America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 21, 1945 — 5 p.m.
[Translation]
very urgent

1433

Re my telegram No. 1418

It is presumed that there is no connection between the rumored peace proposals in your telegram No. 919 and my telegram No. 1422 and the question of sending a special envoy. However, the Big Three Conference had already started on the 17th. Therefore, it may be presumed that the reply from the Soviet Union on the evening of the 18th mentioned in my previous telegram No. 1417 may have stemmed from the Big Three Conference. If not, it must be taken into consideration that we had proposed sending a special envoy prior to the Big Three Conference and that this matter may have been divulged to the Anglo-American group.

Very little information on that conference is available from radio or other sources. In spite of the paucity of information thereon, it appears that the conference atmosphere is very friendly and that the three leaders are having frequent private meetings. Therefore, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union may take an unforeseeable turn. I am convinced of the necessity for extreme caution.

Text Considered by the Heads of Government

Berlin, July 21, 1945

Statement on the Polish Question

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

[The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property.]

The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of property belonging to the Polish state located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer, in accordance with the requirements of the law, of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer (and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relationship of such advances to any assets of the Polish state available abroad). All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish state which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine.

British version:
(It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they expect that the Polish Provisional Government will give suitable assurances that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens).

Soviet version:
(They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens).

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. (It is the confident hope of the three powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life).

(The three powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections).

860c.01/7-2145

Text Approved by the Heads of Government

[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret

Statement on the Polish Question

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied powers [press] shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m.

The report of the foreign secretaries was read. It was recommended that notice of the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers should be sent to France and China before the public announcement thereof. Minor verbal changes in the draft of the document were also recommended. The economic subcommittee had not yet finished its work. The subcommittee on the Polish question was not fully agreed nor could the foreign secretaries reach a complete agreement on this question and the points of the difference were to be referred to the heads of state.

TRUMAN: The first question then is the Polish question.

BYRNES: The first point of difference relates to the problem of the transfer of assets without mentioning liabilities.

TRUMAN: So far as our laws are concerned, when our assets are transferred, liabilities must be transferred. We do not intend to assume the liability of the old Polish government and give the new Polish government the assets.

CHURCHILL: We are content with the proposals put forward by the President and particularly with the proposition that there can be no release of assets without a consideration of liabilities.

Mr. President, how does your redraft cover liabilities?

BYRNES: It protects the property but deals neither with transfer of assets nor liquidation of liabilities.

CHURCHILL: This is a more serious question for Britain than the United States.

STALIN: Does the British government propose to exact from the Polish government to the full their advances for the Polish forces?

CHURCHILL: No. We will discuss it with the Poles.

STALIN: We gave credits to the Sikorski government. We consider those advances redeemed. The American proposals are accepted but needs [sic] polishing up. I suggest we amend the American proposal.

STALIN offers a verbal amendment but after a little discussion states that the American draft is acceptable as is.

EDEN: This morning, we agreed to compromise by combining the first two sentences of the third paragraph.

STALIN: It is good that Mr. Eden is meeting us half way. If he strikes out reference to the press, we will applaud it. Foreign correspondents came to Poland and they remained there and they are enjoying full freedom. The Poles are very touchy.

CHURCHILL: There is no compromise on that. I had hoped to strengthen this by adding representatives of Allied governments and the press.

STALIN: They are enjoying freedom to report.

TRUMAN: The Poles in America are much interested in the Polish election and this will help the President very much with his Polish constituents.

STALIN: I suggest that we add reference to the press in the preceding sentence.

(This suggestion was accepted)

SECRETARY BYRNES proceeds with reading the report of the foreign secretaries. He points out that consideration of the Yalta agreement was postponed. United States had presented two papers, one on Italy and one on the satellite states. Foreign secretaries agreed to refer these papers to drafting subcommittee. Question was whether there should be two papers or one.

TRUMAN: Italy was first to surrender and terms of surrender were more drastic. We thought that Italy should be considered separately.

STALIN: I have an amendment to the American proposals concerning the policy as to Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland. I have no objection in principle to the American proposal but I want to make an addition to paragraph 2. The three governments should make a statement that they will renew diplomatic relations with the satellite governments.

TRUMAN: I cannot agree.

STALIN: Then these two questions will have to be postponed.

TRUMAN: We will not recognize these governments until they are set up on a satisfactory basis.

CHURCHILL: I dislike to see these questions postponed.

BYRNES: The next questions are Polish western frontier, trusteeships and Turkey.

TRUMAN: I propose that the matters of the Polish frontier be considered at the peace conference after consultation with the Polish government of national unity. We decided that Germany with 1937 boundaries should be considered starting point. We decided on our zones. We moved our troops to the zones assigned to us. Now another occupying government has been assigned a zone without consultation with us. We cannot arrive at reparations and other problems of Germany if Germany is divided up before the peace conference. I am very friendly to Poland and sympathetic with what Russia proposes regarding the western frontier, but I do not want to do it that way.

STALIN: The Crimea decision was that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line. As to the western frontier, it was decided that Poland was to receive territory in the west and north in compensation.

TRUMAN: That is right, but I am against assigning an occupation zone to Poland.

STALIN: The new Polish government has already expressed its views on boundaries. What is our proposal for the Polish western frontier?

TRUMAN: I understand that the Secretary of State has received a communication from the new Polish government but I have not seen it.

STALIN: Our view is that we should express our view in accordance with that of the Polish government, but final question should be left to the peace conference. As to our giving the Poles a zone of occupation without consulting the other powers, this is not accurate. We received several proposals from the American and British governments that we should not permit the Poles in the disputed western frontier area. We could not follow this because German population fled and Poles remained. Our armies needed local administrations. Our armies are not set up to fight and clear country of enemy agents at the same time. We so informed our British and American friends. The more ready we were to let the Polish administration function, the more we were sure the Poles would receive territory to the west. I do not see the harm of permitting the Poles to set up administrations in territories in which they are to remain.

TRUMAN: I wanted the administrations in the four zones to be as we have agreed. We cannot agree on reparations if parts of Germany are given away.

STALIN: We are concerned about reparations but we will take this risk.

TRUMAN: We are not concerned about reparations for ourselves but we do not want to pay reparations as we did before.

STALIN: The western frontier of Poland then remains open and no discussions are binding on us.

CHURCHILL: I have a good deal to say on the line, but I don’t think from what the President has said that this is the time.

STALIN: It will be more difficult to restore territory as the German population has fled.

TRUMAN: The Poles may remain under the Russian occupation.

STALIN: Our practice is as follows. An army is fighting when the war is on. Its efforts are concentrated on the war. To advance, it must have a quiet rear. An army can fight the enemy but it cannot at the same time fight well with the enemy in its rear. It needs the quiet and, if possible, a sympathetic rear. Even if the Germans have not fled, it would be difficult to use Germans as the majority in the area are Polish. Imagine a situation where the Germans shrink or flee and the Polish population receives us. It is natural under those circumstances to set up a sympathetic administration. There was no other way out. But that does not mean that we determined ourselves a frontier. If you do not agree, the matter can be arranged later.

CHURCHILL: It is from these regions that a very important part of the supplies from which Germany is to be fed come.

STALIN: Who will work in these areas? There is no one but the Poles who will plow the land.

TRUMAN: The question is not who occupies the country, but how we stand on the question as to who is to occupy Germany. I want it understood that the Soviet [Union] is occupying this zone and is responsible for it. I don’t think we are far apart on our conclusions.

STALIN: On paper it is formerly German territory but in fact it is Polish territory. There are no Germans left. The Soviet [Union] is responsible for the territory.

TRUMAN: Where are the nine million Germans?

STALIN: They have fled.

CHURCHILL: How can they be fed? I am told that under the Polish plan put forward by the Soviets that a quarter of arable land of Germany would be alienated – one-fourth of all the arable land from which German food and reparations must come. The Poles come from the East but 8¼ [8½?] million Germans are misplaced [displaced]. It is apparent that a disproportionate part of the population will be cast on the rest of Germany with its food supplies alienated.

TRUMAN: France wants the Saar and the Ruhr. What will be left?

STALIN: As regards the claims of France, we have made no decision. As to the Poles, we have.

CHURCHILL: As to the Marshal’s figures that all Germans have fled, we should bear in mind that there are other figures indicating that two or three million Germans remain.

STALIN: We discussed the question of frontiers but we are getting into the question of food supplies for Germany.

CHURCHILL: We are only considering complications which arise from the frontier question.

STALIN: I fully appreciate this burden and the difficulties of supply, but the Germans are principally to blame for these difficulties. Mr. Churchill has cited the figure of 8K million Germans in this area, but bear in mind that the men from this area were conscripted in this area several times and others fled. They got word that the Russians were to be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than the Poles. Now, look at the turn of events. In the west between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans have quit their fields and these are being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles will agree to let the Germans cultivate these lands.

TRUMAN: Again I want to make it clear that our zone agreement should be kept. I do not think we can settle boundaries here.

CHURCHILL: Of course I am deeply committed to compensate Poland for what has been taken from her, but I thought there should be a balance. Poland is now claiming a vastly more territory than she gave up. I cannot concede that such an extravagant movement of populations should occur. So vast a movement of population will be a great shock to public opinion to [in] my country at least. It puts us in a position that I cannot possibly defend. I do not think it is good for Poland. If the Germans have run out they should be encouraged to return. The Poles have no right to create a catastrophe in the feeding of Germany. I press my point in hope that the Marshal will appreciate the difficulties. We do not wish to be left with a vast German population on our hands deprived of its food supply. Take your population of the Ruhr. If enough food is not found we may be confronted with conditions like those in the German concentration camps, even on a vaster scale.

STALIN: Germany has never done without the import of grain. Let Germany buy more bread from Poland. The territory is cultivated by the Poles, not the Germans.

CHURCHILL: In addition, the condition of this territory into which Poles are being introduced is most peculiar. I am told the Poles are selling coal from Silesia to Sweden when we in England must go through a bitter, fireless winter, worse than that experienced during the war. We stand on the general principle that the supply of food of 1937 Germany should be available for the support of the German people irrespective of the zones of occupation.

STALIN: But who is to produce the coal? It is the Poles who are mining the coal.

CHURCHILL: They fled from the cannons. Now that the firing has ceased they should come back.

STALIN: We have little sympathy with these scoundrels and war criminals.

CHURCHILL: I was impressed by what the Marshal said yesterday about not letting past bitterness color our decisions.

STALIN: What I said yesterday does not apply to war criminals. I had in mind only the proprietors who have fled. We ourselves are purchasing coal from the Poles who are mining it.

TRUMAN: I am concerned that a piece of Germany, a valuable piece has been cut off. This must be deemed a part of Germany in considering reparations and in the feeding of Germany. The Poles have no right to seize this territory now and take it out of the peace settlement. Are we going to maintain occupied zones until the peace or are we going to give Germany away piece-meal?

STALIN: Nobody can exploit this region but the Poles. Are [We] are short of labor for our own enterprises. There are no Germans in this area. Herr Goebbels’ propaganda has achieved its purpose. No production comes from this area except from the Poles. We cannot take coal from them for nothing. The Silesian mines have always been mined by a large number of Polish miners.

CHURCHILL: There is no objection to the Poles’ mining this area for the Russian occupiers of the zone.

STALIN: It is not possible. It would disturb all normal relations between the two states. The Germans themselves were short of labor. Most of the enterprises were employing foreign forced labor and when Russian troops entered the region these foreign laborers went back to their own country. Most of the Germans had been called up for the army. They were killed or taken captive. These enterprises must now be closed down or must be worked by the Poles. That is the situation as it spontaneously arose. No one but the Germans are to blame. As to Mr. Churchill’s claims that the Poles are receiving too much, undoubtedly Polish proposal creates difficulty for Germany, but Germany created this situation.

CHURCHILL: This situation creates difficulties for us as well as for the Germans.

STALIN: We may have to create further difficulty for the Germans then. The less industry we leave in Germany, the more markets there will be for your goods. We have destroyed for you a competitor with low living standards and low prices.

ATTLEE: From the point of view of the occupying power, we are faced with a country in chaos, formerly, an economic unit depending for its food and coal from [upon?] the eastern areas partly inhabited by Poles. If part of Germany is detached, it puts an onerous burden on occupying states in the west and south. If labor is needed for exploiting the eastern areas, it should be available from western Germany. Pending final settlement that labor force should be directed to where it can be employed so as to relieve the western allies from an impossible burden.

TRUMAN: I shall state frankly what I think. I cannot consent to the removal of eastern Germany from contributing to the economy of the whole of Germany.

STALIN: Are we through?

CHURCHILL: Can’t we sleep on it?

Adjourned.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Babelsberg, July 21, 1945]
Top secret

Status of Problems Before the Conference

I. Problems on which substantial agreement has been reached

  1. Council of Foreign Ministers. This proposal has been substantially approved, although the Drafting Committee has been asked to make minor textual improvements. London has been fixed as the place of meeting, and the date is set at September 1 at the latest. A telegram of invitation is being drafted to the French and Chinese Governments.

  2. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions. A revised document on this subject has received final approval.

  3. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

  4. Austria and Vienna. The EAC agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery for Austria and Vienna having been finally approved, the Soviets have agreed that U.S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones.

  5. The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement. A document on this matter has received final approval.

II. Problems pending for consideration before the heads of government or foreign ministers

  1. German Economic Questions. The Subcommittee has reported on this question, and the report is ready for consideration.

  2. Italian and Austrian Reparations. This matter has been referred to the Subcommittee which has been dealing with German economic questions.

  3. Oil for Western Europe. The U.S. has circulated a paper urging that oil from Rumania, Hungary, and Austria be made available to Western Europe.

  4. Italy and Spain in the United Nations. Two papers have been prepared on this question, one supporting Italy’s claim to become a member of the United Nations as soon as the peace treaty has been concluded, the other supporting, in general, the entry of other neutrals into the United Nations but opposing the entry of Spain as long as the present regime remains in power.

  5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States. A revised U.S. paper on this subject has been circulated and is ready for consideration.

  6. Italy and the Other Satellite States. The U.S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U.S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present Governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, this question should not be discussed further.

  7. Rumanian Oil. The British have presented a paper, which was referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Ministers, protesting the seizure by the Soviets of British-owned oil equipment in Rumania.

  8. The Western Boundary of Poland. This question has been discussed inconclusively by the Big Three.

  9. Trusteeship. The Russians have presented a paper on this subject but it has not yet been discussed.

  10. Turkey. This has been placed on the agenda of the Big Three by the British but has not yet been discussed.

  11. Withdrawal of Troops from Iran. The British have circulated a paper on this subject, which is now ready for consideration.

III. Problems which have been discussed and dropped without agreement

  1. Yugoslavia. The British raised the question of the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia but, in the absence of support for their position, have apparently decided not to press the matter.

IV. Questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been raised before the conference

  1. U.S. Proposals
    a. Soviet Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
    This matter has not yet been discussed at all.

    b. Admission of American Press Correspondents into Eastern Europe
    This question has not been raised as a separate issue but is being dealt with in connection with the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and will presumably not be raised as a separate problem.

  2. British Proposals
    a. War Crimes
    This question has not been discussed at all.

  3. Soviet Proposals
    a. Tangier.
    b. The Levant.

Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m.

Stalin’s quarters at Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Fleet Admiral Leahy Lord Leathers Mr. Beriya
Mr. Davies Major Birse Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Pauley Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky

The question of war booty was discussed.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 21, 1945)

Halsey ready for new attack

Fleet refueled at sea, Japs say; planes hit foe 45th day in row

Allies to try war criminals in Nuremberg

Prosecutors will fly to Nazi shrine city

Progress reported at Big Three meeting by U.S. delegation

‘Much serious business has been done,’ delegation says; sessions held daily
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Navy studies point system for discharges

Age and service only factors

Japs have no gas, Mitscher believes

Gives reason for Nips’ failure to attack

Chinese at edge of key air base

Reach within mile of Kweilin

WLB ignores state laws as it upholds union policy

Florida’s right-to-work amendment not binding, federal board declares

U-boat escape by Hitler scouted


U.S. subs bag 11 more Jap ships

Hiring of veterans causes bus strike

I DARE SAY —
Sweet land!

By Florence Fisher Parry

Bus drivers go on strike at Warren, Ohio

Telephone operators continue walkout

In Washington –
United Nations food plan faces Senate vote today

Measure asks U.S. participation in world agriculture proposal

Coal-for-Europe backed by Truman

Fuel considered key to political unrest


Soldier loses race to see dying son

Nationalists dangle bait for vets, but their aim’s not to help them

Instead it’s busy promoting dissension
By Eugene Segal, Scripps-Howard staff writer