Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall		Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith		Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke		General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick		Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull		General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson		Air Marshal Robb
Major General Hull		Major General Laycock
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
	Secretariat*
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob
Captain Graves		Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
		Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 184th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale – a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.

b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841 upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:

1. Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor

2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.

Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/8)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested the substitution of the word “some” for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6d, he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.

General Marshall suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5b.

Turning to CCS 746/8, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/10 subject to the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.

b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of CCS 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following: “Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”

c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe

Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional airpower would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to strengthen the northern thrust.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.

General Marshall pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States’ P-47s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter-ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of CCS 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.

General Marshall said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.

General Kuter said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.

General Marshall said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.

Sir Alan Brooke felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.

Field Marshal Alexander said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in CCS 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:

5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U-Boat Threat

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6b of the CCS 184th Meeting.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774/3).

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph 6h of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776).

General Marshall explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.

General Somervell pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U.S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.

Interim Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that paragraph 6h of CCS 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of CCS 746/10 was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6h of the interim report along the lines indicated in CCS 775.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.

[NormanStewart]

JCS to the President

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
Nr: No #.

Top Secret memorandum for the President.

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective governments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of government at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U.S.-U.K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.

The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples. At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.

Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
CCS 746/7

After considering CCS 746/6 the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the overall objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in CCS 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.

A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in estimates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander’s minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U.S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.

They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so overriding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.

Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:

Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:

A. First priority to

1. Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.

2. Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.

3. Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war-making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.

D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.

E. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.

F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.

G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.

H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 1, 1945
Secret
U.S. urgent

To the Secretary of State from Clayton.

Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.

Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther, Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.

Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.

It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.

Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 775

Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2, paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.

For existing h. substitute the following:

h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger		Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Secretary Eden
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 6:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter		Field Marshal Wilson
		General Ismay
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

The Meeting had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 776/1).

The President expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions.

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.

a. Paragraph 6h
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be included in this paragraph.

General Marshall said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff raised a new question which involved placing supplies for liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to accept.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had had less than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to import into Great Britain in 1945.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the wording of the proposed basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting.

The Prime Minister, referring to paragraph 6f, thought that great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles.

Admiral King said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive the supplies.

b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)
The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected.

c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that complete agreement had been reached on this question.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of having plenty of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, so that tired divisions could be replaced.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front.

The Prime Minister inquired what action had been taken on SCAF 180.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower’s proposed operations, and two further telegrams had been received from the latter. SCAF 180 should be read in the light of these additional explanations and telegrams.

The Prime Minister questioned the meaning of the words “to close the Rhine” which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report.

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General Eisenhower’s signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, or closing up to, the Rhine.

d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)
The President inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that there should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based government.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix “A” to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that he expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn. There were special reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible.

In reply to an inquiry by the President, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed.

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, Sir Charles Portal explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation.

The Prime Minister agreed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety.

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians.

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, the Prime Minister said that he presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely reserved.

The President agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the phrase as used in the report applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia.

The War Against Japan

e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (paragraphs 18 and 19)
The Prime Minister said that the main object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be.

Sir Alan Brooke referred to Appendix “C” of the report, which contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca.

The Prime Minister hoped there would be time to review this matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way which the British had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the Pacific.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review the matter.

The Prime Minister inquired whether paragraph 18 meant that there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et cetera.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give them support.

The President said that three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor.

General Marshall pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably changed. In the first place, certain well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be in existence.

The Prime Minister said that it now appeared that the American and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the operations there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the facilities for sending equipment and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities certainly could not support British troops as well.

General Marshall agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated – one arm of the pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by Admiral Mountbatten’s forces much easier. He felt that it was important that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. It might even be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as to what forces he could count on for his operations.

The Prime Minister repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China, he would certainly be prepared to consider it.

Admiral Leahy said that all the transportation available was fully required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China.

General Marshall agreed, and said that he did not think it would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,” which contained an outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific, the Prime Minister inquired whether it had been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the German war.

General Marshall said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on operations in this area.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered later.

The President agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and Sir Alan Brooke explained that arrangements were being made to keep all the accommodations available at Malta so that the conference could be resumed there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the return journey would be desirable.

The Meeting then adjourned.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger		Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Byrnes
Fleet Admiral Leahy

[NormanStewart]

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 2, 1945

0000: In Mediterranean Sea, enroute Malta from Gibraltar, steaming on various courses and at various speeds while conforming to our prescribed routing.

0610: We sighted the island of Sicily, bearing 055, distant 50 miles.

0616: We sighted the islands of Goza and Malta, bearing 115, distant 32 miles.

0935: We passed through the submarine net gate and entered Grand Harbor, Valetta, Malta. The President was on deck as we entered port. From the very large crowd evident, it appeared that all Malta was out to greet him. Both sides of the channel were lined with people of Malta.

1001: The Quincy moored, starboard side to, at Berth 9 in Grand Harbor, Valetta. The USS Memphis (light cruiser and flagship of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander Eighth Fleet) was present in Malta. Prime Minister Churchill and his party were at Grand Harbor and witnessed our arrival from the deck of the HMS Sirius (light cruiser), moored across the channel from where the Quincy tied up.

Total distance steamed, Newport News to Malta, 4883 miles.

Colonel Park and the following listed members of our advance party were awaiting us on the dock at Grand Harbor and joined us as soon as the Quincy had been moored: Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Holmes, Mr. Wood and Mr. O’Driscoll.

A few days before our arrival at Malta we began to receive disconcerting messages from the Prime Minister about the difficulties of reaching Yalta and the unhealthy living conditions there. The first gun came from Mr. Hopkins who stated, “He (the Prime Minister) says that if we had spent ten years on research we could not have found a worse place in the world than Yalta… He claims it is good for typhus and deadly lice which thrive in those parts.” This was followed by other messages from the Prime Minister, who reported the drive from the airfield at Saki to Yalta as being six hours, instead of two hours as originally reported by Mr. Harriman; and that one of his people had reported the mountain part of the drive as frightening and at times impassable, and the health conditions as wholly unsanitary, as the Germans had left all buildings infested with vermin. It was, therefore, a great relief upon arriving at Malta to find from Mr. Harriman and members of our advance party (headed by Colonel Park) that although we would face a difficult drive after landing at the airport at Saki, it would not be too tiring if completed during daylight and if we had clear weather. We were also informed that the medical officers of the USS Catoctin had accomplished a very effective job of debugging at Yalta.

1020: Secretary of State Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Hopkins came on board the Quincy to confer with the President. Sergeant Robert Hopkins came on board with his father, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. Sergeant Hopkins had joined his father at Paris.

1042: His Excellency, the Governor-General of Malta (Lieutenant General Sir Edmond Schreiber) came on board the Quincy and called on the President. The President was on deck (port side, first superstructure deck) at the time, enjoying the warm sun. He received all his distinguished guests there during the forenoon.

1052: Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, came on board and called on the President.

1107: General of the Army George C. Marshall came on board and called on the President. A short time later Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King called and he and Fleet Admiral Leahy joined the President and General Marshall in a conference.

1143: Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe) and Vice Admiral Hewitt came on board and called on the President.

1148: Prime Minister Churchill and his daughter, Section Officer Sarah Oliver (WAAF), came on board the Quincy and called on the President.

1155: The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, came on board and called on the President.

1300: The President entertained at lunch in his quarters aboard the Quincy. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

1415: The Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber and Miss Schreiber came on board and called on the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

1430: Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, USN (Ret.), Director of War Shipping Administration, came on board and called on the President.

1443: The President, the Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber, Miss Schreiber, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger left the ship for a 30-mile auto drive about the Island of Malta. They visited the countryside and the towns of Medina, Chajn Tuffieha and Valetta. The Prime Minister left the ship at the same time but did not accompany the President on the drive. The President rode in the car with the Governor-General, while the ladies followed in a second car. During the course of the drive Palace Square in Valetta was visited and the President was shown the stone replica of the scroll that he presented to the people of Malta on his previous visit, December 8, 1943. The replica is mounted in the side of the Palace building, near the main entrance.

To those of us who had been with the President on his previous visit, the many signs of rebuilding were most evident all about the island.

The weather was delightful. The average temperature was 58.

1625: The President and Mrs. Boettiger returned to the ship from their drive.

1630: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff came on board and the President met with them in his quarters. Present were: Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King and Major General L. S. Kuter (representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold who was ill and did not attend this conference), and the President.

1800: The Prime Minister, accompanied by the members of the British Staff, came on board. The President then met with the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and British) in his cabin. Present were: The President, the Prime Minister, Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, Major General Kuter, Field Marshal H. Maitland Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. B. Cunningham, General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, and Major General Jacob. Major Randolph Churchill came on board with his father but did not attend the meeting. The meeting adjourned at 1850. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been in conference at Malta for several days prior to our arrival and this was the first plenary meeting with the President and the Prime Minister.

2000: The President was host at dinner in his quarters. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

2215: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and Mrs. Oliver left the ship.

2230: Lieutenant (jg) A. L. Conrad, USNR, special courier, left the ship with White House mail to proceed to Washington via air transportation.

2300: The President and members of his party left the Quincy by automobile for the Luqa Airfield, Malta. On arrival at the airfield, they embarked in assigned aircraft to await scheduled departure times. The entire British and American delegations to the Conference at Yalta were on the move and departed from Malta during the night. This involved approximately 700 people, so that the Luqa airport was a very busy place throughout the night. Commencing at about 2330, huge planes took off at about 10-minute intervals all night long. The Air Transport Command aircraft specially fitted for the President’s use was used by the President for all flights on this cruise. It has private quarters for the President and an elevator which lowers to ground level to facilitate his embarking and disembarking.

The President turned in at once as his plane was not scheduled to take off until 0330 tomorrow.

2330: Colonel Park, Commander Clark, Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Chief Warrant Officer Cornelius, departed Malta for Saki, USSR. They were embarked in the State Department plane.

2345: The special cargo aircraft transporting our heavy baggage and freight departed Malta for Saki. Embarked were Agents Dorsey and Williams and Messmen Estrada, Calinao, Floresca and Sarate. Air Transport Command planes were used exclusively by the American delegation.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (February 3, 1945)

Neuer Riesenbetrug am deutschen Volk geplant

Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill wollen Wilson-Schwindel übertrumpfen

vb. Berlin, 2. Februar – Seit einem halben Jahr planen die Feindmächte eine Neuauflage des Teheraner Dreiertreffens. Nunmehr sind Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill an einem geheimgehaltenen Ort zu einer solchen Konferenz zusammengetreten.

Alle Meldungen der feindlichen Presse stimmen darin überein, dass die drei Hauptkriegsschuldigen sich vor allem mit Deutschland beschäftigen wollen, und dass dabei wieder der alte Plan hervorgeholt worden ist, den berüchtigten Wilson-Betrug von 1918 zu wiederholen und das deutsche Volk durch plumpe Agitationskniffe über die tatsächlichen Kriegsziele der drei großen Räuber hinwegzutäuschen.

Obwohl sie selbst unablässig von der „unbedingten Kapitulation“ sprechen und die Zerstückelung des Reiches sowie eine weitgehende Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes zu offiziellen Kriegszielen erhoben haben, wollen sie es trotzdem wagen, einen solchen Versuch zur Zermürbung des deutschen Kampfwillens zu unternehmen, weil sie erkennen müssen, dass sie den Krieg auf dem Schlachtfeld nicht gewinnen können.

Wer einen solchen Betrug ins Auge fasst, gesteht damit ein, dass er mit seinem Latein völlig zu Ende ist. Ein Teil des deutschen Volkes hat sich 1918 durch das 14-Punkte-Programm Wilsons in seinem Kampfgeist erschüttern lassen und geglaubt, dass man tatsächlich nach der Niederlegung der Waffen einen erträglichen Frieden erhalten werde. Ausdrücklich hatten sich alle Alliierte durch die Note vom 5. November 1918 dazu verpflichtet, Frieden auf der Grundlage der 14 Punkte zu schließen. Nicht ein einziger dieser Punkte ist eingehalten worden, nachdem Deutschland kapituliert hatte. Man hat rein deutsche Gebiete vom Reichskörper losgerissen, ungeheure Tribute gefordert und das Versailler Diktat darauf abgestellt, das deutsche Volk bis aufs Blut zu demütigen und sein Leben zu vergiften.

Diesem Betrug folgte ein zweiter. Vor der Unterzeichnung des Diktats wurde den deutschen Unterhändlern von englischen und amerikanischen Mittelsmännern gesagt, sie sollten ruhig unterschreiben, weil dafür Sorge getragen würde, die Durchführung des Diktats verständnisvoll zu handhaben und seine schlimmsten Bedingungen zu revidieren.

Nichts von alledem ist geschehen! Das Versailler Diktat ist auf das brutalste durchgeführt worden und es gibt zahlreiche Fälle, in denen über seine Bestimmungen noch weit hinausgegangen worden ist deutsche Soldaten, die heldenmütig für ihr Volk gekämpft hatten, mussten als „Kriegsverbrecher“ von deutschen Gerichten verurteilt werden. Deutschland wurde völlig wehrlos gemacht, seine Währung künstlich zerstört, seine Wirtschaft ruiniert und zur Beute ausländischer, meist jüdischer Schieber, gemacht. Das war eine Bilanz, die selbst jene feigen Verräternaturen belehrte die bei der Unterzeichnung des Diktats gemeint hatten, es werde „alles nicht so schlimm kommen.“

1918 war das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker proklamiert worden, aber es galt nicht für die Deutschen. Millionen von ihnen kamen unter Fremdherrschaft, andere Millionen wurden zu einem kleinstaatlichen Hungersdasein in dem österreichischen Reststaat verurteilt. 40 Millionen Franzosen vermaßen sich, die Vorherrschaft auf einem Kontinent auszuüben, dessen 80 Millionen starkes deutsches Volk zu dauernder Nichtigkeit verurteilt werden sollte.

Betrug reihte sich also an Betrug, und es war nur selbstverständlich, dass sich die „Sieger“ von 1919 niemals an das Abrüstungsversprechen von Versailles hielten, das sie nach erfolgter deutscher Entwaffnung erfüllen sollten. Als nach endlosen Verhandlungen, im Jahre 1933 eine Klärung erfolgte, ergab sich als Herzenswunsch der alten Ententegenossen folgendes Bild:

Sie selbst wollten gerüstet bleiben und Deutschland sollte weiter verboten sein, eine wirksame Landesverteidigung aufzubauen. Deutschland, so forderten sie, müsse erst eine längere „Bewährungsfrist“ durchmachen, ehe es sich einige moderne Waffen zulegen dürfe.

Als Wilson im Jänner 1918 die 14 Punkte verkündet hatte, besaßen die anderen Alliierten noch kein festes Kriegszielprogramm, obwohl sie in mehreren Geheimabkommen weitgehende Raubpläne verfolgten. Diesmal aber liegen die Dinge ganz anders.

Ihr Programm: Vernichtung

Die Bolschewisten, die Amerikaner und die Briten mögen in vielen Punkten verschiedene Anschauungen vertreten, soweit sich ihre Weltherrschaftsansprüche überschneiden, aber in einem sind sie sich völlig einig: in einem abgrundtiefen und vernichtungswütigen Hass gegen das deutsche Volk, der von den jüdischen Drahtziehern eifrig geschürt wird, in dem Willen, dass aus diesem Krieg kein Deutschland mehr hervorgehen dürfe, das irgendwann noch mehr bedeuten könne, als ein halbkoloniales Anhängsel dieser oder jener Weltmacht, ob sie nun im Zeichen von Hammer und Sichel steht oder als Ausbeutungsobjekt der Wall Street ausgeliefert ist – in beiden Fällen dem triumphierenden Judentum zum Fraß vorgeworfen.

Es ist völlig gleichgültig, in welchen Abschattierungen die Absicht, Deutschland auszutilgen, sich bekundet, wie weit der Schlächterwahn Oberwiegt oder die Gier nach auszubeutenden Arbeitssklaven, oder welche Daseinsformen dieser oder Jener Partner einem zerbrochenen und zerfetzten Deutschland aufzwingen möchte. Im Endergebnis kommt überall das gleiche heraus: Zerstören, ausmorden, ausplündern. versklaven und entehren!

Es ist wohl beispiellos in der gesamten Geschichte, dass unter solchen Umständen überhaupt daran gedacht wird, den alten Betrug von 1918 wieder aufzuwärmen. Aber tatsächlich geht man schon seit der ersten Konferenz in Quebec im August 1943 mit diesem Gedanken um und hat ihn nur deshalb noch nicht in die Wirklichkeit umgesetzt, weil man durch militärische Teilerfolge in dem Wahn bestärkt wurde, man könne das Reich militärisch in die Knie zwingen. Allen Ernstes erwartete man damals, nach Italien werde auch Deutschland kapitulieren und es würde sich in Berlin genau wiederholen, was sich in Rom ereignet hatte.

Das deutsche Volk ist aber entgegen allen Hoffnungen seiner Feinde in den schweren Wechselfällen der letzten beiden Jahre nur noch härter und noch entschlossener geworden, sich in diesem Kampf auf Leben und Tod siegreich durchzusetzen und sein Lebensrecht für alle Zeiten zu sichern. Es war eine besonders bittere Enttäuschung für die Kriegsverbrecher in Moskau, Washington und London, dass der 20. Juli 1944 zu einem völlig anderen Ergebnis führte, als sie sich das erträumt hatten. Und ebenso haben die massierten Stürme auf unsere Fronten im Westen und Osten wohl Gelände gewinnen können, den deutschen Kampfwillen aber zu keiner Zeit geschwächt, sondern in Stunden sichtbarer Gefahr so sichtbar gesteigert, dass man draußen an einer Erkenntnis nicht vorbeikommt:

Das deutsche Volk kapituliert niemals

Sie möchten sich daher an uns mit einem Aufruf wenden, diese drei, die jetzt irgendwo zusammenhocken und darüber brüten, ob sich der deutsche Block nicht doch von innen hersprengen ließe, wenn der Druck von außen her ein solches Ergebnis nicht verspreche.

Roosevelt und Churchill haben es zuerst im August 1941 mit der Atlantik-Charta versucht, in einer Zeit, da das äußere Bild des Krieges keineswegs günstig für die Briten und Bolschewisten war. Inzwischen ist dieses Papier längst bis zur Unkenntlichkeit vergilbt und in den Washingtoner Archiven unauffindbar verkramt worden. Das war nur selbstverständlich, denn seine Unterzeichner haben nie ernstlich daran gedacht, der Welt einen Frieden £u geben, der diesen Namen wirklich verdient. Was sie 1919 nicht zustandebrachten, können sie heute natürlich erst recht nicht leisten. Was ihnen im eigenen Land nicht gelingt, können sie erst recht der Welt nicht bringen.

Zwei Jahre später überwog in Teheran bereits die reine Gewaltpolitik Stalinscher Prägung und Churchill und Roosevelt atmeten erleichtert auf, dass sie auf diese Weise von ihren verlogenen Deklamationen auf dem Atlantik loskamen. Inzwischen ist alles sehr viel klarer und deutlicher hervorgetreten: Die Völker Europas wurden unzweideutig an die Sowjets verschachert, England und Amerika haben über ihr Schicksal nichts mehr mitzureden und müssen sich mit der Rolle eines Zutreibers für Moskau begnügen, wofür sie ein Trinkgeld in Gestalt umfangreicher bolschewistischer Warenbestellungen nach dem Kriege erwarten. Am Rande dieser Konferenz bewegt sich der Pariser Filialleiter des Kremls, der seine Befehle von Stalin schon erhalten hat, zugleich mit dem Versprechen, dass die Gaullisten ihren Hass gegen Deutschland zur Genüge austoben dürften.

De Gaulles Außenminister hat schon bei der Rückkehr aus Moskau klipp und klar gesagt, dass die Sowjets Frankreich das Rheinland und Westfalen zuschanzen wollten, wie sie dem Lubliner Polensowjet den größten Teil Ostdeutschlands zugesprochen haben. Hier wie dort hat Churchill seinen Segen bereits erteilt, und Roosevelt wird zweifellos das gleiche tun. Von dieser Basis aus also möchte man das deutsche Volk anreden. Welche Worte man wählen wird, wird sich zeigen, wahrheitsgemäß müsste man ungefähr folgendes sagen:

Legt die Waffen nieder, damit wir euch fressen können! Tretet die Hälfte eures Volksbodens ab, dann dürft ihr auch damit rechnen, dass nur die Hälfte von euch massakriert wird und die andere Hälfte ihr Dasein in Sklaverei fristen darf. Am besten erreicht ihr das dadurch, dass ihr eure Einigkeit aufgebt, denn niemals wart ihr schwächer und missachteter als in den Zeiten der Zersplitterung und Uneinigkeit. Lasst euch durch britische Gouvernanten und amerikanische Soldateska umerziehen, damit ihr recht schnell ein Volk von erbärmlichen Duckmäusern werdet, das nicht mehr gegen den Stachel zu lecken wagt.

So etwa müsste dieser Aufruf lauten, wenn er einigermaßen der Wahrheit entspräche. Sollte man aber wieder zur Wilson-Tonart übergehen, so hieße das dem deutschen Volk eine politische Instinktlosigkeit unterstellen, wie sie möglicherweise Briten und Amerikaner gegenüber den Sowjets besitzen, die aber sonst wohl auf dem ganzen Erdball nirgendwo angetroffen werden kann.

Mit dem Betrug von 1919 im Gedächtnis und all die wahnwitzigen Vernichtungspläne, vor Augen, die als derartige Vernichtungsprogramme vorgelegt werden, lässt sich das deutsche Volk nicht betrügen. Unter tatkräftiger Führung ist es vor zwölf Jahren mit dem größten Erfolg daran gegangen, Deutschland aus hoffnungslosem Verfall emporzureißen und das matte Herz Europas wieder zum Schlagen zu bringen. Es hat auf allen Gebieten Beispielhaftes geleistet, ist mit sozialen Fragen fertig geworden, deren Tragweite in England und Amerika heute noch nicht einmal begriffen wird. Es hat den Krieg mit gesundem politischem Sinn und einem. Opfermut ohnegleichen und mit heldenhafter Tapferkeit durchgestanden und ist in klarer Erkenntnis seiner Aufgaben und Ziele unbeugsam entschlossen, durch alle Prüfungen hindurch den Sieg zu erringen.

Dumm und unverschämt

Ein solches Volk von außen her anreden zu wollen, ist nicht nur dumm, sondern von einer so plumpen Unverschämtheit, dass dahinter der vorwärtspeitschende Zwang zum Handeln sichtbar wird. Zu einem solchen schamlosen Hausieren, zu einem derartigen kindischen Versuch, in einem großen Volk kleine Gefühle erwecken zu wollen, greift nur der, der es dringend nötig hat.

Wir kennen den Vernichtungswillen des Feindes, aber wir wissen ebenso gut, dass auch bei ihm nur mit Wasser gekocht wird. Wir kennen die Grenzen seiner Macht und seiner Leistungskraft und sind uns bewusst, dass hier schon weithin ein Höchstmaß erreicht ist, das nicht mehr übersteigert werden kann. So begreifen wir sehr wohl, dass es ihm dringend darum zu tun ist, weitere Blutopfer zu sparen, die fortschreitende Zerrüttung des eigenen nationalen Gefüges aufzuhalten und möglichst schnell zu einem Frieden zu kommen, ehe sich die Fragwürdigkeit des eigenen politischen Daseins allzu deutlich erweist.

In dieser Lage sollten selbst jene drei, mögen sie in Moskau sitzen oder sonstwo, begreifen, dass sie sich mit ihren Plänen, soweit sie das deutsche Volk betreffen, nur lächerlich machen werden. Was sie in Wirklichkeit zu bieten haben, wissen wir genau: Genickschüsse, Fesseln, Hunger, Not und Seuchen. Mögen sie ruhig glauben, dass sie einen Keil zwischen Führung und Volk treiben könnten, indem sie ein paar belanglose Floskeln zu Papier bringen, sie dürfen gewiss sein, dass sie damit ihren früheren Enttäuschungen die allergrimmigste hinzufügen werden und dass ihnen auch mit der Waffe die Antwort zuteilwerden wird, die dieser Herausforderung entspricht.

Nur mit Verachtung wird das deutsche Volk dieses plumpe Manöver zur Kenntnis nehmen und daraus den Schluss ziehen, dass der Gegner, der zu solchen schäbigen Mitteln greift, selbst nicht mehr an seine Sache glaubt. Umso fanatischer und zielbewusster werden wir für Leben und Freiheit welterkämpfen, und es wird sich dann zeigen, ob wir es am Kriegsende auf der Gegenseite noch mit jenen drei zu tun haben, die ihre Völker und die ganze Erde in ein Meer von Blut und Brand gestürzt haben, und deren Verbrechen Sühne fordert, wenn es noch eine höhere Gerechtigkeit gibt.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 3, 1945)

‘Big Three’ reported studying armistice terms for Nazis

South Russia suggested as meeting place for Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin

LONDON, England (UP) – President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph Stalin were believed studying armistice terms for Germany today at their “Big Three” conference.

There were a number of signs that the long-awaited meeting had finally begun, with the approval of terms for a defeated Reich the most urgent item on the agenda.

Though official secrecy cloaked the site of the meeting, unconfirmed reports placed it somewhere in southern Russia.

A Tokyo broadcast, however, said the three Allied leaders were “reportedly” in session in Cairo.

The Jap-controlled Singapore radio guessed the meeting was being held at a “Romanian Black Sea port.”

The European Advisory Commission was understood to have drafted armistice terms for Germany for final approval of Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Washington sources said the terms were put in textual form and initialed by the commission some weeks ago.

The nature of the terms was kept secret. As in the case of Italy, they probably will not be published immediately, if at all.

While there was no indication of impending German collapse, it was believed the “Big Three” wished to be prepared in the event that the Germans decide to capitulate when the Red Army reaches Berlin.

The lightning-like Soviet drive into eastern Germany gave the armistice question precedence over pressing political problems affecting Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.

The German press saw the meeting as a prelude to an Allied propaganda campaign to break Germany’s morale and hasten her surrender. Headlines in Berlin newspapers warned the German people against listening to surrender demands.

Adolf Hitler’s newspaper Voelkischer Beobachter carried a banner headline asserting that a “gigantic deceit is planned,” while the Nachtausgabe saw a “new big humbug maneuver” in the making.

[NormanStewart]

Editorial: Stalin, Junkers and peace

The most important issue before the Big Three meeting is security through international organization versus security through balance of power. The United States wants the former. Russia has been acting for the latter. Britain goes along with Russia one minute, and the next yearns for better protection than her old system.

At the heart of the problem, of course, is Germany. there will be no enduring peace after Nazi defeat if German militarism can revive, as after World War I. Hence the necessity of making German demilitarization realty effective this time, and of creating healthy conditions under which the European people – including the Germans – will develop toward self-rule rather than another frustrate brand of totalitarianism.

At the Big Three meeting President Roosevelt will have two aces. One is the superior economic, financial, naval and airpower of the United States in the post-war world. The other is the willingness of the United States – including the Republicans, as represented by Sen. Vandenberg – to enter a peacetime military alliance to enforce Axis demilitarization, provided Russia and Britain will accept a genuine international organization instead of their balance of power system.

Marshal Stalin, however, also has aces. He has the biggest land power of the world in the strategic center of the Euro-Asian continents. In Eastern Europe, he has established a solid belt of puppet governments from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, with the exception of Greece – if that is an exception in the end. In Western Europe he has a separate post-war alliance with France.

Moreover, Stalin has a “Free Germany Committee” of Junker marshals and generals ready to rule the Reich after Nazi defeat, if he so decides – as he has used the Hungarian generals for his regime in that country. This would be the opposite of demilitarization; it would perpetuate the caste which always has been the heart and brain of German militarism. As long ago as Nov. 6, 1942, Stalin state publicly:

It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is impossible in regard to Germany, ass it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future.

Stalin’s diplomatic achievement in Europe to date is equaled only by his military success, which grows by the hour. How is Russia’s vast power to be used? We assume Stalin’s purpose is Russian security and prosperity

But we question the ability of Stalin or any other leader, no matter how powerful his nation, to obtain world peace through this sphere of influence system – much less to build a peaceful or a free Germany around the Junkers militarists. The Junkers always will find some Hitlerian demagog as a partner; and they not only will destroy world peace again, but also, if necessary, betray their Russian friends as they did in 1941. Unless, that is, the Allies this time wipe out German militarism completely along with Nazism, as they are pledged to do.

So, we hope that President Roosevelt in this meeting can persuade Stalin that an international security organization which makes the settlements and enforces them – in Germany and Eastern Europe as elsewhere – is a better bet in the long run for Russia than settlements dictated by the Kremlin and dependent on puppets. Secretary of State Hull persuaded him of that at the Moscow conference, when Stalin promised to give up his one-man settlements and his “Free Germany Committee” in favor of Big Three cooperation in a free international organization.

But this time the agreement must last.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 3, 1945)

Log of the Trip

Saturday, February 3, 1945

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1210: The President’s plane (#1), escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.

At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.

The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.

Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.

We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Campion, Savage and Griffith, members of our advance party.

1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President’s plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing the Star-Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.

1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our caravan were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.

The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West. We saw few, if any, trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there – gutted-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.

From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the “Route Romanoff” to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea – 5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.

1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.

1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.

The Prime Minister’s party proceeded separately from the President’s and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.

Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Cornelius had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our map room and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the Catoctin.

2100: Lieutenant Bogue, who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last-minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our flight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.

The U.S. minesweepers Pinnacle and Implicit were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary Catoctin, the liberty ship William Blount and the minesweepers Incessant and Incredible were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 80 miles to the southwest. The Soviet authorities had declined to permit the Catoctin or the William Blount to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.

Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the Catoctin which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced “wire trouble” between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.

Yalta
Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.

Livadia Palace
The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.

After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President’s bedroom.

The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanitoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Backus, MC-V(S), USNR, and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), USNR, (both from the USS Catoctin) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.

The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect Krasnov. It stands on the site of the former palace which, except for the church, had been entirely demolished. Situated more than 150 feet above the sea, it commands a striking panorama of the mountains and the sea to the east and north. Wings extend from the rear of the main building to form two courts, one modeled after the Convent Court of St. Mark (Florence, Italy), and the other is of Moorish design.

The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by Nicholas and his son, Alexi, for living quarters. The left wing, facing the sea, contained the Czar’s study and bedroom. The room used as the President’s private dining room was formerly a billiard room. The large room used as the main conference room was the ballroom-banquet hall.

The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four daughters. The room occupied by General Marshall was formerly the Imperial bedroom and that used by Admiral King was the Czarina’s boudoir. The second-floor conference hall was formerly a private reception room of the Czarina. The second-floor dining room was a private sitting room used only by the Czar’s family.

The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees. There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought there from all over the world by Count Potocki and the Romanov family during the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 4, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
General of the Army Marshall		Brigadier General Lindsay
Fleet Admiral King		Brigadier General Bessell
Major General Kuter		Brigadier General Everest
Lieutenant General Somervell		Commodore Burrough
Vice Admiral Cooke		Colonel Peck
Major General Deane		Colonel Ritchie
Major General Bull		Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull		Colonel Cary
Major General Wood
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Olsen		Commander Clark
Brigadier General Roberts
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General McFarland
	Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Yalta, February 4, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Agenda for Tripartite Discussions at Argonaut (JCS 1176/9, JCS 1227/3 and JCS Info. Memo 359)

Admiral Leahy said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.

Admiral Cooke explained that the Joint Staff Planners and the members of the U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up to date all matters dealing with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of JCS 1176/9 and JCS 1227/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:

1. coordination with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;
2. negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.

The first item involved British, U.S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U.S. and the USSR. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U.S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.

The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.

The agenda items listed in Appendix “A” in JCS 1227/3 have been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer has been received from the Soviets.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Deane expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite session. The Russian military staff would be adequately represented at such a meeting and having already received the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they would be prepared to discuss them.

General Marshall said it was important to keep the consideration of military matters alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff a rather free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U.S. staffs. Further, it was felt by the Planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix “A” and “B” of JCS 1227/3.

Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.

Admiral King emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

Admiral Leahy said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be briefed on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions.

---

JCS to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army

Yalta, 3 February 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for General Antonov

It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the President with his advisers, 10:30 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
The President
Fleet Admiral Leahy
General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
Major General Kuter
Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Hiss
Secretary
Brigadier General McFarland

JCS Minutes

February 4, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Top secret

Admiral Leahy said there were two matters which the Chiefs of Staff considered it desirable to have settled at the tripartite meeting scheduled for 1700 today. The first was to get Marshal Stalin to instruct the Red General Staff to participate in full, free and frank discussions with the U.S. and British Staffs. It was also desirable to get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander and the Soviet General Staff by having them deal with each other directly through the Heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow.

General Marshall said that the establishment of direct liaison for day-to-day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the Russians had raised to the presence of General Burrows on the proposed tripartite liaison committee and to the fear that General Eisenhower would become involved in the settlement of matters which would be more appropriate for consideration on a higher level.

Mr. Harriman said with reference to discussions between the Russian and Allied staffs that Marshal Stalin’s formal approval of the discussions would be necessary before it would be possible to get any information of value from the Russian General Staff.

At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal Stalin to agree to the proposed method of liaison through the Military Mission in Moscow was presented to the President, signed by him and dispatched at once to the Prime Minister.

The President considered the agendas contained in Appendices “A” and “B” of JCS 1227/3.

In answer to the President’s question with reference to item e, General Marshall explained that Milepost requirements and progress was not a matter for discussion with the British but with the Russians only.

In reply to the President’s question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, General Marshall said that the British had not raised this point. He thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in Thailand.

The President asked if any material and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.

General Marshall replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.

General Marshall then read to the President a telegraphic report summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on the map.

The President stated any action in Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U.S. action which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long as it did not involve any alignments with the French.

Mr. Stettinius informed the President that there were seven major topics which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The first was the question of the post-war international organization. The matter of immediate interest was the question of who was to be invited to attend the next conference on this subject and where the conference was to be held. He indicated a number of locations which would be suitable and stated that he had options on all of the desirable places in the United States if this country should be selected as the site.

The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.

The President indicated that he preferred periodic meetings between Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to the creation of a formal commission.

The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite conference. The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.

The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U.S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.

The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in Iran in June.

The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.

Mr. Stettinius stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for the President’s information.

Mr. Harriman stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the status quo in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Dairen.

The President said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the status quo in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions.

At this point Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hiss entered the meeting to discuss the papers prepared by the Department of State for the President.

[NormanStewart]

The Secretary of State to the President

Malta, February 2, 1945

Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for the President

1. International Organization
   We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to announce immediately calling of general United Nations Conference.

   (Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof are available if you wish to hand them to Churchill and Stalin.)

   Argumentation: Our proposal safeguards unity of the great powers so far as is possible by any formula – enforcement action will require unanimous vote – only with respect to discussion will a party to a dispute not be able to vote. Latin American and other small powers will be disillusioned if discussion can be vetoed.

   NOTE: If the voting issue is settled, additional points would have to be agreed to before a United Nations Conference could be called: International Trusteeships, France as fifth sponsoring power, list of nations to be invited, date of conference and its being held in United States, invitations to be by United States on behalf of other four sponsoring powers, United States to consult China and France on behalf of Britain and Russia, form of announcement of agreement on International Organization matters (we have available the necessary papers on these points).

2. Adoption of Emergency European High Commission
   (Copies of draft text of declaration and of accompanying protocol are available if you wish to hand them to Stalin and Churchill.)

   Argumentation: Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.

3. Treatment of Germany
   (a) Final agreement should be reached with respect to control machinery and zones of occupation. Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier agreement on surrender terms.

   (b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has been prepared and is available.

   (c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with neighboring states. Transfers should be carried out gradually under international supervision.

   (d) Long range economic policies: We should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve these aims.

4. Poland
   (a) Boundaries: We favor the Curzon line in the north and center and, in the south, the eastern line of Lwow Province, which would correspond generally with one of the frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council. Transfer of German territory to be limited to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia.

   (b) We should be prepared to assist in the formation of a new representative interim government pledged to free elections when conditions permit. We should urge inclusion in a provisional government of Mikolajczyk (Peasant Party is most important in Poland) and other moderate Poles abroad. We should not agree to recognize the Lublin “government” in its present form.

5. Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary
   Our representatives must be assured of: (a) freedom of movement, and (b) consultation before decisions are made by the Control Commissions.

6. Iran
   We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for oil concessions in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops.

7. China
   We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.

   Argumentation: Cooperation between the two groups will expedite conclusion of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Yalta, February 4, 1945

2/4 Byrnes
Jebb

Jebb joined us

Jebb said: Have paper on Dep. Areas – which has been cleared thru Dominions & is now being considered by War Cabinet

He then read rapidly a paper containing following points

1. Goal is Int. collabor, to promote well-being of colonial peoples by:
   (a) develop self govt
   (b) social & econ devel.
   (c) ?

2. Majority of problems are not in dep. areas themselves

3. … need something broader & more flexible than mandates

4. Proposal – regional bodies

5. Full publicity re colonial admn – desire uniformity of admn.

Proposal: Regional bodies could make recommends. to individual govts or gen. decl.

Eur H Com.

(a) Jebb said might continue as regional body
(b) Wants it also to make provisional demarcations
(c) Mix with quarterly meetings to be held at its seat.

Put temporary nature into Protocol

To assist, where conditions require, in the maintenance of internal order, such assistance to include where other means fail the joint use of force.

to take, upon the unanimous decision of the Commission, action designed to accomplish the following aims:

When the emergency which has given rise to action by the Commission in any country has terminated the Commission will terminate

Justice Byrnes 2:15

(Leahy earlier meeting: get US troops out of Eur)

Pres. fears taking internal rep.

Pres. doesn’t like “big” organ.

Mr. B doesn’t like indep. autb. of U.S. Commissioner Would prefer decl. with auth. to Ambassadors to act as specified in protocol. Ambs. are appointed with consent of Pres. & are under control of Sec.

Mr. B fears any agency would perpetuate itself

Redraft as mere decl. – ad hoc commission for any country

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States		Soviet Union
President Roosevelt		Marshal Stalin
Mr. Bohlen		Foreign Commissar Molotov
		Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Yalta, February 4, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subject: GENERAL DISCUSSION

After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for his comfort and convenience, the President said that the military situation was considerably improved since they had last met.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was certainly true, and that the Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.

The President replied that he had made a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get to Manila.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.

There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics of the Crimea.

The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest bloodshed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

The President agreed with this.

Marshal Stalin then inquired about the military situation on the Western Front.

The President replied that General Marshall, at the five o’clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western Front would take place in March.

Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at this news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern Front at the five o’clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia basin.

The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.

Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute military defeat.

The President inquired whether the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.

Marshal Stalin replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the Eastern front.

The President said that one of the difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt once he reached the Rhine, he would be able to cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the north sector in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Mainz.

The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.

Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.

The President then described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

Marshal Stalin replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western Front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.

The President replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.

Marshal Stalin said that was good insofar as it would help the American armies but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.

The President said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow – there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.

The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.

The President then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of [have] preferred to have the northwest zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone. Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be considered further here at Yalta.

As it was then three minutes to five, the President suggested that they proceed to the conference room where the military staffs were gathered.

[NormanStewart]

First plenary meeting, February 4, 1945, 5:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Foreign Secretary Eden
General of the Army Marshall	Field Marshal Brooke	General of the Army Antonov
	Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Major General Kuter	Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Deane		Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Brigadier General Mc-Farland	Field Marshal Alexander	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	General Ismay	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	Mr. Gusev
		Mr. Maisky
		Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Yalta, February 4, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

Subject: THE MILITARY SITUATION

Marshal Stalin said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.

The President replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience. He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking. He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern Front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany 25 kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought, it would be most appropriate if the Marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern Front.

General Antonov then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in translation of General Antonov’s report is attached hereto.)

In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the Prime Minister asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.

General Antonov stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western Front, eight from Italy, and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern Front to reinforce the Germans.

The President then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide Russian gauge.

General Antonov replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.

The President said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.

Marshal Stalin answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.

The Prime Minister then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov’s report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western Front to the Eastern Front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western Front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President’s approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western Front.

General Marshall then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western Front:

The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.

In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement Northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago has ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions to the North. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.

Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.

Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a Southeast direction north of Düsseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction toward the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans East of the Rhine and to cross the river North of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land East of the Rhine.

The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.

In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfort as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.

Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.

Marshal Stalin then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.

General Marshall replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.

In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.

General Marshall mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to enemy oil production and refining centers.

General Marshall concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet Armies could give in the U-boat war, since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.

Marshal Stalin asked what were the other points.

Admiral Cunningham replied: Kiel and Hamburg.

The Prime Minister said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.

Marshal Stalin then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in the Northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the breakthrough sector on the central front.

General Marshall said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was armored comprising 200-300 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German panzer division which they had encountered on the Western Front had had a complement of 23,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprisee.

The Prime Minister said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.

Sir Charles Portal , in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 8,000 to 9,000 aircraft on the section of the Western Front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 3 to 4 tons of bombs each.

The Prime Minister said, in reply to Marshal Stalin’s observations that they had 180 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the central front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority had rested in air power and armor.

General Marshall stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.

Marshal Stalin then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery “break-through” divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery “break-through” divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy calibre. The result was after a two-hour bombardment a gate was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were severely stunned and shellshocked. Marshal Stalin then said that they had explained their desires from their Allies, but that they had learned from the discussions already undertaken that their desires had already been met, and inquired what were the wishes of the Allies in regard to the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said first of all that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was sure of America for the massive power and successes of the Soviet offensive.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was not a desire. Marshal Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Tehran to conduct a winter offensive and despite what some people had thought no demand or request had been received from the President or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive. The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower’s staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their Allies. He said Air Marshal Tedder had explained the desire, which he presumed was that of the President and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do it if the weather and road conditions permitted.

The President said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin’s statement since at the Tehran Conference it had been merely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was facing an election, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans far into the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our armies approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate more closely our operational plans.

The Prime Minister remarked that the reason no request had been made on Marshal Stalin was because of the complete confidence which the President and he felt in the Marshal, the Russian people and the efficiency of the Russian military, and therefore, there had been no attempt to strike any bargain. He had always been thoroughly confident that when an offensive was possible the Red Army would attack. The Prime Minister added that no matter what discussions Air Marshal Tedder had had in Moscow, he felt that it was of the highest importance that the three staffs which were assembled here for the first time should really work out together detailed plans for the coordination of the joint blows against Germany; so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies could move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the East and the West.

Marshal Stalin agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred; that when the Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.

Mr. Churchill replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.

Admiral Cunningham then gave a short review of the situation in regard to German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however, that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine construction was being carried out.

The President asked if Danzig was within range of Soviet artillery fire.

Marshal Stalin replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it soon would be.

It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Koreis and that tomorrow, February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at 4:00 p.m. between the President, Marshal Stalin, and the Prime Minister and the three Foreign Ministers on the political treatment of Germany.

[NormanStewart]

CCS Minutes

Yalta, February 4, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

Marshal Stalin asked the President to open the meeting.

The President said that he was very happy to open such a historic meeting in such a lovely spot. In view of the conveniences and comforts that had been provided the visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal Stalin for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely among ourselves the matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map in Europe in fact. Today, however, the conversations by common agreement would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet armies against the common enemy.

Marshal Stalin said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the Eastern Front.

General Antonov made the following statement:

Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.

Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose, this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the front there remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.

On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted to 220-230 guns (from 75 mm and above) on one kilometer of the front.

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions – low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.

The following results were achieved:
a. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.

Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.

b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.

c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.

d. Breakthroughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.

e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the following losses:

Prisoners	–about 100,000 men
Casualties	–about 300,000 men
Total	–approximately 400,000 men

Probable enemy action:
a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, setting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

For the defense of Pomerania, they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.

b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.

The shifting of enemy troops:
a. On our front there have already appeared:

From the central regions of Germany	–9 division
From the Western European Front	–6 divisions
From Italy	–1 division
Total	16 divisions

b. In the process of being shifted:

• 4 tank divisions
• 1 motorized division
• 5 divisions

c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30–35 divisions (at the expense of the Western European Front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in Germany).

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.

Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable:

1. To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front.
2. To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.
3. The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.

b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.

c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

The President asked whether the Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the lines.

General Antonov replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines that are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only as a matter of necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not sufficient to widen all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of the German lines will remain intact.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Delegation would have a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a technical and military nature, he thought it would be more advantageous if they could be brought up between the military staffs.

The Prime Minister then suggested that General Marshall explain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western Front.

The President pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating the operations of the three Allies now that the British and American armies are getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short distance separating the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans are now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front to the other.

General Marshall then gave a résumé of the operations planned for the Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his forces and conducting operations designed to eliminate enemy pockets in the southern part of the line north of Switzerland. At the same time, he has been maintaining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement northeast towards Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered, it was decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions further north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being directed towards the elimination of the German positions in the vicinity of Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied but the advance of the First French Army north of Mulhausen has been very slow.

North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group and Ninth U.S. Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike towards the southeast in order to reach the line of the Rhine from Düsseldorf north. A complementary operation has been planned in a northeast direction towards the same objective, which it is hoped can be launched about a week later than the first operation. By means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the Germans east of the Rhine north of Düsseldorf and then to cross the river north of the Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British and American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is logistically possible to support. In addition, airborne troops in large numbers will land east of the Rhine.

From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.

The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.

United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.

The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.

There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.

Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German oil supplies.

In concluding, General Marshall said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.

The Prime Minister stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal Brooke to do this and stated that he would like for Admiral Cunningham also to say a word about the submarine operations.

The Prime Minister pointed out that Danzig is the place where much of the assembling of the submarines is done and expressed satisfaction in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which are daily drawing closer.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg.

Field Marshal Brooke said that General Marshall had fully covered the situation now existing on the Western Front and the operations which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General Marshall had outlined.

The Prime Minister stated that both the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch is at present in ARGONAUT and he, the Prime Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be kind enough to provide.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine down as far as Düsseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would be bypassed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good tank country.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample.

Marshal Stalin said that he asked the question because in the Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.

General Marshall said that roughly one in every three divisions employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have 89 divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and all the remainder were either British or American.

Through answers to his questions, it was made clear to Marshal Stalin that there are nearly 10,000 Allied tanks in the European Theater. The British divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000, and armored divisions contain 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each carrying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs.

Marshal Stalin explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full such superiority in strength as existed.

Marshal Stalin said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes of the British and Americans were.

The Prime Minister said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now.

Marshal Stalin said there had been no demand from the British and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted by them to bring it about.

The President had asked that information of the offensive be given to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal Tedder, who came to Moscow as General Eisenhower’s representative, had requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this was understood to be a request from the military leaders.

Marshal Stalin said they had staged their winter offensive because they felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this matter.

The Prime Minister said the reason that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless of the discussions which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters should be fully discussed now by the three Staffs in order to determine what is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives should be integrated so as to get the best results.

Marshal Stalin agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that time.

Admiral Cunningham said that he would like to add something to General Marshall’s statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers of new types of U-boats. As these will have high underwater speed and embody all the latest technical devices, it will be very difficult for the Allied air and surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for in that city about 30 percent of the U-boats were being constructed.

In answer to a question by the President, Marshal Stalin stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.

Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 4, 1945)

London paper says –
Roosevelt dominating Big Three talks

Outspoken American attitude reported

LONDON, England (UP) – The Sunday Observer, usually well informed diplomatically, indicated today that President Roosevelt was playing a dominant role in the Big Three conference, expressing an outspoken American attitude on differences in Allied policies.

The Observer said:

Hints from high Americans officials suggest that President Roosevelt is going to play (or is perhaps already playing) a most active part at the Big Three conference. He has made it clear that he will be outspoke on differences in policies of Allies and will make several proposals on how to settle them.

U.S. ready to bargain

The Observer said the United States opposes any totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, “whether of right or left that may be sponsored or propped up by Russia or Great Britain,” and that Mr. Roosevelt was believed to be strongly critical of British policy in Greece and Italy and Russian policy in Poland.

The United States is prepared to use its many bargaining counters, especially economic to enforce open-door politics and is likely to ask from Russia that no Communist governments be sponsored in liberated countries of the Russian zone, the Observer said.

The newspaper added that Mr. Roosevelt favors settlement of Germany’s future now rather than at a peace conference and has rejected all lenient peace proposals although not going as far as British and Russian advocates of harsh terms.

The Observer believed the President would suggest that the German frontier be not along the Oder River, but about halfway between the Oder and the 1939 Polish frontier. Similarly, while supporting a Curzon Line settlement in Poland, he was said to oppose the “Curzon A” settlement supported by Churchill preferring “Curzon B,” under which Poland would retain Lwow and the Galician oil fields.

The Big Three, the Observer said, is likely to discuss a new Polish settlement providing for diffusion of the London and Lublin government, in which the political parties and groupings in London and in Lublin would cooperate, the Observer said.

Early German collapse

The Sunday dispatch said the No. 1 priority item, on the agenda of the meeting is “What to do in case of early German collapse.” Since post-war plans for Germany have already been worked out the Big Three now has only to discuss the final details, the newspaper said.

They are also expected to make a final demand for Germany’s surrender, the newspaper said. The Germans have suggested that the “Big Three” will issue a new version of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

The Germans have issued such suggestions in hope unconditional surrender terms may be modified, the Dispatch said, adding that “this is wishful thinking in hopes that owing perhaps to Allied differences there may be a chance of conditional terms.”

The Sunday Times said the first task of the meeting will be to decide on the final measures to end Nazi resistance and treatment to be given the defeated enemy. It added that the Nazi leaders are obviously apprehensive that the Allied statesmen may appeal to the German people “over the heads of the gangsters in control,” and that the Germans “seem to think such action might lead to that crack of which they are so terrified.”

The Sunday News of the World editorialized that it is taken for granted the three leaders are now meeting somewhere in Europe or outside, adding that “the Big Three have gotten together for the last time before the trumpets of peace replace the drums of war… the future of a dying Germany is priority number one at this fateful conference.”