Senators will get more Patton data
…
British ‘break’ news release; U.S. angered
‘Premature’ disclosure of parley news brings rebuke
By Joseph Laitin, United Press staff writer
Washington –
Government officials, angered by repeated premature British disclosures of Allied news involving the United States, promised today to exert every effort to ensure American newspapers and news services an even break from now on.
Reuters, a British news agency, broke the news of the three-power Cairo Conference Tuesday morning, about 33 hours ahead of the official release time. Officials charged this was in violation of an Allied agreement not to publish the news until 7:30 p.m. Wednesday night to protect the safety of the conferees.
Held in confidence
American editors, it was pointed out, had the official communiqué on their desks and were holding it in confidence at the time the Reuters dispatch was circulated.
Rep. Frank Carlson (R-KS) today told the House that Congress should investigate the “slipshod and bungling manner” in which the conference was announced.
He added:
This is not the first time. What about the Tokyo raid? What about the Patton incident?
Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI) asserted that the people of the United States are being neglected because “the President of the United States wants to be President of the world.”
Defended by Democrat
Democratic Leader Rep. John W. McCormack (D-MA) replied that the President is a “strong and courageous” man now “abroad in line of duty.”
McCormack said:
In future generations when the country faces such a crisis, I hope we have another man as strong and courageous, and I don’t care whether he’s Republican or Democrat – Protestant, Catholic or Jew.
Director Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information placed partial blame on British censorship which allowed the Reuters story to be sent out from London although it did forbid its publication in the British Isles.
Price pledges aid
Director Byron Price of the U.S. Office of Censorship said he would back Mr. Davis to the hilt. Asserting that “the circumstances speak for themselves,” Mr. Price said that:
Censorship is doing all it can and is anxious to see American newspapers and radio stations get at least an even break on such stories in the future.
Mr. Davis sarcastically rejected Reuters’ explanation that the “scoop” was the result of enterprise by its Lisbon bureau chief.
He said it was a kind of “enterprise” that any American news editor could have “indulged” in if he so desired, considering that the official communiqué was available to editors at the time.
U.S. people entitled to news, paper says
Bayonne, New Jersey (UP) –
The Bayonne Times published the official announcement of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek yesterday, in advance of the official release time, explaining that “the people of the United States are as fully entitled to news as any other country in the world.”
The story was headlined:
Everyone In the World Except U.S. Knows FDR, Churchill, Chiang Meet
The Times said:
This release has been violated not alone by foreign and domestic news agencies, by various diverse means, but by the Office of War Information itself, which has kept the news from the American people but has broadcast it to foreign lands. We prefer to do this openly instead of publishing rumor stories credited to the usual “well-informed circles.”
Sydney, Australia (UP) –
The Daily Mirror yesterday published a full report of the Cairo Conference – 23 hours before the official release date. The story was withdrawn from later editions, the newspaper explaining that it had made a mistake.
Editorial: The Cairo Pact
The Cairo Three-Power Pact pledges destruction of the Japanese Empire and the rise of free China as the major Far Eastern nation. If it provides the united military power to make that pledge a fact, Japan will be confined permanently to her own islands.
This recognizes that the old era of foreign domination is past; that the key to the future is Western cooperation with China, and no imperialist deals with Japan. On that basis, Pacific peace is to be built.
All of which is a great victory for American policy. The inclusion of China in the four-power Moscow Pact, which is now implemented by the American-British-Chinese agreement, is due chiefly to Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt.
Indeed, this agreement underwrites the Roosevelt assurance to Congress last September:
The United Nations will never again let her [Japan] have authority over the islands which were mandated to her by the League of Nations… And the same thing holds good in the case of the vast territories which Japan has stolen from China starting long before this war began.
Thus, Japan’s loot of half a century is to be reclaimed. Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores go back to China. Korea, after a necessary period of help, is to be independent. The morale effect of these pledges on the Chinese, staggering from almost seven years of war, is obvious. It will be harder now for Jap propagandists to poison China.
Of course, the Cairo communiqué leaves many questions unanswered. United Nations agreement is not yet complete. Will Britain return Hong Kong to China? What becomes of French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies when the Japs are driven out? Are they to be trained for independence on the Philippine model, under their former rulers or under United Nations trusteeship? And the strategic mandated islands, are they to be under American or international guardianship?
Where does Russia come in? This four-power conference is being held in two sections, with Marshal Stalin absent from the Pacific sessions because Russia and Japan are nominally at peace. But his representative, Andrey Vyshinsky, attended unobstructively. That indicates Russian concurrence. Moreover, the return of Manchuria to China could not be guaranteed without Stalin’s tacit consent – probably leaving important Russian claims there to be negotiated by Moscow and Chungking directly.
When Russia is freed of the Nazi menace, she doubtless will become an active partner in the alliance against Japan – for neither Russia nor the present Pacific Allies can risk a Far Eastern settlement in which Russia has no part.
Also, the Cairo communiqué leaves open the complicated questions as to Japan’s future, when shorn of her conquests and disarmed. Is there to be Allied military occupation, short or long? Must the Emperor go? Is the Allied formula for free elections by the people, and civil liberties, to be applied? What about reparations, or Jap labor to rebuild liberated areas? Will a law-abiding small Japan have equal rights to markets, materials, trade and membership in the international organization, as hitherto promised by the Allies to all peaceful nations?
But it would be out of focus to expect answers to all the questions which will arise with Pacific victory, when we are so far from victory. On the political side, this conference was content to agree on the general goal while wisely it concentrated most on immediate military means. For Americans should be under no illusion – as certainly the Chinese are not – that any of the fine political pledges are of value unless enforced by much more Allied military power than has been put into the Pacific War so far.
Two years after Pearl Harbor and Singapore, Japan holds virtually all of her conquests, still keeps us 3,000 miles from Tokyo. The Cairo Pact is a sign that the Allies at last are ready to fight a major Pacific war. The test of the Cairo military threats is how soon and how hard and how continuously Adm. Nimitz, Gen. MacArthur, Lord Louis Mountbatten and Generalissimo Chiang can strike at the vitals of the Jap octopus.
Action counts now.
Editorial: Everybody knew it
That great “secret” is out.
Nobody would have suspected it, but President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek have been meeting in Cairo.
The three now are meeting, or are about to meet, Premier Stalin of Russia.
It had been a very “hush-hush” affair. Nobody was supposed to say anything about it. And nobody did, or practically nobody. Only those who knew it. And the only ones who knew it were all the government people in Washington, all the newspapermen, nearly every taxi driver, the hotel chambermaids, officials, non-officials, motorists, pedestrians, retailers, wholesalers, consumers, workers, non-workers and maybe a few others.
They say even the birds and the bees knew it, but perhaps that is “wholly unconfirmed.”
Still, it was a secret. Elmer Davis, boss of the Office of War Production, said so. Reuters, a British news service, was among those distributing news of the meeting, but Mr. Davis said that was “reprehensible.”
However, Reuters, which spread the story to America, was forbidden to publish it in England, so Mr. Davis’ OWI obligingly rebroadcast it to England, not to mention ‘steen other countries, but didn’t breathe a word of it in this country.
Now you tell one.
In Washington –
Bowles warns against ban on food subsidies
OPA administrator says prices would increase 7-10% in 1944
…
Millett: Urges extra allotment for pregnant wife of soldier
It doesn’t do expectant mother any good to know proper diet if she can’t afford it, writer says
By Ruth Millett
…
Simms: Cairo parley stressed need of Reds’ help
Allies’ desire for bases in Siberia emphasized by decisions
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
Washington –
The momentous decisions of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, reemphasize the compelling necessity for an understanding with Marshal Stalin.
To carry out the Cairo manifesto, it is clear that two things must be done. First, Nazi Germany must be smashed and the war in Europe brought to an end and, second, Russia must give us bases in Siberia from which to get at Japan proper. In short, she too must come into the war against Nippon.
Japan, it was decided in Cairo, must be shorn of all the territory grabbed since 1895, including Manchuria, Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Philippines, the East Indies, the Pacific mandates, Indochina, Burma, Malaya and the rest.
That is a large order. It means reducing Japan to a third-rate power. To do so will be far from the cinch some predict after we lick Hitler and concentrate on the Far East. Nothing thus far indicates it will be an easy task.
Two alternatives
There are two alternatives. One – almost as long as bloody as the island route – is to retake Burma and build communications capable of supplying Chinese battlefields comparable to those in Europe and fight our way back to Shanghai. The other is for Russia to come in and provide us with more convenient bases in the Siberian maritime provinces.
But we would have to wait, of course, for possible Russian aid in Asia until the fighting in Europe is ended. Russia cannot afford a war on two fronts 5,000 miles apart. And as long as we ourselves are up to our necks in Europe, we are not in any position to take over and defend Siberia on our own.
Benefits for Russia
China excepted, Russia stands to gain more than any other power by the total defeat of Japan. Sooner or later, one must give way to the other in Northeast Asia. Both sides have long admitted this. They have already fought three wars over it – one declared, one undeclared and one diplomatic – only to reach the present stalemate.
Three-quarters of Soviet territory lies in Asia. Russia must have a dependable outlet to the Pacific, or Siberia will suffocate. A strong Japan blocks that outlet.
Korea was used as a springboard to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. These territories constitute a springboard to eastern Siberia. Thus, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek announced that Korea and Manchuria would be taken from Japan, they were helping Russia as much as themselves.
Völkischer Beobachter (December 3, 1943)
Der erste Akt des großen Blufftheaters –
In Kairo die Kapitulation des siegreichen Japans verlangt
Tschiangkaischek wird wieder mit leeren Worten vertröstet
vb. Wien, 2. Dezember –
Der erste Akt des neuen großen Agitationstheaters, zu dem Bolschewisten und Plutokraten in verbesserter Neuauflage der Moskauer Konferenz sich zusammengefunden haben, ist vorübergerauscht. Die Konferenz in Kairo, mit größter Heimlichkeit inszeniert, durch eine voreilige Meldung des Reuter-Büros aber seit einigen Tagen ein offenes Geheimnis, wurde am Mittwoch abend zu Ende gebracht, und ein gemeinsames amtliches Kommuniqué soll nun den Eindruck erwecken, als ob dort weltbewegende Dinge beschlossen worden seien.
Bei näherem Zusehen freilich entpuppt sich dieses Dokument als ein Gemisch von aufgeblasenem Schwindel, Selbstbetrug und dem Ausdruck der eigenen Unsicherheit, die durch die großsprecherischen Phrasen um so peinlicher hindurchleuchteten. Das Kommuniqué stellt zunächst fest, daß Roosevelt, Churchill und der „Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek“ gemeinsam mit ihren militärischen und diplomatischen Beratern eine Konferenz „in Nordafrika“ abhielten. Schon diese Präambel wird der Wirklichkeit nicht vollkommen gerecht. Wichtiger als der Generalissimus Tschiangkaischek war in Kairo wie in Tschungking ohne Zweifel die Frau Generalissimus, die ebenfalls an den Besprechungen teilnahm. Es ist bekannt, daß diese amerikanisch erzogene Dame im Laufe der Jahre geradezu zum bösen Geist Chinas geworden ist und durch ihren unseligen Einfluß Tschiangkaischek in die Ausweglosigkeit seiner heutigen Lage hineinmanövriert hat. Die Tournee, die sie vor einigen Monaten als Bittstellerin durch die USA unternahm, hat den Tschungking-Chinesen außer Komplimenten für ihre „erste Lady“ nichts eingebracht. So begab sich nunmehr Tschiangkaischek gemeinsam mit seiner Gemahlin persönlich zu den großen demokratischen Freunden – um ebenfalls freundliche Worte zu finden, aber sonst nichts.
Denn wenn das Kairoer Kommuniqué in seinem Schlußsatz erklärt, die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Tschungking-Chinesen seien entschlossen, auch weiterhin die schweren und langen Operationen durchzuhalten, die erforderlich sind, um eine bedingungslose Kapitulation Japans zu erzwingen, so ist die Ankündigung weiterer langer Leiden für die Chinesen die einzige Realität, die dieser Satz enthält. Die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation Japans, das die Plutokraten in raschem Anlauf aus dem gesamten ostasiatischen Bereich hinauswarf, das Tschiangkaischek selbst in den äußersten Winkel seines Landes drückte und einer neuen lebensfähigen Regierung die Bahn freimachte, das den Völkern Ostasiens die Freiheit erkämpfte und eine neue Ordnung in seinem Raum aufrichtete – die Vorstellung einer Kapitulation dieses siegreichen und selbstbewußten Volkes vor seinen aus Ostasien hinweggefegten Gegnern ist einfach grotesk. Die letzten Siege der japanischen Luftwaffe über die amerikanische Flotte bei Bougainville und den Gilbertinseln sind der einzig passende Kommentar zu den Tiraden aus Kairo.
Nach demokratischem Ritus
Mit größter Gelassenheit wird man daher in Japan vernehmen, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner der Großmacht des Fernen Ostens die völlige Erdrosselung und die Zurückführung auf seinen nationalen Besitzstand vom Jahre 1895 androhen. Denn nicht nur der Gewinn Japans aus dem ersten Weltkriege soll ihm abgenommen werden, sondern „auch alle Gebiete, die Japan den Chinesen genommen hat, wie die Mandschurei, Formosa und die Pescadoresinseln.“ Auch Korea wird „zu gegebener Zeit“ Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit verheißen – nach dem guten demokratischen Rezept, immer dort „Versklavung von Völkern“ zu entdecken und zu bekämpfen, wo nicht die eigene Fahne weht, wie beispielsweise in Indien. Selbstverständlich beteuern die Väter des Kommuniqués, auch, das gehört zum demokratischen Ritual, daß sie „für sich selbst keinen Gewinn begehren und keinen Gedanken an eine territoriale Expansion hegen.“ Immerhin ist recht auffallend, daß von der Wiederherstellung des holländischen Besitzes in Ostasien mit keinem Wort die Rede ist, was darauf schließen läßt, daß Briten und Yankees nach bewährten Beispielen der englischen Geschichte davon träumen, sich auch hier am eigenen Bundesgenossen zu bereichern, wie die Briten es auch als selbstverständlich betrachten, daß das chinesische Hongkong nach dem Kriege wieder seine Rolle als Ausbeutungszentrum in China übernimmt.
Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten aber bestehen, um das Rad der asiatischen Geschichte in dieser Weise zurückzudrehen, darüber äußert sich das Kommuniqué mit vielsagender Zurückhaltung. Es heißt lediglich, daß die militärischen Sachverständigen ein Einvernehmen über die künftigen militärischen Operationen gegen Japan erzielt hätten. Zu Lande, zur See und in der Luft solle ein pausenloser Druck auf den Feind ausgeübt werden. Nun, das hörte man schon vor einem Vierteljahr in Quebec, ohne daß den Ankündigungen größere Taten gefolgt wären, diesmal wird es kaum anders sein. Was hinter dem großen Bluff an militärischen Möglichkeiten steckt, geht nämlich mit geradezu peinlicher Deutlichkeit aus dem Kommentar hervor, den Reuter zu dem Kommuniqué in die Welt funkt. Auch in diesem Machwerk ist an der Oberfläche alles Kraft und Selbstbewußtsein.
Die drei Baumeister des Krieges haben entscheidende Entschlüsse gefaßt. Der Plan für den Sieg im Pazifik ist fertiggestellt.
Smuts, der nirgends fehlen darf, ist mit der Empire-Strategie beauftragt worden, „währen Churchill den Verlauf der Operationen in weltweitem Maßstabe ausarbeitet.“
Ein Bluff unter vielen
Eine „kombinierte Strategie für eine Riesenoffensive“ ist der Stein der Weisen, der in Kairo entdeckt wurde. Zum Schluß aber folgt die kalte Dusche für Tschiangkaischek:
Man glaubt in Kairo, daß alle drei Alliierten grundsätzlich die Auffassung teilten, der Krieg gegen Deutschland müsse zunächst abgeschlossen sein, ehe man den Pazifikplan durchführen kann. Da liegt der Hase im Pfeffer. Nicht einmal der Mann, der diesen Satz geschrieben hat, glaubt, daß Tschiangkaischek mit diesem Programm einverstanden ist. Aber er weiß und mit ihm weiß die ganze Welt, daß die Anglo-Amerikaner nicht gleichzeitig in Europa und Ostasien mit voller Kraft zu militärischen Großoperationen imstande sind. Vor wenigen Tagen mußte der englische Produktionsminister Littleton im Unterhaus mit unbritischer Bescheidenheit erklären, leider habe man Leros und Samos nicht verteidigen können, weil der italienische Kriegsschauplatz Englands Kraft zu sehr in Anspruch nehme. Auch der Empirestratege Smuts wird das Rätsel nicht lösen, woher dann die erforderlichen Divisionen und der erforderliche Schiffsraum für die „Riesenoffensive“ gegen Japan kommen sollen.
Mit diesem Reuter-Kommentar sinkt das Kairoer Kommuniqué zu dem zusammen, was es tatsächlich ist, zu einem reinen Bluff. Tschiangkaischek ist wieder einmal der von seinen Freunden Betrogene, aber wie bisher sucht der Betrüger sich selbst und sein Volk zu betrügen, das mit erneuter Hoffnung auf eine Linderung seiner fürchterlichen Notlage zu neuen Kraftanstrengungen aufgepulvert werden soll. Nicht anders als die Tschungking-Chinesen werden die Yankees dumm gemacht. Statt der Geständnisse von seinen neuen schweren Niederlagen bietet Roosevelt ihnen die Verheißung kommender Siege – einen faulen Wechsel, der ebenso wenig eingelöst werden wird, wie die von Casablanca und von Quebec.
Filmtheater Kairo
So ist die Kairoer Konferenz weniger ein politisches Ereignis als eine große Revue. In dieser Hinsicht freilich wird sie den höchsten amerikanischen Anforderungen gerecht. Die Reporter der britischen und amerikanischen Presse schildern spaltenlang die riesige Staffage und die Kulissen, die in Kairo aufgebaut wurden. Ein Gelände von mehreren Quadratkilometern wurde von Stacheldraht und durch Minenfelder gesichert, um das kostbare Leben der „großen Drei“ gegen Anschläge zu sichern. Alle Personen mußten mehrere Posten und Wachen passieren, ehe sie in das Allerheiligste des Beratungsraumes Vordringen konnten. Roosevelt hatte eigens hunderte seiner G-Männer mitgebracht, die drüben in den USA Bekämpfer – oder je nach Bedarf (auch als Komplicen der Gangster) – einen Namen haben und ein unentbehrliches Requisit für Hollywood darstellen. Wo immer sich Roosevelt, Churchill oder Tschiangkaischek zeigten, wurden sie von einem Schwarm Polizisten auf Motorrädern in Kübelwagen begleitet. Schilderungen dieser Art nehmen kein Ende.
Dagegen treten fast die militärischen Hauptpersonen der großen Handlung in den Hintergrund, obwohl auf ihre Anwesenheit in den Schilderungen aus agitatorischen Gründen das nötige Gewicht beigemessen wird. Wieviel Generale und Stabsoffiziere anwesend waren, entzieht sich vorerst einer genauen Feststellung. Die Angaben der Yankees und Briten schwanken zwischen fünf runden Dutzenden und einigen Hunderten. Wenn Offensiven durch Generale und Generalstäbler entschieden würden, so wären die großen Projekte von Kairo der Durchführung sicher. An den Fronten freilich pflegen ja die Waffen und die Tapferkeit den Ausschlag zu geben.
In einem Punkt jedenfalls war die Konferenz für alle Teilnehmer ein voller Erfolg: am Abend des 25. November gab Roosevelt ein großes Festessen, dessen Speisenfolge das Reuter-Büro von der bescheidenen Gemüsesuppe am Anfang bis zu den Orangen und dem Teegebäck am Schluß Gang um Gang aufzählt, selbstverständlich ohne die Cocktails zu vergessen. Die englischen Leser, denen diese Genüsse nur auf so weite Distanz gezeigt werden, werden nicht ohne Neid vernehmen, wie gut es den Herren in Kairo gegangen ist. Auch sie wären ohne Ausnahme sicherlich bereit gewesen, als unvermeidliche Dreingabe die Hymnen und Märsche über sich ergehen zu lassen, die eine amerikanische Kapelle den Gästen zur Würze des Mahles darbot.
Man versteht es, daß nach der gesegneten Tafel ein Dankgottesdienst fällig war. Tschiangkaischek, der bekanntlich Christ ist, nahm daran sicherlich keinen Anstoß. In Teheran, zusammen mit Stalin, dürfte ein derartiger Schluß des Programms auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen.
U.S. State Department (December 3, 1943)
The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Cairo, December 3, 1943
Secretary of State
I spoke to you yesterday about our desire for a very much closer co-operation with the Americans in the Balkans, both as regards policy and execution of policy. Both Mr. Stevenson and I are in full agreement on this point, and I cannot do better than attach a copy of a paper he has written on the subject, which is on the Agenda for the Middle East Defence Committee this morning. I understand that most members of the Defence Committee have already signified in advance their warm approval of these proposals.
R. A. LEEPER
Cairo, 3 December 1943
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt
Co-ordination of OSS and SOE
General Donovan has demanded a very largely increased share in special operations in the Balkans. We should welcome this demand, provided that an agreed policy is carried out.
At present the OSS organisation as a whole is answerable only to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and is entirely independent of the State Department. On the other hand, SOE carries out a policy agreed between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.
There is definite danger that General Donovan’s organisation will not necessarily pursue the same policy as SOE. Such a development would obviously lead to incalculable difficulties, and should be avoided if possible.
The best, if not indeed the only, way of doing this would be:
(a) to concert our Balkan policy with the United States Government:
(b) to integrate the carrying out of that policy, so far as special operations are concerned, at all executive levels.(a) would presumably be done on the highest political level.
(b) would mean:(i) that SOE and OSS should be two separate, but not independent, organisations:
(ii) that by means of working committees the closest possible integration should be achieved in operational policy and control between the two organisations:
(iii) that by some similar means the closest contact should be established between PWE and the moral operations section of OSS:
(iv) that not only OSS but the United States State Department should be represented on the Special Operations Committee at GHQ Middle East, the State Department representative being the United States Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia:
(v) that the United States State Department should be represented by the United States Ambassador on the Middle East Defence Committee:
(vi) that operational control of all special operations should remain in the hands of the C. in C. Middle East who would be advised, as now, by the Special Operations Committee and, when necessary, the Middle East Defence Committee.
- It is suggested that advantage should be taken of the present conference to obtain an agreed decision on the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 above.
(Intd.)
RCSS
President Roosevelt to President al-Khouri of Lebanon
Cairo, December 3, 1943
Great and Good Friend, It has afforded me very particular satisfaction and pleasure to receive today in Cairo, from the hand of my representative in Lebanon, Mr. Wadsworth, the letter whereby you inform me that, called by the suffrage of Parliament, you assumed on September 21, last, the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic.
I should welcome the opportunity to convey in person my congratulations to you and to the Lebanese people; for the events of recent weeks in your country have been followed in mine with very special attention and sympathy.
The pressure of other events, however, render[s] such visit impractical at this time. I, therefore, with this reply, cordially reciprocate the sentiments of friendship you express, a friendship which unites our two peoples in the great struggle to uphold the principles to which the United Nations are dedicated.
Your good friend,
FDR
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Dill | |
| General Marshall | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Admiral King | General Riddell-Webster | |
| General Arnold | Captain Lambe | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | General Brooke | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Major General Sutherland | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Handy | Colonel Cornwall-Jones | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Brigadier General Kuter | ||
| Brigadier General Roberts | ||
| Captain Doyle | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Approval of decisions of CCS 131st and 132nd meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of the 132nd meeting, subject to the insertion of the words “via the Supreme Commander, SEAC” after the word “Generalissimo” in the conclusion of Item 1 of CCS 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Implications of military conclusions of the EUREKA Conference (CCS Memorandum for Information No. 165)
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the military conclusions reached at the EUREKA Conference as set out in the enclosure to CCS Memorandum for Information Number 165, and consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The military conclusions were then examined in turn.
- Partisans
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a directive should be issued to General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were certain points which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make and would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troops where necessary with Allied weapons.
Admiral King suggested that these points might form a part of the general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area.
After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans.
- Turkey
Sir Alan Brooke said that all the necessary preparations were going forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war.
Admiral King said he felt that there were implications in this decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of aircraft and how may anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support Turkey?
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the details of the commitments were set out in CCS 418.
Admiral King said that he considered that paper, at least in part, out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility for OVERLORD.
CCS 418, “Entry of Turkey into the War” was later considered in closed session.
- Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria
It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to this conclusion.
- OVERLORD and operations against the South of France
Sir Alan Brooke felt the first step in considering the implications of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the South of France assault could be obtained. He suggested that the Combined Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the OVERLORD operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place against the South of France.
Admiral King pointed out that the decision at EUREKA was only that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with sufficient strength to make it successful.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that the Combined Staff Planners must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had been considered at EUREKA envisaged something in the neighborhood of a two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this operation was impossible of successful accomplishment.
Admiral Leahy felt that the Planners should be told that this operation should be carried out without interference with Operation OVERLORD.
Admiral King said that the problem might be approached in two ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be made available for a lift of this size.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that in considering the availability of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except OVERLORD. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this assault force could be made available.
Admiral King said that he believed there was no record in the EUREKA discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for some 37,000 personnel.
General Marshall pointed out that the conclusion at EUREKA implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of France without affecting Operation OVERLORD. This operation could not be planned on a lavish scale.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that one hypothesis might be that the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations.
It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:
a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;
b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.
This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found.
- Coordination with the Russian Staff
It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian Staff should be achieved through the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow.
It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem of deception.
Draft agenda for the remainder of SEXTANT Conference
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the future subjects for discussion might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented, for consideration, a draft agenda set out on this principle.
Admiral Leahy then explained that he believed the United States Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that it would be a calamity if the Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many points still to be resolved.
Admiral Leahy said he saw no hope of postponing their departure after these dates.
General Marshall then suggested an agenda designed to deal only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the SEXTANT Agenda.
b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they should be dealt with:
- Entry of Turkey into the war.
- Integration of the U.S. Air Command – directive to Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
- Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
- RANKIN – discussion only.
- Operations against the South of France.
- Relation of resources to requirements.
- Final Report.
At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.
Entry of Turkey into the war (CCS 418)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. (Subsequently published as CCS 418/1)
Progress reports
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the SEXTANT Conference should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, the recommendations in question must be put forward separately.
Combined Bomber Offensive
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged.
b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.
c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.