Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Stimson-Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Bundy Lord Cherwell

Stimson’s diary entry: “I then left the ‘Little White House’, picked up Bundy, and went to the Prime Minister’s house where we conferred with him and Lord Cherwell. I turned over the paper to Churchill and he began reading it but was interrupted a few minutes before five in order to hurry to the Big Three Conference at five o’clock. He asked me to return on the following morning to finish up the report.”

Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pauley Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev
Mr. Davies Sir William Strang Mr. Novikov
Mr. Dunn Major Birse Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Clayton Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Bohlen

Department of State Minutes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m.
Top secret

The meeting of the Heads of States opened at 5:15 p.m. on Saturday, July 21, 1945. THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that the Secretary of State had a report to deliver.

MR. BYRNES delivered a report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the morning of July 21, 1945 (copy of report attached). Mr. Byrnes read the portions of this report dealing with the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions.

MR. BYRNES then reported that the Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with the Polish question, including the liquidation of the London Government and the implementation of the Yalta declaration, had presented the subcommittee’s report. Since the subcommittee had been unable to reach full agreement, points of disagreement were first discussed by the Foreign Ministers who were likewise unable to reach agreement and had agreed to refer the matter to the Heads of Government for final decision.

MR. BYRNES called attention to the difference existing in connection with the second paragraph of the proposed statement on the Polish question. (Annex 2). This paragraph concerns the question of the transfer to the Polish Provisional Government of assets and property belonging to the Polish state located in the United States and Great Britain. After reading this paragraph, Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was desired to act on this question while it was fresh in the minds of the Heads of State rather than proceed to the other points.

STALIN asked that Mr. Byrnes proceed with his report.

MR. BYRNES stated that on the third paragraph of the report there was no disagreement, but that on the fourth paragraph disagreement existed. Mr. Eden had agreed to the withdrawal of this paragraph, provided that the last sentence was retained and a new paragraph added regarding freedom of the press. He read the proposed new paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT stated that in the United States it was impossible to transfer assets without taking liabilities into account, either legally or otherwise. As he had stated before, there was no intention in the United States for America to assume burdens of this sort. It was therefore absolutely necessary for liabilities to be taken into consideration. We will give the Polish Provisional Government everything coming to it and we want to be friendly.

CHURCHILL stated that the British were content with the President’s proposal, particularly the words stating that assets would not be released except on condition that liabilities would be assumed. Churchill went on to ask how the re-draft of paragraph two of the statement on the Polish question covered the question of liabilities.

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Byrnes to read the paragraph again.

MR. BYRNES stated that the language made no specific mention either of assets or liabilities and then read the paragraph in question.

CHURCHILL repeated that this paragraph dealt neither with assets nor liabilities.

THE PRESIDENT stated that we were proposing to deal with the Polish Provisional Government under American law.

CHURCHILL remarked that there is no provision at all in the case of the British for any transfer of liabilities, particularly in connection with the 120 million (pounds) advanced by the British Government to the former Polish Government in London.

MR. BYRNES stated that there is not. It is the American position that the settlement of property rights is a matter that lays between the Polish Provisional Government and the United States Government.

CHURCHILL inquired whether the same position would apply to the British.

MR. BYRNES answered that it would, of course, and also to the Soviet Government. He saw no reason for a special declaration by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government or the United States on the transfer of property to the Polish Provisional Government.

CHURCHILL stated his understanding that we were abandoning arrangements for the transfer of the assets and liabilities insofar as this conference is concerned. He pointed out that it is a much more serious question for the British than for the United States, since the British had made much larger grants to the Polish Government.

THE PRESIDENT stated he believed that it was not necessary to single out the United States or United Kingdom Governments for a special statement. The United States meets its obligations and always has.

STALIN asked whether the British Government proposed to exact from the Polish Provisional Government full return for advances granted to Polish forces.

CHURCHILL replied that this matter would be discussed with the Polish Provisional Government.

STALIN then said that the Soviet Union had granted large credits to the Polish Provisional Government and to Polish forces. It is the Soviet opinion that Polish forces have redeemed these advances and that the account is regarded as closed. He believed the American proposal to be acceptable, but it needed polishing. He suggested an amendment to the American proposal which was read. The differences between the two texts will be that there will be none of the usual juridical delay.

THE PRESIDENT stated that there is no intent on the part of the United States to procrastinate.

STALIN then stated that the proposal might be accepted as is.

THE PRESIDENT thanked him and asked that the Conference pass to the next paragraph.

MR. BYRNES stated that the next paragraph concerned the holding of elections. The issue would be presented by Mr. Eden on behalf of the British.

MR. EDEN suggested the deletion of certain words.

STALIN remarked that it was good of Mr. Eden to come part of the way and suggested that in the interests of the dignity of Poland it would be well if Mr. Eden could take another step. He stated that the preceding paragraph embodied everything necessary regarding freedom of the press. Press correspondents remain in Poland and enjoy freedom. There is no use repeating. The Poles are very touchy and will be hurt. They will suspect us of accusing them of being unwilling to accord a free press. Therefore, Stalin suggested that the document end with the paragraph regarding the election in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part.

CHURCHILL stated that this suggestion was in no way a compromise.

STALIN replied that it was a compromise insofar as the Polish Provisional Government is concerned.

CHURCHILL remarked that he had hoped to strengthen the declaration rather than weaken it.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the United States is very much interested in the Polish elections. There are six million Poles in the United States. A free election in Poland reported to the United States by a free press would make it much easier to deal with these Polish people. The President stated that it seemed to him that the Polish Provisional Government knew that the Three Powers would expect the press freely to report the elections and would expect this matter to be raised.

STALIN said that he could see that this compromise is not acceptable and then suggested an amendment of the last paragraph which was read.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this amendment suited him.

CHURCHILL asked whether the President was content and pointed out that the paragraph was now governed by the word “note.” However, Churchill believed that the amendment was all right and did not make much difference.

MR. BYRNES then read section IV of the report of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. This concerned the implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and the satellite states. It had been decided to postpone discussion of this paper to allow time for further study. Mr. Byrnes next read section V of the report regarding Italy and the other satellite states.

THE PRESIDENT stated that on the first day of the meeting the American Government had presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward the satellite states. He remarked that the surrender terms for Italy were much more drastic than the surrender terms for those other satellite states which surrendered later. The American Government felt that there should be two separate papers on these matters, rather than one.

STALIN stated that he had an amendment to make to the American proposal concerning policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. He had no objection in principle to the American proposal. However, he wanted an addition made to paragraph two, which he read. This amendment, among other things, provided for recognition of the governments of these countries.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he could not agree to this amendment.

STALIN then said that the two questions would have to be postponed, since Italy could not be dealt with alone.

THE PRESIDENT stated that the American Government was unable to recognize the governments of the other satellite countries. When these countries were established on a proper basis, the United States would recognize them and not before. The President stated that the meeting would proceed and that this question would be passed over.

CHURCHILL pointed out that time was passing, that the Heads of State had been here for a week and that many papers had been passed over. On this point he wanted to say that the position of the British Government was similar to that of the United States.

MR. BYRNES then read section VI of the report dealing with the agenda set by the Foreign Ministers in their morning meeting for the present meeting of the Heads of State. The remaining matters dealt with the Polish western frontiers, trusteeships and Turkey.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he wished to make a statement regarding the Polish frontiers. As the Crimean Declaration read it was decided that Germany would be occupied by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, and that the Polish frontiers would be favorably considered by the four governments but that final settlement of these frontiers would be effected at the peace conference. During the first [second] day’s meeting it was decided that in considering the boundary of Germany the 1937 frontiers would be the point of departure. The three governments had decided upon the zones and their boundaries had been set. We have already gone back to the zone assigned to us and the British have done the same. It now appears as if another occupying government was being assigned a zone. This was being done without consultation. If the Poles were occupying a zone this should have been agreed on. The President stated that he was unable to see how reparations or other questions could be decided if Germany was carved up. These matters should be considered at the present conference. He was very friendly toward the Polish Provisional Government and it is probable that full agreement could be reached on what the Soviet Government desires, but he wanted consultation.

STALIN replied that the Crimean decision says that the three Heads of Government felt that the eastern frontiers should follow the Curzon line.19 In regard to the western frontiers, it was decided that Poland should receive cessions of territory in the north and west. The declaration goes on to say that the three Heads of Government had decided that a new Polish government should consult at the appropriate time on the final settlement of the western frontiers.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this was correct, but that it was not correct to assign a zone. He agreed with Stalin’s reading of the Crimean declaration.

STALIN stated that on the basis of the Crimean declaration the Polish Provisional Government had already stated its views in regard to the western frontiers.

THE PRESIDENT replied that this had not been done to the United States Government to his knowledge.

STALIN remarked that he had in mind the Polish Provisional Government.

THE PRESIDENT then stated that he now understood that the Secretary of State yesterday had received a communication from the Polish Provisional Government which he, the President, had not seen.

STALIN stated that the Soviet Union proposed that the Conference express an opinion on the wishes of the Polish Government regarding the western frontiers. It made no difference whether this was done today or tomorrow. The final settlement would, of course, be left to the peace conference. In regard to the statement that the Russians had given the Poles a zone of occupation without agreement, Stalin claimed that this was not quite accurate. Several communications had been received from the American and British Governments to the effect that Polish administration should not be established in certain areas until the western frontiers had been finally set. The Soviet Union could not accept the suggestions, since the German population in these areas had followed the German army to the west and the Poles had remained. The Red Army had needed local administration in this territory, since it was not accustomed to setting up an administration, fighting and clearing out enemy agents at the same time. The American and British Governments had been so informed. The Soviet Government was more ready to permit the functioning of the Polish administration, since Poland was to receive territorial cessions in the west. He was unable to see what harm was done by the establishment of a Polish administration where only Poles remained.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had no objection to an expression of opinion regarding the western frontiers, however, he wanted it distinctly understood that the zones of occupation will be as established. Any other course will make reparations very difficult, particularly if part of the German territory is gone before agreement is reached on what reparations should be.

STALIN replied that the Soviet Union was not afraid of the reparations question and would if necessary renounce them.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the United States would get no reparations anyhow. This made no difference. We were trying to keep from paying more, as we did before.

STALIN remarked that everything the President said was interpretative since no frontiers had been ceded at the Crimea except for the provision that Poland would receive territory. The western frontier question is open and the Soviet Union is not bound.

THE PRESIDENT repeated: “You are not?”

STALIN replied: “No.”

CHURCHILL said that he had a good deal to say about the actual line, but gathered that the time for saying it was not yet.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was not possible for the Heads of State to settle this question. It was a matter for the peace conference.

STALIN remarked that it would be very difficult to restore a German administration to this area. Stalin stated that he would like the President to understand the Russian conception, to which they adhered both in war and during the occupation. An army fights in war and cares only for its efforts to win the war. To enable an army to win and advance it must have a quiet rear. An army cannot fight the enemy and the rear. It fights well if the rear is quiet and better if the rear is friendly. Even if the Germans had not fled, it would have been difficult to set up a German administration in these areas since the majority of the population was Polish. He asked the President to imagine the establishment of a German administration which would stab one in the back while the Poles were there who received the Soviet army enthusiastically. Since such a situation existed, it was natural that the Soviet Government set up an administration of friends.

THE PRESIDENT stated his agreement and sympathy for this situation but pointed out that there were other aspects of the matter.

STALIN insisted that there was no other way out. Soviet action does not imply that the Russians had settled the question themselves. If the President did not agree, the question should be suspended.

CHURCHILL inquired whether the question could be suspended. There is also the question of supply, which is very urgent. The region in question is a very important source of food from which Germany is to be fed.

STALIN asked who will work to produce the grain; who will plow the fields; this must be borne in mind.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that each was stating in a friendly way his own point of view. The question was not one of who occupied an area, but a question of the occupation of Germany. We occupy our zone, the British theirs, the French theirs, and the Soviet Union should occupy theirs. There is no objection to the discussion of the western frontiers. The President did not believe that they were far apart on this matter.

STALIN insisted that on paper these areas constituted German territory, but practically, they were Polish territories since there is no German population.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that nine million Germans are a lot.

STALIN maintained that they had all fled.

CHURCHILL remarked that in case this was true consideration should be given to the means of feeding them in the regions to which they had fled, as the produce of the land they had left was not available to nourish Germany. Churchill stated his understanding that under the full Polish plan put forward by the Soviet Government, one quarter of the total arable land of 1937 Germany would be alienated from the German area on which food and reparations were based. This was tremendous. Insofar as the populations were concerned, it appeared that three to four million people would be moved from east of the Curzon line, but the pre-war population of the German territory to be transferred amounted to 8¼ [8½?] millions. It was apparent that it was a serious matter to effect wholesale transfers of German populations and burden the remainder of Germany with their care if their food supply had been alienated.

THE PRESIDENT interjected to ask where we would be if we gave France the Saar and the Ruhr.

STALIN replied that the Soviet Government had not made a decision in regard to French claims but had done so in regard to the western frontier of Poland.

CHURCHILL remarked that in regard to Stalin’s statement that all Germans had left the areas in question there are figures showing that there are about two and a half millions left. This should be explored.

STALIN stated that the questions of frontiers had been up for discussion but that the Conference was now on the question of food supplies. He had no objection.

CHURCHILL replied that he had only wanted to point out the implications of this question.

STALIN stated that the Soviet Union fully appreciated the burden and admitted the difficulties which would arise from the transfer of this territory but that the German people were principally to blame for these difficulties. Churchill had quoted the figure of eight and a half million, said to be the population of this area. It should be remembered that there had been several call-ups during the war and that the rest of the population had left before the Soviet Army. They had found that the Stettin population of 500,000 had almost entirely disappeared, only 8,000 remaining. The majority of the Germans had gone west behind the line. Some, however, had gone to the Koenigsberg area since they had heard that the Russians would be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than with the Poles. No single German remained in the territory to be given Poland. Between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans had quitted their fields which are now being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles would agree to the return of these Germans. This situation should be borne in mind.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he wanted again to declare that the occupation zones should be occupied as agreed upon. The question of whether the Poles should have part of Germany cannot be settled here.

CHURCHILL stated that he agreed to compensation for Poland at the expense of Germany for that territory taken from the east of the Curzon Line. However, he had thought that a balance would be maintained. Poland was now taking a far greater territory than that they lost. This could not be for the good of Europe. Millions of people would be moved across the Curzon Line and other millions would be moved elsewhere. These vast transfers of population constituted a great shock to his country. It would seem to bring about a position not possible for him. Moreover, he did not believe that it was good for Poland. If it was true that the Germans have run away, they should be encouraged to come back. Poland which owes all to the Great Powers has no right to bring about a catastrophe. He wanted to emphasize these things since he was anxious that Stalin should see our difficulties. We see his. We do not want to be left with a German population deprived of sources of food supply. Take the immense population of the Ruhr which is in the British zone. If food is not found, we might be confronted with a condition similar to that in the German concentration camps but on a far larger scale.

STALIN maintained that Germany had always had to import food and will need to continue.

CHURCHILL replied that this was certainly true if their feeding grounds were taken.

STALIN remarked that the Germans could buy food from the Poles.

CHURCHILL insisted that he did not admit that this territory is Polish.

STALIN stated that the territory is inhabited by Poles who cultivated the fields, not by Germans. It is impossible to ask the Poles to cultivate the fields and give the food to the Germans.

CHURCHILL pointed out that certain conditions in this great area in which Poles have been introduced are most peculiar. He understands that the Poles are selling Silesian coal to Sweden. They are doing so at a time when England had to go through a fireless winter. Great Britain stands on the general principle that the supply of food from the 1937 German territories should be available to the whole German people in proportion to their number irrespective of the particular zone in which the food is produced.

STALIN asked who is to produce the coal. The Germans do not, the Poles are producing the coal.

CHURCHILL said, “You mean the Silesians?”

STALIN said they all fled.

CHURCHILL remarked that they had fled from fright and could now return.

STALIN stated that these people were reluctant to return and that the Soviet Union is not in sympathy with them. He was afraid that the Poles would hang them if they returned.

CHURCHILL then remarked that he had been deeply impressed by what Stalin had said about the mistake of letting past bitterness influence future problems. We should not have a mass of people dumped upon us, while the Poles acquire food which the Germans need.

STALIN replied that what he had said yesterday did not apply to war criminals.

CHURCHILL interjected that surely the eight and a half million were not war criminals.

STALIN stated that he had in mind the proprietors. He went on to state that the Soviet Union is purchasing coal from Poland since Russia has coal shortages.

THE PRESIDENT stated that it seems to be an accomplished fact that a large piece of Germany has been given to the Poles. The United States is short of coal but has made arrangements to ship considerable quantities to Europe. The Silesian mines are a part of Germany for reparations and feeding purposes. Under these conditions we will talk about boundaries but the Poles have no right to take this territory now and remove it from the German economy. Simply stated, the case is are the zones valid until peace, or are we giving Germany away piecemeal.

STALIN insisted that no one can exploit this region but the Poles. Russia is short of labor and there are no Germans there. Apparently German propaganda had carried the day. Either all production would be stopped or the Poles would operate it.

STALIN pointed out that the Poles operated in their country rich coal areas. Now Silesia had been added. The Poles are now working the mines. We cannot take their coal for nothing.

CHURCHILL pointed out that the Silesian mines had always operated with large numbers of Polish miners. There is no objection to the mines being operated as an agency of the Soviet Government but not for the Polish Government.

STALIN stated that this was not possible because it would disturb normal relations between two states. He would like to draw Churchill’s attention to the fact that there is a serious German shortage of labor. Most enterprises during the advance of the Soviet army employed foreign labor. When Russian troops entered, the foreign labor had been freed and the laborers went home. Where have the German workers gone? They are either killed or captured. Such is the situation. A vast German industry existed with few German laborers. Everything fell to pieces before our army. Either these enterprises are closed or the local population, here, the Poles, should be given a chance to work. This is not a result of deliberate policy but the result of a situation. No one but Germany is to blame. In regard to Churchill’s statement about the western frontier to the effect that Poland was getting too much, he agreed that the Provisional Government’s proposal for territory would create difficulties for Germany.

CHURCHILL interjected, “For us all.”

STALIN went on to state that our policy is to create difficulty for the Germans in order to make it difficult for German power to rise again. It was better to make difficulties for the Germans than for the Poles.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that it was bad to create difficulties for the Allies.

STALIN stated that the less industry there was in Germany the greater the market would be for American and British goods. He asked what is the best. We had brought the state which competed with our countries to its knees. Germany was a dangerous business rival because it had lower living standards. He repeated, “What is best.”

CHURCHILL remarked that we did not wish to be confronted by a mass of starving people.

STALIN replied “there will be none.”

CHURCHILL said that Mr. Attlee wished to make a statement.

MR. ATTLEE stated that he wanted to say in regard to the immediate situation on the part of the occupation powers that aside from the boundaries between Germany and Poland we are faced with a country in chaos and a country which as an economic unit depends to a considerable extent for coal and food on the eastern area partly inhabited by Poles. It would seem that pending the final settlement the resources of the whole 1937 Germany would have to bear a first charge on the sustenance of the whole people and if a part of Germany is to be detached in anticipation, it would be a very heavy burden on the powers charged with the occupation of the western and southern zones. Any labor needed to exploit the eastern areas should be made available from the rest of Germany including released army forces. They should be directed to such places as they can work most usefully. The Allies should not be confronted by an impossibly difficult situation.

STALIN replied that Mr. Attlee should bear in mind that Poland is also an Ally.

ATTLEE replied that this was so but it should not be compensated at the expense of the rest of the Allies.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to make a frank statement of what he thought. He could not agree to the separation of the eastern part of Germany under these circumstances. This must be considered in connection with reparations and the supply problems of the whole German people.

STALIN said, Are we through today?

THE PRESIDENT replied that the Conference had apparently reached an impasse on this matter.

CHURCHILL added that they were not through but that there were more agreeable things to come. He suggested later consideration.

THE PRESIDENT announced that the Conference was adjourned until 5 p.m. on July 22.

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 21, 1945 — 5 p.m.
[Translation]
very urgent

1433

Re my telegram No. 1418

It is presumed that there is no connection between the rumored peace proposals in your telegram No. 919 and my telegram No. 1422 and the question of sending a special envoy. However, the Big Three Conference had already started on the 17th. Therefore, it may be presumed that the reply from the Soviet Union on the evening of the 18th mentioned in my previous telegram No. 1417 may have stemmed from the Big Three Conference. If not, it must be taken into consideration that we had proposed sending a special envoy prior to the Big Three Conference and that this matter may have been divulged to the Anglo-American group.

Very little information on that conference is available from radio or other sources. In spite of the paucity of information thereon, it appears that the conference atmosphere is very friendly and that the three leaders are having frequent private meetings. Therefore, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union may take an unforeseeable turn. I am convinced of the necessity for extreme caution.

Text Considered by the Heads of Government

Berlin, July 21, 1945

Statement on the Polish Question

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

[The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property.]

The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of property belonging to the Polish state located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer, in accordance with the requirements of the law, of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer (and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relationship of such advances to any assets of the Polish state available abroad). All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish state which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine.

British version:
(It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they expect that the Polish Provisional Government will give suitable assurances that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens).

Soviet version:
(They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens).

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. (It is the confident hope of the three powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life).

(The three powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections).

860c.01/7-2145

Text Approved by the Heads of Government

[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret

Statement on the Polish Question

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied powers [press] shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections.

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m.

The report of the foreign secretaries was read. It was recommended that notice of the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers should be sent to France and China before the public announcement thereof. Minor verbal changes in the draft of the document were also recommended. The economic subcommittee had not yet finished its work. The subcommittee on the Polish question was not fully agreed nor could the foreign secretaries reach a complete agreement on this question and the points of the difference were to be referred to the heads of state.

TRUMAN: The first question then is the Polish question.

BYRNES: The first point of difference relates to the problem of the transfer of assets without mentioning liabilities.

TRUMAN: So far as our laws are concerned, when our assets are transferred, liabilities must be transferred. We do not intend to assume the liability of the old Polish government and give the new Polish government the assets.

CHURCHILL: We are content with the proposals put forward by the President and particularly with the proposition that there can be no release of assets without a consideration of liabilities.

Mr. President, how does your redraft cover liabilities?

BYRNES: It protects the property but deals neither with transfer of assets nor liquidation of liabilities.

CHURCHILL: This is a more serious question for Britain than the United States.

STALIN: Does the British government propose to exact from the Polish government to the full their advances for the Polish forces?

CHURCHILL: No. We will discuss it with the Poles.

STALIN: We gave credits to the Sikorski government. We consider those advances redeemed. The American proposals are accepted but needs [sic] polishing up. I suggest we amend the American proposal.

STALIN offers a verbal amendment but after a little discussion states that the American draft is acceptable as is.

EDEN: This morning, we agreed to compromise by combining the first two sentences of the third paragraph.

STALIN: It is good that Mr. Eden is meeting us half way. If he strikes out reference to the press, we will applaud it. Foreign correspondents came to Poland and they remained there and they are enjoying full freedom. The Poles are very touchy.

CHURCHILL: There is no compromise on that. I had hoped to strengthen this by adding representatives of Allied governments and the press.

STALIN: They are enjoying freedom to report.

TRUMAN: The Poles in America are much interested in the Polish election and this will help the President very much with his Polish constituents.

STALIN: I suggest that we add reference to the press in the preceding sentence.

(This suggestion was accepted)

SECRETARY BYRNES proceeds with reading the report of the foreign secretaries. He points out that consideration of the Yalta agreement was postponed. United States had presented two papers, one on Italy and one on the satellite states. Foreign secretaries agreed to refer these papers to drafting subcommittee. Question was whether there should be two papers or one.

TRUMAN: Italy was first to surrender and terms of surrender were more drastic. We thought that Italy should be considered separately.

STALIN: I have an amendment to the American proposals concerning the policy as to Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland. I have no objection in principle to the American proposal but I want to make an addition to paragraph 2. The three governments should make a statement that they will renew diplomatic relations with the satellite governments.

TRUMAN: I cannot agree.

STALIN: Then these two questions will have to be postponed.

TRUMAN: We will not recognize these governments until they are set up on a satisfactory basis.

CHURCHILL: I dislike to see these questions postponed.

BYRNES: The next questions are Polish western frontier, trusteeships and Turkey.

TRUMAN: I propose that the matters of the Polish frontier be considered at the peace conference after consultation with the Polish government of national unity. We decided that Germany with 1937 boundaries should be considered starting point. We decided on our zones. We moved our troops to the zones assigned to us. Now another occupying government has been assigned a zone without consultation with us. We cannot arrive at reparations and other problems of Germany if Germany is divided up before the peace conference. I am very friendly to Poland and sympathetic with what Russia proposes regarding the western frontier, but I do not want to do it that way.

STALIN: The Crimea decision was that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line. As to the western frontier, it was decided that Poland was to receive territory in the west and north in compensation.

TRUMAN: That is right, but I am against assigning an occupation zone to Poland.

STALIN: The new Polish government has already expressed its views on boundaries. What is our proposal for the Polish western frontier?

TRUMAN: I understand that the Secretary of State has received a communication from the new Polish government but I have not seen it.

STALIN: Our view is that we should express our view in accordance with that of the Polish government, but final question should be left to the peace conference. As to our giving the Poles a zone of occupation without consulting the other powers, this is not accurate. We received several proposals from the American and British governments that we should not permit the Poles in the disputed western frontier area. We could not follow this because German population fled and Poles remained. Our armies needed local administrations. Our armies are not set up to fight and clear country of enemy agents at the same time. We so informed our British and American friends. The more ready we were to let the Polish administration function, the more we were sure the Poles would receive territory to the west. I do not see the harm of permitting the Poles to set up administrations in territories in which they are to remain.

TRUMAN: I wanted the administrations in the four zones to be as we have agreed. We cannot agree on reparations if parts of Germany are given away.

STALIN: We are concerned about reparations but we will take this risk.

TRUMAN: We are not concerned about reparations for ourselves but we do not want to pay reparations as we did before.

STALIN: The western frontier of Poland then remains open and no discussions are binding on us.

CHURCHILL: I have a good deal to say on the line, but I don’t think from what the President has said that this is the time.

STALIN: It will be more difficult to restore territory as the German population has fled.

TRUMAN: The Poles may remain under the Russian occupation.

STALIN: Our practice is as follows. An army is fighting when the war is on. Its efforts are concentrated on the war. To advance, it must have a quiet rear. An army can fight the enemy but it cannot at the same time fight well with the enemy in its rear. It needs the quiet and, if possible, a sympathetic rear. Even if the Germans have not fled, it would be difficult to use Germans as the majority in the area are Polish. Imagine a situation where the Germans shrink or flee and the Polish population receives us. It is natural under those circumstances to set up a sympathetic administration. There was no other way out. But that does not mean that we determined ourselves a frontier. If you do not agree, the matter can be arranged later.

CHURCHILL: It is from these regions that a very important part of the supplies from which Germany is to be fed come.

STALIN: Who will work in these areas? There is no one but the Poles who will plow the land.

TRUMAN: The question is not who occupies the country, but how we stand on the question as to who is to occupy Germany. I want it understood that the Soviet [Union] is occupying this zone and is responsible for it. I don’t think we are far apart on our conclusions.

STALIN: On paper it is formerly German territory but in fact it is Polish territory. There are no Germans left. The Soviet [Union] is responsible for the territory.

TRUMAN: Where are the nine million Germans?

STALIN: They have fled.

CHURCHILL: How can they be fed? I am told that under the Polish plan put forward by the Soviets that a quarter of arable land of Germany would be alienated – one-fourth of all the arable land from which German food and reparations must come. The Poles come from the East but 8¼ [8½?] million Germans are misplaced [displaced]. It is apparent that a disproportionate part of the population will be cast on the rest of Germany with its food supplies alienated.

TRUMAN: France wants the Saar and the Ruhr. What will be left?

STALIN: As regards the claims of France, we have made no decision. As to the Poles, we have.

CHURCHILL: As to the Marshal’s figures that all Germans have fled, we should bear in mind that there are other figures indicating that two or three million Germans remain.

STALIN: We discussed the question of frontiers but we are getting into the question of food supplies for Germany.

CHURCHILL: We are only considering complications which arise from the frontier question.

STALIN: I fully appreciate this burden and the difficulties of supply, but the Germans are principally to blame for these difficulties. Mr. Churchill has cited the figure of 8K million Germans in this area, but bear in mind that the men from this area were conscripted in this area several times and others fled. They got word that the Russians were to be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than the Poles. Now, look at the turn of events. In the west between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans have quit their fields and these are being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles will agree to let the Germans cultivate these lands.

TRUMAN: Again I want to make it clear that our zone agreement should be kept. I do not think we can settle boundaries here.

CHURCHILL: Of course I am deeply committed to compensate Poland for what has been taken from her, but I thought there should be a balance. Poland is now claiming a vastly more territory than she gave up. I cannot concede that such an extravagant movement of populations should occur. So vast a movement of population will be a great shock to public opinion to [in] my country at least. It puts us in a position that I cannot possibly defend. I do not think it is good for Poland. If the Germans have run out they should be encouraged to return. The Poles have no right to create a catastrophe in the feeding of Germany. I press my point in hope that the Marshal will appreciate the difficulties. We do not wish to be left with a vast German population on our hands deprived of its food supply. Take your population of the Ruhr. If enough food is not found we may be confronted with conditions like those in the German concentration camps, even on a vaster scale.

STALIN: Germany has never done without the import of grain. Let Germany buy more bread from Poland. The territory is cultivated by the Poles, not the Germans.

CHURCHILL: In addition, the condition of this territory into which Poles are being introduced is most peculiar. I am told the Poles are selling coal from Silesia to Sweden when we in England must go through a bitter, fireless winter, worse than that experienced during the war. We stand on the general principle that the supply of food of 1937 Germany should be available for the support of the German people irrespective of the zones of occupation.

STALIN: But who is to produce the coal? It is the Poles who are mining the coal.

CHURCHILL: They fled from the cannons. Now that the firing has ceased they should come back.

STALIN: We have little sympathy with these scoundrels and war criminals.

CHURCHILL: I was impressed by what the Marshal said yesterday about not letting past bitterness color our decisions.

STALIN: What I said yesterday does not apply to war criminals. I had in mind only the proprietors who have fled. We ourselves are purchasing coal from the Poles who are mining it.

TRUMAN: I am concerned that a piece of Germany, a valuable piece has been cut off. This must be deemed a part of Germany in considering reparations and in the feeding of Germany. The Poles have no right to seize this territory now and take it out of the peace settlement. Are we going to maintain occupied zones until the peace or are we going to give Germany away piece-meal?

STALIN: Nobody can exploit this region but the Poles. Are [We] are short of labor for our own enterprises. There are no Germans in this area. Herr Goebbels’ propaganda has achieved its purpose. No production comes from this area except from the Poles. We cannot take coal from them for nothing. The Silesian mines have always been mined by a large number of Polish miners.

CHURCHILL: There is no objection to the Poles’ mining this area for the Russian occupiers of the zone.

STALIN: It is not possible. It would disturb all normal relations between the two states. The Germans themselves were short of labor. Most of the enterprises were employing foreign forced labor and when Russian troops entered the region these foreign laborers went back to their own country. Most of the Germans had been called up for the army. They were killed or taken captive. These enterprises must now be closed down or must be worked by the Poles. That is the situation as it spontaneously arose. No one but the Germans are to blame. As to Mr. Churchill’s claims that the Poles are receiving too much, undoubtedly Polish proposal creates difficulty for Germany, but Germany created this situation.

CHURCHILL: This situation creates difficulties for us as well as for the Germans.

STALIN: We may have to create further difficulty for the Germans then. The less industry we leave in Germany, the more markets there will be for your goods. We have destroyed for you a competitor with low living standards and low prices.

ATTLEE: From the point of view of the occupying power, we are faced with a country in chaos, formerly, an economic unit depending for its food and coal from [upon?] the eastern areas partly inhabited by Poles. If part of Germany is detached, it puts an onerous burden on occupying states in the west and south. If labor is needed for exploiting the eastern areas, it should be available from western Germany. Pending final settlement that labor force should be directed to where it can be employed so as to relieve the western allies from an impossible burden.

TRUMAN: I shall state frankly what I think. I cannot consent to the removal of eastern Germany from contributing to the economy of the whole of Germany.

STALIN: Are we through?

CHURCHILL: Can’t we sleep on it?

Adjourned.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Babelsberg, July 21, 1945]
Top secret

Status of Problems Before the Conference

I. Problems on which substantial agreement has been reached

  1. Council of Foreign Ministers. This proposal has been substantially approved, although the Drafting Committee has been asked to make minor textual improvements. London has been fixed as the place of meeting, and the date is set at September 1 at the latest. A telegram of invitation is being drafted to the French and Chinese Governments.

  2. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions. A revised document on this subject has received final approval.

  3. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

  4. Austria and Vienna. The EAC agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery for Austria and Vienna having been finally approved, the Soviets have agreed that U.S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones.

  5. The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement. A document on this matter has received final approval.

II. Problems pending for consideration before the heads of government or foreign ministers

  1. German Economic Questions. The Subcommittee has reported on this question, and the report is ready for consideration.

  2. Italian and Austrian Reparations. This matter has been referred to the Subcommittee which has been dealing with German economic questions.

  3. Oil for Western Europe. The U.S. has circulated a paper urging that oil from Rumania, Hungary, and Austria be made available to Western Europe.

  4. Italy and Spain in the United Nations. Two papers have been prepared on this question, one supporting Italy’s claim to become a member of the United Nations as soon as the peace treaty has been concluded, the other supporting, in general, the entry of other neutrals into the United Nations but opposing the entry of Spain as long as the present regime remains in power.

  5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States. A revised U.S. paper on this subject has been circulated and is ready for consideration.

  6. Italy and the Other Satellite States. The U.S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U.S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present Governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, this question should not be discussed further.

  7. Rumanian Oil. The British have presented a paper, which was referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Ministers, protesting the seizure by the Soviets of British-owned oil equipment in Rumania.

  8. The Western Boundary of Poland. This question has been discussed inconclusively by the Big Three.

  9. Trusteeship. The Russians have presented a paper on this subject but it has not yet been discussed.

  10. Turkey. This has been placed on the agenda of the Big Three by the British but has not yet been discussed.

  11. Withdrawal of Troops from Iran. The British have circulated a paper on this subject, which is now ready for consideration.

III. Problems which have been discussed and dropped without agreement

  1. Yugoslavia. The British raised the question of the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia but, in the absence of support for their position, have apparently decided not to press the matter.

IV. Questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been raised before the conference

  1. U.S. Proposals
    a. Soviet Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems
    This matter has not yet been discussed at all.

    b. Admission of American Press Correspondents into Eastern Europe
    This question has not been raised as a separate issue but is being dealt with in connection with the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and will presumably not be raised as a separate problem.

  2. British Proposals
    a. War Crimes
    This question has not been discussed at all.

  3. Soviet Proposals
    a. Tangier.
    b. The Levant.

Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m.

Stalin’s quarters at Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Fleet Admiral Leahy Lord Leathers Mr. Beriya
Mr. Davies Major Birse Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Pauley Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky

The question of war booty was discussed.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 21, 1945)

Progress reported at Big Three meeting by U.S. delegation

‘Much serious business has been done,’ delegation says; sessions held daily
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Jews in Germany called prisoners

Protest sent to Big Three at Potsdam

Youngstown Vindicator (July 21, 1945)

Editorial: The President on bases

United Nations administrator may be designed at Potsdam

By Pertinax, North American Newspaper Alliance

U.S. State Department (July 21, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Saturday, July 21:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1500: Mail arrived from Washington.

1545: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes.

1635: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. We arrived at the Palace at 1645.

The fifth meeting of the conference was called to order at 1700. The conference adjourned at 1925, and the President returned to the Little White House at 1935.

At 2015 the President, accompanied by Mr. Davies, Mr. Byrnes and Admiral Leahy, left the Little White House for Generalissimo Stalin’s residence where they attended a dinner given by the Generalissimo. Present were: The President, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Davies, Mr. Bohlen, Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Attlee, Lord Leathers, Major Birse, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vyshinski, Mr. Beria (People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs), Mr. Gousev, Mr. Gromyko, and Mr. Pavlov.

The President returned to the Little White House at 2330.

Neues Österreich (July 22, 1945)

Die Potsdam Konferenz

L’Aube (July 22, 1945)

Potsdam va de l’avant !

déclarent les Américains

U.S. State Department (July 22, 1945)

Stimson-Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Bundy Lord Cherwell

Stimson’s diary entry: “At ten-forty Bundy and I again went to the British headquarters and talked to the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell for over an hour. Churchill read Groves’ report in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said ‘Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting’. Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it if and when it was successfully finished.”

According to Bundy in 1957...

Churchill exclaimed after learning the contents of the report of the first atomic test: “Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath.”

Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky
Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov
Mr. Matthews Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Russell
Mr. Allen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m.
Top secret

The Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place on Sunday, July 22, 1945, Mr. Eden being in the Chair. The meeting opened at 11:10 a.m.

MR. EDEN stated his belief that mention should be made of all outstanding subjects which appear on the agenda, in order that the meeting could decide which were ready to discuss. He mentioned first the admission of neutral states, except Spain, into world organizations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about Italy.

MR. EDEN replied that Italy was linked to this subject.

MR. EDEN went on to mention the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions.

MR. BYRNES inquired about the status of the proposal for the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN asked that he be permitted first to state the questions on the agenda. He mentioned the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe and the removal, as war booty, of Allied equipment from Rumania, and asked about the condition of each of the foregoing subjects.

MR. BYRNES remarked that he had suggested the question of the supply of oil for Western Europe.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there were other questions, including German and Austrian reparations, on which a subcommittee is working. He inquired about Spain.

MR. EDEN stated his assumption that Mr. Molotov meant the general paper on Spain. He remarked that Spain was included in the paper regarding the admission of Italy into international organizations. The question on policy towards Spain was discussed by the Big Three and was still before them.

MR. BYRNES stated that the Big Three had discussed the question of withdrawal of recognition from Spain, but when agreement was not reached the question had been passed over.

MR. EDEN replied that it had not been passed on to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. BYRNES agreed that it had not, but remained on the Big Three agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that there had been a suggestion for special mention of Spain.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the drafting committee had been instructed to state, in connection with the admission of Italy into international organizations, that Spain should not be so admitted. The committee’s report is not yet ready.

MR. EDEN agreed, except that it had been suggested that Spain be linked with the neutrals. The whole question was now in the hands of a subcommittee.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether a committee had been appointed.

MR. BYRNES said Yes and that Maisky had been appointed for the Soviet Union.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Tangier and the question of the admission of neutral states into the United Nations.

MR. BYRNES remarked that the latter subject was connected with the proposal he had just mentioned. It had been referred to the same committee that was dealing with Spain and Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated his agreement and asked about Tangier.

MR. EDEN replied that the question had not yet been discussed but could be put on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that although the question had not been referred to the Foreign Ministers, he had no objection.

MR. BYRNES then stated that he had another item to suggest. This was a paper concerning international cooperation for the solution of European economic problems.

MR. EDEN asked whether the meeting had a paper on this subject.

MR. BYRNES replied that the paper will soon be circulated, but if Mr. Eden wished, he would suggest it for discussion by the Big Three in order that it might be referred back to the Foreign Ministers. This would take another day.

MR. EDEN pointed out that five big items were already on the agenda, but suggested that a start be made on them and, if possible, this extra item may be considered.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the question was not before the meeting and that no document was available.

Implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe

MR. EDEN announced that the first question before the meeting was the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe (Annex l).

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had studied the American suggestion and had two questions on it. The first is the provision for the supervision of elections. The Soviet delegation did not like this provision and had already stated that it did not approve. It believed supervision to be unnecessary. The second question concerned the press. There is no doubt that conditions have now changed and that the end of the war will mean more favorable treatment of the press. He had no doubt that everything possible will be done. He did not understand the need for such a statement. On the question of the control commissions, Mr. Molotov stated that this was not clear. No doubt the American and British members know that in the countries in question the Soviet representatives have submitted suggestions for the improvement of conditions. If his colleagues do not know about the suggestions, he would be glad to furnish information in order that they might be discussed. He was willing to amend them, and any amendments made could be inserted. He had just received a telegram from Voroshilov stating that the American and British representatives on the Control Council in Hungary had been given the text of the Soviet suggestions. Voroshilov believed that they approved of them. Mr. Molotov would like to hear comment regarding these suggestions.

MR. BYRNES in reply referred first to the last question. It is the American position that just as the representatives of the Three Powers gather around the present conference table in order to exchange views and make suggestions, the representatives of the Three Powers in the satellite states should follow the same procedure. Up to now this had not been done, according to reports received from our representatives. Our representatives report not only that suggestions are not made by Soviet representatives, but that action is taken without consultation. Mr. Byrnes believed that the Soviet Government should consult prior to taking action, just as the Conferees were doing here. All paragraph 3 does is to assert that as a desirable thing. There could certainly be no objection to this. As to the press, we have heretofore stated that the American press representatives are refused freedom of movement and freedom to report to their papers. Marshal Stalin had agreed that the end of the war meant an improvement in this situation. We are only stating in our document what he suggested. As to paragraph 1, Mr. Byrnes stated that he could only repeat that we do not like the idea of the supervision of elections but that we have become convinced that it is the wise thing to do in order to remove suspicion regarding the conduct of elections. These suspicions may be unjustifiable, but they can only be removed by supervision of elections; that was agreed to at Yalta.

MR. EDEN stated that the British had been asked to put forward a paper on this subject. This had not been done because the document before the Conference is entirely acceptable to the British Government. In regard to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion regarding the modification of the control councils, Mr. Eden believed that it would be useful if we could have the text of these suggestions here. It is difficult to follow the exact nature of the modifications proposed. Perhaps Mr. Molotov could arrange to make the text available, in which case a subcommittee could be appointed to consider them. In regard to the supervision of elections, Mr. Eden agreed with the paper. We do not wish to supervise elections but must do so in order to fulfill the spirit of the Yalta Agreement. In regard to the press, this was not wholly a question of freedom of movement but a question of the right to report free from political censorship. That is why the British like the proposal in this paper and hope that their Soviet Allies will be able to accept it.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that in the paragraph dealing with the supervision of elections five countries were mentioned, including Italy. However, in paragraph 3 of the paper, dealing with control commissions only three countries were mentioned. It is evident that Greece could not be mentioned in paragraph 3 since there is no control council there, but this is not true in Italy. Why was Italy omitted?

MR. BYRNES replied that Italy had been omitted because no complaint had been received regarding the operation of the Council.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether a tripartite basis would be approved in Italy.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Commission is an Allied commission in Italy and that the Soviet Government has representatives.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that the Soviet representatives took no part in the work and were not kept informed.

MR. BYRNES replied that this was the first that the United States had heard about the Soviet representative not being kept informed. He was certain that he must be. The United States sought nothing in Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary which it was not willing to make available to the Soviet Union in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he believed that it would be best to circulate the Soviet suggestions regarding the Control Council as suggested by Mr. Eden. Of course, there were slight differences in conditions in the three countries, but the principles would be the same. Perhaps somebody would suggest an improvement in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Italy.

MR. BYRNES replied that any suggestion would be considered and reiterated that this was the first time he had heard any complaint about operations in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had mentioned on several occasions, to American and British representatives, that conditions in Italy constituted a model for the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Russians had read about the reorganization of the Italian Commission in the press but had decided not to do anything about it.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the Soviet representative should have been informed.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether Mr. Byrnes was satisfied that American and British representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary should have the same working conditions as the Soviet representative in Italy.

MR. EDEN pointed out that if conditions in Italy are not satisfactory to the Soviet Union, they would be changed gladly. Mr. Eden had heard nothing about this.

MR. BYRNES agreed, and stated that our representative should take no action without consultation with the Soviet representative. We wanted the same treatment.

MR. EDEN stated that it was agreed that Mr. Molotov would furnish the text of the proposals and any comment he wished regarding conditions in Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that on the question of the supervision of elections the statement was unnecessary and would cause suspicion. He pointed out that up to now elections in ex-enemy countries had been held only in Finland, and asked whether there is any suspicion that this election had not been free.

MR. BYRNES agreed that so far as we knew this election had been all right.

MR. MOLOTOV then said there was no other election and inquired what grounds there were for suspicion.

MR. BYRNES replied that we would, frankly, always be suspicious of elections in countries where our representatives are not free to move about and where the press cannot report freely. Our representatives in every one of these countries had reported such conditions, but they had not done so in Finland. Elections might be conducted as fairly as is possible to conduct them, but so long as our representatives are not permitted to move about and there is no free press, no one will believe that the elections are free. Great harm might result where no reason existed for such harm.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection to the discussion of the American proposal if this discussion at the same time included the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

MR. BYRNES stated that the press had reported freely about the Finnish election and that the public was satisfied regarding conditions under which it was held.

MR. EDEN, referring to Mr. Molotov’s last statement, said that he believed that there might be something in this. If elections were held under conditions set forth in this proposal, it would be much easier to bring about some form of recognition of these countries. However, it must be borne in mind that Constitutionally Great Britain was unable to extend full recognition until the conclusion of peace. Full diplomatic relations had not yet been established with Italy for this reason.

MR. BYRNES stated that the President had made plain the other afternoon that there could be no question, so far as the United States is concerned, of recognition under existing conditions and that, therefore, the United States would not recognize these governments.9 He hoped that elections would be held under conditions which would permit prompt recognition of any government set up by the people.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Soviet Union could not agree to the supervision of elections. He could understand that other Allies wanted better facilities for their representatives in these countries. Now that the war was at an end, there is every reason to give greater freedom both to these representatives and to the press. They would have every opportunity fully to be informed regarding the elections. Mr. Molotov suggested that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposal be referred to a subcommittee.

MR. EDEN stated that he would report to the Big Three that paragraphs 2 and 3 had been referred to a subcommittee but that no agreement had been reached regarding the supervision of elections.

MR. BYRNES interjected to inquire whether Mr. Molotov would agree to accept paragraphs 2 and 3 if paragraph 1 was withdrawn.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there were drafting points, since certain parts of the paper were not clear. If the Conference was willing to state that conditions would be the same as in Italy, there would be no objection.

MR. BYRNES remarked that we were going in circles.

MR. EDEN suggested that the matter go forward as suggested by him and that a subcommittee be appointed.

MR. BYRNES appointed Mr. Cannon and Mr. Russell.

MR. EDEN appointed Mr. Hayter.

MR. MOLOTOV appointed Mr. Sobolev.

German Economic Questions

MR. EDEN next raised the report of the economic subcommittee (Annex 2).

MR. BYRNES suggested that this afternoon’s consideration of this report be confined to those matters agreed to by the subcommittee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked for clarification of this point.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that if the Foreign Ministers approved those portions of the report of the subcommittee [already?] approved by it, they could be referred to the Big Three and progress would be made. Among the disagreements is the question of reparations, and Mr. Byrnes did not wish to have this question considered this afternoon.

MR. EDEN stated his understanding of the need to leave out reparations, but asked whether there weren’t other sections which must be considered before a report was made to the Big Three.

MR. BYRNES agreed, except for reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked what report was meant.

MR. EDEN replied that they were considering the report of the economic subcommittee. In this report the last half dealt with reparations. Under the American proposal this meeting would deal with all questions but reparations.

MR. BYRNES agreed that questions not dealt with this afternoon should be first on the agenda of the next meeting.

MR. EDEN brought up the report.

MR. BYRNES asked that paragraph 4 be passed.

MR. EDEN failed to see the connection between paragraph 4 and reparations.

MR. BYRNES replied that he did not wish to discuss paragraph 4 and renewed his request that matters in disagreement not be discussed now but be placed first on the next agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it was not quite clear to him what the meeting was discussing.

MR. EDEN replied that he understood that the drafting committee had agreed on this report except where specifically indicated and that it had been agreed that the Foreign Ministers would discuss only portions agreed upon. Eighteen principles had been agreed upon. They would be taken in order.

MR. EDEN mentioned paragraph 10.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that in the last sentence the phrases providing that “production shall be destroyed” and “or shall be removed” be reversed.

MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. EDEN raised paragraphs 11 and 12, and they were agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV submitted an amendment to paragraph 13 which consisted of the addition of the clause “according to detailed instructions to be issued by the Control Council” at the end of the first sentence. He pointed out that Germany cannot be considered a single economic unit in all respects and cited the language of paragraph 11 as proof of his contention. Therefore he believed that more specific instructions were needed.

MR. BYRNES stated that he wished to give more consideration to this matter. In the report, the principle was stated that during the occupation period Germany would be treated as a single economic unit. The language of Mr. Molotov’s proposal would modify this principle and make it subject to directives from the Control Council. If any member of the Control Council objected on a specific issue, Germany would not be treated as a single economic unit on that issue. Mr. Byrnes was in agreement with the language of the committee’s report but not with that of the amendment.

MR. MOLOTOV stated his belief that the amendment was necessary. The language of the present draft was too general.

MR. BYRNES remarked that this would mean that in every single case the Control Council would decide whether Germany was to be treated as an economic unit.

MR. MOLOTOV insisted that he had not been understood. He is not denying that it had been decided that Germany would be treated as an economic unit. However, he had another idea. He felt that the Control Council should be instructed to sit and look at the situation in detail. After some months of experience the Control Council might recommend a new basis based on their experience. He believed this to be essential.

MR. BYRNES suggested that this matter be passed over. He stated that he was willing to take Mr. Molotov’s suggested language and see whether agreement could be reached.

MR. EDEN then raised paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 and they were agreed to.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the deletion of paragraph 18. The effect of the war is serious and great changes have been made. Stalin yesterday had said that it was impossible to restore pre-war conditions in Germany. It is difficult for us now to say in what respect pre-war Germany can be restored.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the matters dealt with in paragraph 18 are already contained in paragraph 5 on which agreement had not been reached. Therefore, we must reserve on paragraph 18 and note that no agreement had been reached. He inquired whether the meeting was willing to consider paragraph 7 which did not deal with reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about the annex.

MR. EDEN replied that it dealt entirely with reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that article 16 referred to the annex and that note must be made that the annex had not been considered. This was agreed to.

MR. EDEN then suggested consideration of paragraph 7.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not read the report.

MR. EDEN stated that there are only a couple of sentences.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that he had not read it.

MR. EDEN agreed that it should be passed over.

Industrial Equipment in Rumania*

MR. EDEN then raised the matter of the seizure of British and American owned industrial equipment in Rumania. A British company had a lot of equipment bought and paid for. Some had come from Germany; some from other countries. When the Germans invaded Rumania, they had seized these companies and the equipment. The British had assumed that when Rumania fell to the Allies this equipment would be returned. They were naturally much concerned when the equipment had been taken by our Russian Allies.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that the losses of this British corporation be compared with the losses of the Soviet oil companies.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the British had not taken Soviet property because of British losses.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that German property had been taken.

MR. EDEN denied that the property was German.

MR. VYSHINSKI then made a long statement containing statistics concerning the equipment in question. He maintained that after Soviet seizures had been completed enough equipment remained to insure three years’ output. He asserted that the pipe in question had been imported by the Germans from Germany in order to build a pipeline for pumping Soviet oil. He denied that the equipment had been paid for by British companies.

MR. EDEN intervened to state that he had heard this story before and that it had been disproved.

MR. VYSHINSKI continued his statement alleging that the Germans had imported these pipes and transferred them to firms already made German. He also made an extended argument attempting to justify the Soviet action under the armistice terms and purporting to prove that the equipment constituted war booty.

MR. EDEN intervened to state that no Allied property in any country is booty to another Ally.

MR. VYSHINSKI continued his argument based on the surrender terms.

MR. BYRNES interposed to state that the question does not concern the right of the Soviet Government to take German property as war booty, but concerns the Soviet claim to the right to take the property of American citizens as booty. The question is whether the property in question is the property of American citizens. If it was German, the Russians had a right to take it. The case must be solved on facts and the facts must be determined by somebody [some body?] like the Reparations Committee. Mr. Byrnes wished the three powers to agree to the general proposition that the property of American citizens should not be confiscated as war booty by the three powers here represented. Byrnes stated his understanding that all four of the armistice terms [agreements] contained appropriate provisions governing these cases.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to make a point.

MR. VYSHINSKI remarked that he had not finished his statement. He stated that the Control Council in Rumania was satisfied that the pipes were not British or American property.

MR. EDEN pointed out that this was a unilateral action of the Soviet High Command which had never been agreed to. However, we are used to such unilateral acts.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the Soviet armies had covered big distances in their advance and that there had only been this one case on which dispute arose.

MR. VYSHINSKI then continued his argument insisting that the equipment in question had not been paid for before the war and could not have been paid for during the war. He mentioned that the high-octane Astra-Romana plant though legitimately war booty had not been removed by the Soviet Union since its removal would have affected Rumanian production. He reiterated that enough equipment had been left to guarantee three years’ supply and insisted that according to all the facts the equipment removed was German property.

MR. BYRNES inquired whether it was contended that the Germans owned the oil in the ground.

MR. VYSHINSKI replied that they had used the oil against the Allies and had also used the pipes.

MR. BYRNES stated that if the German Army uses your property, such use does not take title away.

MR. VYSHINSKI then argued that the matter would have been different if the pipes had come from the United States and had been seized from [by?] the Germans. However, they had been brought from Germany. He asked how they could be considered Allied property.

MR. BYRNES asked whether the American citizen owned the oil or whether he had lost the title to it because the Germans had seized the well. If the oil were to be taken out of the ground now, would the American citizen be paid?

MR. VYSHINSKI stated that the Soviet Union received oil as reparation from the Rumanian Government. The Soviet Union is taking nothing from American firms. In any event, we were dealing with equipment, not oil.

MR. EDEN remarked that the argument could go on for a long time. He thought this matter should be examined by a committee. It should be remembered that:

  1. Not only the question of the pipes should be considered;

  2. The great majority of the pipes had been bought and paid for before the war; and

  3. Great Britain had not objected to the removal of surplus property but did object to indiscriminate removal. He believed that if the Committee investigated the matter it could be cleared up.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that it would be difficult to determine the owner of specific pipes. The matter should be left to the Reparations Commission or some similar body. We ought to agree here on general principles. He suggested the reference of the case to a committee which could arrive at principles governing such cases.

MR. EDEN stated his belief that there should be a meeting of experts to determine what had happened. The Soviet Government had issued orders in the name of the Control Council without consulting either the British or American representatives.

MR. BYRNES suggested the appointment of a committee to reconcile opposing points of view.

MR. MOLOTOV queried the usefulness of such a committee. He could understand that the firms in question wanted the use of these pipes even though they were enemy.

MR. EDEN remarked that he had said many times that this was not enemy property. If Mr. Molotov did not wish to discuss it, it would be necessary to leave it as it is, and in that event he would have to tell Parliament. Personally he thought it best that he should not have to take this course.

MR. BYRNES stated that it was not wise to leave a subject of such disagreement. It would be much better if each appointed a representative to discuss the situation in order to avoid future difficulty. If American citizens submitted complaints it would be necessary to investigate these complaints and claim restitution. It was better to try to settle the issue here.

MR. EDEN suggested that the question be thought over for later consideration. He continued that since it was now 1:30 p.m. it was necessary to produce an agenda for the afternoon meeting. Questions still before the afternoon meeting included Western Frontiers of Poland, adjourned from yesterday.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the question of Koenigsberg and the Koenigsberg area in German territory which is to go to the Soviet Union. He asked whether there was any objection to opening the agenda with the question of the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union.

EDEN inquired whether this subject was desired on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it should not go first on the agenda but should be considered after the Western Frontiers of Poland.

MR. EDEN said that the second item would be Trusteeship; the third, Turkey; and that the Western Frontiers of the Soviet Union could be added as the fourth item if Mr. Byrnes agreed.

MR. BYRNES agreed and added that other territorial questions might well be added since they were all interrelated.

MR. EDEN then stated that he would circulate a paper on Iran and asked whether there was any objection to its inclusion. This would be the fifth item on the agenda.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired about German economic questions.

MR. EDEN stated that a report would be made on this subject but that consideration had better be postponed because of reparations.

MR. BYRNES stated that there were two matters which he wished added to the agenda. Each would in due course be referred back to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of States. The President would first present a paper on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. He would also propose the issuance of a draft [directive] by the Heads of Governments stating the principles governing the control of Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the second point was not quite clear to him.

MR. BYRNES stated that the directive proposed would be issued by the respective governments to their commanders occupying Germany in order that what was agreed by this Conference might be carried out.

MR. EDEN stated that this could not be discussed now.

MR. BYRNES agreed and added that it would not be discussed this afternoon since it must be referred to a committee.

MR. MOLOTOV asked about the object of this proposal.

MR. BYRNES stated that he had wanted the matter on the agenda this morning but was unable to get it included. The President will now present it in order that it can be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN asked whether it could not be taken up tomorrow morning.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether military questions or economic had been included.

MR. BYRNES stated that if the Conference agreed, the proposal could be read and referred to a committee. Such action would save time in the afternoon meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished a short explanation of the subject. Would it include military, economic or political matters?

MR. BYRNES replied that whatever we agreed to here must be sent to our commanders. It will be only a directive to our commanders to carry out our agreements.

MR. EDEN asked whether it could not be agreed that it would be considered tomorrow morning.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that it go to the Big Three for reference back to the Foreign Ministers.

The meeting then adjourned.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-2245

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945
[Translation?]
Top secret

International Zone of Tangier

Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we have agreed that this zone which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it shall, owing to its specific strategic importance, remain international.

Representatives of the states chiefly concerned viz. Great Britain, the United States of America, the USSR and France which will be invited to join this declaration will work out an appropriate status of this international zone responding [corresponding?] to the new conditions that resulted from the victory over Hitler Germany.

Spain will be invited to adhere to the new status after the re-establishment of democratic regime in the country.


Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg,] 7/22/45
[Translation?]

Soviet Proposal on Koenigsberg

On shaping the decision of the three Heads of Governments regarding the transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area. The Conference approved the proposal of the Soviet Union that pending the final settlement of territorial questions at the Peace Congress, the part of the western border of the USSR adjoining the Baltic Sea should follow the line from the point on the western shore of the Danzig Bay indicated on the map annexed hereto, eastward – north of Braunsberg-Goldap to the junction of the frontiers of the Lithuanian SSR, the Polish Republic and former East Prussia.

740.00119 Potsdam/8-245

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 22, 1945]
Top secret

Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems

The urgent tasks of European relief and reconstruction can be most effectively carried out only if supported by the combined efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, recommended that the three governments agree to participate fully in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE), European Coal Organization (ECO) and the European Central Inland Transport Authority (ECITO). It should be the aim of the three Governments to assist in making these organizations effective agencies for handling the problems of relief and reconstruction by day-to-day cooperation in their activities.