Mountbatten besucht General MacArthur
…
L’Aube (July 21, 1945)
Aux « frontières communes » de l’Extrême-Orient –
Les positions respectives de l’URSS et des États-Unis vont être définies à Potsdam
Les deux « Plus Grands » veulent éviter les points de friction
…
U.S. State Department (July 21, 1945)
Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir William Strang | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Murphy | Mr. Ward | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Matthews | Mr. Novikov | |
| Mr. Cohen | Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Russell | ||
| Mr. Thompson |
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret
Agenda
1. Date of establishment of Council of Foreign Ministers
It was agreed at yesterday’s meeting of the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers should decide at what date the newly approved Council of Foreign Ministers should be formally set up.
2. German Economic Questions
The subcommittee which has been working for some days on these questions is presenting its first report.
3. The Polish question – Liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta agreement
The subcommittee which has been working on this question is ready to report.
4. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states
In accordance with the decision taken at yesterday’s meeting of Foreign Ministers, the U.S. is presenting a new paper on this subject setting forth in specific terms the steps which we believe should be taken in the countries in question in order that the Yalta Declaration may be implemented.
5. Italy and the other satellites
The Big Three at yesterday’s meeting referred to the Foreign Ministers the question of easing in the near future the armistice terms imposed on Italy and the other satellites. The U.S. is presenting new proposals on this subject.
6. Turkey
It is understood that the British Delegation desires to raise orally with the Soviet Delegation the question of Soviet desires concerning the modification of the Montreux Convention and concerning other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations.
Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret
The meeting of Foreign Ministers began at 12 noon on Saturday, July 21, 1945. Secretary Byrnes was in the Chair.
Date of Meeting for the Council of Foreign Ministers
MR. BYRNES said that the first item of business was the fixing of the date of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed not later than September 1.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired what day of the week this would be.
MR. EDEN replied that it was Sunday.
MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed.
It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet at a date not later than September 1.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired in what composition would the Council of Foreign Ministers meet.
MR. BYRNES replied that they had agreed first of all to meet in London and that they would have a formal meeting there to set up the Council.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if this meant five members. He pointed out that the composition of the Council would determine the type of questions to be discussed.
MR. BYRNES replied that it would be five, because there was the question of organizing the Council and deciding the procedure to be followed.
MR. EDEN pointed out that he did not wish to be grasping. It had been decided that the Secretariat would be in London but the Council might wish to meet elsewhere. He thought this might be said.
MR. MOLOTOV thought they might rotate the meetings.
MR. EDEN proposed that they approve the addition of language to state that the Council should normally meet at London, which would be the seat of its Secretariat, but that it might meet elsewhere by common agreement.
MR. BYRNES said it was decided that they would communicate with France and China before final announcement was made of the creation of the Council. He proposed that they each appoint a representative to draft a telegram. MR. BYRNES named Mr. Matthews, MR. MOLOTOV named Ambassador Gromyko, and Mr. Eden named Mr. Ward, for the purpose of drafting a telegram.
Report of Subcommittee on German Economic Questions
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Subcommittee on German Economic Questions had presented its report.
MR. MOLOTOV said that the Subcommittee had finished its work late at night and he had had no time to get acquainted with its report. If possible, he would prefer that this question be taken up as item 1 on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting the next day.
This was agreed to.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if they would have any agenda for the present meeting today.
MR. BYRNES said that they would first consider the questions submitted to them by the Big Three. Then they would take up the reports of the subcommittees which they, the Foreign Ministers, had appointed. Finally, they could consider the agenda for the Big Three meeting.
Polish Question
MR. BYRNES said that papers on this subject had been submitted by the British and Soviet delegations. These had been considered by a subcommittee, and he would now call on the chairman of the subcommittee for his report.
MR. VYSHINSKI said that the subcommittee set up to deal with the Polish question had not reached full agreement on their report. They had had three papers before them: (1) a British paper of July 19, (2) an amended text of the British draft of July 19 which the British had submitted, (3) a Soviet amended draft of the same British text. They were guided in their discussions by the second draft submitted by the British. In drafting the final text on this question there were five matters upon which no agreement was reached. These were:
-
The first disagreement related to the question of the transfer of the assets of the London Polish Government to the new Provisional Government. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of the British draft was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation, which thought that no discussion of the question of liabilities of the Polish Government should be included in the declaration. The Soviet delegation thought that this was a matter of Polish-American and Polish-British relations. The amount and character of the assets and debts was not known to the Soviet delegation, and they thought that this question should be dealt with separately.
-
The second difference related to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the British draft, which related to assurances for the return of Poles to Poland. Mr. Vyshinski pointed out that there were three thoughts embodied in this sentence. The Soviet delegation welcomed the last thought, namely, that the Poles who returned to Poland should have equal rights with other Poles. With respect to the other two thoughts, namely, the question of assurances to Poles and the thought that as many Poles as possible should come home, the Soviet delegation considered that it was not proper to include the mention of these assurances, and they thought that it was already clear that it was desired that as many Poles as possible return to Poland. The Soviet delegation had therefore suggested a shorter sentence, to the effect that the three Governments expect that those Poles that return home will be accorded equal rights with all Polish citizens. The British delegation did not agree with this proposal because of the word “expect.” The British delegation thought that the Polish Government should give assurances.
-
This disagreement related to the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the declaration include a statement to the effect that the British Government would undertake not to arrest Poles who wanted to return home.
-
This related to the sentence to the effect that the three powers took note that the Polish Government had undertaken to hold free and unfettered elections, etc. The Soviet delegation agreed to this except for the word “pledge,” which they objected to because the Crimea decision had said “should pledge” and not “pledge.” When the new Polish Government was formed it had given this pledge. A proposal had been made to state “It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life.” Mr. Vyshinski said that if this meant that all sections of public opinion in Poland, including Nazis, had been able to express their views freely, it was not acceptable. If it meant otherwise, the Soviet delegation proposed to avoid repetition by merely adding to the first part of this paragraph a reference to democratic parties fully participating in the country’s political life.
-
This difference referred to the freedom of the press to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. This wording was unlimited and meant that unrestricted freedom of the press was proclaimed. Hostilities had just finished, and the Soviet delegation thought that this would be difficult. They were of the opinion that the press should have greater freedom now because conditions had changed, but this was a Polish internal question and it was impossible to decide it without the Poles.
These five differences the Subcommittee had referred back to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Vyshinski added that he should mention that there had been other serious differences which had been settled and, with the exception of the five points he had mentioned, the draft had been unanimously agreed upon. MR. BYRNES proposed that they discuss these points in order.
(1) Liabilities and Assets of the Polish Government
MR. BYRNES said that the chairman of the Subcommittee had suggested that the liabilities of the Polish Provisional Government should not be mentioned, because that was a question to be handled between the Polish and American and the Polish and British Governments. He felt, however, that the same thing was true of the question of Polish assets. The United States had recognized the Provisional Polish Government. It had promptly taken steps to protect those assets. He saw no reason to believe that the United States would not transfer them to the government which it has recognized. He was sure that the Polish Provisional Government had no doubt about the United States transferring to it property which belonged to it. The United States was unwilling to make any statement with respect to Polish assets without stating at the same time that we would discuss the question of liabilities through diplomatic channels. Otherwise, a statement with respect to Polish assets might deceive people in Poland and elsewhere, because transfers of this kind must be made subject to any liens under the laws of the United States. Secondly, he did not know what debts might be due to the United States by the Provisional Government of Poland. The Polish Government need have no doubt but that our attitude would be sympathetic, because our attitude toward Poland had always been sympathetic. He disliked to mention in a public statement that we would transfer property to the Polish Government that belonged to them now that we had recognized that Government. That followed as a matter of course. Since, however, his colleagues wanted a statement on this subject, the American representative on the Subcommittee had proposed the following language:
The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.
Mr. Byrnes said that he had already stated to the Conference that on the day before the United States had recognized the Polish Provisional Government, the United States Government had learned of a proposal to transfer the Polish Embassy to a third party. The United States Government had intervened and had been prepared to institute proceedings to recover the property had that been necessary. The Polish Government knows this and needs no assurance that it will be treated fairly under the law.
MR. MOLOTOV said he found it difficult to discuss this question without the participation of the Polish Government.
MR. BYRNES said that this was also his position – namely, that the matter could only be discussed with the Poles. He did not know what the debts were, but he would not wish to tell the Poles that we would transfer assets and then find that there were liabilities against these assets. In such a case we would be charged with bad faith. He therefore proposed that they mention neither the transfer of assets nor the payment of liabilities.
MR. EDEN said that they also did not know the extent of the liabilities and debts. They might be sure, however, that the British would not drive a hard bargain. He added, however, that if you deal with the assets you must deal with debts. The British also did not know the amount of the Polish assets. He could assure his Soviet Allies, however, that the British would act in accordance with the obligation they had undertaken by recognizing the Polish Provisional Government. He thought it was best to drop this paragraph altogether.
MR. MOLOTOV said that he did not agree that if they mentioned assets they must mention liabilities. He drew the attention of his colleagues to the manner in which the Polish question was being discussed here and the manner in which it had been discussed at the Crimea. Here the question was a one-sided one. At the Crimea the question was whether or not the British and American Governments would recognize the Polish Provisional Government and not whether the Polish Government would recognize the British and American Governments. He hoped that all these questions of liabilities would be discussed by the parties. There was no need to say anything about it here. He pointed out that the question which had been discussed at the Crimea was only that of the transfer of property which was held by the London Polish Government.
MR. BYRNES said he recalled that Marshal Stalin had raised the question of the transfer of property and that President Roosevelt had said that of course the property of the London Government would be transferred when the new Polish Government was recognized. Mr. Byrnes said he could say the same thing of the Soviet Government. When the Soviet Government recognized the Polish Government, he assumed that it transferred the property of the Polish Government. He assumed also that in making such transfer the Soviets were obliged to take account of Soviet laws and of any liabilities against this property. He would not ask for a declaration that the Soviet Government would comply with its own laws. He knew that it would.
MR. MOLOTOV said that all other questions could be decided by bi-lateral negotiations.
MR. BYRNES said that so far as the United States is concerned they would be decided at the earliest possible date. He did not think that any statement should be made that pressure had to be brought on the United States Government to transfer to the Polish Government property that belonged to that Government.
MR. EDEN pointed out that they had frozen Polish funds.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the matter be referred to the Big Three.
MR. EDEN suggested that Mr. Molotov study the American draft that had been presented during the meeting.
MR. BYRNES said he had offered this substitute draft but he would not be frank if he did not make clear that he would tell the President that, in his opinion, the President should not be a party to a statement in the press that the United States Government would give to Poland property which is rightfully the property of the Polish Government, which it has recognized, without coupling such statement by [with?] a statement that the Polish Government had never questioned that the United States would transfer to the Polish Government the property that belongs to it.
Since Mr. Molotov did not have the Russian text of the new language which had been proposed, the matter was passed over, in order that Mr. Molotov would have time to consider it.
(2) Return of Poles to Poland
MR. BYRNES pointed out that there were two versions of this proposal: one submitted by the Soviet delegation and one submitted by the British delegation.
MR. MOLOTOV said he thought the general idea of both versions was essential and that this general idea should be retained. All the rest was unnecessary and might be offensive to the Poles.
MR. EDEN remarked that he did not see what there was that would be offensive to the Poles. Their object was to get Poles home. He was prepared to agree, however, to some change in the drafting.
MR. MOLOTOV said he did not see why this matter was insisted upon. The Soviet version made clear that the Poles would not be persecuted.
MR. EDEN said that if Mr. Molotov thought the language was offensive, they would accept the Soviet version subject to a minor drafting suggestion.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that there was a change suggested by the Soviet representative, in the last paragraph on page 2 – namely, to substitute for the words “is pledged” the words “in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed.”
This was agreed to.
(3) Arrest of Poles by British
MR. BYRNES said that the next question was the proposed undertaking that the British Government would take steps on British territory and territory under British control not to arrest Poles who wished to return home.
MR. EDEN said he could not accept in a declaration designed to assure the return of Poles to Poland that they would undertake not to do the opposite. He pointed out that the London Polish Government did not now have any power. Power had been transferred to the new Polish Government.
MR. MOLOTOV said that there would probably be no more such acts and that they could drop the paragraph.
MR. EDEN pointed out that certain governments had been given rights on British territory. The London Polish Government did not now have these rights.
MR. MOLOTOV said that there had been some recent incidents.
MR. EDEN replied that there had been none since recognition of the new Polish Government.
(4) Polish Elections
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the proposed sentence on the free expression of views in the election had not been agreed to.
MR. MOLOTOV said that this sentence would be unpleasant for the Polish Government, that all the thoughts had been expressed in the previous sentence. This sentence would give the impression of mistrust.
MR. EDEN offered to leave out the first part of this sentence if Mr. Molotov would agree to include the last sentence of the draft relating to freedom of the press.
MR. VYSHINSKI drew Mr. Eden’s attention to the fact that in the Subcommittee the British representatives had made just the opposite proposal.
MR. EDEN said that he had not known this.
MR. BYRNES said that at the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin [Molotov] expressed agreement in principle with the thought that the press should be allowed to report freely on what went on in these countries. Hostilities had ceased and the situation was changed. It would be of great importance in the future relations of the Polish Provisional Government that there be no question in regard to the freedom of the press.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any complaints that the Allied press could not work in Poland now.
MR. EDEN said it was one thing to let the press in but that it was another as to whether they could say what they wished.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the correspondents who had visited Poland had complained.
MR. BYRNES said that his information was that for a long while no press representatives had been permitted to visit in Poland.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that there had been no government of national unity at that time.
MR. BYRNES continued that a group of correspondents did visit Poland and that they were not restricted. We did not, however, have any regularly appointed press representatives in Poland.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if there were any applications pending for American correspondents to go to Poland.
MR. BYRNES said we did not know how these correspondents would be treated if they went to Poland and we only wished to express the hope that they would have freedom.
MR. MOLOTOV said that this would make a bad impression.
MR. BYRNES then proposed that the question be submitted to the Big Three along with the other difficulties that had arisen.
This was agreed to.
Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
MR. MOLOTOV said that they had not had time to have the document on this question translated into Russian.
At his request it was agreed to pass over this question until he could study the document.
Italian Declaration
MR. MOLOTOV observed that two papers had been submitted on this matter – one on Italy and one on the other satellites. Marshal Stalin had suggested at the meeting yesterday that they simultaneously settle these two questions, and it was Mr. Molotov’s proposal that they consider merging the two drafts.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that at the meeting yesterday it had been recognized that there was a difference between the situation of Italy and that of the other satellites. Italy had signed more severe armistice terms than had the other countries. He preferred two separate declarations rather than one.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they could be merged in the drafting committee.
MR. BYRNES suggested that the reason for separate texts was that the United States had not recognized the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. Also, the United States was not at war with Finland. If it was merely a question of drafting, he urged Mr. Molotov to let them take up the matter in two separate papers.
MR. MOLOTOV said that he was proceeding from the suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin. Both of these papers dealt with armistice terms signed by these countries. He was fully aware of and understood the difference between them. The subject of both documents was the same. He could not give a final opinion as he had only had time to read them once. The drafts contained good working material.
MR. BYRNES said that the question was whether there should be one draft or two, and he proposed to refer the matter to the Big Three.
This was agreed to.
Agenda for the Big Three Meeting
MR. MOLOTOV observed that the Soviet delegation stuck to its suggestion for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary.
MR. EDEN said that he was circulating a paper on Persia, but he did not ask that it be taken up today.
MR. BYRNES said that he wished to submit a paper which he thought should go to the economic subcommittee. This paper dealt with the necessity of making available increased supplies of oil from Rumania and the use of about 200 tankers to transport this oil.
It was agreed to refer this question to the economic subcommittee.
The agenda of the Big Three meeting was drawn up as follows:
- The Polish question – Implementation of the Yalta Agreement and transfer of the Property of the London Polish Government.
- Declaration on Italy and Satellite States.
- The Western Frontiers of Poland.
- Trusteeships.
- Turkey.
The meeting adjourned.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1445
Proposal by the British Delegation
Berlin, 21st July, 1945
P (TERMINAL) 16
Secret
Persia
-
His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government are maintaining their troops in Persia by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th June [January], 1942, under Article 5 of which these forces are to be withdrawn from Persia “not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Satellites had been suspended.” His Majesty’s Government have suggested to the Soviet Government that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Persia pari passu and in stages before the final treaty date is reached. The Soviet Government have not, however, replied.
-
In His Majesty’s Government’s view the time has now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia and they propose that this should take place in three stages as follows:
-
British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn completely from Tehran at once;
-
After the completion of the first stage, British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British troops would remain in Abadan and the southern oilfields area and Soviet troops would remain in a zone in either north-east or northwest Persia;
-
On the completion of the second stage, British troops would be withdrawn from Abadan and the oilfields area in south Persia and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the last area in which their troops were stationed in either north-east or north-west Persia.
-
-
If this proposal is accepted the demarcation of the withdrawal zones can be worked out afterwards.
023.1/9-1454
Report by the Subcommittee on Poland
[Babelsberg,] 21st July, 1945
P. (TERMINAL) 17
NOTE: The Soviet Members of the drafting Committee would omit passages in italics.
The United Kingdom members would omit passages in square brackets.
-
We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.
-
The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent the alienation to third parties of property [including merchant vessels] belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer in accordance with the requirements of the law of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relation of such advances to any assets of the Polish State available abroad. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.
-
The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and merchant marine. It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they consider that the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this regard by giving suitable assurances. [They expect] that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.
-
[The British Government will at the same time take measures in order to prevent on British territory and on territories controlled by British authorities arrests of Poles who wish to return to Poland].
-
The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all [democratic and anti-Nazi] sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 21, 1945]
Top secret
Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
The Three Governments agree upon the following steps of immediate urgency in the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe:
-
In conformity with the obligations contained in clause (d) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on Liberated Europe the three Governments agree to adopt adequate measures to enable them to become informed of proposed electoral procedures, and to provide for the observation of elections, in Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary for the choice of Governments responsive to the will of the people.
-
The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures should now be adopted to assure prompt and effective procedures to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and to permit of their freedom of movement, and to afford adequate opportunity for the despatch of their reports without restriction by reason of political censorship, thus providing to world public opinion the basis for an enlightened interest in the welfare and progress of these peoples and a knowledge of the conditions in which they seek to re-establish their ties with other peoples; further, that the three Governments express their desire to see removed, within the countries in question, such restrictions on freedom of the press as may have been imposed to prevent access to news from abroad or the dissemination of news and expression of opinion.
-
The three Governments agree that the Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, in acknowledgment of the changed conditions since the cessation of hostilities in Europe, will henceforth operate on a tri-partite basis under revised procedures providing for tri-partite participation, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret
Policy Toward Italy
The objectives of the Three Governments with regard to Italy are directed toward her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.
The Three Governments agree to certain steps which would afford some further acknowledgement of Italian contribution toward the defeat of Germany.
-
The Three Governments will publicly announce their intention to conclude a peace treaty with Italy at an early date coupled with an undertaking to provide Italy with such economic assistance as is practicable and reiterating the desirability of early elections in Italy.
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The Allied Commission in Italy will accelerate the steps already taken to transfer increasing responsibilities to the Italian Government.
-
The Three Governments agree to instruct their respective Ambassadors in Italy, in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, together to place before their respective governments before September 1, 1945 a report stipulating those provisions of the terms of surrender to be henceforth considered as inoperative, for approval of the Three Governments.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2145
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945
Top secret
Policy Toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland
The objectives of the three Governments with regard to Rumania Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, as in the case of Italy, are the early achievement of political independence and economic recovery, and the exercise of the right of the respective peoples ultimately to choose their own form of government.
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The preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland will be undertaken by the Council of Foreign Ministers as soon as possible.
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The three Governments will make such public declarations on matters of joint concern with respect to these countries as may be appropriate.
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The three Governments recommend to the respective Control Commissions that steps be taken for the progressive transfer of responsibility to the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish Governments, respectively.
-
The three Governments agree to the revision of the respective terms of armistices with these countries as clauses thereof may become inoperative.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2145
Rapporteur’s Report
Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon
Top secret
I. Council of Foreign Ministers
The Foreign Ministers discussed the date of the formal establishment of the Council and agreed that it should be set up not later than September 1. It was also agreed that telegrams of invitation to participate in the work of the Council should be dispatched to the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France before public announcement of the establishment of the Council is made. At the request of the British Delegation, the drafting committee which has been dealing with this question was asked to make a few minor changes in the present text of the proposal.
II. German economic questions
Since the report of the subcommittee on this question had only just been presented and the various delegations have not had an opportunity to give it adequate study, it was agreed to delay the discussion of this subject until tomorrow.
III. Polish question – liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta Declaration
The Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with this subject presented the subcommittee’s report. Since the subcommittee have been unable to reach full agreement, the points of disagreement were discussed at length. The Foreign Ministers were able to reach an understanding on several of these points, but the following were referred to the Heads of Governments for final decision:
a. The paragraph relating to the transfer of assets and the recognition of liabilities by the Provisional Government. (The U.S. substitute draft of this paragraph was presented for consideration.)
b. The paragraph relating to the holding of elections and to freedom of the press.
IV. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states
The U.S. circulated a paper on this question at the meeting but it was decided to postpone discussion of the paper in order to allow time for further study.
V. Italy and the other satellite states
The U.S. presented in this connection two papers: one on policy toward Italy and one on policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Foreign Ministers agreed to refer these papers to a drafting subcommittee. A point of difference arose, however, as to whether the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to deal with policy toward all these states in a single paper or to deal separately with Italy on the one hand and with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland on the other. The Soviet Delegation favored a single paper and the U.S. favored two separate papers. It was agreed that, since the question of policy toward Italy and the other satellites had been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments, the Heads of Governments should be asked to decide at today’s meeting whether or not the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to prepare a single paper on all of these countries or two papers based on the U.S. drafts.
VI. Agenda of the meeting of Heads of Governments
It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers would recommend to the Heads of Governments that their agenda for this afternoon should include the two questions referred to above, which had previously been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments and on which the Foreign Ministers now desire further instructions, as well as three questions carried over from the agenda of yesterday’s meeting of the Heads of Governments. The recommended agenda for this afternoon’s meeting would therefore be as follows:
-
The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and the Implementation of the Yalta Agreement.
-
Question as to whether in drawing up a policy toward Italy and the other satellites the subcommittee should prepare a separate recommendation on Italy or should prepare a single recommendation on all of the countries in question.
-
Polish Western frontier. The Soviet Delegation yesterday presented a paper on this subject.
-
Trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation also presented yesterday a paper on this subject.
-
Turkey. It is understood that the British Delegation wishes to raise this question orally.
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m.
JCS 200th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Jamison | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Lincoln | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Esposito | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain McDill | |
| General Somervell | Captain Stroop | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | Captain Oster | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Dean | |
| Rear Admiral Gardner | Colonel Donnelly | |
| Rear Admiral Maples | Colonel Stone | |
| Major General Gross | Colonel Riggs | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Cary | |
| Major General Norstad | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Brigadier General Cabell | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 12:15 p.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret
Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policy (CCS 877/4 and JCS 1366/2)
ADMIRAL LEAHY recommended for clarity that the term “this war” be changed wherever appearing in JCS 1366/2 to “the war against Japan.”
GENERAL SOMERVELL read out the wording which he expected Lord Leathers to propose in lieu of the paragraph on cargo shipping appearing on page 21 of the enclosure to JCS 1366/2. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff oppose the change since it does not take into account various shipping problems that are the concern of the United States only. He said that Lord Leathers would wish to include this paragraph in the statement of the basic objectives. He considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff might well accept Lord Leathers’ proposal in this regard.
In reply to a question by General Marshall, ADMIRAL GARDNER said that he saw no reason for singling out the question of shipping for inclusion in the statement of the basic objectives since there were other matters such as questions of food and of petroleum products, of the same nature as shipping, that might equally well be included in the statement.
GENERAL SOMERVELL said that Lord Leathers would also propose to insert in paragraph III 4c “for use as base or line of communication troops” after “areas” in the third line. He suggested that the United States Chiefs of Staff accept this change provided it was made clear that the change related to British bases in India.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1366/2, as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 877/5)
Review of Combined Procedures for Munitions Assignments (JCS 1397/2 and 1397/4)
GENERAL ARNOLD proposed a new paragraph 2 to replace that in the enclosure to JCS 1397/4. The change proposed by General Arnold was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that there were so many important matters for the President and the Prime Minister to discuss that he thought that the question raised in this paper might well be handled in a routine manner after the conference is over. He asked if there was any pressing reason why this should be handled at the present time.
GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the only reason was that there was now an opportunity for the President and Prime Minister to discuss the question.
ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the draft memorandum to the President and that if Admiral Leahy found an opportunity to take the matter up with the President during the conference that he might do so.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1397/4 as amended during the discussion and requested Admiral Leahy to present it to the President at such time as he considered most appropriate.
Internationalization of the Danube River (JCS 1426)
ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out the urgency of acting on this matter at the present time and recommended that the memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosure be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
GENERAL HULL said that the Department of State had developed a similar policy in regard to the internationalization of the Danube River and said that a paper approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would support the Department of State and the Foreign Office in obtaining an agreement.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1426 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 896)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
British Troop Ship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs – First Half of 1946 (CCS 679/7)
GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the British Chiefs of Staff would request a delay in consideration of this question since sufficient data were not available to them at the present time and since it was affected by the decision which might be reached on CCS 679/6. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should urge the British Chiefs of Staff to complete their studies of personnel shipping and be prepared to discuss the matter with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Confirmed their position as indicated in CCS 679/7 and
b. Agreed to urge that the British Chiefs of Staff complete their survey of passenger ships and be prepared to discuss this subject with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945.
Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (CCS 679/6)
GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he understood that the British would offer the Europa for trans-Atlantic service on a 50-50+ basis and that they would agree to the assignment of five of the captured German passenger ships for United States use in the Pacific. He said that the United States wanted all seven of the captured German passenger ships and he thought that the British would agree to the assignment of seven provided the United States Chiefs of Staff made a flat statement that the ships would be used in the Pacific and would not replace there any United States ships for repatriation in the Atlantic.
GENERAL GROSS said that the British might propose that the Europa be used for repatriation of 16,000 Canadians before 31 December 1945.
ADMIRAL FLANIGAN suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should agree that half the capacity of the Europa be used for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000, by 31 December 1945.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Confirmed their position as indicated in CCS 679/6.
b. Agreed to accept a proposal, if made by the British Chiefs of Staff, to employ the equivalent of half the capacity of the Europa for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000 by 31 December 1945.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collection of Weather Information in Eastern Siberia
ADMIRAL KING proposed a memorandum to the President on the above subject.
ADMIRAL COOKE said that this memorandum related to getting United States personnel into Russia in connection with coming operations and that he considered the matter most vital. He thought that the President should press the question involved with Generalissimo Stalin.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President on this subject proposed by Admiral King.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m.
CCS 198th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General of the Army Arnold | General Ismay | |
| General Somervell | Lieutenant-General Macready | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | Major-General Hollis | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | ||
| Major General Norstad | ||
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | ||
| Captain McDill | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Captain Moore | Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon |
CCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 21, 1945
Top secret
Approval of the Minutes of the 197th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 20 July 1945
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the conclusions of the CCS 197th Meeting subject to the amendment of conclusion b. under item 2 to read as follows:
Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.
b. Approved the detailed report of the meeting, subject to:
-
The amendment of the 3rd paragraph under item 2 to read as follows:
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the directive on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for obtaining the approval of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, since these governments had been party to the original arrangements.
-
Any later minor amendments.
Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies (CCS 877, 877/1, 877/2, 877/4, and 877/5)
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered CCS 877/5 and had come to the conclusion that the matter had now reached a stage which was outside the scope of the British Chiefs of Staff. He said that the hands of the British Chiefs of Staff were bound just as were those of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He regretted, therefore, that nothing further could be done in the matter until a decision had been reached on a higher level. He requested that the matter be deferred until such time as a decision on a higher level was forthcoming.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 877/5.
British Troopship Employment in U.S. Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 (CCS 679/7)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this matter.
Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (CCS 679/6)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this matter.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 877/5
Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies
Reference: CCS 877/4
-
The United States Chiefs of Staff having considered the proposals concerning the “Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies” made by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 877/4, wish to make their position clear. They consider that the basic undertakings should be confined to broad statements concerning the military conduct of the war. As a result of the changed circumstances arising from the defeat of Germany and the practical capability of the British Commonwealth to support its own forces in the field, they are operating on the basis that approval of the issue to allied governments of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan and which will not be used for any other purpose. They do not propose to subscribe to any statements which deviate from this principle. They consider that occupation forces are not a subject for combined military commitments. Matters relating to post-war armies are also not susceptible to combined military commitments. Any arrangements which the British wish to make on these subjects are beyond the purview of the United States Chiefs of Staff and should be taken up on the governmental level.
-
Considering in detail the proposed changes, the United States Chiefs of Staff have understood that throughout the entire period of the two-front war the combined commitment limited to supporting the war-making capacity of the British Isles has been satisfactory to the British Chiefs of Staff. In light of the limited information available to the United States Chiefs of Staff, it appears that the war effort of the British Commonwealth in the future is going to be less than that generated over the period when the commitment as previously worded was satisfactory; also certain portions of this war-making capacity will be devoted to other than the war effort against Japan. Since it is realized that certain parts of the British Commonwealth will make a contribution to the war against Japan there is no objection to a statement which confines the combined military commitment to matters clearly connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan. Therefore the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to substitute in their paragraph III 4b. the words “British Commonwealth” for “British Isles” and substitute “the war against Japan” for “this war.”
-
The change proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4c. to include forces “destined for combat areas” is acceptable if rephrased to indicate clearly that it applies only to forces specifically designated for employment in combat areas against Japan. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose that the subparagraph 4c. read in part “… those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.” The proposal contained in paragraph III 6c. that the United States make a military commitment to support forces engaged in other than the prosecution of the war against Japan is unacceptable for reasons indicated in the first paragraph of this memorandum.
-
The proposal to strike out the last sentence of paragraph III 6c. is acceptable. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff are willing to retain it in view of the fact they do not accept the inclusion in the basic undertakings of paragraph 7 proposed by the British.
-
The proposed paragraph 7 is beyond the purview of the United States Chiefs of Staff. They are not in a position to make military commitments on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom or on the matter of supplies for liberated Allies. Furthermore, the inclusion of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping in the basic undertakings is unacceptable. The purpose of the basic undertakings includes provision of a guide to the operating agencies for the allocation and the determination of priorities concerning all resources, not only cargo shipping, but forces and munitions of war. The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, will accept the inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, but not in the basic undertakings[,] of a statement concerning cargo shipping which is limited to matters within their purview. The statement proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff changed as indicated below is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff:
Cargo Shipping
Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated areas civilian requirements. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial conflict arise with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas, the shipping situation will be examined a matter for examination by the two Governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.
-
For purposes of ready reference the statement of policy concerning strategy and basic undertakings is included in the Enclosure using the redraft of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 877/4 and with the changes indicated above shown by italicizing and underlining.
-
It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the statement in the Enclosure.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
[Redrafted Text on Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies]
I. Over-all objective
- In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
-
In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.
-
In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.
III. Basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war
-
The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:
a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.
c. b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated destined for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.
d. c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
-
In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theatre to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war.
The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.
-
The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:
a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.
b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan.
c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan.
d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.
-
Cargo Shipping
The proposal by the British Chiefs of Staff is not acceptable.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union
[Tokyo,] July 21, 1945 — 9:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Urgent
931
Re your telegrams No. 1417 and No. 1418
The mission of special envoy Konoye is to ask the Government of the USSR for its assistance in terminating the war and to explain our concrete intentions concerning the matter in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor; it is also to negotiate on matters of establishing cooperative relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become basic in our diplomacy during and after the war.
Please propose the above to the Soviets and endeavor to obtain the agreement of the Government of the USSR relative to the dispatch of the special envoy.
Also, please understand fully my telegram No. 932 in particular.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union
[Tokyo,] July 21, 1945 — 9:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent
932
Re my telegram No. 931
-
We cannot accept unconditional surrender (understood fully your telegram No. 1416) in any situation. Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand united as one nation against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender. It is, however, our intention to achieve, with Soviet assistance, a peace which is not of unconditional nature, in order to avoid such a situation as mentioned above in accordance with His Majesty’s desire. It will be necessary for us to exert our utmost efforts to have the United States and Great Britain understand thoroughly this intention. Thus, it is impossible at this time to ask the Soviet Union unconditionally for assistance in obtaining peace; at the same time, it is also impossible and to our disadvantage to indicate the concrete conditions immediately at this time on account of internal and external relations. Under such delicate circumstances, we hope to have Prince Konoye transmit to the Soviet Union our concrete intentions based on the Emperor’s wishes and following a conference to have the Soviets deal with the United States and Great Britain, while considering the Soviet demands in Asia.
-
Taking into consideration the fact that this matter is a negotiation of the utmost importance which may determine the fate of our country, I request that you take full measures to grasp the true intentions of the Soviet Union by seeking sufficient explanations, for instance, even with respect to the Soviet reply transmitted in your telegram No. 1417.
-
It is a matter of course that the special envoy has the responsibility of advising the Government; but please explain to the Soviets, if necessary, that the envoy is to be dispatched as a special envoy in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, whose chief aim is benevolence. Please take care to fully impress the other party with the facts regarding His Majesty’s trust in Prince Konoye and the prominent position held by the Prince in the political circles in our country.
-
If the proposal at the beginning of my telegram No. 931 is not absolutely necessary, please avoid making a written proposal.
-
Furthermore, I understood your opinion transmitted in telegram No. 1427, but wish to request your further endeavors since the decision regarding the matter at the beginning of my telegram was that of the Cabinet.
Stimson-Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Stimson | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Bundy | Lord Cherwell |
Stimson’s diary entry: “I then left the ‘Little White House’, picked up Bundy, and went to the Prime Minister’s house where we conferred with him and Lord Cherwell. I turned over the paper to Churchill and he began reading it but was interrupted a few minutes before five in order to hurry to the Big Three Conference at five o’clock. He asked me to return on the following morning to finish up the report.”
Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Mr. Attlee | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Pauley | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Davies | Sir William Strang | Mr. Novikov |
| Mr. Dunn | Major Birse | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Clayton | Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Matthews | ||
| Mr. Bohlen |
Department of State Minutes
Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m.
Top secret
The meeting of the Heads of States opened at 5:15 p.m. on Saturday, July 21, 1945. THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that the Secretary of State had a report to deliver.
MR. BYRNES delivered a report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the morning of July 21, 1945 (copy of report attached). Mr. Byrnes read the portions of this report dealing with the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions.
MR. BYRNES then reported that the Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with the Polish question, including the liquidation of the London Government and the implementation of the Yalta declaration, had presented the subcommittee’s report. Since the subcommittee had been unable to reach full agreement, points of disagreement were first discussed by the Foreign Ministers who were likewise unable to reach agreement and had agreed to refer the matter to the Heads of Government for final decision.
MR. BYRNES called attention to the difference existing in connection with the second paragraph of the proposed statement on the Polish question. (Annex 2). This paragraph concerns the question of the transfer to the Polish Provisional Government of assets and property belonging to the Polish state located in the United States and Great Britain. After reading this paragraph, Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was desired to act on this question while it was fresh in the minds of the Heads of State rather than proceed to the other points.
STALIN asked that Mr. Byrnes proceed with his report.
MR. BYRNES stated that on the third paragraph of the report there was no disagreement, but that on the fourth paragraph disagreement existed. Mr. Eden had agreed to the withdrawal of this paragraph, provided that the last sentence was retained and a new paragraph added regarding freedom of the press. He read the proposed new paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT stated that in the United States it was impossible to transfer assets without taking liabilities into account, either legally or otherwise. As he had stated before, there was no intention in the United States for America to assume burdens of this sort. It was therefore absolutely necessary for liabilities to be taken into consideration. We will give the Polish Provisional Government everything coming to it and we want to be friendly.
CHURCHILL stated that the British were content with the President’s proposal, particularly the words stating that assets would not be released except on condition that liabilities would be assumed. Churchill went on to ask how the re-draft of paragraph two of the statement on the Polish question covered the question of liabilities.
THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Byrnes to read the paragraph again.
MR. BYRNES stated that the language made no specific mention either of assets or liabilities and then read the paragraph in question.
CHURCHILL repeated that this paragraph dealt neither with assets nor liabilities.
THE PRESIDENT stated that we were proposing to deal with the Polish Provisional Government under American law.
CHURCHILL remarked that there is no provision at all in the case of the British for any transfer of liabilities, particularly in connection with the 120 million (pounds) advanced by the British Government to the former Polish Government in London.
MR. BYRNES stated that there is not. It is the American position that the settlement of property rights is a matter that lays between the Polish Provisional Government and the United States Government.
CHURCHILL inquired whether the same position would apply to the British.
MR. BYRNES answered that it would, of course, and also to the Soviet Government. He saw no reason for a special declaration by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government or the United States on the transfer of property to the Polish Provisional Government.
CHURCHILL stated his understanding that we were abandoning arrangements for the transfer of the assets and liabilities insofar as this conference is concerned. He pointed out that it is a much more serious question for the British than for the United States, since the British had made much larger grants to the Polish Government.
THE PRESIDENT stated he believed that it was not necessary to single out the United States or United Kingdom Governments for a special statement. The United States meets its obligations and always has.
STALIN asked whether the British Government proposed to exact from the Polish Provisional Government full return for advances granted to Polish forces.
CHURCHILL replied that this matter would be discussed with the Polish Provisional Government.
STALIN then said that the Soviet Union had granted large credits to the Polish Provisional Government and to Polish forces. It is the Soviet opinion that Polish forces have redeemed these advances and that the account is regarded as closed. He believed the American proposal to be acceptable, but it needed polishing. He suggested an amendment to the American proposal which was read. The differences between the two texts will be that there will be none of the usual juridical delay.
THE PRESIDENT stated that there is no intent on the part of the United States to procrastinate.
STALIN then stated that the proposal might be accepted as is.
THE PRESIDENT thanked him and asked that the Conference pass to the next paragraph.
MR. BYRNES stated that the next paragraph concerned the holding of elections. The issue would be presented by Mr. Eden on behalf of the British.
MR. EDEN suggested the deletion of certain words.
STALIN remarked that it was good of Mr. Eden to come part of the way and suggested that in the interests of the dignity of Poland it would be well if Mr. Eden could take another step. He stated that the preceding paragraph embodied everything necessary regarding freedom of the press. Press correspondents remain in Poland and enjoy freedom. There is no use repeating. The Poles are very touchy and will be hurt. They will suspect us of accusing them of being unwilling to accord a free press. Therefore, Stalin suggested that the document end with the paragraph regarding the election in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part.
CHURCHILL stated that this suggestion was in no way a compromise.
STALIN replied that it was a compromise insofar as the Polish Provisional Government is concerned.
CHURCHILL remarked that he had hoped to strengthen the declaration rather than weaken it.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the United States is very much interested in the Polish elections. There are six million Poles in the United States. A free election in Poland reported to the United States by a free press would make it much easier to deal with these Polish people. The President stated that it seemed to him that the Polish Provisional Government knew that the Three Powers would expect the press freely to report the elections and would expect this matter to be raised.
STALIN said that he could see that this compromise is not acceptable and then suggested an amendment of the last paragraph which was read.
THE PRESIDENT stated that this amendment suited him.
CHURCHILL asked whether the President was content and pointed out that the paragraph was now governed by the word “note.” However, Churchill believed that the amendment was all right and did not make much difference.
MR. BYRNES then read section IV of the report of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. This concerned the implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and the satellite states. It had been decided to postpone discussion of this paper to allow time for further study. Mr. Byrnes next read section V of the report regarding Italy and the other satellite states.
THE PRESIDENT stated that on the first day of the meeting the American Government had presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward the satellite states. He remarked that the surrender terms for Italy were much more drastic than the surrender terms for those other satellite states which surrendered later. The American Government felt that there should be two separate papers on these matters, rather than one.
STALIN stated that he had an amendment to make to the American proposal concerning policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. He had no objection in principle to the American proposal. However, he wanted an addition made to paragraph two, which he read. This amendment, among other things, provided for recognition of the governments of these countries.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he could not agree to this amendment.
STALIN then said that the two questions would have to be postponed, since Italy could not be dealt with alone.
THE PRESIDENT stated that the American Government was unable to recognize the governments of the other satellite countries. When these countries were established on a proper basis, the United States would recognize them and not before. The President stated that the meeting would proceed and that this question would be passed over.
CHURCHILL pointed out that time was passing, that the Heads of State had been here for a week and that many papers had been passed over. On this point he wanted to say that the position of the British Government was similar to that of the United States.
MR. BYRNES then read section VI of the report dealing with the agenda set by the Foreign Ministers in their morning meeting for the present meeting of the Heads of State. The remaining matters dealt with the Polish western frontiers, trusteeships and Turkey.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he wished to make a statement regarding the Polish frontiers. As the Crimean Declaration read it was decided that Germany would be occupied by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, and that the Polish frontiers would be favorably considered by the four governments but that final settlement of these frontiers would be effected at the peace conference. During the first [second] day’s meeting it was decided that in considering the boundary of Germany the 1937 frontiers would be the point of departure. The three governments had decided upon the zones and their boundaries had been set. We have already gone back to the zone assigned to us and the British have done the same. It now appears as if another occupying government was being assigned a zone. This was being done without consultation. If the Poles were occupying a zone this should have been agreed on. The President stated that he was unable to see how reparations or other questions could be decided if Germany was carved up. These matters should be considered at the present conference. He was very friendly toward the Polish Provisional Government and it is probable that full agreement could be reached on what the Soviet Government desires, but he wanted consultation.
STALIN replied that the Crimean decision says that the three Heads of Government felt that the eastern frontiers should follow the Curzon line.19 In regard to the western frontiers, it was decided that Poland should receive cessions of territory in the north and west. The declaration goes on to say that the three Heads of Government had decided that a new Polish government should consult at the appropriate time on the final settlement of the western frontiers.
THE PRESIDENT stated that this was correct, but that it was not correct to assign a zone. He agreed with Stalin’s reading of the Crimean declaration.
STALIN stated that on the basis of the Crimean declaration the Polish Provisional Government had already stated its views in regard to the western frontiers.
THE PRESIDENT replied that this had not been done to the United States Government to his knowledge.
STALIN remarked that he had in mind the Polish Provisional Government.
THE PRESIDENT then stated that he now understood that the Secretary of State yesterday had received a communication from the Polish Provisional Government which he, the President, had not seen.
STALIN stated that the Soviet Union proposed that the Conference express an opinion on the wishes of the Polish Government regarding the western frontiers. It made no difference whether this was done today or tomorrow. The final settlement would, of course, be left to the peace conference. In regard to the statement that the Russians had given the Poles a zone of occupation without agreement, Stalin claimed that this was not quite accurate. Several communications had been received from the American and British Governments to the effect that Polish administration should not be established in certain areas until the western frontiers had been finally set. The Soviet Union could not accept the suggestions, since the German population in these areas had followed the German army to the west and the Poles had remained. The Red Army had needed local administration in this territory, since it was not accustomed to setting up an administration, fighting and clearing out enemy agents at the same time. The American and British Governments had been so informed. The Soviet Government was more ready to permit the functioning of the Polish administration, since Poland was to receive territorial cessions in the west. He was unable to see what harm was done by the establishment of a Polish administration where only Poles remained.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he had no objection to an expression of opinion regarding the western frontiers, however, he wanted it distinctly understood that the zones of occupation will be as established. Any other course will make reparations very difficult, particularly if part of the German territory is gone before agreement is reached on what reparations should be.
STALIN replied that the Soviet Union was not afraid of the reparations question and would if necessary renounce them.
THE PRESIDENT replied that the United States would get no reparations anyhow. This made no difference. We were trying to keep from paying more, as we did before.
STALIN remarked that everything the President said was interpretative since no frontiers had been ceded at the Crimea except for the provision that Poland would receive territory. The western frontier question is open and the Soviet Union is not bound.
THE PRESIDENT repeated: “You are not?”
STALIN replied: “No.”
CHURCHILL said that he had a good deal to say about the actual line, but gathered that the time for saying it was not yet.
THE PRESIDENT stated that it was not possible for the Heads of State to settle this question. It was a matter for the peace conference.
STALIN remarked that it would be very difficult to restore a German administration to this area. Stalin stated that he would like the President to understand the Russian conception, to which they adhered both in war and during the occupation. An army fights in war and cares only for its efforts to win the war. To enable an army to win and advance it must have a quiet rear. An army cannot fight the enemy and the rear. It fights well if the rear is quiet and better if the rear is friendly. Even if the Germans had not fled, it would have been difficult to set up a German administration in these areas since the majority of the population was Polish. He asked the President to imagine the establishment of a German administration which would stab one in the back while the Poles were there who received the Soviet army enthusiastically. Since such a situation existed, it was natural that the Soviet Government set up an administration of friends.
THE PRESIDENT stated his agreement and sympathy for this situation but pointed out that there were other aspects of the matter.
STALIN insisted that there was no other way out. Soviet action does not imply that the Russians had settled the question themselves. If the President did not agree, the question should be suspended.
CHURCHILL inquired whether the question could be suspended. There is also the question of supply, which is very urgent. The region in question is a very important source of food from which Germany is to be fed.
STALIN asked who will work to produce the grain; who will plow the fields; this must be borne in mind.
THE PRESIDENT pointed out that each was stating in a friendly way his own point of view. The question was not one of who occupied an area, but a question of the occupation of Germany. We occupy our zone, the British theirs, the French theirs, and the Soviet Union should occupy theirs. There is no objection to the discussion of the western frontiers. The President did not believe that they were far apart on this matter.
STALIN insisted that on paper these areas constituted German territory, but practically, they were Polish territories since there is no German population.
THE PRESIDENT remarked that nine million Germans are a lot.
STALIN maintained that they had all fled.
CHURCHILL remarked that in case this was true consideration should be given to the means of feeding them in the regions to which they had fled, as the produce of the land they had left was not available to nourish Germany. Churchill stated his understanding that under the full Polish plan put forward by the Soviet Government, one quarter of the total arable land of 1937 Germany would be alienated from the German area on which food and reparations were based. This was tremendous. Insofar as the populations were concerned, it appeared that three to four million people would be moved from east of the Curzon line, but the pre-war population of the German territory to be transferred amounted to 8¼ [8½?] millions. It was apparent that it was a serious matter to effect wholesale transfers of German populations and burden the remainder of Germany with their care if their food supply had been alienated.
THE PRESIDENT interjected to ask where we would be if we gave France the Saar and the Ruhr.
STALIN replied that the Soviet Government had not made a decision in regard to French claims but had done so in regard to the western frontier of Poland.
CHURCHILL remarked that in regard to Stalin’s statement that all Germans had left the areas in question there are figures showing that there are about two and a half millions left. This should be explored.
STALIN stated that the questions of frontiers had been up for discussion but that the Conference was now on the question of food supplies. He had no objection.
CHURCHILL replied that he had only wanted to point out the implications of this question.
STALIN stated that the Soviet Union fully appreciated the burden and admitted the difficulties which would arise from the transfer of this territory but that the German people were principally to blame for these difficulties. Churchill had quoted the figure of eight and a half million, said to be the population of this area. It should be remembered that there had been several call-ups during the war and that the rest of the population had left before the Soviet Army. They had found that the Stettin population of 500,000 had almost entirely disappeared, only 8,000 remaining. The majority of the Germans had gone west behind the line. Some, however, had gone to the Koenigsberg area since they had heard that the Russians would be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than with the Poles. No single German remained in the territory to be given Poland. Between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans had quitted their fields which are now being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles would agree to the return of these Germans. This situation should be borne in mind.
THE PRESIDENT stated that he wanted again to declare that the occupation zones should be occupied as agreed upon. The question of whether the Poles should have part of Germany cannot be settled here.
CHURCHILL stated that he agreed to compensation for Poland at the expense of Germany for that territory taken from the east of the Curzon Line. However, he had thought that a balance would be maintained. Poland was now taking a far greater territory than that they lost. This could not be for the good of Europe. Millions of people would be moved across the Curzon Line and other millions would be moved elsewhere. These vast transfers of population constituted a great shock to his country. It would seem to bring about a position not possible for him. Moreover, he did not believe that it was good for Poland. If it was true that the Germans have run away, they should be encouraged to come back. Poland which owes all to the Great Powers has no right to bring about a catastrophe. He wanted to emphasize these things since he was anxious that Stalin should see our difficulties. We see his. We do not want to be left with a German population deprived of sources of food supply. Take the immense population of the Ruhr which is in the British zone. If food is not found, we might be confronted with a condition similar to that in the German concentration camps but on a far larger scale.
STALIN maintained that Germany had always had to import food and will need to continue.
CHURCHILL replied that this was certainly true if their feeding grounds were taken.
STALIN remarked that the Germans could buy food from the Poles.
CHURCHILL insisted that he did not admit that this territory is Polish.
STALIN stated that the territory is inhabited by Poles who cultivated the fields, not by Germans. It is impossible to ask the Poles to cultivate the fields and give the food to the Germans.
CHURCHILL pointed out that certain conditions in this great area in which Poles have been introduced are most peculiar. He understands that the Poles are selling Silesian coal to Sweden. They are doing so at a time when England had to go through a fireless winter. Great Britain stands on the general principle that the supply of food from the 1937 German territories should be available to the whole German people in proportion to their number irrespective of the particular zone in which the food is produced.
STALIN asked who is to produce the coal. The Germans do not, the Poles are producing the coal.
CHURCHILL said, “You mean the Silesians?”
STALIN said they all fled.
CHURCHILL remarked that they had fled from fright and could now return.
STALIN stated that these people were reluctant to return and that the Soviet Union is not in sympathy with them. He was afraid that the Poles would hang them if they returned.
CHURCHILL then remarked that he had been deeply impressed by what Stalin had said about the mistake of letting past bitterness influence future problems. We should not have a mass of people dumped upon us, while the Poles acquire food which the Germans need.
STALIN replied that what he had said yesterday did not apply to war criminals.
CHURCHILL interjected that surely the eight and a half million were not war criminals.
STALIN stated that he had in mind the proprietors. He went on to state that the Soviet Union is purchasing coal from Poland since Russia has coal shortages.
THE PRESIDENT stated that it seems to be an accomplished fact that a large piece of Germany has been given to the Poles. The United States is short of coal but has made arrangements to ship considerable quantities to Europe. The Silesian mines are a part of Germany for reparations and feeding purposes. Under these conditions we will talk about boundaries but the Poles have no right to take this territory now and remove it from the German economy. Simply stated, the case is are the zones valid until peace, or are we giving Germany away piecemeal.
STALIN insisted that no one can exploit this region but the Poles. Russia is short of labor and there are no Germans there. Apparently German propaganda had carried the day. Either all production would be stopped or the Poles would operate it.
STALIN pointed out that the Poles operated in their country rich coal areas. Now Silesia had been added. The Poles are now working the mines. We cannot take their coal for nothing.
CHURCHILL pointed out that the Silesian mines had always operated with large numbers of Polish miners. There is no objection to the mines being operated as an agency of the Soviet Government but not for the Polish Government.
STALIN stated that this was not possible because it would disturb normal relations between two states. He would like to draw Churchill’s attention to the fact that there is a serious German shortage of labor. Most enterprises during the advance of the Soviet army employed foreign labor. When Russian troops entered, the foreign labor had been freed and the laborers went home. Where have the German workers gone? They are either killed or captured. Such is the situation. A vast German industry existed with few German laborers. Everything fell to pieces before our army. Either these enterprises are closed or the local population, here, the Poles, should be given a chance to work. This is not a result of deliberate policy but the result of a situation. No one but Germany is to blame. In regard to Churchill’s statement about the western frontier to the effect that Poland was getting too much, he agreed that the Provisional Government’s proposal for territory would create difficulties for Germany.
CHURCHILL interjected, “For us all.”
STALIN went on to state that our policy is to create difficulty for the Germans in order to make it difficult for German power to rise again. It was better to make difficulties for the Germans than for the Poles.
THE PRESIDENT remarked that it was bad to create difficulties for the Allies.
STALIN stated that the less industry there was in Germany the greater the market would be for American and British goods. He asked what is the best. We had brought the state which competed with our countries to its knees. Germany was a dangerous business rival because it had lower living standards. He repeated, “What is best.”
CHURCHILL remarked that we did not wish to be confronted by a mass of starving people.
STALIN replied “there will be none.”
CHURCHILL said that Mr. Attlee wished to make a statement.
MR. ATTLEE stated that he wanted to say in regard to the immediate situation on the part of the occupation powers that aside from the boundaries between Germany and Poland we are faced with a country in chaos and a country which as an economic unit depends to a considerable extent for coal and food on the eastern area partly inhabited by Poles. It would seem that pending the final settlement the resources of the whole 1937 Germany would have to bear a first charge on the sustenance of the whole people and if a part of Germany is to be detached in anticipation, it would be a very heavy burden on the powers charged with the occupation of the western and southern zones. Any labor needed to exploit the eastern areas should be made available from the rest of Germany including released army forces. They should be directed to such places as they can work most usefully. The Allies should not be confronted by an impossibly difficult situation.
STALIN replied that Mr. Attlee should bear in mind that Poland is also an Ally.
ATTLEE replied that this was so but it should not be compensated at the expense of the rest of the Allies.
THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to make a frank statement of what he thought. He could not agree to the separation of the eastern part of Germany under these circumstances. This must be considered in connection with reparations and the supply problems of the whole German people.
STALIN said, Are we through today?
THE PRESIDENT replied that the Conference had apparently reached an impasse on this matter.
CHURCHILL added that they were not through but that there were more agreeable things to come. He suggested later consideration.
THE PRESIDENT announced that the Conference was adjourned until 5 p.m. on July 22.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 21, 1945 — 5 p.m.
[Translation]
very urgent
1433
Re my telegram No. 1418
It is presumed that there is no connection between the rumored peace proposals in your telegram No. 919 and my telegram No. 1422 and the question of sending a special envoy. However, the Big Three Conference had already started on the 17th. Therefore, it may be presumed that the reply from the Soviet Union on the evening of the 18th mentioned in my previous telegram No. 1417 may have stemmed from the Big Three Conference. If not, it must be taken into consideration that we had proposed sending a special envoy prior to the Big Three Conference and that this matter may have been divulged to the Anglo-American group.
Very little information on that conference is available from radio or other sources. In spite of the paucity of information thereon, it appears that the conference atmosphere is very friendly and that the three leaders are having frequent private meetings. Therefore, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union may take an unforeseeable turn. I am convinced of the necessity for extreme caution.