Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

463 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045

Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]

Soviet Citizens in Allied Territories

According to the information of the Repatriation Soviet Authorities General Thorne, Commander of English troops in Norway, having quoted the British Government’s order refused to deliver to these authorities citizens of the Soviet Baltic Republics, who are at present time in Norway, as well as Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, several thousand persons altogether.

Similar situation exists in Great Britain from which country 287 Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Soviet Baltic Republics and from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were not permitted to leave for their native country by the British authorities.

Drawing attention of the Government of Great Britain to these facts the Soviet Government expects that the British Military Authorities will immediately issue instructions about delivering to the Repatriation Soviet Military Authorities of all Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.

464 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-3045

Rapporteur’s Report

[Babelsberg,] 31st July, 1945
Secret
P (TERMINAL) 69

  1. Mr. Bevin was in the Chair. The meeting began by conveying to Generalissimo Stalin an expression of the regret with which they had heard of his illness and their hope for a speedy and complete recovery.

  2. The meeting then agreed to the immediate despatch by each of the Three Governments of telegrams to the Governments of France and China inviting their participation in the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers. The telegram to the French Government would also refer to the dissolution of the European Advisory Commission.

  3. The meeting also approved the despatch of telegrams to the French Government communicating to them the text of the statement of political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period.

  4. Reparations
    The Foreign Secretaries considered a proposal by the United States Delegation as follows:

    Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus:
    (a) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets.

    (b) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet Government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

  5. The U.S. Delegation made it clear that there were two other questions which must be settled at the same time. The first was the proposal for admission of neutral and ex-enemy states to the United Nations as regards which the U.S. Delegation had circulated a revised note; the second was a proposal concerning the Western frontier of Poland, according to which the U.S. Delegation would agree that the Polish Provisional Government should administer the area claimed by them pending final arrangement of the actual frontier at the Peace Conference. The U.S. Delegation insisted that all three proposals must be the subject of agreement at the same time.

  6. The Foreign Secretaries also considered proposals about reparations and sources of supply for the zones of occupation put forward by the U.K. Delegation.

  7. The discussion showed that there was general agreement with the lines of the American proposal, subject to the following two points:

    (i) The U.S. and U.K. Delegations considered that the figures in the U.S. proposal should be 12½% from all the western zones in exchange for goods, and 7½% from all the western zones without payment. The Soviet Delegation on the other hand maintained that these figures should be 25% from the Ruhr on the basis of exchanges and 15% from each of the Western zones free.

    (ii) The Soviet Delegation wished to see a minimum figure of either weight or value stated in addition to the percentages. The U.S. and U.K. Delegations could not accept this suggestion.

    As there was no agreement on this question, the other two proposals by the U.S. Delegation were not discussed.

  8. Economic Principles
    The British Delegation proposed that the following should be included in the Economic Principles: “Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods”.

    The Soviet Delegation asked for the addition of the following sentence: “As regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations, as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs”.

    The U.S. and U.K. Delegations were unable to accept the Soviet suggestion.

  9. German Fleet and Merchant Navy
    The U.K. and Soviet Delegations submitted memoranda on the subject. These memoranda were referred to a Sub-Committee composed as follows:

    • U.S. Delegation: Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell
    • U.K. Delegation: Admiral McCarthy, Mr. Weston and Mr. Ward
    • Soviet Delegation: Admiral Kuznetsov and M. Sobolev

  10. German External Assets
    The U.S. Delegation submitted a memorandum on this subject, which was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee.

  11. Germany – Political Principles
    The U.K. Delegation had proposed two additions to the statement on political principles. The first of these, which was adopted, reads as follows: “So far as is practicable there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population.”

    The second proposed addition was as follows: “Subject to normal regulations there shall be free circulation of nationals of the Powers represented on the Control Council in all zones by land and air.”

  12. It was agreed that this should be referred for examination by the Control Council for Germany, who should be asked to submit their recommendations about it to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945.

  13. The Soviet Delegation then suggested a third addition to the statement on political principles as follows:

    Assistance will, however, be rendered to the establishment of a central German administration composed of secretaries for respective branches of administration – in the first instance of central administrative institutions for foreign trade, industry, finance, transport and communications. The central German administration shall act under the direction of the Control Council, and it will be their task to coordinate the activities of the Provincial Governments in order to ensure the fulfilment of the decisions of the Control Council and the exercise of functions connected with the solving of problems of an all-German character.

  14. It was agreed to defer this until the Delegations had had an opportunity to study it.

  15. Yugoslavia
    Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U.K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting.

  16. War Crimes
    Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U.K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting.

  17. Activities of Russian Fascists in Germany and Austria
    The Soviet representative referred to the memorandum circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th July. The U.S. and U.K. Delegations said that they had asked for reports from the competent military authorities, which had not yet been received.

  18. German Troops in Norway
    The Soviet representative referred to a memorandum on this subject circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th [25th?] July. The U.K. representative said that a reply on this topic had been received and would be sent to M. Molotov as soon as possible.

  19. Administration of the Ruhr Industrial Area
    The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject.

  20. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and White Russia
    The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject.

465 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-3045

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.

Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business, July 30, 1945

I. Problems before the Big Three

{
1. German Reparations
2. Western Frontier of Poland
3. Admission to the United Nations

The U.S. has presented proposals on all three of these questions and has insisted that they be considered as a unit. The British also presented yesterday a new proposal on German Reparations. There seemed to be general agreement on the U.S. proposal concerning reparations, made applicable to the entire British and American Zones rather than to the Ruhr alone, with a corresponding reduction in the percentages. The specific question referred to the Big Three was whether or not a definite figure, in dollars or tons, for the Soviet share of reparations from western Germany should be specified.

  1. Economic Principles for Germany
    It was agreed that decision on this question will depend on the decision on German reparations.

  2. Italian Reparations
    Mr. Molotov’s motion on this question was referred back once more to the Big Three.

II. Problems before the Foreign Ministers

  1. Additional Points for Inclusion in the German Political Principles
    The British proposed two additional points the first of which was accepted and the second referred to the Control Commission for Germany. The Soviets also presented a new point which is still before the Foreign Ministers.

  2. Southeast Europe and Trieste-Istria District
    British and Soviet papers on these subjects are still before the foreign ministers.

  3. War Crimes
    The Soviet and British papers on this subject were presented. It was agreed in principle that a statement on the subject should be issued by the Conference. The question of the exact form of this statement is still before the Foreign Ministers.

  4. Fascist Activities in the U.S., British and French Zones of Germany and Austria
    The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject.

  5. German Troops in Norway
    The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note on this subject.

  6. Disposition of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, the Ukraine and White Russia now in Allied Territories
    The U.S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note10 on this subject.

  7. Ruhr Industrial Area
    The Soviet paper on this question is before the Foreign Ministers but the British have stated they could not discuss the subject without the French.

  8. Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania
    The Foreign Ministers have not yet acted on the latest British proposal for dealing with this subject.

III. Problems before subcommittees

  1. German Fleet and Merchant Marine
    British and Soviet papers on this subject are before the subcommittee.

  2. German External Assets
    A U.S. proposal on this subject was referred to the Economic Sub-committee.

  3. Oil for Western Europe
    The Economic Sub-committee has not yet reported on the U.S. proposal on this subject.

  4. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States
    The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.

  5. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways
    The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.

  6. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary
    The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported.

  7. Directive to the Military Commanders in Germany
    The Sub-committee on this subject is awaiting completion of the work of the Conference in relation to Germany.

  8. Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference
    The Sub-committees are engaged in preparation of these documents.

466

Lane-Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m.

Polish Delegation HQ, 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Lane President Bierut
Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Modzelewski 
860c.00/7-3145: Telegram

The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State

Babelsberg, July 31, 1945
Secret
Victory 444

To Acting Secretary of State from Lane.

Called yesterday on Modzelewski former Polish Ambassador Moscow now Assistant Minister Foreign Affairs, President Bierut and Mikołajczyk also joined group. Following is summary of Modzelewski’s remarks:

  1. Newspaper correspondents should be able to enter Poland before end August. Only present obstacle poor quality telegraphic communications. (As Modzelewski mentioned censorship this may also be reason for short delay.)

  2. Consulates can be established Danzig, Poznan, Lodz and Cracow. (Depending on outcome of western frontier we may suggest Breslau also.)

  3. Rate of exchange for diplomatic corps will have to be arranged. Present rate of eleven zlotys and fraction impossible for us to subsist on.

  4. Policing entirely adequate. Polish Government will furnish sufficient guards. Unnecessary for us bring military detachment. (Shall report further on arrival Warsaw.)

  5. Coal deal being arranged with U.S. here. They want goods in return principally fats, meats and oils.

  6. Requested my personal advice re Oskar Lange as Ambassador to U.S. I replied I thought it might create unfortunate impression because his U.S. Citizenship.

  7. Soviet troops being withdrawn from Poland except for portion west of 1939 west frontier. (Repeated to Moscow and Paris for Lovell.)

  8. Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, French Ambassadors and Swedish and British chargés now in Warsaw.

467

Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Brown

Brown: “… Met with communiqué committee after Foreign Ministers, British and Soviets seemed to like draft. Foote and I had prepared it. All of it had previously been submitted to British. …”

468 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 30, 1945 — 8 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1480

Re your telegram No. 952

  1. There is no reason to believe that Stalin was not informed beforehand on the Potsdam joint declaration and this must be considered only natural, judging from the present relationship among the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Also, for the most part, we can surmise that the above-mentioned joint declaration had some connection with our plan to send the special envoy, i.e., our first request to the Soviet Union on the 13th regarding the dispatch of a special envoy. It can be suspected that the subject was casually mentioned to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam. I believe we can conclude that the recent joint declaration was based on this information and that the three countries – the United States, Great Britain, and China – made a proclamation in an effort to make their stand clear and definite. As to whether or not the declaration of the 26th was made after the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were informed of the first request which I made to Lozovsky on the 25th and also regarding the second request (my telegram No. 1449) on sending the special envoy, all this is not actually too important. Also, in reality, we believe that a discussion was held with Chiang Kai-shek prior to our presentation of the request on the 25th. Nevertheless, it is possible that they have already ferreted out signs of our overtures to conclude a negotiated peace at that time. The only ones who knew the circumstances of that period are Stalin and Molotov, and it is a difficult task to find out the truth. As for our side, I believe there is nothing we can do but to reason as indicated above.

  2. In connection with the above problems, one important point is that by issuing the joint declaration, the United States and Great Britain made persistent demands on Japan to surrender unconditionally immediately, and another important point which they made clear is that they have no intention of relaxing the terms as stated in the declaration. If Stalin sees that it is impossible to shake the will of the United States and Great Britain regarding the above points, it would mean that our request to send the special envoy cannot be accepted and will be futile, regardless of how we explain that our desire to terminate the miserable war is in accordance with the will of our gracious Emperor and that Stalin will be called the advocate of world peace, etc. As for the United States and Great Britain, their contention will be that the only way for Japan to avoid the bloodshed of war is to surrender immediately. Stalin will also exert sufficient heavy pressure on the United States, Great Britain, and China regarding Manchuria, China, Korea, etc., in the event that Japan surrenders. He is also believed to have made up his mind to push through his claim and actually holds the power to do so. Therefore I believe that Stalin feels there is absolutely no necessity for making a voluntary agreement with Japan. On this point I see a serious discrepancy between your view and the actual state of affairs.

Also, attention should be paid to Australian Foreign Minister Evatt’s announcement, as reported by the BBC on the 30th, that he was opposed to the attitude of the joint declaration against Japan since it tends to be more lenient toward Japan than the stand taken by the Allied nations against Germany in the past.

I request that you read through my telegram No. 1476 together with this telegram.

469

Byrnes-Attlee meeting [?]

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Attlee
Foreign Secretary Bevin

Byrnes: “As soon as Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin returned I visited them and, after several hours discussion, obtained their agreement in principle to our proposal [on reparations from Germany].”

470

Mosely-Ward and Mosely-Gusev conversations

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Mr. Ward Mr. Gusev 
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2945

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]

Informed J. G. Ward (UK) and Gousev (USSR) July 30, of U.S. approval and timing arrangement. Telegram to Mr. Winant, July 30.

P[HILIP] E. M[OSELY]

471 
740.00119 EAC/7-3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Babelsberg, July 30, 1945
Top secret
Victory 440

To American Embassy, London, information State Department, Washington, D.C. For Winant.

Re your 65481, July 28, repeated to Department 7606, Comea 345 and re your 65482, July 28, repeated to Department as 7607, Comea 346 and re your 281045, July 28

United States Government has approved three proposed public statements re zones of occupation in Austria, control machinery in Austria and consultation with governments of other United Nations in exercising four-power authority in Austria. US Government approves simultaneous issuance three joint statements in four capitals at a time to be determined in each. Publication of three joint statements should not precede publication of conference communiqué. Each might agree that three joint statements be issued 24 or 48 hours after publication of conference communiqué.

Mosely has informed Gousev of US approval of three statements and of proposal for their issuance immediately after conference communiqué. Gousev has not yet reported re Soviet clearance of three statements and timing of their publication.

BYRNES

472

The Pittsburgh Press (July 30, 1945)

Big Three working on communiqué

Military decisions to be kept secret
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

473

Leaders say ultimatum may shorten Jap war, despite rejection

Army and Navy men hail Truman’s move, hope it means U.S. will keep Pacific bases
By Roy W. Howard

…

474

Col. Palmer: Attlee won’t alter strategy in Pacific

U.S. still will have to do most of job
By Col. Frederick Palmer, North American Newspaper Alliance

…

475

Youngstown Vindicator (July 30, 1945)

Australia raps Potsdam terms offered Japan

…

476

Editorial: Jap Navy ended, but not Jap war

…

477

U.S. State Department (July 30, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 30, 1945 — 10:31 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

1484

Re my telegram No. 1476, item 6

Worried by the delay in the reply from the Soviet side, I met with Lozovsky on the 30th at 5 p.m. and again conveyed our wishes. The following conversation took place:

SATO: I have come to receive your reply concerning our request for assistance by the Government of the Soviet Union to end the war which was presented to your Government on the 25th. Although it was arranged that we should be notified as soon as the reply was ready, since it is now Monday I have come to inquire about your reply.

LOZOVSKY: Since both Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, are now in Berlin, the reply will necessarily take several days to arrive. I regret to say that the reply cannot be delivered yet.

SATO: I fully understand the circumstances. However, the three countries – Great Britain, the United States, and China – issued a joint declaration against Japan on the 26th, pressing unconditional surrender on Japan. Unconditional surrender is, after all, out of the question for the Japanese Government. Our view remains the same as was stated on the 13th, at our meeting before the last. If it is possible to avoid such a formula, however, Japan desires to end the war, with an extremely conciliatory attitude, so long as Japan is guaranteed the nation’s honor and existence. For this purpose we asked the Soviet Government for assistance. I hope that Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, will give special consideration to this point. Although it has not been possible to receive your reply, I shall be happy if you will notify Commissar Molotov that I have come to see the Acting People’s Commissar in order to receive the reply.

LOZOVSKY: I shall do my best to convey Your Excellency’s request to Molotov today by all means.

SATO: I shall be much obliged if you will kindly do so. The Japanese Government has decided to send the Emperor’s most trusted Prince Konoye as special envoy to Moscow. As I explained at previous meetings, the envoy will discuss a wide range of subjects as to how the Japanese Government should work to re-establish peace in the Far East and will seek your Government’s assistance. I shall also appreciate it if you will inform Mr. Molotov that my understanding is that Prince Konoye will be empowered to discuss a wide range of subjects with the Soviet Government. Also, the Japanese Government understands that various reservations and stipulations will be made by the Soviet Union in connection with the Japanese Government’s request for assistance.

LOZOVSKY: I shall arrange as you request immediately.

SATO: The point which I am concerned about is the possibility that the tripartite joint declaration may obstruct the assistance from the Soviet Government which is desired by the Japanese Government. However, since the top leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin, I hope that they will give appropriate consideration to the removal of such obstruction.

LOZOVSKY: I promise again to convey your request.

478

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Monday, July 30:

Secretary Forrestal, General Eisenhower, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Cochrane, General Clay, Commodore Schade and Captain E. B. Taylor, USN, had breakfast with the President. Later they conferred with the President, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed so there was no meeting of the Big Three today.57 The Foreign Secretaries had a very long session however.

1800: Ambassador Pauley called on the President.

1900: Dinner at the Little White House. Sergeant List played a number of Chopin selections – the President’s favorites – during the dinner hour.

479

The Syonan Shimbun (July 31, 1945)

Attlee may request postponement of the Potsdam 3-power conference

…

480

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 31, 1945)

Strengstes Stillschweigen um Potsdam

…

Das Schicksal der Sudetendeutschen

…

481

Australien kritisiert Potsdam

…

482

U.S. State Department (July 31, 1945)

Truman-Rowan conversation, 10 a.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Mr. Rowan