Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 889/2
British Participation in the War Against Japan
The following extracts of a message from General MacArthur to the War Department under date of 9 July 1945 concerning British participation in the war against Japan are furnished for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff:
The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and French contingents were considered.
These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date.
This operation, as at present visualized, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines.
The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval, and ground forces, and within the ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures, and doctrines will complicate command, operations, and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of homogeneous forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefor.
British forces participating in operations against Singapore in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in Coronet. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient.
Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for Coronet dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date.
The following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above.
This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.
a. Limit British Empire participation to one corps of three divisions; one British, one Canadian, and one Australian.
b. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.
c. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the Borneo-Morotai area.
d. British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the Borneo-Morotai area or, as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.
e. Amphibiously train one British division and one Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.
f. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be used as the AFPac assault reserve afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the Borneo-Morotai area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated.
g. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States Army. Utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand.
I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required.
Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon.
The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operation.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 842/2
French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosed memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in lieu of the memorandum in the Enclosure to CCS 842/1.
[Enclosure]
Top secret
Draft
Memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:
a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.
b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 679/6
Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships
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The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated in papers of the CCS 679 series an urgent need for 39,000 troop spaces in captured enemy shipping to supplement the trooplift available for carrying out redeployment plans.
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Since the publication of CCS 679/1, U.S. requirements for trooplift in the Pacific have materially increased. Deficits now are serious.
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Drastic action has been taken to augment United States resources by conversion of cargo ships, increasing air-lift, and curtailing withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe. In spite of every possible adjustment in United States resources, the trooplift situation in the Pacific will remain serious during the last half of this year.
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The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) has had the matter of distribution of captured German shipping under discussion for several weeks. Certain agreements as to manning and operation have been reached, but the United States view that the seven vessels under consideration should be allocated for the carriage of U.S. troops during the current emergency period has been opposed on the British side of the CSAB pending decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
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The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that in order to meet emergency requirements for the movement of U.S. troops necessary for forthcoming operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the allocation for United States purposes, so long as an emergency exists, of the following seven vessels:
Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee.
- Arrangements as to manning, operation, repair and conversion can be determined by the CSAB, and it is understood that the agreement proposed in paragraph 5 above in no way prejudices ultimate disposition of these vessels.