewiycz [Raczkiewicz] are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Bierut and Osubka Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski [Zeligowski] or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some [chance] of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.

As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.

The Prime Minister said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.

The Conference then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

		Livadia
Note to Pres				Tonight
for ERS			Harriman
re VIII C			Page	} Gromyko who else?
			AH
redraft of provision		Voting Plenary
Letter from ERS to vish. for set of pictures
			2/6	4.15 pm – 6.20
				(Then Poland)

1. Pres, ERS, Leahy, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman
2. P.M., Eden, Cadogan, Interpreter (military), Sir Ed. Bridges, Clark-Kerr
3. Stalin, Molotov, Maisky, Vishinsky, Gusev, Gromyko

1. Behind:	Hopkins, Matthews, A. H.
2. “:	Jebb, Dixon, Wilson
3. “:	Pavolov

ERS reported that the words “and the dismemberment” be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow

Molotov withdraws his suggestion

ERS made final report

Church, said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached

Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us. Must have a strong French army

Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine; – but in his opinion if we get D.O. much more likely to take part in world activity

ERS Read analysis

Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D.O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.

Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years

ERS: read statement

3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.

Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.

Agreed

I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times

Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)

I shall now read the situations which also require etc… in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute

Read I to IV [V?]

Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure

Thing we have to remember – objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty

Stalin: Would like to know what is new in proposals read by ERS as compared with Dec. 5

Asked about minor phraseological change

Long discussion

Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal

Could we put it off to tomorrow

Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow

I cannot conceal from the company that HMG that has examined the U.S. proposal – the general proposal – with very close attention. I did not feel myself wholly in agt. with the orig. proposal at DO I have been anxious to make sure that the realities of the positions of the 5 great powers have been fully faced

On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.

I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found, can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers

Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn’t provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world

It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world – we 3 Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the lap of its inhabs. ∴ I feel that we great powers – 3 – should make what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world. Within the limits stated. I’ve naturally been looking at this as to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em & Com. I’m going to take a part, instance to illustrate why I do not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be damaging to Brit, interests. The case I take is a difficult one which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK If we agree to the proposal of the US let us suppose Ch. asks us to return HK to them. We should have a right to state our case fully ag. any case made by the Ch. But we should not be allowed to vote on the qs set out – the 5 q’s set out at the end of this doc. (missed sentence – see Jebb)

St. Who is we

Church I’m speaking only of the Brit Govt

St. Will Eg. take part in the Assembly?

Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected

St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.

Church: Yes & so long as Brit G concerned these 5q’s the Brit Govt would not be allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters being decided without our vote – I’m only taking HK illus. – we means Brit Govt

I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow

What his majesty’s Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there

I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III

We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.

∴ I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III

No (missed more)

On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those

In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal–

Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will

HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.

(Absent see Doc)

St. If any nation raise any import, q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.

Will demand a dec.

∴ matter is much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin

Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D.O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don’t know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.

I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world

Im sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn’t want domin. I’m sure US hasn’t opin. of this kind. USSR hasn’t There remains only 1 power. China

Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world – not any 1 power but the 3 Not 1 but a trinity

(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that

I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.

Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world

I fear – we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries – act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear – new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru

Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create --that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.

I must apologize I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories–

In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions

Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council

I understood in consid. of q’s of 1st cat.

perm, members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw

But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.

We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I’m interested in decs.

Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors

Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced

St: Is it so.

Church It is as I understand it

Eden They could talk & complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent

ERS No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm, members of Sec. Coun.

Maisky No recommend, could be made

Maisky These 5 points will not be decisions but only discussions?

ERS Yes

St I’m afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity

Church See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves

St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade

Church: we were very angry, were all alone

St: How guar, such thing not occur ag.

Church We couldn’t do it here

St. Couldn’t we make more obstacles in way of it

Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.

St. First time we have

Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5

St. Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion

Church. I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit I can only say dip. would be active

Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity

I’m quite sure Mar. St. wouldn’t make a harsh att on Brit Em-- verbally I mean – without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed

St: I would prob. but what of Maisky

Pres: Let’s put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences – will be known – will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no sense impair unity but will promote it & will demonstrate confid. have in each other & in justice

St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study

Poland
In intermission Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L.P. the changes in 3rd ¶ of our proposal. I straightened him out on the score of texts but he was still not clear satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the Rs if we could drop the whole reference & asked if Pres would agree to that. I said I thought so

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Minutes

February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss’ notes.

Poland

PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré Poles?

PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.

PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler’s brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty’s Government cordially support the President’s suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.

STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britian the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland’s frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918–1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin’s position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [Arciezewski], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [Raczkiewicz]. All these people were against the agreement and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government “bandits” and “traitors.” Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won’t hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [Zeligowski] but they won’t hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.

PRIME MINISTER: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelts Plan zur Weltherrschaft

wh. Berlin, 5. Februar – Wer es unternimmt, sich ein Bild von der Dreimächtekonferenz zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill zu machen, tut gut daran, nicht nur an die akuten Probleme (wie vor allem an den Plan, das deutsche Volk mit Sirenenklängen zu ködern) oder etwa an Polen, Griechenland, Italien usw. zu denken, sondern sich auch zu fragen: Was ist das vorige Mal in Teheran vor sich gegangen und was plant Roosevelt eigentlich, von dem man sagen kann, dass er sich am meisten um das Dreiertreffen bemüht hat?

Es hat lange gedauert, bis man aus authentischer amerikanischer Quelle erfuhr, was wirklich in Teheran passierte, aber die Wahrheit über Teheran enthüllte gleichzeitig den „Großen Plan“ des amerikanischen Präsidenten. Forrest Davis, ein Publizist, der in Washington nicht nur zu Hause ist, sondern auch im Weißen Haus immer eine offene Tür findet, hat in der konservativen und äußerst populären amerikanischen Wochenzeitschrift Saturday Evening Post mit ihrer Auflage von weit über drei Millionen berichtet, wie sich Roosevelt die Nachkriegswelt vorstellt. Sein Plan bedeutete die absolute Beherrschung der Welt durch die USA, Moskau und England, unter gnädiger Anhörung Tschungkings und Frankreichs, nach der Vernichtung des Reiches, Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes und völliger Niederwerfung Japans.

Dieser „Große Plan“ einer Kontrolle der Welt durch Moskau, Washington und London steht und fällt zweifellos mit der Notwendigkeit, Moskau aus seiner ideologischen Vereinsamung und dem sich daraus ergebenden revolutionären Herrschaftsanspruch herauszulösen, um es wieder in die „Familie der demokratischen Nationen“ einzureihen. Der amerikanische Präsident hofft offensichtlich, dass es möglich wäre, Stalin und die Sowjetunion in eine solche Weltorganisation westlerischer Prägung einzugliedern. Roosevelt ist bereit, alles auf diese Hoffnung zu setzen. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie er in Teheran mit nervösen Spielerhänden eine Chesterfield nach der anderen in seinem langen Zigarettenhalter entzündete, während er versuchte, Stalin von seinem „Größen Plan“ zu begeistern, um aber zu sehen, dass der Mann aus dem Kreml erst dann wirkliches Interesse zeigte, als ihm durch Roosevelt Konzessionen gemacht worden sind, die alles auslöschen, was in London seit 1939 an Plänen für Europa in mühseliger diplomatischer Arbeit geschaffen worden war.

Welche Vorteile verspricht sich Roosevelt von seinem Plan, wenn er bereit ist, soviel dafür auf das Spiel zu setzen?

• Der Präsident in Washington vertritt die These, dass keine Machtkonstellation in der Welt in der Lage wäre gegen den Stachel der drei zu lecken, solange gegen eine solche wie auch immer geartete Machtballung die Riesenkapazität der amerikanischen maschinellen Produktion und die Wucht der sowjetischen Menschenmassen gestellt werden könnten. Deshalb ist Roosevelt bereit, für eine Zusammenarbeit Moskau-Washington auch angesichts größter Schwierigkeiten einzutreten. Der bisherige Verlauf des jetzigen Weltkrieges wird von ihm dabei als Hauptargument benützt.

• Der Mann im Weißen Hause fürchtet, dass bei einem Zusammenbruch seines Planes sowohl die Sowjetunion wie auch England eine verzweifelte Jagd nach Interessengebieten und Verbündeten in Europa beginnen würden, wodurch in kurzer Zeit ein neuer Weltbrand seinen Anfang nehmen müsste. Roosevelt fürchtet sogar, eine Ausschaltung Stalins von der „Weltorganisation“ würde ermöglichen, dass der zweite Weltkrieg pausenlos in den dritten Weltkrieg übergehen könnte, denn Amerika könnte aus klaren und im Weißen Haus eindeutig vertretenen geopolitischen Gründen niemals dulden, dass Europa mit der Sowjetunion zusammen einen eurasischen Block bilde. Umgekehrt weiß Roosevelt, dass ein völlig von Großbritannien beherrschtes Europa von Moskau als ständige Bedrohung aufgefasst werden würde. Um deshalb die wilde Jagd nach Interessengebieten in Europa zu verhindern, glaubt Roosevelt, alles versuchen zu müssen, um Stalin erst einmal grundsätzlich in die „Familie der demokratischen Völker“ einzubauen, auch um den Preis von Konzessionen an den Sowjetwillen zur Einflussnahme in Europa.

• So sehr Roosevelt seinen „Großen Plan“ auch deshalb wünscht, weil er glaubt, bei einer allgemeinen „Weltkontrolle“ die USA ausschlaggebend zu sehen, so schließt doch sein weiteres Bemühen, Tschungking als „Anhängsel“ in den Plan zu verankern, einen sehr praktischen Grund ein. Wenngleich Tschungking-China eindeutige totalitäre Tendenzen aufweist, so steht Roosevelt doch hinter Tschiangkaischek, weil er dadurch hofft, 450,000.000 Chinesen als Abnehmer für seine überschüssige Produktion an Autos, Eisschränken und Radios zu gewinnen. Auch in Asien würde das Nichtzusammenarbeiten der Sowjets in dieser Weltorganisation eine gewissenlose Jagd nach Interessensphären bringen. Diesmal allerdings zwischen Washington und Moskau, wobei es keineswegs entschieden ist, ob Japan die ihm von Roosevelt zugedachte Rolle des „kleinen Mannes“ spielen würde.

Die Roosevelt-Planung für die Schaffung einer Weltordnung auf Grundlage des Gleichgewichts der Großmächte mit Washington als Zünglein an der Waage erscheint den Amerikanern einleuchtend. Trotzdem gibt es Amerikaner, deren Bedenken in die Öffentlichkeit dringen. Diese Männer erklären, dass durch Teheran und was dann folgte, Roosevelt heute bereits dastehe, wo Wilson 1919 sich im Versailler Spiegelsaal befunden habe. Wie Wilson hat Roosevelt seine Hoffnung für die Weltsicherheit auf eine zentrale fixe Idee aufgebaut. Wilsons „Großer Plan“ war der „Völkerbund.“ Wilson war beredt, um diesem Plan das Leben zu schenken, Punkt für Punkt seiner Gerechtigkeit versprechenden 14 Punkte aufzugeben oder umdeuten zu lassen. Roosevelts „Großer Plan“ ist ein Weltsystem mit einer „Drei-Mächte-Konstellation“ an Stelle eines Völkerbundes, von dem Roosevelt glaubt, dass er scheitern musste, weil weder genug Macht dahinterstand, noch die Völker in der Lage waren, die Ideale eines solchen Instruments in die Praxis umzusetzen. Roosevelt glaubt, dass seine Drei-Mächte-Konstellation diese Macht besitzt; aber auch er ist bereit, um seine fixe Idee durchzusetzen, Punkt für Punkt seiner „Atlantik-Charta“ über den Haufen zu werfen oder in Kompromissen ersticken zu lassen, deren verhängnisvollster das der „freien Hand für Moskau in Europa“ ist. Dem Ehrgeiz Roosevelts soll Europa geopfert werden, vor allem das deutsche Volk, dessen Todesurteil nach dem Willen des Judentums Stalin Vollstreckern soll.

Den Morgenthau-Plan in der Tasche

br. Bern, 5. Februar – Man erinnere sich an den Morgenthau-Plan, der darauf hinausläuft, Deutschland nach dem erhofften Siege seiner Gegner jeder Industrie zu berauben und es, soweit man es nicht unter seine Nachbarn aufteilt, zu einem „großen Kartoffelacker“ zu machen.

Der Plan wurde damals in einem ungelegenen Augenblick bekannt, denn er schien in seiner Hirnverbranntheit geeignet, die Aussichten Roosevelts auf eine abermalige Wiederwahl zu stören.

Nun ist Roosevelt wiedergewählt – nun glaubt man wieder offener sprechen zu können. Und so meldet eine nordamerikanische Agentur in Verbindung mit der Dreierkonferenz in aller Harmlosigkeit: „Roosevelt habe im Augenblick nur den Morgenthau-Plan bei sich, der als Grundvorschlag der Vereinigten Nationen vorgelegt werden soll.“ Also nicht ein unverbindlicher Privatvorschlag ist dieser Plan jetzt, sondern ein offizieller Vorschlag, mit dem der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten zur Konferenz mit Stalin und Churchill gefahren ist. Nun weiß man wenigstens, was gemeint ist, wenn diese drei ihren angekündigten Aufruf an das deutsche Volk starten sollten, um nach Wilsons Vorbild wieder einmal zu versichern, es werde gar nicht so schlimm werden, wenn Deutschland nur erst einmal kapituliert habe.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council

Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.

Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

Yalta, February 6, 1945

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Voting Procedure

Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary

1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.

American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and – we believe – the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.

2. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Tehran Declaration, the three powers stated:

We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…

Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization – even if it could be established – its future would be uncertain.

To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge of great power domination.

3. Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

Yalta, February 6, 1945

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Proposed Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and Analysis of the Effects of That Formula

The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 6, 1945

Mr. President: Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru – and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15

HARRY

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill meet

European policy statement likely

LONDON, England (UP) – The “Big Three” conference was underway today and observers here expected it to conclude with a broad statement of European policy, supplementing and perhaps expanding the Atlantic Charter.

High U.S. conferees favored a detailed announcement of the conclusions reached. But it was questionable whether the conference statement would reveal many of the decision by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

Observers believed they would issue a statement charting the general course of their policy, but leaving many key questions unanswered publicly.

There were strong reasons to believe they would disclose little if anything of their plans for the future of Germany beyond a broad statement of intent. Russia’s intention toward Japan was believed almost certainly not to be revealed at this time.

That the conference was underway was confirmed for the first time by Sir Walter Citrine, general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress

He made the disclosure at the opening session of the World Trade Union Conference in explaining why Mr. Churchill could not address the meeting.

Mr. Churchill had promised to speak at the conference, but instead sent a message of greetings to the delegates.

Speculation continued over the whereabouts of the “Big Three” meeting, with most sources suggesting the Black Sea area or possibly Stalingrad. One theory was that some sessions at least were being held aboard a warship, perhaps American, with Mr. Roosevelt as host.*

Gen. Charles de Gaulle expressed French resentment that he hadn’t been invited to participate in the conference and laid down French conditions for post-war Europe in a radio address yesterday.

His conditions were: French military occupation of the whole length of the Rhine River; separation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr Basin from the “German state or states,” and independence of “the Polish, Czech, Austrian and Balkan peoples.”

Japs show concern

The Japanese betrayed increasing concern that Marshal Stalin would align Russia with the United States and Britain against Japan at the conference.

They obviously feared that Marshal Stalin, flushed by victories over the German Army. will give Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill a definite promise to throw at least part of the Red Army against the Japs after Germany has surrendered.

The influential Tokyo newspaper Asahi, as quoted by the German Transocean Agency, said the question of Soviet participation would “most certainly be raised,” since the Pacific war situation was “nearing the decisive stage.”

[NormanStewart]

Editorial: Time to tell the Germans

German morale is the growing question mark as the Red armies sweep on toward Berlin, as Anglo-American planes bomb the panicky capital and Gen. Eisenhower moves through the Siegfried Line. That morale must be much less affected by propaganda and counter-propaganda than by the actual chaos and carnage which the German people see and feel. And yet propaganda does continue to play a part. At least Herr Goebbels, who has been more consistently successful than Hitler or the generals, is shouting louder than ever.

He is harping on two strings. One is German pride. He says: Remember how the Russians held out at Leningrad and Moscow (Stalingrad is passed over as too painful for reminders), how the Poles took it at Warsaw, how Londoners refused to crack under the blitz and planned to fight on elsewhere if their capital fell. Then he asks: Will Germans, the superior race, weaken when inferior Russians, Poles and Britons stood firm? That’s a good line. It may stiffen some sagging German spines.

Goebbels’ second line is the appeal to German fear of Allied retaliation. He says: If Germany surrenders, she will be destroyed. This is also potent. The Germans know the bestial record of their armies in conquered lands, they see the foreign slave labor which has been brought into Germany, they know they have earned the hatred and revenge of the world.

Because there is much truth in the situation which Goebbels is now exploiting with an evil twist, it is not easy for the Allies to counter his propaganda. They cannot deny that there is hatred of Germans among those who have survived the barbarism of German occupation. Nor do the Allies wish to sugarcoat the truth that the settlement terms will be hard, that everything necessary will be done by the victors to prevent another revival of German power of conquest.

But we think the Allies, within the realm of honesty and reason, could be more effective in counter-propaganda. They can emphasize, more than they have done, the official statements of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin that unconditional surrender means destruction of Nazism and German aggressive power, but not of the German people. The sooner there is a joint Big Three declaration of that kind the better.

Moreover, the Big Three ultimatum should stress that the danger of destruction of the German people would not be created but removed by an armistice. They should be told that Hitler’s plan to continue the war means national suicide, that German cities will be wiped out at a rate hitherto undreamed, that millions upon millions of Germans will die needlessly. In sober truth Germany today is facing destruction – not because the Allies will it; but because the German people, who started the war under Nazi orders, go on making war under Nazi orders.

[NormanStewart]

Background of news –
Since Tehran

By Bertram Benedict

It is now 14 months since the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union signed their joint declaration at Tehran, in Iran.

In those 14 months, there has been no other meeting of the Big Three, although Mr. Roosevelt conferred with Mr. Churchill at Quebec in September and Mr. Churchill with Stalin at Moscow in the following month. There have been three great international conferences in the United States on post-war problems: at Chicago, on aviation; at Bretton Woods, on financial relations; at Dumbarton Oaks, on world organization.

The main Tehran Declaration (there was another on Iran) was largely political, but probably the most vital decisions reached were military. Now, with the Red armies near Berlin, the most vital decisions of the Big Three may well be political, on what to do after victory over Germany.

Since Tehran, British and American relations with Chiang Kai-shek have deteriorated, although a little improvement seems to have been achieved of late. Fourteen months ago, the Generalissimo conferred with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill (Russia is not at war with Japan) at Cairo prior to the Tehran meeting, and the three issued a joint declaration on the territorial future of Japan.

Reds were still in Russia

When the Tehran conference met, the Red armies were still on Russian soil. British and American armies were on the continent of Europe only in Italy, and there they were still south of Rome. But in January 1944, the Red Armies reached the old border of Poland and lifted the siege of Leningrad; in March, they were in the Ukraine; in April, in the Balkans; in August, in East Prussia.

On June 6, two days after Rome fell, the Allies landed in Normandy; on August 15, they invaded southern France; on August 25, they took Paris; on September 12, they were on German soil in the west. And on July 20, a German army group tried to assassinate Hitler.

In the Pacific, the Marshalls were invaded in February 1944 and Saipan in June; by August 15, the Japanese were all out of India; late in October, U.S. troops landed on Leyte in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese Navy in a naval battle; on December 16, the Americans landed on Luzon and began their march on Manila; and Tokyo has come under systematic bombing from the air.

Roosevelt policy strengthened

Since Tehran, Germany has lost every ally in Europe, and Turkey has broken diplomatic and economic relations with Berlin. At the time of Tehran, the Axis held 20 European capitals. Only five are left.

President Roosevelt goes to a new conference with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Churchill strengthened politically by his reelection, by the election defeat of some outstanding opponents of his foreign policy, by a larger majority for his party in the House, by retention of his party majority in the Senate.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

Log of the Trip

Tuesday, February 6, 1945

0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.

1300: Luncheon at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p. m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.

1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S.	For Great Britain	For the USSR
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen.	Major Birse.

The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today’s meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.

1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.

This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O’Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President’s forthcoming visit to Egypt.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Top secret

	Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Brigadier General Roberts
General of the Army Marshall		Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Fleet Admiral King		Brigadier General Lindsay
Major General Kuter		Brigadier General Bessell
Lieutenant General Somervell		Brigadier General Everest
Vice Admiral Cooke		Commodore Burrough
Major General Bull		Colonel Peck
Major General Deane		Colonel Lincoln
Major General Anderson		Colonel Cary
Major General Hull		Captain Stroop
Major General Wood		Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick		Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Rear Admiral Duncan		Commander Clark
Rear Admiral Olsen
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General McFarland
	Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, 10 a.m.

Approval of Minutes of CCS 186th Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area (JCS 1241)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin’s agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.

Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777; JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT); JCS 1266/1 (Wash.))

Admiral Leahy said that JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the British proposal in CCS 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of JCS 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as CCS 777/1).

Supplies and Equipment Requested by the USSR (JCS 1138/3, JCS Info. Memo 360 – MILEPOST SUMMARY)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed JCS 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation MILEPOST. In JCS 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that JCS 1138/3 be approved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.

Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin” (JCS 577/28)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,” the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zone of Limitation for British and U.S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies

General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words “British and U.S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U.S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the British-U.S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as JCS 1243).

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.

Report by Combined Shipping Staffs

General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell’s, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of General Somervell’s report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

[NormanStewart]

740.00114 EW/2-545

The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State

Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret

My Dear Secretary of State: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.

In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.

There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as SHAEF have already reported, that the only V real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.

It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower’s telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.

Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.

Yours sincerely,
ANTHONY EDEN

[NormanStewart]

740.00114 EW/2-545

The War Shipping Administrator to the Secretary of State

Yalta, February 5, 1945
Secret

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Stettinius
From: Admiral Land

Subject: MR. EDEN’S LETTER TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO MEET RUSSIAN REPATRIATION REQUIREMENTS

1. After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.

2. Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.

3. In Washington the CMTC in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower’s request had been made in ignorance of CCS decision on availability of lift.

4. Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:
   (a) Type of ship required.
   (b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established.

5. The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U.S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large type. This changes U.S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U.S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.

[NormanStewart]

740.00114 EW/2-545

The British Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Foreign Commissar

Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret

You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.

Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20 January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter. We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.

In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.

I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.

On 20 January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom. This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.

I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.

I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.

His Excellency Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV

[Enclosure]

Redraft of Soviet Government’s Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies

Article 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.

Article 4

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.

Article 5

Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

(Redrafted) Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

Article 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 7 [8], 1945
Top secret

War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27) While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266, the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:

1. Protection of Geneva Convention which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.

2. Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.

3. Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.

4. Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.

5. Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.

(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.

[NormanStewart]

JCS to the President

Yalta, 6 February 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin’s approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.

(Sec JCS)

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Chief of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army

Yalta, 7 February 1945
Top secret

My Dear General Antonov: The U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P.M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.

For the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, USN

[NormanStewart]

The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army to the President’s Chief of Staff

Crimea, 7 February 1945
Top secret

[TRANSLATION]

Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the eighth of February at three o’clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.

I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.

Yours very respectfully,
ANTONOV
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
General of the Army