Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

[NormanStewart]

Editorial: Everybody knew it

That great “secret” is out.

Nobody would have suspected it, but President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek have been meeting in Cairo.

The three now are meeting, or are about to meet, Premier Stalin of Russia.

It had been a very “hush-hush” affair. Nobody was supposed to say anything about it. And nobody did, or practically nobody. Only those who knew it. And the only ones who knew it were all the government people in Washington, all the newspapermen, nearly every taxi driver, the hotel chambermaids, officials, non-officials, motorists, pedestrians, retailers, wholesalers, consumers, workers, non-workers and maybe a few others.

They say even the birds and the bees knew it, but perhaps that is “wholly unconfirmed.”

Still, it was a secret. Elmer Davis, boss of the Office of War Production, said so. Reuters, a British news service, was among those distributing news of the meeting, but Mr. Davis said that was “reprehensible.”

However, Reuters, which spread the story to America, was forbidden to publish it in England, so Mr. Davis’ OWI obligingly rebroadcast it to England, not to mention ‘steen other countries, but didn’t breathe a word of it in this country.

Now you tell one.

[NormanStewart]

Simms: Cairo parley stressed need of Reds’ help

Allies’ desire for bases in Siberia emphasized by decisions
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Washington –
The momentous decisions of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, reemphasize the compelling necessity for an understanding with Marshal Stalin.

To carry out the Cairo manifesto, it is clear that two things must be done. First, Nazi Germany must be smashed and the war in Europe brought to an end and, second, Russia must give us bases in Siberia from which to get at Japan proper. In short, she too must come into the war against Nippon.

Japan, it was decided in Cairo, must be shorn of all the territory grabbed since 1895, including Manchuria, Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Philippines, the East Indies, the Pacific mandates, Indochina, Burma, Malaya and the rest.

That is a large order. It means reducing Japan to a third-rate power. To do so will be far from the cinch some predict after we lick Hitler and concentrate on the Far East. Nothing thus far indicates it will be an easy task.

Two alternatives

There are two alternatives. One – almost as long as bloody as the island route – is to retake Burma and build communications capable of supplying Chinese battlefields comparable to those in Europe and fight our way back to Shanghai. The other is for Russia to come in and provide us with more convenient bases in the Siberian maritime provinces.

But we would have to wait, of course, for possible Russian aid in Asia until the fighting in Europe is ended. Russia cannot afford a war on two fronts 5,000 miles apart. And as long as we ourselves are up to our necks in Europe, we are not in any position to take over and defend Siberia on our own.

Benefits for Russia

China excepted, Russia stands to gain more than any other power by the total defeat of Japan. Sooner or later, one must give way to the other in Northeast Asia. Both sides have long admitted this. They have already fought three wars over it – one declared, one undeclared and one diplomatic – only to reach the present stalemate.

Three-quarters of Soviet territory lies in Asia. Russia must have a dependable outlet to the Pacific, or Siberia will suffocate. A strong Japan blocks that outlet.

Korea was used as a springboard to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. These territories constitute a springboard to eastern Siberia. Thus, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek announced that Korea and Manchuria would be taken from Japan, they were helping Russia as much as themselves.

[NormanStewart]

The calendar of events at conference in Cairo

Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
The timetable of events at the three-power conference:

Sunday, November 21: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and party arrive by air from China, followed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his party about teatime. Chiang visited Churchill, who later invited British Chiefs of Staff to dinner, which was followed by informal talks.

Monday, November 22: President Roosevelt arrived by plane. Mr. Churchill received Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow, and visited the President and Chiang. Churchill lunched with the President and stayed on for dinner. The President and Churchill had a post-war discussion with American and British military staffs. Military leaders met at 11:00 a.m. EET and the first conference session was held at the time. Military, naval and air force delegates conferred nearly one hour.

Tuesday, November 23: Churchill met Andrey Vyshinsky on his way from Moscow to Algiers to represent Russia in the Italian Advisory Council. Churchill lunched at the President’s villa. Chiefs of Staff met at 3:30 p.m. with Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied commander in Southeast Asia; Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, commanding U.S. forces in China, Burma and India, and Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, commanding the U.S. 14th Air Force based in China, attending.

Wednesday, November 24: American, British and Chinese Chiefs of Staff met at 9:30 a.m. The first conference was held at 11:00 a.m. at the President’s villa. Chiefs of Staff and political leaders attended. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, U.S. envoy in Algiers Robert Murphy and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent British Foreign Under Secretary, arrived.

Thursday, November 25: Separate American and British staff meetings were followed in the afternoon by a general meeting seemingly ending the first phase of military conferences. At 6:00 p.m., the President and Churchill attended a Thanksgiving Day service. The President was host at dinner, with Churchill and American and British leaders as guests.

Friday, November 26: A big joint American-British conference was held at 2:30 p.m., with more than 30 military leaders including Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff; Gen. Sir Alan Brook, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Gen. Eisenhower; Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, commanding Allied air forces in the Mediterranean; Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commanding Allied forces in the Middle East, and Air Chief Marshal Sir W. Sholto Douglas, commanding British air forces in the Middle East.

Mr. Eden conferred long with John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (December 3, 1943)

Der erste Akt des großen Blufftheaters –
In Kairo die Kapitulation des siegreichen Japans verlangt

Tschiangkaischek wird wieder mit leeren Worten vertröstet

vb. Wien, 2. Dezember –
Der erste Akt des neuen großen Agitationstheaters, zu dem Bolschewisten und Plutokraten in verbesserter Neuauflage der Moskauer Konferenz sich zusammengefunden haben, ist vorübergerauscht. Die Konferenz in Kairo, mit größter Heimlichkeit inszeniert, durch eine voreilige Meldung des Reuter-Büros aber seit einigen Tagen ein offenes Geheimnis, wurde am Mittwoch­ abend zu Ende gebracht, und ein gemeinsames amtliches Kommuniqué soll nun den Eindruck erwecken, als ob dort weltbewegende Dinge beschlossen worden seien.

Bei näherem Zusehen freilich entpuppt sich dieses Dokument als ein Gemisch von aufgeblasenem Schwindel, Selbstbetrug und dem Ausdruck der eigenen Unsicherheit, die durch die großsprecherischen Phrasen um so peinlicher hindurchleuchteten. Das Kommuniqué stellt zunächst fest, daß Roosevelt, Churchill und der „Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek“ gemeinsam mit ihren militärischen und diplomatischen Beratern eine Konferenz „in Nordafrika“ abhielten. Schon diese Präambel wird der Wirklichkeit nicht vollkommen gerecht. Wichtiger als der Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek war in Kairo wie in Tschungking ohne Zweifel die Frau Generalissimus, die ebenfalls an den Besprechungen teilnahm. Es ist bekannt, daß diese amerikanisch erzogene Dame im Laufe der Jahre geradezu zum bösen Geist Chinas geworden ist und durch ihren unseligen Einfluß Tschiangkaischek in die Ausweglosigkeit seiner heutigen Lage hineinmanövriert hat. Die Tournee, die sie vor einigen Monaten als Bittstellerin durch die USA unternahm, hat den Tschungking-Chinesen außer Komplimenten für ihre „erste Lady“ nichts eingebracht. So begab sich nunmehr Tschiangkaischek gemeinsam mit seiner Gemahlin persönlich zu den großen demokratischen Freunden – um ebenfalls freundliche Worte zu finden, aber sonst nichts.

Denn wenn das Kairoer Kommuniqué in seinem Schlußsatz erklärt, die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Tschungking-Chinesen seien entschlossen, auch weiterhin die schweren und langen Operationen durchzuhalten, die erforderlich sind, um eine bedingungslose Kapitulation Japans zu erzwingen, so ist die Ankündigung weiterer langer Leiden für die Chinesen die einzige Realität, die dieser Satz enthält. Die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation Japans, das die Plutokraten in raschem Anlauf aus dem gesamten ostasiatischen Bereich hinauswarf, das Tschiangkaischek selbst in den äußersten Winkel seines Landes drückte und einer neuen lebensfähigen Regierung die Bahn freimachte, das den Völkern Ostasiens die Freiheit erkämpfte und eine neue Ordnung in seinem Raum aufrichtete – die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation dieses siegreichen und selbstbewußten Volkes vor seinen aus Ostasien hinweggefegten Gegnern ist einfach grotesk. Die letzten Siege der japanischen Luftwaffe über die amerikanische Flotte bei Bougainville und den Gilbertinseln sind der einzig passende Kommentar zu den Tiraden aus Kairo.

Nach demokratischem Ritus

Mit größter Gelassenheit wird man daher in Japan vernehmen, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner der Großmacht des Fernen Ostens die völlige Erdrosselung und die Zurückführung auf seinen nationalen Besitzstand vom Jahre 1895 androhen. Denn nicht nur der Gewinn Japans aus dem ersten Weltkriege soll ihm abgenommen werden, sondern „auch alle Gebiete, die Japan den Chinesen genommen hat, wie die Mandschurei, Formosa und die Pescadoresinseln.“ Auch Korea wird „zu gegebener Zeit“ Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit verheißen – nach dem guten demokratischen Rezept, immer dort „Versklavung von Völkern“ zu entdecken und zu bekämpfen, wo nicht die eigene Fahne weht, wie beispielsweise in Indien. Selbstverständlich beteuern die Väter des Kommuniqués, auch, das gehört zum demokratischen Ritual, daß sie „für sich selbst keinen Gewinn begehren und keinen Gedanken an eine territoriale Expansion hegen.“ Immerhin ist recht auffallend, daß von der Wiederherstellung des holländischen Besitzes in Ostasien mit keinem Wort die Rede ist, was darauf schließen läßt, daß Briten und Yankees nach bewährten Beispielen der englischen Geschichte davon träumen, sich auch hier am eigenen Bundesgenossen zu bereichern, wie die Briten es auch als selbstverständlich betrachten, daß das chinesische Hongkong nach dem Kriege wieder seine Rolle als Ausbeutungszentrum in China übernimmt.

Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten aber bestehen, um das Rad der asiatischen Geschichte in dieser Weise zurückzudrehen, darüber äußert sich das Kommuniqué mit vielsagender Zurückhaltung. Es heißt lediglich, daß die militärischen Sachverständigen ein Einvernehmen über die künftigen militärischen Operationen gegen Japan erzielt hätten. Zu Lande, zur See und in der Luft solle ein pausenloser Druck auf den Feind ausgeübt werden. Nun, das hörte man schon vor einem Vierteljahr in Quebec, ohne daß den Ankündigungen größere Taten gefolgt wären, diesmal wird es kaum anders sein. Was hinter dem großen Bluff an militärischen Möglichkeiten steckt, geht nämlich mit geradezu peinlicher Deutlichkeit aus dem Kommentar hervor, den Reuter zu dem Kommuniqué in die Welt funkt. Auch in diesem Machwerk ist an der Oberfläche alles Kraft und Selbstbewußtsein.

Die drei Baumeister des Krieges haben entscheidende Entschlüsse gefaßt. Der Plan für den Sieg im Pazifik ist fertiggestellt.

Smuts, der nirgends fehlen darf, ist mit der Empire-Strategie beauftragt worden, „währen Churchill den Verlauf der Operationen in weltweitem Maßstabe ausarbeitet.“

Ein Bluff unter vielen

Eine „kombinierte Strategie für eine Riesenoffensive“ ist der Stein der Weisen, der in Kairo entdeckt wurde. Zum Schluß aber folgt die kalte Dusche für Tschiangkaischek:

Man glaubt in Kairo, daß alle drei Alliierten grundsätzlich die Auffassung teilten, der Krieg gegen Deutschland müsse zunächst abgeschlossen sein, ehe man den Pazifikplan durchführen kann. Da liegt der Hase im Pfeffer. Nicht einmal der Mann, der diesen Satz geschrieben hat, glaubt, daß Tschiangkaischek mit diesem Programm einverstanden ist. Aber er weiß und mit ihm weiß die ganze Welt, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner nicht gleichzeitig in Europa und Ostasien mit voller Kraft zu militärischen Großoperationen imstande sind. Vor wenigen Tagen mußte der englische Produktionsminister Littleton im Unterhaus mit unbritischer Bescheidenheit erklären, leider habe man Leros und Samos nicht verteidigen können, weil der italienische Kriegsschauplatz Englands Kraft zu sehr in Anspruch nehme. Auch der Empirestratege Smuts wird das Rätsel nicht lösen, woher dann die erforderlichen Divisionen und der erforderliche Schiffsraum für die „Riesenoffensive“ gegen Japan kommen sollen.

Mit diesem Reuter-Kommentar sinkt das Kairoer Kommuniqué zu dem zusammen, was es tatsächlich ist, zu einem reinen Bluff. Tschiangkaischek ist wieder einmal der von seinen Freunden Betrogene, aber wie bisher sucht der Betrüger sich selbst und sein Volk zu betrügen, das mit erneuter Hoffnung auf eine Linderung seiner fürchterlichen Notlage zu neuen Kraftanstrengungen aufgepulvert werden soll. Nicht anders als die Tschungking-Chinesen werden die Yankees dumm gemacht. Statt der Geständnisse von seinen neuen schweren Niederlagen bietet Roosevelt ihnen die Verheißung kommender Siege – einen faulen Wechsel, der ebenso wenig eingelöst werden wird, wie die von Casablanca und von Quebec.

Filmtheater Kairo

So ist die Kairoer Konferenz weniger ein politisches Ereignis als eine große Revue. In dieser Hinsicht freilich wird sie den höchsten amerikanischen Anforderungen gerecht. Die Reporter der britischen und amerikanischen Presse schildern spaltenlang die riesige Staffage und die Kulissen, die in Kairo aufgebaut wurden. Ein Gelände von mehreren Quadratkilometern wurde von Stacheldraht und durch Minenfelder gesichert, um das kostbare Leben der „großen Drei“ gegen Anschläge zu sichern. Alle Personen mußten mehrere Posten und Wachen passieren, ehe sie in das Allerheiligste des Beratungsraumes Vordringen konnten. Roosevelt hatte eigens hunderte seiner G-Männer mitgebracht, die drüben in den USA Bekämpfer – oder je nach Bedarf (auch als Komplicen der Gangster) – einen Namen haben und ein unentbehrliches Requisit für Hollywood darstellen. Wo immer sich Roosevelt, Churchill oder Tschiangkaischek zeigten, wurden sie von einem Schwarm Polizisten auf Motorrädern in Kübelwagen begleitet. Schilderungen dieser Art nehmen kein Ende.

Dagegen treten fast die militärischen Hauptpersonen der großen Handlung in den Hintergrund, obwohl auf ihre Anwesenheit in den Schilderungen aus agitatorischen Gründen das nötige Gewicht beigemessen wird. Wieviel Generale und Stabsoffiziere anwesend waren, entzieht sich vorerst einer genauen Feststellung. Die Angaben der Yankees und Briten schwanken zwischen fünf runden Dutzenden und einigen Hunderten. Wenn Offensiven durch Generale und Generalstäbler entschieden würden, so wären die großen Projekte von Kairo der Durchführung sicher. An den Fronten freilich pflegen ja die Waffen und die Tapferkeit den Ausschlag zu geben.

In einem Punkt jedenfalls war die Konferenz für alle Teilnehmer ein voller Erfolg: am Abend des 25. November gab Roosevelt ein großes Festessen, dessen Speisenfolge das Reuter-Büro von der bescheidenen Gemüsesuppe am Anfang bis zu den Orangen und dem Teegebäck am Schluß Gang um Gang aufzählt, selbstverständlich ohne die Cocktails zu vergessen. Die englischen Leser, denen diese Genüsse nur auf so weite Distanz gezeigt werden, werden nicht ohne Neid vernehmen, wie gut es den Herren in Kairo gegangen ist. Auch sie wären ohne Ausnahme sicherlich bereit gewesen, als unvermeidliche Dreingabe die Hymnen und Märsche über sich ergehen zu lassen, die eine amerikanische Kapelle den Gästen zur Würze des Mahles darbot.

Man versteht es, daß nach der gesegneten Tafel ein Dankgottesdienst fällig war. Tschiangkaischek, der bekanntlich Christ ist, nahm daran sicherlich keinen Anstoß. In Teheran, zusammen mit Stalin, dürfte ein derartiger Schluß des Programms auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (December 2, 1943)

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Thursday, December 2 (at Cairo)

	. . . . . . .
2:35 p.m.	(Cairo Time). The President’s plane arrived at Cairo West Airfield. We changed our clocks and watches (set them back 1½ hours) to conform to Zone Minus Two time. Air distance traveled from Tehran to Cairo (our route), 1,290 miles. The President disembarked and left the airport immediately via auto and proceeded to Ambassador Kirk’s villa in the Mena district of Cairo.
3:30 p.m.	Ambassador Kirk called on the President.
4:00 p.m.	The President summoned Lieutenant (jg.) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had been received on our arrival here. There were no Congressional bills or executive orders in this particular pouch.
8:30 p.m.	The President had dinner at his villa and had as his guests the Prime Minister, Mrs. Oliver, Admiral Leahy, Major Boettiger, Captain Randolph Churchill and Mr. Hopkins.
	The President received word this evening, from Ambassador Steinhardt at Ankara, that President Inonu would come to Cairo Saturday, December 4, for a conference with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
	We left Ambassador Harriman and Mr. Bohlen at Tehran. They were to remain there for a few days longer and then proceed on to Moscow.
	The news story concerning the Cairo Conference (Nov. 22-26) broke officially this morning.
	. . . . . . .

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (December 3, 1943)

The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Cairo, December 3, 1943

Secretary of State

I spoke to you yesterday about our desire for a very much closer co-operation with the Americans in the Balkans, both as regards policy and execution of policy. Both Mr. Stevenson and I are in full agreement on this point, and I cannot do better than attach a copy of a paper he has written on the subject, which is on the Agenda for the Middle East Defence Committee this morning. I understand that most members of the Defence Committee have already signified in advance their warm approval of these proposals.

R. A. LEEPER
Cairo, 3 December 1943

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt

Co-ordination of OSS and SOE

1. General Donovan has demanded a very largely increased share in special operations in the Balkans. We should welcome this demand, provided that an agreed policy is carried out.

2. At present the OSS organisation as a whole is answerable only to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and is entirely independent of the State Department. On the other hand, SOE carries out a policy agreed between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.

3. There is definite danger that General Donovan’s organisation will not necessarily pursue the same policy as SOE. Such a development would obviously lead to incalculable difficulties, and should be avoided if possible.

4. The best, if not indeed the only, way of doing this would be:
   (a) to concert our Balkan policy with the United States Government:
   (b) to integrate the carrying out of that policy, so far as special operations are concerned, at all executive levels.

5. (a) would presumably be done on the highest political level.
   (b) would mean:

(i) that SOE and OSS should be two separate, but not independent, organisations:

(ii) that by means of working committees the closest possible integration should be achieved in operational policy and control between the two organisations:

(iii) that by some similar means the closest contact should be established between PWE and the moral operations section of OSS:

(iv) that not only OSS but the United States State Department should be represented on the Special Operations Committee at GHQ Middle East, the State Department representative being the United States Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia:

(v) that the United States State Department should be represented by the United States Ambassador on the Middle East Defence Committee:

(vi) that operational control of all special operations should remain in the hands of the C. in C. Middle East who would be advised, as now, by the Special Operations Committee and, when necessary, the Middle East Defence Committee.

6. It is suggested that advantage should be taken of the present conference to obtain an agreed decision on the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

(Intd.)
RCSS

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt to President al-Khouri of Lebanon

Cairo, December 3, 1943

Great and Good Friend, It has afforded me very particular satisfaction and pleasure to receive today in Cairo, from the hand of my representative in Lebanon, Mr. Wadsworth, the letter whereby you inform me that, called by the suffrage of Parliament, you assumed on September 21, last, the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic.

I should welcome the opportunity to convey in person my congratulations to you and to the Lebanese people; for the events of recent weeks in your country have been followed in mine with very special attention and sympathy.

The pressure of other events, however, render[s] such visit impractical at this time. I, therefore, with this reply, cordially reciprocate the sentiments of friendship you express, a friendship which unites our two peoples in the great struggle to uphold the principles to which the United Nations are dedicated.

Your good friend,
FDR

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		Field Marshal Dill
General Marshall		Lieutenant General Ismay
Admiral King		General Riddell-Webster
General Arnold		Captain Lambe
Lieutenant General Somervell		Brigadier Sugden
Vice Admiral Willson		Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson		Air Commodore Elliot
Rear Admiral Cooke		General Brooke
Rear Admiral Bieri		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Rear Admiral Badger		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Sutherland		Brigadier McNair
Major General Handy		Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Major General Fairchild
Brigadier General Kuter
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Doyle
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
	Secretariat
Captain Royal		Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland		Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret

Approval of decisions of CCS 131st and 132nd meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of the 132nd meeting, subject to the insertion of the words “via the Supreme Commander, SEAC” after the word “Generalissimo” in the conclusion of Item 1 of CCS 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Implications of military conclusions of the EUREKA Conference (CCS Memorandum for Information No. 165)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the military conclusions reached at the EUREKA Conference as set out in the enclosure to CCS Memorandum for Information Number 165, and consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The military conclusions were then examined in turn.

1. Partisans

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a directive should be issued to General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were certain points which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make and would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troops where necessary with Allied weapons.

Admiral King suggested that these points might form a part of the general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area.

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans.

2. Turkey

Sir Alan Brooke said that all the necessary preparations were going forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war.

Admiral King said he felt that there were implications in this decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of aircraft and how may anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support Turkey?

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the details of the commitments were set out in CCS 418.

Admiral King said that he considered that paper, at least in part, out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility for OVERLORD.

CCS 418, “Entry of Turkey into the War” was later considered in closed session.

3. Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria

It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to this conclusion.

4. OVERLORD and operations against the South of France

Sir Alan Brooke felt the first step in considering the implications of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the South of France assault could be obtained. He suggested that the Combined Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the OVERLORD operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place against the South of France.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision at EUREKA was only that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with sufficient strength to make it successful.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the Combined Staff Planners must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had been considered at EUREKA envisaged something in the neighborhood of a two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this operation was impossible of successful accomplishment.

Admiral Leahy felt that the Planners should be told that this operation should be carried out without interference with Operation OVERLORD.

Admiral King said that the problem might be approached in two ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be made available for a lift of this size.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that in considering the availability of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except OVERLORD. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this assault force could be made available.

Admiral King said that he believed there was no record in the EUREKA discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for some 37,000 personnel.

General Marshall pointed out that the conclusion at EUREKA implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of France without affecting Operation OVERLORD. This operation could not be planned on a lavish scale.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that one hypothesis might be that the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations.

It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:
a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;
b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found.

5. Coordination with the Russian Staff

It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian Staff should be achieved through the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow.

It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem of deception.

Draft agenda for the remainder of SEXTANT Conference

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the future subjects for discussion might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented, for consideration, a draft agenda set out on this principle.

Admiral Leahy then explained that he believed the United States Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that it would be a calamity if the Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many points still to be resolved.

Admiral Leahy said he saw no hope of postponing their departure after these dates.

General Marshall then suggested an agenda designed to deal only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the SEXTANT Agenda.

b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they should be dealt with:

1. Entry of Turkey into the war.
2. Integration of the U.S. Air Command – directive to Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
3. Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
4. RANKIN – discussion only.
5. Operations against the South of France.
6. Relation of resources to requirements.
7. Final Report.

At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.

Entry of Turkey into the war (CCS 418)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. (Subsequently published as CCS 418/1)

Progress reports

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the SEXTANT Conference should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, the recommendations in question must be put forward separately.

Combined Bomber Offensive

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged.
b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Secret
CCS 397 (Revised)

References:	a. CCS 242/6
	b. CCS 319/5
	c. CCS 417

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944

We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the USSR into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event.

We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.

A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning purposes is given in the appendix to the enclosure. The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all objective and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT and reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 380/2, and with the provisions of CCS 417 (Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan).

General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated, supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date; to secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier-based air operations against Japan.

North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long-range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.

Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New Guinea-NEI-Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the NEI-Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will be intensified.

China. Our efforts in the China area should have as their objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up of the USAAF and the Chinese army and air forces. It shall include also the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very long-range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese “inner zone.”

Southeast Asia. In the Southeast Asia Area operations should be carried out for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Operation BUCCANEER will be conducted. Within the means available additional offensive operations including carrier borne raids, should be conducted by sea, air, and ground forces for the purpose of maintaining pressure on the enemy, inducing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum attrition practicable on [of?] his air and naval forces and shipping. The preparation of the bases in India required for approved operations in the SEA and China Theaters should continue.

As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.

The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.

[Enclosure]

A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the appendix. Target dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:

a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.

b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska).

c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault shipbuilding program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.

d. The early collaboration of the USSR in the war against Japan.

We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept up to date for the conditions assumed in c and d.

We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.

We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing, and deployment in the war against Japan of very long-range bombers.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Secret
CCS 418/1

Entry of Turkey into the war

The object of this paper is to discuss the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war, and the extent of our commitments likely to be involved.

Turkey’s role in the war

We consider that our object in the Balkans should be to bring about the surrender of Bulgaria and open a short sea route to Russia.

The surrender of Bulgaria is most likely to be achieved by:
a. Air action.
b. Russian diplomatic and subversive action.
c. The psychological effect of Turkey becoming an active ally of the United Nations.

We do not propose that Allied forces should be concentrated in Thrace to cooperate with the Turks. In Thrace, therefore, the Turks must be persuaded to stand on the defensive and to concentrate their forces for the protection of the Straits. To assist them we would continue to bomb the Bulgarians.

The opening of a short supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles would achieve a considerable economy in shipping, but might also enable us to take the strain off the Persian supply route. The Turks should be called upon to provide us with the bases from which to protect the convoys.

Commitments involved

The commitments which would be involved in the above policy can be considered under two headings:

a. Minimum air and anti-air assistance to the Turks, who make a great point of the necessity for protecting their main cities, communications and industries from German air attack.

b. Action, within the capacity of the forces that can be made available, for opening the Aegean Sea, the capture of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands.

Assistance to the Turks
We can provide a reasonable scale of air defense for Turkish key points.

Opening the Aegean
In addition to 6a above, we can find the necessary air forces to provide air cover for convoys in the Aegean and the Marmora, without any serious effect on operations elsewhere.

The naval forces required for escorting and minesweeping for a fortnightly convoy cycle would have to be provided from outside the Mediterranean.

With the above naval and air forces it should be possible to pass occasional convoys through the Aegean without first capturing Rhodes. In these circumstances, however, the losses in ships might be considerable, and for the passage of regular convoys it would be necessary to capture Rhodes and highly desirable to clean up Kos, Leros, Samos, Khios, Mytilene and Lemnos. From the military point of view, it would be an immense advantage if the Turks could cooperate in the assaults on the islands other than Rhodes.

The forces required for the capture of Rhodes over and above those now in ME Command would be:
a. Naval forces for the assault.
b. One British division.
c. The assault shipping and craft for one division, two brigades assaulting.
d. Two parachute battalions and the necessary air lift for them amounting to 90 transport aircraft.

As far as can be foreseen at present the land and air forces for this operation could be found from resources in the Mediterranean Theater.

There are two possible sources for the necessary assault shipping and craft: the Mediterranean Theater, and the Southeast Asia Theater.

The two parachute battalions and the 90 transport aircraft could only come from the Central Mediterranean and their release would depend on the requirements of the situation in Italy, and the preparations for operations against Southern France.

From the point of view of the weather it might be possible to stage an assault on Rhodes towards the end of February, but other factors are likely to affect this date.

[NormanStewart]

The President to the Secretary of State

Cairo, 3 December 1943
Secret

In reference your message transmitted as White 67, in view of the fact that the Russians have appointed the Russian Ambassador as Soviet Representative on the Advisory Council [Commission] in London, I suggest that you announce Winant’s appointment.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

My conferences with the Generalissimo were very satisfactory and I liked him. He is delighted with the results of the Moscow Conference.

In Tehran things went on the whole very well and better than I expected. Marshal Stalin and I worked together toward objectives which turned out to be very similar. I will bring you the minutes of all that was said and done. Molotov sent you his very warm personal regards.

Churchill and I are to see President Inonu here in Cairo and then I will head westward.

[NormanStewart]

The President to the Secretary of State

Cairo, 3 December 1943

Personal and secret from the President.

I think it best not to appoint International Civil Aviation Committee until I get back because I think you and I should agree on some general principles to lay before them before they meet.

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Cairo, December 3, 1943
Secret

To Marshal Stalin personal and secret from the President.

I have arrived safely at my destination and earnestly hope that by this time you have done the same. I consider that the conference was a great success and I am sure that it was an historic event in the assurance not only of our ability to wage war together but to work in the utmost harmony for the peace to come. I enjoyed very much our personal talks together and particularly the opportunity of meeting you face to face. I look forward to seeing you again. In the meantime, I wish you and your Armies the greatest success.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy

The conversation dealt with the allocation of forces for the operation against the Andaman Islands or alternatively against Rhodes, and the choice of zones of occupation in Germany as between the United States and the United Kingdom. With regard to the first topic, Roosevelt insisted on the Andaman Islands operation and emphasized that promises made to Chiang should be fully carried out. With respect to the second topic, Churchill and Eden argued for British occupation of the northwestern zone in Germany.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (December 3, 1943)

Draft of declaration written by Churchill

Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 1, delayed)
Prime Minister Churchill is believed to have prepared the first rough draft of the declaration of the Sino-American-British conference here between midnight and 2:00 a.m. EET. After discussions with President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mme. Chiang acted as interpreter during the talks.

The following day, Mr. Churchill took his draft of the declaration to President Roosevelt who congratulated the Prime Minister and dictated slight changes and additions in accord with his views.

Then Mme. Chiang, on behalf of China, requested its amplification of the original terms.

The completed declaration was in the hands of the Big Three for final initialing only a few hours before they left for secret destinations.

[NormanStewart]

At Thanksgiving dinner –
Roosevelt sings a ditty and Churchill dances jig

Old-time favorite tunes played by musicians for distinguished group at parley
By Gault MacGowan, North American Newspaper Alliance

Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 1, delayed)
In a temporary White House which gleamed in actual white against a tropical setting of scarlet flowers, cypresses and peppercorns, President Roosevelt was host at a “family” dinner on Thanksgiving at which the guests feasted on turkey and trimmings and an American orchestra played.

The President’s singing of a little ditty of his own composition, Prime Minister Churchill’s execution of a dance step while waving his cigar, and a proposal by Harry Hopkins to take the orchestra home to the “Twenty-One Club,” a New York nightclub, to learn the very latest tunes were among the most vivid memories of the musicians.

The President’s personally composed ditty, in the key of E flat, was unfortunately unrecorded in either words or music. The Prime Minister’s impromptu dance steps were to the oft-recorded “Sidewalks of New York.”

President’s son present

The joking threat of Mr. Hopkins to take the orchestra to New York to learn some new music came when the orchestra could not meet a request for “Pistol-Packin’ Mamma,” apologizing, “We don’t know the latest ones; we’ve been overseas too long.”

Prime Minister Churchill, who attended the dinner with his daughter Sarah and her husband Victor Oliver, asked the musicians to play “Carry Me Back to Old Virginny.” The request song of President Roosevelt, whose son, Col. Elliott Roosevelt, and son-in-law Maj. John Boettiger, were present, was “Home on the Range.”

Other requests

“Home on the Range” was played four times for the President and “Carry Me Back to Old Virginny” four times for Mr. Churchill. There were also special requests for “The White Cliffs of Dover” and “When the Lights Go On Again.” The President followed with suggestions of “Anchors Aweigh” and “Swanee River.”

All the men in the orchestra were presented to the President and the Prime Minister after the dinner.

Among other celebrated guests at the American Thanksgiving meal were British Foreign secretary Anthony Eden, U.S. Ambassador to Russia W. Averell Harriman and U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James John G. Winant.

Prime Minister Churchill and the President visited the Pyramids together after the dinner, returning soon to continue that conference. Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek visited the Pyramids separately before their departure.

A stop of 15 minutes before the Sphinx was included in the Pyramid trip of the President.

WAC is in charge of Roosevelt phone

Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 1, delayed)
There were thousands of soldiers guarding with anti-aircraft installations and machine guns, the perimeter within which the momentous Cairo Conference was held.

There were hundreds of delegates and there were dozens of famous soldiers, sailors and airmen in attendance. Yet the proudest and busiest person of all was a 37-year-old WAC corporal from New York.

She is Cpl. Mary Catherine Broadhead, and she was in charge of the personal telephone switchboard of President Roosevelt. This was a big job, as Cpl. Broadhead found out, but the corporal was up to it, for she was formerly in charge of 74 telephone operators at the headquarters of Gen. Eisenhower.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (December 3, 1943)

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Friday, December 3 (at Cairo)

10:30 a.m.	Mr. John S. [J.] McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, called on Mr. Hopkins at the President’s villa.
11:00 a.m.	The President summoned Lieutenant (jg.) Rigdon and worked on official mail that had arrived earlier in the day. He signed Congressional bills S630, S770, S862, S950, S1008, S1246, S1309, S1382, S. J. [Res.] 47; an executive order authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to take possession and operate the shipyard of the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation at Los Angeles; and a proclamation entitled “Day of Prayer.”
12:00 (noon)	Major Boettiger left Cairo by plane (Major Otis F. Bryan pilot) for Adana, Turkey, to meet and accompany President General Ismet Inonu to Cairo.
1:30 p.m.	The President had lunch at his villa with General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Assistant Secretary of War John S. [J.] McCloy, Ambassador Winant and Mr. Hopkins.
2:00 p.m.	Mr. George Wadsworth, American Consul General at Beirut, Syria [Lebanon], called on the President.
2:30 p.m.	Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh (to governments-in-exile of Greece and Yugoslavia) called on the President.
4:40 p.m.	The President worked on his mail. He read the “Fathers’ Draft Act” and announced his intention to sign the same at a later date.
5:10 p.m.	The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold and Captain Royal).
8:30 p.m.	The President dined at his villa with the Prime Minister, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Hopkins.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (December 4, 1943)

Psychiater vor!
Illusionsepidemie ‚Kairo‘

dr. th. b. Stockholm, 3. Dezember –
Um den geistigen Zustand zu begreifen, in den die britische Agitation die britische Bevölkerung und die übrige Welt – letztere allerdings mit sehr geringem Erfolg – nach der Zusammenkunft in Kairo zu versetzen versucht, müßte man ein Psychiater sein. Die Illusionsepidemie greift rasend um sich und droht völlig zu vernichten, was die Briten einst stolz als einen Hauptfaktor ihrer Politik bezeichnet haben: den gesunden Menschenverstand.

Um den Umfang dieser Epidemie zu erkennen, braucht man aus den spaltenlangen Berichten der schwedischen Korrespondenten nur den einen Satz herauszugreifen:

Bald werden über England wieder die Lichter angezündet werden.

Es verlohnt sich nicht, sich mit dieser Wirkung der Konferenz von Kairo näher zu befassen. Wenn Churchill und Roosevelt ihre eigenen Völker bluffen wollten, so ist ihnen das zweifellos gelungen. Sie mögen das als einen Erfolg verbuchen, und zwar als den einzigen Erfolg, den sie bisher im Kriege gegen Japan erzielen konnten. Daß aber die Riesenbluffs auf die Völker Europas und Ostasiens irgendwelchen Eindruck erzielen würden, könnten nur Narren glauben. Die Vernichtungsansage an das japanische Volk, dem man alles rauben wolle, was es sich seit der Meijizeit in harter Arbeit und in harten Kämpfen erworben habe, um überhaupt leben und atmen zu können – das konnten sich Churchill und Roosevelt von vornherein sagen – werde die gleiche Wirkung haben wie die Vernichtungsansage an das deutsche Volk, die vor einem Jahr in Casablanca beschlossen wurde.

Besorgte Fragen

Ruhige und kühle Beobachter, wie der bekannte Militärschriftsteller der Vereinigten Staaten Hamson Baldwin, haben das bereits jetzt erkannt. Baldwin stellt in der New York Times die besorgte Frage, ob es richtig gewesen sei, bereits jetzt dem japanischen Volk ein so düsteres und dürftiges Schicksal anzukündigen. So schreibt er:

Noch lebt der Staat im japanischen Kaiserreich und Hunderttausende von Japanern haben sich in den Gebieten angesiedelt, die Japan wieder verlieren soll. Der japanische Kampf- und Widerstandswillen wird damit nur gestärkt werden.

Hinter dem lauten Wortgetöse im Anschluß an das Reuter-Kommuniqué über die Konferenz in Kairo steht aber in Wirklichkeit die wachsende Sorge, sich auf ein Abenteuer festgelegt zu haben, zu dem die eigenen Kräfte niemals ausreichen. Helfen soll, wie auch in Europa, die Sowjetunion.

Die Sowjets und Japan

Das wichtigste an der Konferenz in Kairo, so heißt es in einem Bericht aus Neuyork, sei zweifellos, daß man militärische Hilfe durch die Sowjets auch gegen Japan suche. Stalin werde gebeten werden, gegen Japan aufzumarschieren, und man sei auf amerikanischer Seite bereit, ihm im Stillen Ozean die Gebiete und die Häfen anzubieten, die Rußland im russisch-japanischen Krieg verloren habe. Nur aus diesem Grunde habe man sich bereit erklärt, Korea die Freiheit wiederzugeben, das eine ganz besondere strategische Rolle spielen könnte, wenn sich die Sowjets der angelsächsischen Koalition gegen Japan anschlößen. Korea sei überdies die Rolle eines Pufferstaates zwischen den bolschewistischen und angelsächsischen Interessen in Ostasien zugedacht.

Es ist natürlich so, daß die Teilnahme der Sowjets am Krieg gegen Japan von Roosevelt nur deshalb in die Debatte geworfen wurde, um damit die sicher zu erwartende Ablehnung des Zustandekommens der zweiten Front in Europa zu begründen. Ohne ein Druckmittel wollte sich Roosevelt wahrscheinlich nicht mit Stalin in Täbris an einen Tisch setzen. Sein Druckmittel ist aber nicht mehr wert als das der Briten, die das Ausbleiben, der zweiten Front damit zu begründen versuchten, daß sie gar nicht mehr nötig sei, da ja Deutschlands Tage ohnehin gezählt seien.

[NormanStewart]

Auf die arrogante Entschließung –
Tokios Antwort: ‚Niemals!‘

dnb. Tokio, 3. Dezember –
Die arrogante Entschließung von Kairo entsprang an erster Stelle dem besorgten Wunsch, Tschiangkaischek zu beruhigen, der ständig mehr Boden bei seinem nutzlosen Widerstand gegen Japan verliert, so stellt man, wie Dōmei berichtet, in Tokio fest.

Die Tatsache, daß Roosevelt und Churchill sich die Mühe machten, eine Konferenz mit Tschiangkaischek zu veranlassen, sei nur ein weiterer Beweis für ihre Besorgnis über Japans neue Chinapolitik und über die dramatische Erhebung Ostasiens, die auf einer Basis der Gegenseitigkeit erfolgte, um es von der jahrhundertelangen anglo-amerikanischen Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung zu befreien.

Kairo könne nur als ein schlechter Scherz angesehen werden. Es beweise nur, wie besorgt die Anglo-Amerikaner seien, Tschiangkaischek in ihrem Lager zu behalten. Es bestehe kein Zweifel, daß die Konferenz in Kairo einzig und allein diese Absicht verfolgte.

Gutunterrichtete Kreise betonten weiter, daß, gleichgültig was auch die Anglo-Amerikaner tun mögen, Ostasien nie wieder unter ihr altes imperialistisches Regime zurückkehren wird. Die ungeheure Kampfkraft Japans, die alle anderen ostasiatischen Nationen geschlossen hinter sich wisse, werde Großostasien gegen alle anglo-amerikanischen „Regressions-Versuche“ verteidigen.

Interessant und belustigend sei die Tatsache, daß Churchill und Roosevelt völlig vergessen haben, die rücksichtslose imperialistische Herrschaft, die in ihren früheren Gebieten und Kolonien während der letzten Jahrhunderte ausgeübt wurde, überhaupt zu erwähnen. Das sei ein weiterer offensichtlicher Beweis für die anglo-amerikanische Denkungsart, die entweder zu naiv oder zu veraltet sei. Wenn Tschiangkaischek gewillt sei, auf diesen anglo-amerikanischen Bluff hereinzufallen, und wenn er weiter Ostasien verrate, werde er von seinen Landsleuten restlos beiseitegelegt werden, noch ehe seine sogenannten anglo-amerikanischen Verbündeten ihn im Stich ließen.

Englische Kritik an Kairo

dnb. Stockholm, 3. Dezember –
Mit dem Kommuniqué über das Treffen in Kairo ist ein fundamentaler Mißgriff begangen worden, erklären jetzt sogar schon englische Kommentatoren nach einer Meldung in Aftonbladet. Der Mißgriff bestehe darin, daß man erklärt habe, die Japaner auf ihre Inseln zurücktreiben zu wollen. Dieses sei etwas, was die Japaner nur noch stärker zusammenschweißen werde zu einem noch härteren Kampf um ihr Leben. Gleichzeitig vermisse man ein „positives Programm“ für die ostasiatischen Staaten.

Zu den Stimmen über die Bluffkonferenz gesellen sich auch zwei britische. Reuters hat zwei namhafte englische Politiker interviewt und nach ihrer Meinung über das Ergebnis von Kairo befragt.

Die Meinung Greenwoods

Der stellvertretende Führer der Arbeiterpartei, Arthur Greenwood, gab seiner Meinung dahin Ausdruck, daß der Krieg in China „jetzt ein Krieg zwischen allen freiheitsliebenden Völkern und jenen sei, die die Freiheit ausmerzen“ wollten. Nach seiner Meinung kann der Krieg erst dann beendet werden, wenn „Hitler aus Europa verschwunden und jeder japanische Soldat vom chinesischen Boden vertrieben ist.“

Unbeirrt durch die Tatsachen, welche die Konferenzphrasen von Kairo überdecken, sprach Greenwood das große Wort:

Die britische Arbeiterschaft blickt auf ein neues China, das seinen rechtmäßigen Platz in den Ausschüssen des Fortschrittes der Welt einnimmt.

John Lawson, Mitglied der parlamentarischen Delegation, die kürzlich in China weilte, sieht die Dinge aus der Kenntnis der Lage wesentlich nüchterner an. Er sagt:

Es ist ganz klar, daß wenig getan werden kann, bis wir Panzer, schwere Geschütze und moderne Ausrüstungen den Chinesen bringen können.

Die Konferenz in Kairo wäre also überflüssig gewesen, wenn England und die USA imstande wären, Tschungking mit Waffen und Material zu unterstützen. Sie haben zwar Tschiangkaischek und Frau Gemahlin mit Versprechungen heimgeschickt, aber sie haben nicht verraten, wie sie das von Japan versperrte Tor nach Tschungking aufbrechen wollen.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt (in the chair)		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold		Field Marshal Dill
		Lieutenant General Ismay
	Secretariat
	Captain Royal

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 4, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret

The President said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it must be done.

The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000-600,000 British. Terrific battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.

Reverting to ANVIL, the Prime Minister expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.

Admiral King intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.

The Prime Minister, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin’s promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.

The Prime Minister concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.

Sir Alan Brooke said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at SEXTANT. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March. The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin’s promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of ANVIL was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.

Sir Andrew Cunningham observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely OVERLORD and ANVIL. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in BUCCANEER to get back in time for ANVIL, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.

Sir Charles Portal said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.

General Marshall expressed agreement with General Brooke’s observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.

The Prime Minister said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?

Admiral Leahy said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.

Admiral King remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.

The Prime Minister said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.

The President agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.

Sir Alan Brooke demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.

Admiral King said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U.K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U.K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.

The Prime Minister observed that this was a fruitful contribution.

Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)s. Would it not be possible, asked the Prime Minister, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?

Admiral King said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U.S. Navy used ships of 6,000–10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.

Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, Admiral King pointed to the interrelation between the attack on Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points. Admiral Leahy suggested that if it could be decided:

a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault; and,

b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;

the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mount-batten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.

The Prime Minister suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.

Admiral King said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.

The Prime Minister recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (the Prime Minister) had said quite firmly that he could not agree. The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.

The President suggested the following plan of action:

a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.

b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.

Sir Alan Brooke said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3½ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.

Admiral Leahy entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.

The Prime Minister pointed to the great military advantages that were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.

Mr. Eden thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a coup d’etat.

The Prime Minister pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumania’s entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.

There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.

The President, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:
a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.

c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.

d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.

The Prime Minister suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.

The President said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.

The Prime Minister said that this “very good reason” might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3½ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.

Field Marshal Dill thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Admiral Leahy agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.

General Marshall agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [India and China?] would be at hazard.

The Prime Minister observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.

The President said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.

Admiral King, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.

The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.