America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

Truman-Stalin meeting, 3:04 p.m.

Stalin’s quarters, Babelsberg

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen
740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845

Bohlen notes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 3:04 p.m.

3 p.

S: [blank]

M [blank]

Pres—lakes—Black

S—I must tell you they the news—hands Pres note from Sato & message from the Emperor

B—I remember that H— H—

S—worthwhile answer to answer—

Pres no respect.

S—not a war—will want lull—might answer as follows no specific—don’t know character—of K Mission—can’t—answer=a refusal

Pres satisfactory

M—factual

B—what [one word illegible] ins inspired it—fear of what you will do—

M—I think they guess

S—Can see our forces tanks etc

M—not only to USSR

S—to US. Eng & [one word illegible]

Pres—we had indicati[on] from Sweden

800.515/7-545

The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State and the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg, July 18, 1945]

War Department Responsibility for German Interim Financing

  1. On July 5 the Secretary transmitted a memorandum to the President, a copy of which is attached, outlining policy agreed in Washington for U.S. participation in German interim financing. The short annex included in the German political and economic policy directive put forward yesterday by the President follows this line exactly.

  2. It is essential that responsibility be clearly fixed upon one U.S. Agency for all U.S. financing with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility. The memorandum of July 5 recommends that the responsibility be placed upon the War Department.

  3. No reply has been received from the President. Since problems relating to responsibility for financing certain types of imports into the U.S. Zone have already arisen, and the necessity for handling the United States’ share of any combined financing should soon arise if the President’s proposals are adopted, it is important that an early decision be sought.

E[MILIO] G C[OLLADO]

Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War

Berlin, 18.7.45
Top secret
and personal

Mr. Secretary Stimson: I enclose a photostat record of the Hyde Park Agreement on T.A., for which you asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

This photograph was taken by a special photographic section of the Air Ministry, and flown out here in the charge of a trusted officer.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

[Enclosure]
Top secret

Tube Alloys

Aide-Mémoire of Conversation Between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944

  1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a “bomb” is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.

  2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]
W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

Second plenary meeting, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Dunn Sir William Strang Mr. Gusev
Mr. Davies Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Pauley
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Thompson

Thompson minutes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Press

CHURCHILL raised the question of the press in relation to the Conference. At Tehran it had been difficult for the press to obtain access to the Conference; at Yalta it had been impossible; here there were many representatives of the press outside the well-guarded fortress in which the Conference was taking place and they were raising a great outcry in the world press regarding the inadequacy of their access to information.

STALIN inquired who had let them in.

CHURCHILL replied they were outside the compound. He recognized that secrecy and quiet were necessary for the work of the Conference. If his colleagues agreed he was willing to have a talk with the press not to explain the work of the meeting but rather why the press must be excluded or it might be delegated to the President or to someone else to do this.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that each delegation had a press representative here and suggested that it be left to them to handle and that this meeting be kept secret as the others have always been. He was not worried about the correspondents who were mostly American.

This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL said he had only offered himself as the lamb and that in any event he would only go if the Generalissimo would agree to rescue him.

Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers

THE PRESIDENT said that the Foreign Ministers had agreed that the agenda of the present meeting should be the following:

  1. The question of procedure for peace negotiations and territorial settlements.

  2. The question of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political questions.

  3. The Polish question, particularly the problems having to do with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government and with the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland.

THE PRESIDENT said it was agreed that the Secretary of State would present the report of the Foreign Ministers meeting and he would now ask him to do so.

Procedure for Peace Settlements

MR. BYRNES then read section 1 of his report dealing with the procedure for peace settlements (Attachment 1).

STALIN said that the Soviet delegation withdrew its reservation to paragraph 1 of the United States draft and that the rest of the draft was acceptable.

CHURCHILL said he wondered about the words “with a view to their submission to the United Nations.”

MR. BYRNES said that the Declaration of [by] United Nations of January 1, 1942 called for this.

CHURCHILL said he assumed this meant the ultimate submission of the treaties to the United Nations.

STALIN said this made no difference as the three powers would represent the interests of all.

CHURCHILL said it was all right if this was clear.

THE PRESIDENT said that the report on the procedure for peace settlements was agreed to unanimously.

Political Authority of the Control Council for Germany

MR. BYRNES read section 2 of his report (Attachment 1).

CHURCHILL said the word “Germany” was used repeatedly. What was Germany for this purpose? Was it pre-war Germany. If this were meant he agreed.

THE PRESIDENT asked what was the understanding of the Soviet delegation.

STALIN replied that Germany is what she has become after the war. No other Germany existed now. Austria for example was not now a part of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT proposed that for this purpose they consider Germany as it existed in 1937.

STALIN proposed to add “minus what Germany had lost in 1945.”

THE PRESIDENT observed that Germany had lost all in 1945.

STALIN replied that he was speaking geographically and said that it was impossible to get away from the results of the war.

THE PRESIDENT agreed but said it was necessary to have a line from which to start.

STALIN referred to the Sudetenland which Germany had taken from Czechoslovakia. Did his colleagues propose that this be considered part of Germany?

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had suggested the Germany of 1937.

STALIN agreed that from a formal point of view Germany might be considered in this way. He suggested that the Western frontier of Poland be fixed now and that the question would then become clear.

THE PRESIDENT said that this could best be done when it had been decided what to do with Germany.

STALIN said that Germany was a country with no government and with no definite frontier. It had no frontier guards. It did have four occupied zones.

THE PRESIDENT said he still suggested that 1937 Germany be taken as a point from which to operate in considering this matter.

STALIN replied that of course they would have to base themselves on some starting point and from this point of view the Germany of 1937 was satisfactory.

CHURCHILL said he agreed and The President noted that Germany of 1937 was agreed to.

MR. Byrnes pointed out that economic questions connected with Germany had been referred to the subcommittee and that it was not possible to finish with this question until the subcommittee had reported. It was, however, possible to discuss the political section of the report. Certain changes in drafting had been referred to a subcommittee but that would not prevent discussion of political questions now.

STALIN said the Soviet delegation accepted, in the main, all the points in the political section of this proposed agreement. The Soviet delegation, however, had one amendment to propose in point 5, namely, the deletion of the last sentence.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Foreign Ministers had already agreed to this.

STALIN noted that the Soviet delegation agreed to the document but said that the drafting could be looked over.

MR. EDEN proposed that the Foreign Ministers look over the redraft the next morning and submit it to the next meeting of the heads of state.

This was agreed to.

CHURCHILL drew attention to section 2, paragraph (1), (b), which covered the destruction of arms, implements of war and so forth. There were many things which could not be destroyed such as wind tunnels and other technical facilities. Would it not be well to have some use of them?

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the words of the report were “shall be seized or destroyed.”

STALIN said that they were not barbarians and they would not destroy research institutions.

CHURCHILL said he meant they could share them and use them together.

STALIN said he agreed that this could be done.

The Polish Question

MR. BYRNES read section 3 of his report dealing with the Polish question (Attachment 1).

STALIN also presented a statement on the Polish question which was read by the interpreter (Attachment 2).

CHURCHILL said that the burden of this matter lies on the British Government. When Hitler drove the Poles out of Poland, Great Britain received them. There was no property worthwhile belonging to the London Polish Government which the British have now disowned. There were about twenty million pounds in gold which has been frozen. He supposed it was the ultimate asset of the Central Polish Bank and that they must follow whatever is the normal course of such transfers. This gold was not, however, in the control of the London Polish Government. He added that the Polish Embassy in London had been vacated by Raczkiewicz and is available to the representative of the Polish Provisional Government. The Ambassador of the Polish Provisional Government may have it when he wants it and the sooner he arrives to take it the better.

CHURCHILL said he may be asked how the Polish Government had been financed. The answer was that it had been financed by the British Government which had expended about £120,000,000 to finance the Polish Army and to look after Poles who had fled the German scourge and who had taken refuge on British shores – the only asylum available to them in Europe. When the London Polish Government had been disavowed and they had recognized the new provisional government, the British had arranged that three months salary be paid to the employees of the London Government and that they be dismissed. He thought it would have been improper if they had not given these people an opportunity to look around to see what they would do. The expense of this fell on the British Government.

CHURCHILL asked the indulgence of the President in pointing out that the British position was unique. They had to deal with the transfer or liquidation of the Polish forces who had fought with them. Some Poles had got out of France, others had escaped from Switzerland to Italy. They got 40 or 50 thousand out of France before the French capitulation and had constructed a Polish Army of about five divisions which was based in England. There were a great many Poles in a Polish corps of three divisions in Italy which was also in a very excited frame of mind. This Polish Army of about 200,000, front and rear, fought with great bravery and discipline here in Germany and also in Italy. They suffered heavy losses and held the line with distinction. Relations with these men involved the honor of His Majesty’s Government. Pledges had been given to Parliament, but in any event they would feel obliged to treat them in a manner which the world as a whole would approve.

STALIN interrupted to say “of course.”

CHURCHILL said that these men had taken an oath to President Raczkiewicz. He said it was necessary for him to state British policy toward these men. It was to persuade as many as possible to return to Poland. He had been very angry when he learned that General Anders, who is a good soldier, but who, Marshal Stalin knows, is anti-Russian in his views, told his troops that if they returned to Poland they would probably be sent to Siberia. Disciplinary action would be taken against this officer. This was the British policy but they needed a little time. This policy also applied to civilian employees. Of course, the better things were in Poland, the quicker they would go.

CHURCHILL wished to take this occasion to rejoice in the improvement which had developed in the Polish situation and to express the wish for the success of the new Polish Provisional Government. He referred to the fact that Mr. Mikolajczyk had contributed to its establishment. He had wished for more in the setting up of this Government but the progress made was a splendid example of the collaboration of the great powers. He had said in Parliament as a pledge, because feeling after the Crimea Conference was high on the Polish question, that if soldiers who had fought for Britain did not wish to return to Poland they would receive them in the British Empire. They could not cast adrift men who had been brothers in arms. He hoped as few as possible would remain and they would be encouraged to return to Poland. If the Polish Provisional Government could give them the assurance that they would be well received in full freedom and under appropriate economic conditions, this would be of great help. He would like them to feel assured in returning to their home which had been freed by the victory of the Red Army. The Foreign Ministers might discuss this matter.

MR. CHURCHILL said he had read the Soviet paper on this question which had been submitted earlier in the meeting and his remarks were in answer to it. They showed that subject to what he had said he agreed with it and suggested that it be sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if anything should be added. He said the British were also submitting a paper on Poland.

STALIN said he appreciated the difficulties of the British Government. They had sheltered the former rulers of Poland and in spite of this these foreign rulers had caused much trouble to them. The Soviet draft was not intended to make the British position more complicated. Its purpose was to put an end to the position which still existed. The Government of Arciszewski continued to exist; it had means to conduct activities; it had agents and press representatives. This made an unfavorable impression on public opinion in all allied nations. If Mr. Churchill pointed out some items in the Soviet draft that complicated the British position he was prepared to withdraw them. He repeated that it was only intended to end the present situation.

CHURCHILL said the British delegation agreed with Stalin but he pointed out that when you cut off money and end a Government you cannot prevent – in England – individuals from going on talking. This included members of Parliament. After the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk, he had never seen the members of this Government nor had the Foreign Secretary. But what could be done if Arciszewski wandered through the streets of London and talked with journalists? He repeated that the British Government had nothing to do with these men and was giving them no facilities. They had to be careful, however, about the Army, if they were to prevent mutiny and possibly bloodshed in which case their own people would be killed. In this connection he said that many of them were in Scotland and that they only wanted to get rid of them. The British had the same objectives as the Soviets. They asked for help and a little time and also that Poland be made an attractive place for Poles to return to.

CHURCHILL said that they were willing for the draft of the Soviet Government to be examined by the three Foreign Secretaries in the light of this discussion and of the paper which he would submit. He agreed that this matter [should] be settled as soon as possible.

THE PRESIDENT observed that there was no fundamental difference. Churchill asked for time to get the Polish soldiers into a condition in which they would wish to return to Poland. Stalin had agreed to withdraw any points in the Soviet draft which would complicate the position of the British Government.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he was also interested in the Polish question. He recalled that the Yalta agreement had been reached on the holding of free and secret Polish elections as soon as possible. He hoped that this procedure would be carried out by the Polish Government.

STALIN proposed that the question be referred to the Foreign Secretaries.

CHURCHILL agreed but suggested that the whole Polish question be referred to the Foreign Ministers and that they bring out a new draft.

STALIN said he wished to state that the Polish Government had never refused to hold elections.

CHURCHILL inquired if it was agreed that they would continue tomorrow the discussion of the big question covered in section 2 of the report, namely, the German question.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative and STALIN said it was only a question of wording.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

On the proposal of THE PRESIDENT, it was agreed that the agenda of the next meeting would be prepared by the Foreign Ministers.

CHURCHILL said he was impressed by the question of political principles to be applied to Germany and that it was well to discuss it at the next meeting. It was, however, a very big question. Were there to be uniform or different practices in the different zones?

STALIN said he understood that they were all in favor of the uniform policy.

THE PRESIDENT stated that was correct.

CHURCHILL said he only wished to emphasize this.

The meeting adjourned.

Cohen notes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m.

CHURCHILL: When we were at Teheran, there were no journalists. At Yalta, there were few. Here they are all about. They carry powerful weapons. They are making a great outcry.

MOLOTOV: Where are they?

CHURCHILL: They are not in the compound. We can only do our work in absolute secrecy. If my colleagues are willing, I am willing to have a talk with them and explain as a newspaper man the need for secrecy. I am willing to speak to them or to have the President or the Marshal speak to them.

MOLOTOV: What do they wish? Are their demands known to everyone?

TRUMAN: We each have a press representative here. Let them handle it. We will make no communication until the end of the Conference. I am not disturbed by them. Most of them are Americans. Your election is over and so is mine.

Let us proceed. The Foreign Secretaries have recommended the following items for discussion:

  1. Machinery for peace settlement. Shall we discuss this?

MOLOTOV: I agree.

TRUMAN: Draft proposal for Council of Foreign Ministers (American proposal) approved in principle. May I ask the Secretary of State to read the report of the Foreign Secretaries?

MOLOTOV: Yes.

CHURCHILL: Yes.

Secretary of State Byrnes reads report of the foreign secretaries.

Three questions presented:

  1. Peace machinery.
  2. Control Commission for Germany.
  3. Polish question.

TRUMAN: Is it your pleasure to proceed with the first point?

MOLOTOV: The Soviet Delegation withdrew its reservation in regard to paragraph 1, as to the rest, it agrees to accept.

CHURCHILL: What is the meaning of reference to submission to the United Nations?

BYRNES: This is required by United Nations undertaking not to make a separate peace.

CHURCHILL: It means with a view to their ultimate submission.

MOLOTOV: It makes no difference. The three powers represent the whole.

CHURCHILL: British Delegation agrees.

BYRNES: (proceeds with reading of report.)

TRUMAN: What is your pleasure regarding the second item? This is the principles for the control of Germany.

CHURCHILL: What do we mean by Germany? If we mean pre-war Germany, I agree to such.

STALIN: Germany is what has become of her after war. No other Germany exists. Austria is not a part of Germany.

TRUMAN: Why not say the Germany of 1937?

STALIN: Minus what she has lost. Let us for the time being regard Germany as a geographical section.

TRUMAN: But what geographical section?

STALIN: We cannot get away from the results of the war.

TRUMAN: But we must have a starting point.

STALIN: Do you wish to restore German administration to Sudan line [the Sudetenland]?

TRUMAN: I said Germany of 1937.

STALIN: It may be so understood from a formal point of view. If German administration appears in Koenigsberg, we would expel it.

TRUMAN: We said territorial changes are to be made at the peace conference.

STALIN: Let us fix the western frontier of Poland. I have difficulty of [in?] saying what is the frontier of Germany now. No frontier guards, no troops. The country is broken up into four occupation zones.

TRUMAN: I am still suggesting we shall proceed from Germany of 1937.

STALIN: We shall proceed from there as a starting point.

CHURCHILL: I agree.

TRUMAN: That is the Germany of the Versailles Treaty. So it is agreed that the Germany of 1937 should be the starting point.

STALIN: Have we finished the political principles?

BYRNES: The economic principles have been referred to a subcommittee. As to political section, it is reported complete and is ready for discussion.

STALIN: The Russian Delegation accepts in the main all the points in the political section. There is one amendment to item 5. If possible, it would be well to delete the last four lines. We agree to the rest but wish a commission to go over the style of the document.

EDEN: I hope the foreign secretaries can go over the drafting committee’s draft tomorrow.

STALIN: That would be better.

TRUMAN: That is agreed.

CHURCHILL: I refer to Section 2(i)(b). There are experimental military stations (wind tunnels, etc.) in Germany which should not be immediately destroyed.

BYRNES: The language is seized or destroyed.

CHURCHILL: We shall use them share and share alike.

MOLOTOV: The Soviet delegation has a draft to submit.

BYRNES: (proceeds with reading of the report on Polish question.)

MOLOTOV’S paper is read. It suggests severance of all relations with the former Polish government, the transfer of all assets to the government of national unity, and the placing of Polish armed forces and fleet under the new Polish government.

CHURCHILL: The burden of this matter rests on Britain. We received the Poles when they were driven out by the Germans. There is no property of any kind or extent belonging to the old Polish government. There are 20 million pounds gold in London and Canada which is frozen and is the ultimate property of the Polish national state. There is a Polish Embassy vacated by the old ambassador which is available to the ambassador of the new government as soon as they send one and the sooner the better.

The Polish Government has been financed during the last five years by the British Government. We have advanced 120 million pounds sterling for them and their troops.

When the Polish Government in London was disavowed, it was arranged that three months’ salary should be paid all employees and they should be dismissed. It would have been improper to do otherwise. The expense has been borne by Great Britain.

Our position is unique in another way. We must deal with the transfer of forces which have fought with us against the Germans. Some of them came from France after France fell. Some came to Italy from Switzerland. We built up five divisions of 50,000 escaped Poles. The Poles built up an army of 180 to 200 thousand men. These men have fought with great bravery and discipline. They have had heavy losses. I must make it perfectly clear that this involves the honor of His Majesty’s Government. We have given pledges to Parliament and we must treat them in a manner which the world as a whole will regard as just and fair.

STALIN: Of course.

CHURCHILL: These men have taken an oath to their President and we have ceased to recognize him. What is the policy we are pursuing? Our policy is to persuade as many as possible to go back to Poland. I was angry when General Anders said to his troops that if they went back to Poland they will be sent to Siberia. This officer will not be permitted to make such prejudicial statements to the troops. Our policy is to persuade as many to go back to Poland as soon as possible. This applies also to civilian officials, and employees. The better things are in Poland, the quicker they will go. I rejoice in the improvement which has taken place in Poland and I wish every success to the new Polish government. It is not perfect but it is a great advance. I have said if there were Polish soldiers who have fought with us who do not go back we will receive them as British citizens. But we hope the great bulk will return. It would assist if the new Polish Government could give undertakings that those who do return will be safe in their livelihood. They should with proper assurances want to go back to the land of their fathers which has been liberated by Russian arms.

STALIN: Have you read the draft of the Russian delegation?

CHURCHILL: I have read the draft. I agree in principle, subject to what I have said. I should be pleased to have the draft remitted to the foreign secretaries to be considered along with the British suggestion.

STALIN: I appreciate the difficult position of the British who have sheltered their former rulers. I know that despite this fact the former rulers have caused great difficulty for the British government. I assure Mr. Churchill my draft is not intended to make the position of the British government more difficult. It is intended only to put an end to the former Polish government. They have their agents and press which make an unfavorable impression on public opinion. The purpose of our draft is to put an end to this position. I am fully prepared to withdraw anything that will complicate the British situation. Our only purpose is to put an end to an indefinite situation.

CHURCHILL: If you cut off all financial aid, you can’t in England prevent their talking. We have no relations with them. But we have to be careful about the Army. They might mutiny. Our purposes are the same. We ask for trust and confidence in the making of [in making?] Poland a place which will attract them.

TRUMAN: It seems there is no fundamental difference. The Prime Minister is asking time for soldiers to get back. I think there should be an agreement. I am interested in the Polish Government, particularly in free elections assured by the Yalta agreement.

STALIN: Let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries, including the matter of elections. The Polish Provisional Government has never refused to hold elections.

TRUMAN: That is all the foreign secretaries have submitted today. Is there anything further? Shall I suggest that the foreign secretaries prepare another agenda for tomorrow?

CHURCHILL: I am concerned with the weight and scope of the political principles. Are we going to have uniform control or different practices in the four zones?

STALIN: This is dealt with in the political section. My understanding is that we all favor a unified policy.

Meeting adjourned.

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945

Memorandum to Ambassador Pauley

In accordance with your instructions, your staff has reviewed the “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” and respectfully submits the following comments and suggestions:

Appendix A:
(I) Insert the following at the beginning of the first sentence: “Subject to the policies and provisions of any Agreements entered into between the Governments of the USSR, UK, and USA, …”

(II) (b) The terms “starvation, disease and civil unrest” are noted. Under this, the area commander may in his own discretion maintain any plants that he may desire. This is broad power.

(d) The only financing that should be permitted should be incident to exports which are required for approved imports. Otherwise, our policy that exports should be a first charge against imports, would be undermined.

(III) Sentence should be amended by insertion of clause as indicated by underscoring: “During the period of occupation, the German Reich as its boundaries existed on December 31, 1937, shall be treated as a single economic unit.”

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

July 18, 1945
[Translation]

The Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question

In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity and in view of the establishment by the United States of America and by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America as well as the Governments of other United Nations shall sever all relations with the government of Arciszewski. We deem it imperative to render to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the disposal of the government of Arciszewski and of its organs, in whatever form this property may be and no matter where or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the present moment. The transfer of this property to any institution of any kind or to private persons is forbidden.

We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces, including the navy and the merchant marine, now subordinated to the government of Arciszewski, should be subordinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, which [will?] determine the further measures to be taken in respect of these armed forces, men of war and merchant ships.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845

Memorandum by the British Delegation

Foreign Office, 18th July, 1945

The Eastern Frontier of Germany as It Affects the Principles Governing the Treatment of Germany and the Authority of the Control Council

At the plenary session on the 18th July, it was unanimously agreed that as a preliminary working assumption Germany should be regarded as comprising all territories contained within her 1937 frontiers. It is suggested that at this afternoon’s meeting Marshal Stalin should be asked how, in the light of this understanding, the Soviet Government regard the Polish claim to a frontier on the Oder and the Neisse (including Stettin) in its effect upon the joint occupation and control of Germany. Do these territories come under the authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Germany? Are the Polish authorities in this area acting as the agents of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and responsible to him? Are the resources of the area available for supplying the rest of Germany?

If these questions do not provoke a direct answer, we might go on to say that we understand that Marshal Zhukov at recent meetings in Berlin, has maintained that the territory to the east of the Oder and the Neisse was outside his zone and that he could not therefore draw upon it for food and fuel supplies for his zone.

We should then develop our grievance on the following lines:

  1. Under the agreements concluded in the European Advisory Commission on the occupation and control of Germany, the controlling Powers agreed that the zones of occupation should be created out of Germany within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, including East Prussia, and that the members of the Control Council should jointly exercise authority in matters affecting Germany as a whole (i.e. 1937 Germany). His Majesty’s Government do not regard these agreements as having been modified by the Crimea decisions on Poland. His Majesty’s Government consider that the Soviet Government are not entitled to release from their authority any of the territory of 1937 Germany without prior consultation and agreement with the other controlling Powers.

  2. If these German territories are withdrawn from the authority of the Control Council and of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the whole basis of our combined plans for the treatment of Germany is altered. The balance between the zones is upset. The Soviet zone, reduced in area but obliged to support a larger population owing to the influx of Germans expelled from the territories further east, becomes in Marshal Zhukov’s view a deficit area. The British and American Commanders-in-Chief, instead of being able to draw upon the normal surpluses of Eastern Germany, are expected to help to supply Berlin. This radical readjustment threatens to cause very serious consequences for us in our zones. Moreover, the total stock of reparation supplies available for the common pool is gravely reduced.

  3. His Majesty’s Government, while fully supporting Poland’s right to accessions of territory, regard the present claim to the Oder-Neisse line, including Stettin, as excessive. On the short-term view, it is doubtful whether the Poles will be able to maintain full production in the whole of this area during the critical next winter, while continued expulsion of Germans from the area will cause grave problems for the controlling Powers in Germany. On the long-term view Poland’s capacity to populate and absorb the whole of these territories is uncertain, while the permanent amputation of one-fifth of the area of Germany would be a cause of weakness to Poland and of instability in Europe as a whole.

Marshal Stalin should then be asked to have the Soviet view reconsidered in the light of our attitude and to let us know the result.

852.00/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State

London, July 18, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
7241

Ambassador Mallet, proceeding Madrid Monday, expressed himself this morning as in much doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves considered by FonOff unsatisfactory, unencouraging and it seems to be feared Franco by holding on will play Spain into Soviet hands. Garran of FonOff expects interesting developments Spanish scene in view of Soviet interest in Tangier coupled with renewed radio campaign against Franco which now features, Garran said, instructions for sabotage.

Sent Dept as 7241; repeated Madrid 189.

WINANT


881.00/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State

London, July 18, 1945 — 5 p.m.
Secret
7242

The British do not intend to raise Tangier question at big three meeting except in so far as determining whether Russia will participate is concerned, according to Harvey and Garran of FonOff. Embassy was told today that while Russian request presumably will be granted British hope to use their concurrence as bargaining point with Russia. It was stated British are dissatisfied with tardy and sometimes unsatisfactory Soviet action on British requests. Garran said Spanish Under Secretary Castillo has told Bowker if Russians brought in Spain will revert to status quo ante 1923. FonOff evidently believes Soviet Govt out to embarrass Franco to fullest and has noted anti-Franco Soviet broadcasts recently stepped up considerably.

Sent Dept as 7242; repeated Paris 461; Madrid 190; Tangier 44; Moscow 255.

WINANT

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-1745

Memorandum by the Central Secretariat

[Washington,] July 18, 1945
Top secret
SC-145b

Proposed Communication to the Secretary at the Berlin Meeting on the Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany

There is attached a redraft of the proposed communication to the Secretary on the objective of the United States Government in the occupation of Germany.

This redraft has been prepared by Mr. MacLeish in the light of comments in the meetings of the Staff Committee on July 16 and July 17.

[Annex]

Subject: OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

  1. The Allied purpose with respect to the future of Germany was stated in the communiqué issued at the close of the Crimea Conference as being “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world.”

  2. This objective was to be achieved by the unconditional surrender of Germany and its occupation by the Allied armies which would apply certain measures of control, political, economic, and social. The achievement of the objective by the destruction of the German people was never considered as a possibility. Even the partition of Germany was rejected. Reliance was put upon the occupation as the means of attaining the end in view.

  3. Programs of occupation have been developed by the Allied governments, but their relation to the overall purpose “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world” has not been defined. It is essential to the successful administration of any program or programs of occupation ultimately approved that their relation to the end purpose should be clearly understood by those responsible for their direction.

  4. It is sometimes assumed that the occupation of Germany will remove the German threat to the peace of the world solely by destroying the German war potential. It is undoubtedly true that certain measures contemplated will deprive Germany not only of existing arms but of the materials and machines necessary to the waging of modern war. It is highly improbable, however, that the occupation will deprive Germany permanently of the material means of waging war, since it is highly doubtful that the occupation itself will be permanent.

  5. An illustrative parallel can be drawn between the treatment of Germany and the treatment of individual criminals in modern penal institutions. It is well-known to penologists that, although numerous criminals are condemned to prison for life, and even for terms beyond life expectancy, few such criminals ever die in prison. The violence of the public demand for severe punishment declines rapidly as time passes, and life-term convicts are commonly released, at first under parole and then completely, after fifteen to eighteen years. There are already signs that the violence of the demand for German punishment is subsiding, and it is highly improbable that Allied occupation of Germany – at least American occupation – can be continued beyond the period of a few years.

  6. Furthermore, the principal war potential of Germany is not German industry or German raw materials. The principal war potential of Germany is the German people whose industrial and scientific aptitude and whose docility in accepting military and social discipline have been demonstrated over a considerable period of time. Since the destruction of the German people is not thinkable, and since it is unlikely, not to say inconceivable, that the German people will be kept under permanent control and surveillance from without, it would follow that the Allies cannot put their sole or even their principal reliance, for the achievement of their over-all purpose, on the destruction of the material means of making war.

  7. Over and above their reliance upon the destruction of the material means of waging war, the Allies will be obliged to attempt to bring about a change in the attitude toward war of the German people. If we are not prepared to destroy the German people, and if we are not prepared to police the German people permanently, we must attempt to change the German people in such a way that the German nation, when finally freed of occupation and surveillance, will be a nation which will not be a threat to the peace of the world.

  8. A relevant consideration is the fact that weapons developed, or in the course of development, during the present war indicate not only that future wars will be increasingly destructive but that they will be waged with weapons which a scientifically and industrially minded people can produce under conditions which will make surveillance difficult.

  9. If this analysis is substantially correct, then the purpose of the German occupation is to remove the German threat to peace by changing the German attitude toward peace. We are occupying Germany, in other words, with a view to changing the social and political character of the nation to such an extent that Germany can be trusted at some future time with independent existence as a nation in a world in which weapons will be more destructive and more difficult to control than they have ever been before.

  10. It should be noted that this objective conforms to the objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the situation which the establishment of that Organization will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could be introduced at some appropriate time into the United Nations where the measures of the Organization for security and for peace could be brought to play affirmatively rather than negatively.

  11. The explicit recognition that the occupation of Germany is intended to produce a change in the German people would enable us to plan the various measures of occupation more intelligently and to administer them more effectively. At the present time, there is a tendency to make a distinction between political, economic, and military measures for Germany, on the one hand, and measures for what is called the “reeducation” of the German people on the other. Actually, if the present analysis is correct, all aspects of the occupation, whether military, or economic, or political, or social, have one end objective, which is largely psychological: to create a Germany which can be trusted to exist without continuing occupation and surveillance – a Germany which can be re-admitted to the society of peaceful nations. The success of all measures taken in the occupation should therefore be judged not by their immediate consequences alone but by their ultimate effect upon the social and political structure of Germany.

  12. There will, of course, be conflicts from time to time between the short-term objectives and the long-range purpose of the occupation. For example, the use of German output for the relief of liberated areas may create economic distress in Germany which will make the labor of the conversion of Germany to our views and our outlook more difficult. However, the explicit recognition of the true long-range objective of the occupation, whether or not in conflict with certain short-term purposes, is essential to the success of the undertaking.

  13. Something more is required, however, than the explicit declaration of this purpose. The purpose must also be warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. It is our intention to employ every means at our disposition, economic and political means as well as the more direct means of education and information, to produce the change in German thinking and German beliefs and German psychology which we desire.

  14. Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an individual or the mind of a nation. We must assume, although we have no explicit knowledge, that the Russians are clear as to their intentions on this point. Presumably they propose to substitute for Nazi Germany a Germany at least sympathetic to Communism. We presumably believe that a Germany converted to respect for the worth and dignity of human beings and a belief in the basic principles of justice and in the right of men to govern themselves would be a Germany which we could trust. If this, however, is our purpose, we must recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must play again the role we played at the beginning of our history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas of liberty and justice and human dignity.

  15. The important point, however, is to ascertain at the earliest possible moment what the other occupying powers have in mind with reference to the kind of Germany to be set up and the means by which it is to be established. It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the Secretary on the subject of German reeducation that it is highly desirable that the occupying powers should reach an understanding as to the common denominators of a policy for reeducation in order that Germany may not be turned, under the occupation, into an ideological cockpit. If the analysis of the present paper is correct, the same considerations would lead to the same conclusion as to the entire program of occupation. It is therefore recommended that conversations be undertaken in the early future to determine, if possible, a common Allied position as to the question of the kind of Germany we wish to see established and the means by which we propose to bring it about.

The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations

Moscow, 18 July 1945
Secret
priority

To US Headquarters Berlin District Visitors Bureau for Ambassador from Sproul, Abramovitz and Bergson signed Deane M 25043. (Confmess 5)

  1. Approximately 40 percent of both movable and fixed capital assets before the war were located in Russian Zone. This includes Berlin.

  2. Movable capital assets east of Oder-Neisse line were worth about 6 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 12 percent of total Germany. This does not include value of land, mineral reserves, fixed plant, housing, commercial establishments or commercial and manufacturing inventories. Values are net after depreciation. Present value probably not less than in 1938.

  3. Based on value added, industrial and mining output. Area east of Oder Neisse was about 28 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 7 percent of total Germany.

  4. It should be noted that because of dislocations involved, loss of territory may affect Germany’s capacity to pay in somewhat greater degree than percentage figures above would suggest.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3145

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945

My Dear Mr. Secretary: The attached memorandum on the relationship between reparations and ceded German territory embodies what we believe to be certain improvements over a similar memorandum submitted to you in my letter of July 16th.

The purpose of this proposal is quite simple. It aims to distribute reparation burdens as well as benefits among those receiving ceded German territory. The first three points provide that any exportable surpluses of commodities from any ceded territory shall be subject to the following priorities:

  • First, Shipment into Germany to such extent as these commodities are needed to sustain minimum subsistence.

  • Second, To pay for imports into Germany where needed to sustain minimum subsistence.

  • Third, For payment into the general reparation fund to be allocated among claimant nations.

The fourth and last point provides that the value of capital equipment and natural resources located in any ceded territory shall be accounted for as reparations delivered to the receiving nation.

Since I understand that the subject of the eastern boundaries of Germany will be considered at today’s meeting of the beads of the Governments, I urge that you give this subject your immediate personal consideration.

Respectfully,
EDWIN W. PAULEY

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the U.S. Section, Allied Commission on Reparations

Re: Relationship between Reparations and ceded German territory

As a part of any treaty recognizing the ceding of any portion of Germany as its boundaries existed at the end of 1937, it shall be provided that:

  • One. Any property or current production available for removal from any ceded territory shall be first utilized within Germany to whatever extent occupation authorities require to avoid the necessity of imports into Germany.

  • Two. Thereafter, the value or proceeds of any property or current production from any ceded territory available for delivery outside of Germany shall be first used to pay for approved imports into Germany.

  • Three. If sufficient funds are available to pay for all such approved imports, the proceeds or value of any assets delivered from any ceded territory shall be treated as a reparations delivery to such nation or nations and in such amounts as may be designated by the Allied Commission on Reparations, or a permanent Reparations Agency to be created.

  • Four. The value of capital equipment and natural resources within the boundaries of any territory ceded from Germany to any other nation shall be accounted for as reparations. To the extent that the production of such equipment or resources is pledged for reparations or to pay for approved imports into Germany, the reparation value of such equipment and resources shall be correspondingly decreased.

(Practically, the foregoing obligations may well have to be funded both in the form of agreements to deliver certain fixed quantities of coal, zinc, coke, iron, steel, cement, calcinated soda, etc., for a definite period of years, and by reducing the amount of reparations which will be delivered to the nation receiving ceded territory or delivered to another nation for whose security territory may be ceded.)


The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President

[Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945

Memorandum to the President

It is important that we get a definite picture of what Generalissimo Stalin had in his mind yesterday when he raised the question of securing reparations from Italy.

As you know, Italy is going to be dependent on the United States for its sheer existence during the coming winter. The economic situation there verges on a state of almost complete economic disorganization. I understand that our Army representatives on the scene have estimated that the United States would have to ship approximately 750 million dollars worth of food and other materials into Italy in order to tide the country over until next spring. Investigations made by FEA place the figure at over a billion dollars, while the State Department estimates it to be no less than 500 million.

Under these circumstances, it is quite evident that we can look for very little in the form of reparations from Italy. Indeed, in the final analysis, any reparations coining from there would in fact be a contribution from the taxpayers of the United States. We certainly cannot permit materials and equipment to be taken out as reparations when at the same time we are pouring in hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the Italian people alive.

In order to clarify this issue fully, I am taking the liberty of suggesting that you ask the Generalissimo just what he has in mind when he talks about “reparations from Italy”. You might wish to ask him to be specific as to what he expects to take out and how large a sum he has in mind.

Respectfully
EDWIN W PAULEY

740.00119 EW/7-1845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 18, 1945
Secret
56

(For Assistant Secretary Clayton.)

Bucharest has seen a letter from Russians to Rumanian Prime Minister informing latter that German-held shares in Rumanian oil corporations “pass into the patrimony of the Soviet Union as partial compensation for damages caused to USSR by Germany.” Objectionable features of this are obvious. It (1) asserts Soviet desire for share interests as reparation or otherwise; (2) manifests USSR intention to obtain exclusionary control Rumanian oil industry; (3) bypasses current Four Power discussions regarding treatment of German assets in ex-enemy and neutral countries from economic security and reparations points of view; and (4) raises serious question regarding looted property.

Accordingly, it is suggested that positive steps be taken at Potsdam Conference to forestall this action.

In addition to basing our objections to proposed Russian action upon as many of the foregoing grounds as can be mentioned to Russians, following arguments could be advanced:

  1. No shares can be subjected to control or disposition as German by Soviet for its individual advantage unless it is established that they were not acquired by the Germans in looting transactions outlawed by United Nations’ declaration of January 5, 1943. It might be added that US would have to be satisfied that particular shares were not United Nations’ property which had been looted by Germans;

  2. shares which have met above burden of proof (i.e. shown conclusively to have been German owned through legitimate transactions) should be governed by general principles to be established by Four Powers regarding treatment of German assets in ex-enemy or neutral countries. It should be emphatically denied that such assets in Rumania pass into patrimony of USSR alone as compensation by Germany for war damage. US cannot admit competence of USSR to assert unilaterally ownership rights to German assets in ex-enemy or neutral countries. Without exception US has treated such assets coming within its control in these countries as subject to trusteeship on behalf of all four occupying powers. Similar standard of conduct expected of Soviet Union and must be strongly insisted upon. It should be obvious to Soviet Government that in three neutral Western European countries, German external assets will be principally under control of British and ourselves.

  3. Article 8 of Rumanian Armistice5 pledges the Rumanian Government not to allow the expropriation of any form of German property without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. While we recognize that protests can hardly be based on actual wording of this article, this Government maintains control should be exercised on behalf of and with respect to interests of other United Nations, particularly since Article 18 provides that Allied (Soviet) High Command, in controlling execution of Armistice, acts on behalf of the Allied Powers.

Please inform Harriman and Pauley. Inform whether this message should be repeated to Moscow and Bucharest for information.

[GREW]


800.85/7-1845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 18 [1945]
Secret
57

For Clayton.

Following is for your information in event Admiral Land’s attendance at conference leads to discussion of question of inviting Italy to join United Maritime Authority. Italy has intimated its desire to be invited to join UMA and British Foreign Office has inquired as to Department’s views. Foreign Office suggests awaiting conclusion peace treaty with Italy. We have been discussing subject informally with WSA. Opinion within Department leans toward extending invitation now, in line with broad general policy of promoting resumption of responsible Italian participation in international affairs and strengthening Italian political and economic status. WSA considers invitation inopportune at this time for fear of jeopardizing smooth operations UMA. Its opposition is based on (1) apprehension of French, Greek and Yugoslav resentment, (2) belief that Italian political status first be clarified as by admission Italy to United Nations and (3) doubts as to competence Italian authorities and shipping operators to function in accordance with UMA requirements. We are not fully in concurrence these objections insofar as they touch on political relations and contemplate requesting more detail as to question of competence, particularly as to steps Italy would have to take to remove this objection. However at WSA request we intend to leave issue in statu quo until Admiral Land’s return particularly as WSA state they are taking steps meanwhile to improve Italian position by substituting specific charter arrangements in place of Admiral Cunningham Agreement as basis for control of Italian ships, by considering possibility of including provisions in charters to compensate Italy for shipping services, and by formulating with Ministry of War Transport arrangements for greater Italian participation in UMA operations in Zone III Mediterranean area.

[GREW]

The Navy Department to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe

Washington, 18 July 1945
Secret
routine

This is serial No. 33. CominCh and CNO addressed ComNavEu for action and ComNavForGer for info and directed info to be forwarded CominCh and CNO.

Admiralty … [messages of July 7 and 11] indicate no US representation on Capcraft Commission or provision for protecting US interest in disposing of captured enemy small craft including tugs for immediate use in Pacific.

There is an immediate and urgent need for seagoing tugs in carrying out approved primary operations in the Pacific. Request you investigate and if desirable arrange equal representation on Capcraft Commission or set up counter commission for US account in order to secure all possible immediate assistance for Pacific seagoing tug requirements. Suggest substitution of captured German tugs for US tugs now operating ETO.

WSA and War Washington have been advised of Admiralty dispatches and feel their interest identical with ours and that you and local War and WSA representatives should handle to satisfactory conclusion.

868.00/7-1745

The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State

Berlin Conference, July 18, 1945

Memorandum

Subject: GREEK ELECTIONS

The attached telegram No. 38, July 17, from the Department, makes our proposed telegram on Greek elections unnecessary.

The Department agrees with the British suggestion in substance but objects to the British text of a joint “invitation” to the Russians. The Department prefers that we and the British propose that the four powers supervise the elections rather than that the United States and the United Kingdom “invite” the Russians and French to participate. I think the Department’s point well taken and believe I can work out a suitable agreement with the appropriate member of the British delegation, if you would like me to try.

The Department also apparently wishes to limit the proposal to supervision of the Greek parliamentary elections and not to include the subsequent plebiscite regarding the King. The Department doubtless thinks that only one bridge should be crossed at a time. I agree.

G[EORGE] V A[LLEN]

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
Secret

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning and left with me the appended papers which he asked be sent to you for the President’s and your consideration during the present meeting at Potsdam. The Ambassador said that his Government is seriously worried about indications that a peace treaty for Italy might be drawn and that the British and Soviet Governments are inclined to make the terms as harsh as possible. He said that if this were done it would destroy Italian morale and make it impossible for Italy to recover its position in the world, which he believed was not in the best interests of the European nations. The Ambassador feared that the general lines for such a treaty would be laid down at the present meeting and would be accepted. He asks on behalf of his Government that the United States Government take a position at Potsdam which would avoid laying down harsh terms for Italy.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure 1]

The Italian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
N. 5760

My Dear Mr. Grew: I have just received from Rome instructions to officially thank the Department of State in the name of the Italian Government for the so encouraging assurances recently given to me and indicating the intention of the United States not to proceed to the signature of a treaty deemed inequitable or oppressive for Italy and to do their utmost, from the Potsdam Conference on, to avoid that such a tendency should prevail.

My Government have also deeply appreciated the verbal communication according to which it was the expectation of the United States Government, that before any Italian peace treaty be put in final form, a full opportunity be offered to the Italian Government to discuss it and present their views.

In consideration of the friendly spirit of such assurances, I want to convey to you personally the heartfelt and profound gratitude of my Government who have highly appreciated this new evidence of the purposes of equity and generous comprehension inspiring the United States toward the Italian nation, in the difficult international situation confronting it at the present time.

Please accept [etc.]

TARCHIANI

[Enclosure 2]

The Italian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
N. 5759

My Dear Mr. Grew: My Minister of Foreign Affairs has directed me to convey to the Department of State our deepest gratitude for the action taken with regard to our declaration of war against Japan and for the very valuable advice given us.

Mr. De Gasperi has instructed me to tell the Department of State that the Italian Government is placing its highest hopes in the action that the President of the United States of America may deem it fitting to take at Potsdam for the purpose of alleviating the terms of a peace treaty for Italy. The Foreign Minister has also asked me to inform you of the following views the Italian Government has on the matter.

It is certain that, should particularly harsh peace terms be imposed upon Italy, even though not in the form of a veritable “Diktat”, thereby humiliating and thwarting the Italian nation, the orderly development of a working democracy in Italy would be seriously endangered.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The basic necessity for Italy – as the Department of State fully realizes – is, at the present time, to be released from the Armistice terms, and to be internationally rehabilitated, so as to allow her to take part in the negotiations for the peace treaty in which she is concerned.

If, therefore, the action of the President of the United States and of the American Delegation at the Potsdam Conference should encounter obstacles and difficulties …, the Italian Government would deem it more preferable if provisional solutions could be adopted which, although settling the fundamental problem of the moral and juridical status of Italy, would leave open the more controversial questions, such as those of Venezia Giulia, of the final settlement of the Italian colonies, and of the fleet (the latter being bound to constitute, in the firm intention of the Italian Government, an important part of the Italian contribution to the war against Japan).

The Italian Government shall be extremely grateful to the United States if, were such a necessity to arise, they would consider it possible to withhold final decisions which would allow Italy to make some headway against opposing international currents, after having, of course, succeeded in attaining on a general basis her international rehabilitation. This would leave to time and to the evolution of the European events in general and of the Balkan situation in particular the possibility of working out with more chances of equitable solutions, a far-reaching and constructive European settlement.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In bringing to your knowledge, according to instructions received, the above-mentioned viewpoints of the Italian Government, I shall be very grateful to you, Mr. Grew, if you will kindly communicate the foregoing to the President of the United States or to the American Delegation at Potsdam.

I avail myself [etc.]

TARCHIANI

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg

Berlin, 18 July 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for: Mr. Dunn
Mr. McCloy
Admiral Gardner

Subject: UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING DARDANELLES AND KIEL CANAL

References: JCS 1418 SERIES

The attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, embodying a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommended U.S. policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal, is circulated for informal consideration.

It is requested that you indicate your concurrence or comments.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
H A GERHARDT
Colonel, GSC Acting Secretary SWNC

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

London, 18 July 1945
Secret
urgent

Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307

Please read Dept’s 5766 July 14 to London repeated to Hoechst as 112. No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of additional requirements agreement and agreement amending agreement on zones Germany.


740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

London, 18 July 1945
Secret
urgent

Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307.

… No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of … agreement amending agreement on zones Germany.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 18, 1945)

JAP WAR TOPS TRUMAN’S BIG THREE LIST
Peace plan can follow, Allies told

Must spare lives, President says
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Carriers raid Tokyo again

Coast of Japan afire from Navy shells as Nips report new blow