Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

The Navy Department to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe

Washington, 18 July 1945
Secret
routine

This is serial No. 33. CominCh and CNO addressed ComNavEu for action and ComNavForGer for info and directed info to be forwarded CominCh and CNO.

Admiralty … [messages of July 7 and 11] indicate no US representation on Capcraft Commission or provision for protecting US interest in disposing of captured enemy small craft including tugs for immediate use in Pacific.

There is an immediate and urgent need for seagoing tugs in carrying out approved primary operations in the Pacific. Request you investigate and if desirable arrange equal representation on Capcraft Commission or set up counter commission for US account in order to secure all possible immediate assistance for Pacific seagoing tug requirements. Suggest substitution of captured German tugs for US tugs now operating ETO.

WSA and War Washington have been advised of Admiralty dispatches and feel their interest identical with ours and that you and local War and WSA representatives should handle to satisfactory conclusion.

868.00/7-1745

The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State

Berlin Conference, July 18, 1945

Memorandum

Subject: GREEK ELECTIONS

The attached telegram No. 38, July 17, from the Department, makes our proposed telegram on Greek elections unnecessary.

The Department agrees with the British suggestion in substance but objects to the British text of a joint “invitation” to the Russians. The Department prefers that we and the British propose that the four powers supervise the elections rather than that the United States and the United Kingdom “invite” the Russians and French to participate. I think the Department’s point well taken and believe I can work out a suitable agreement with the appropriate member of the British delegation, if you would like me to try.

The Department also apparently wishes to limit the proposal to supervision of the Greek parliamentary elections and not to include the subsequent plebiscite regarding the King. The Department doubtless thinks that only one bridge should be crossed at a time. I agree.

G[EORGE] V A[LLEN]

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
Secret

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning and left with me the appended papers which he asked be sent to you for the President’s and your consideration during the present meeting at Potsdam. The Ambassador said that his Government is seriously worried about indications that a peace treaty for Italy might be drawn and that the British and Soviet Governments are inclined to make the terms as harsh as possible. He said that if this were done it would destroy Italian morale and make it impossible for Italy to recover its position in the world, which he believed was not in the best interests of the European nations. The Ambassador feared that the general lines for such a treaty would be laid down at the present meeting and would be accepted. He asks on behalf of his Government that the United States Government take a position at Potsdam which would avoid laying down harsh terms for Italy.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure 1]

The Italian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
N. 5760

My Dear Mr. Grew: I have just received from Rome instructions to officially thank the Department of State in the name of the Italian Government for the so encouraging assurances recently given to me and indicating the intention of the United States not to proceed to the signature of a treaty deemed inequitable or oppressive for Italy and to do their utmost, from the Potsdam Conference on, to avoid that such a tendency should prevail.

My Government have also deeply appreciated the verbal communication according to which it was the expectation of the United States Government, that before any Italian peace treaty be put in final form, a full opportunity be offered to the Italian Government to discuss it and present their views.

In consideration of the friendly spirit of such assurances, I want to convey to you personally the heartfelt and profound gratitude of my Government who have highly appreciated this new evidence of the purposes of equity and generous comprehension inspiring the United States toward the Italian nation, in the difficult international situation confronting it at the present time.

Please accept [etc.]

TARCHIANI

[Enclosure 2]

The Italian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 18, 1945
N. 5759

My Dear Mr. Grew: My Minister of Foreign Affairs has directed me to convey to the Department of State our deepest gratitude for the action taken with regard to our declaration of war against Japan and for the very valuable advice given us.

Mr. De Gasperi has instructed me to tell the Department of State that the Italian Government is placing its highest hopes in the action that the President of the United States of America may deem it fitting to take at Potsdam for the purpose of alleviating the terms of a peace treaty for Italy. The Foreign Minister has also asked me to inform you of the following views the Italian Government has on the matter.

It is certain that, should particularly harsh peace terms be imposed upon Italy, even though not in the form of a veritable “Diktat”, thereby humiliating and thwarting the Italian nation, the orderly development of a working democracy in Italy would be seriously endangered.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The basic necessity for Italy – as the Department of State fully realizes – is, at the present time, to be released from the Armistice terms, and to be internationally rehabilitated, so as to allow her to take part in the negotiations for the peace treaty in which she is concerned.

If, therefore, the action of the President of the United States and of the American Delegation at the Potsdam Conference should encounter obstacles and difficulties …, the Italian Government would deem it more preferable if provisional solutions could be adopted which, although settling the fundamental problem of the moral and juridical status of Italy, would leave open the more controversial questions, such as those of Venezia Giulia, of the final settlement of the Italian colonies, and of the fleet (the latter being bound to constitute, in the firm intention of the Italian Government, an important part of the Italian contribution to the war against Japan).

The Italian Government shall be extremely grateful to the United States if, were such a necessity to arise, they would consider it possible to withhold final decisions which would allow Italy to make some headway against opposing international currents, after having, of course, succeeded in attaining on a general basis her international rehabilitation. This would leave to time and to the evolution of the European events in general and of the Balkan situation in particular the possibility of working out with more chances of equitable solutions, a far-reaching and constructive European settlement.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

In bringing to your knowledge, according to instructions received, the above-mentioned viewpoints of the Italian Government, I shall be very grateful to you, Mr. Grew, if you will kindly communicate the foregoing to the President of the United States or to the American Delegation at Potsdam.

I avail myself [etc.]

TARCHIANI

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg

Berlin, 18 July 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for: Mr. Dunn
Mr. McCloy
Admiral Gardner

Subject: UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING DARDANELLES AND KIEL CANAL

References: JCS 1418 SERIES

The attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, embodying a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommended U.S. policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal, is circulated for informal consideration.

It is requested that you indicate your concurrence or comments.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:
H A GERHARDT
Colonel, GSC Acting Secretary SWNC

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

London, 18 July 1945
Secret
urgent

Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307

Please read Dept’s 5766 July 14 to London repeated to Hoechst as 112. No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of additional requirements agreement and agreement amending agreement on zones Germany.


740.00119 Potsdam/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission

London, 18 July 1945
Secret
urgent

Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307.

… No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of … agreement amending agreement on zones Germany.

The Pittsburgh Press (July 18, 1945)

JAP WAR TOPS TRUMAN’S BIG THREE LIST
Peace plan can follow, Allies told

Must spare lives, President says
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Background of news –
A different Potsdam

By Bertram Benedict

London press protests gag by Big Three

Paper predicts rumor scramble

Simms: U.S. lives may depend on future of Mikado

Bitter debate rages over disposition of Jap Emperor
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor

Youngstown Vindicator (July 18, 1945)

Editorial: Our policy toward Hirohito

ON THE RECORD —
The unconditional surrender of Japan

By Dorothy Thompson

Lawrence: Russians seen in peace role

Molotov’s talk with Jap envoy may foreshadow surrender move
By David Lawrence

U.S. State Department (July 18, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 18, 1945 — 11:28 p.m.
[Translation]
very secret
very urgent

1416

Re your telegram No. 913-2

The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by some-thing close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392 and others which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram No. 1143, believing that there should be no fear of a misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure.

If the matter of the preservation of our form of government were already taken care of, whether you call it unconditional surrender or whether you call it something close to this condition, in the final analysis it is a matter of degree. As for us I think it should not be made an absolute condition. Concerning the early portion of the telegram, I would like to express my humble opinion at another time after giving the matter full consideration.

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Wednesday, July 18:

Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President this morning.

The President conferred with the Secretary of State and a number of his advisers during the forenoon.

At 1315 the President, accompanied by Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman, left the Little White House by foot for the Prime Minister’s quarters. There the President lunched privately with the Prime Minister while Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman had lunch with Junior Commander Mary Churchill and some, other members of the Prime Minister’s personal staff.

At 1450 the President, together with the Prime Minister and Miss Churchill, left the Prime Minister’s residence and walked down the street to Mr. Eden’s quarters where they met Mr. Eden and Secretary Byrnes. The party then returned to the Prime Minister’s house. The President’s party assembled at the Prime Minister’s and left with him for Generalissimo Stalin’s quarters so that the President could return Marshal Stalin’s earlier call.

At 1500 a pouch with mail for the White House was dispatched to Washington.

1504: The President and his party arrived at the Generalissimo’s quarters. The President was met as he alighted from his car by Mr. Molotov who escorted him and his party inside where Mr. Stalin awaited. Although most of our party had just left the luncheon table, we were ushered to a large dining table where a buffet lunch was served us. After lunch with attending toasts, the President talked briefly with the Generalissimo. Then they posed for still and motion pictures. The President and party left the Generalissimo’s house at 1600 for Cecilienhof. We arrived at the Palace at 1608.

At 1615 the second meeting of the Berlin Conference was convened. The meeting adjourned at 1800, and the President and his party left immediately to return to the Little White House.

1930: Assistant Secretary Clayton, Assistant Secretary Dunn, and Mr. Donald Russell were dinner guests of the President. The U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, Army Band, under the direction of Warrant Officer Frank J. Rosato, played during the dinner hour…

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 19, 1945)

Truman führt den Vorsitz

BERLIN, 18. Juli (PW) – Am Dienstagnachmittag begann in Potsdam die Dreimächte-Konferenz. Folgendes amtliche Kommuniqué wurde ausgegeben:

Die Potsdamer Konferenz der Regierungschefs von Großbritannien, den Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion nahm heute um 17 Uhr ihren Anfang. Der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten wurde von den beiden anderen Regierungschefs aufgefordert, den Vorsitz bei den Zusammenkünften der Konferenz zu übernehmen. Es fand ein vorläufiger Meinungsaustausch darüber statt, welche Fragen von den drei Regierungschefs entschieden werden sollen. Ferner wurde beschlossen, dass die drei Außenminister regelmäßig zusammentreffen sollen, um die vorbereitende Tätigkeit der Konferenz durchzuführen.

Churchill lud Präsident Truman zu einem Frühstück in die Villa am See den Wohnsitz des Ministerpräsidenten, ein. In einer der benachbarten Villen empfing der britische Außenminister Anthony Eden den amerikanischen Außenminister James Byrnes als Gast.

L’Aube (July 19, 1945)

Quinze hommes autour d‘une table ronde gardent le secret de leurs entretiens

…et 180 journalistes estiment s’être déplacés pour rien

U.S. State Department (July 19, 1945)

871.6363/7-1945: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, July 19, 1945 — midnight
Secret
2634

Letter went forward to Foreign Office in conformity with Department’s 1621, July 16, warning that exclusive Soviet Rumanian trade pact and monopolistic agreements on oil would cause serious concern in United States Government and might compel United States Government to reconsider present favorable oil policy toward USSR. (To Department, repeated Bucharest 94, London 372). Harriman has been informed.

KENNAN

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

JCS 198th Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Lincoln
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Esposito
Fleet Admiral King Captain McDill
General of the Army Arnold Captain Stroop
General Somervell Captain Oster
Lieutenant General Hull. Colonel Peck
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Donnelly
Major General Gross Colonel Stone
Major General Deane Colonel Riggs
Major General Norstad Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Jamison
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extract]
Top secret

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War (CCS 884, 884/1 and 884/2)

GENERAL HULL said that it was the desire of the British that information be given to the Russians on a combined basis. This had not been the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Intelligence Committee had prepared an intelligence report on the Japanese situation which had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a report which might be given to the Russians. He said that he did not believe that the British would agree to giving the Russians the Combined Intelligence Committee report, but he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be willing to give the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Russians.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the British were more concerned in regard to intelligence that might be given the Russians on special projects than in regard to operational intelligence.

GENERAL DEANE said that he believed that the British had two motives in presenting their views: first, to share in the operational running of the war, and second, to exchange information with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis.

He said that he believed that we should give the Russians operational intelligence without reference to the British. He agreed to a certain extent in the exchange of intelligence with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis, but it had been the policy of the Military Mission to Moscow to go further than that and to provide the Russians with information they needed to win the war. He felt that Russian security was entirely adequate and that they would not disclose information furnished them. It was his view that the only relations that the British would have with the Russians in connection with the war in the Far East was in the exchange of intelligence, whereas our interest was operational and much greater than that of the British.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had noted that the British paper on the subject (CCS 884/2) was written before yesterday’s meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he felt that their motive at that time was to take an equal part with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational strategy of the war against Japan. He thought there should be a delimitation between operational intelligence and general intelligence; that we should give the Russians directly such operational intelligence as we considered necessary and that general intelligence should be furnished the Russians on a common basis which would mean a continuation of the present arrangement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss this subject with the British Chiefs of Staff.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Cohen Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Mr. Novikov
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

MR. EDEN in the Chair stated his understanding that the Agenda for today included:

  1. German political questions, on which there was a revised draft;
  2. Poland; and
  3. German Economic Problems.

MR. EDEN stated that before consideration of the agenda, he understood that Mr. Byrnes had a point to make on the paper concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV at this point asked whether he could add to the agenda.

Reconsideration of Paper on Council of Foreign Ministers

MR. BYRNES stated that he wished to move reconsideration of the language of the paper on the Council of Foreign Ministers. He referred to the members charged with duties under section 3 and specifically to the language restricting membership to governments signatory to the terms of surrender. He pointed out that some governments were at war but were not signatory to the armistice terms and asked that the drafting committee on this subject be instructed to reconcile points of view on this phase of the matter.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether paragraph 3 was referred to and stated that it was not quite clear to him what question was involved.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that France, for example, was at war with Italy but was not signatory to the armistice terms and asked whether she would be permitted to participate in discussions regarding Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he believed that she would.

MR. BYRNES stated that under the present language of this paper he did not believe that a state in such a situation could participate.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether the change would provide only for Italy.

MR. BYRNES replied that if Russia, for example, were at war with a country but was not a signatory to the armistice terms, Russia should not be excluded.

MR. MOLOTOV then asked specifically whether France should take part in the formulation of the peace treaty with Rumania.

MR. BYRNES stated his belief that if France were not at war with any country she would be present during any discussions but would not necessarily participate in the decisions.

MR. MOLOTOV then moved that Mr. Byrnes’ motion be accepted.

MR. EDEN stated general agreement and asked Mr. Molotov what subjects he wished to add to the agenda.

German Fleet and Merchant Marine

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had a draft on the German fleet and merchant marine which he wished his colleagues to study. He stated that the draft would be ready in 10-15 minutes.

Consideration of the Agenda

MR. EDEN then brought the meeting back to the agenda and stated that the drafting committee on German political questions had a revised draft ready for presentation. He asked Mr. [Sir William] Strang to present it.

MR. STRANG explained in some detail various changes made by the drafting committee in the text of this paper. (See Attachment 1)

In paragraph 1 [2] (i) the word “demilitarization” was added after the word “disarmament” in order to bring this section in line with the declaration issued in Berlin on June 5. Subparagraph (a) immediately after subparagraph (i) was altered to accord with EAC recommendations. Subparagraph (b) was altered by the deletion of the word “seize” and the substitution of the phrase “held at the disposal of the Allies”, since most seizures had already been made.

MR. MOLOTOV then thanked the drafting committee for its work, and was followed by MR. EDEN and MR. BYRNES.

MR. BYRNES moved that the text be approved and this was agreed to.

Poland

MR. EDEN stated that the next item on the agenda was Poland. He added that the Prime Minister during the meeting on July 18 had promised to produce the text of a possible proposal.

MR. EDEN stated gratitude to the Generalissimo for his understanding of British difficulties even though their purposes were the same.

The British Delegation had produced the text of a draft proposal and had attempted a Russian translation, which was only in manuscript form. This proposal was delivered to the delegates and there was an interim period for consideration of it during which MR. MOLOTOV distributed copies of the Russian proposal.

After a brief period MR. EDEN again called the meeting to order.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Russian Delegation had no objection to the first paragraph of the proposal. There was, however, some question about paragraph 2. The title [paragraph?] began “The British and U.S. Governments express their willingness.” This was not considered urgent enough and some expression of the need for immediacy was needed.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to say that a telegram had come giving information on this subject. The British have done more than the Prime Minister was able to indicate during the July 18 session of the Heads of Governments. The British Government had taken under control the whole machinery of the former Polish Government, which was being liquidated rapidly. A Treasury committee has assumed full control of all Polish finances. All Polish ministries have been closed and diplomatic privileges have been withdrawn. All properties except the Polish Embassy have been taken by the British Government and all work not connected with the liquidation of the former Polish Government has been stopped. All recruiting for Polish armed forces has been stopped and the War Office is now supervising the activities of the Polish General Staff. Polish ships are under charter to the United Kingdom, which desires to discuss this question with the Warsaw government. Much has been done and is being done.

MR. MOLOTOV then pointed out that since there is no representative of Poland here, it is impossible for the Soviet Delegation to speak for them. The principal question is to prevent the London Government from transferring assets and properties to private persons.

MR. EDEN stated that he was able to give absolute assurances on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV then pointed out that the law governing these matters was recent and that many transfers might have taken place in the past.

MR. EDEN replied that British action had been taken from the moment that recognition was accorded to the Warsaw government. The British Government is now awaiting the arrival of a representative of the Polish Provisional Government in London in order that immediate discussions can begin.

MR. MOLOTOV again raised the question of immediacy.

MR. EDEN replied that discussions could not be begun with persons who are absent.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that he only wanted a statement stressing immediacy.

MR. EDEN expressed the belief that such statement could be made and MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. BYRNES then mentioned the fact that an attempt had been made to transfer the Polish Embassy property in Washington but that this had been stopped and the Embassy had been vacated and was now at the disposal of the Warsaw Government.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the matter of stocks, assets, and property and asked whether the sentence from the Russian proposal forbidding such transfers could be used.

MR. EDEN replied that he would consider a phrase noting that steps had been taken.

MR. MOLOTOV then questioned practice in other countries, specifically mentioning Norway.

MR. EDEN then agreed that a drafting committee might be appointed in order to try to find words which would meet Mr. Molotov’s wishes and asked whether there were any other points in the draft to which the Soviet Delegation took exception.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired concerning the debts of the London Polish Government and asked for an indication of the totals.

MR. BYRNES replied that he was unable to give a definite answer on this point and pointed out that the statement in paragraph 2 concerning discussions which would take place on these matters apparently met Mr. Molotov’s point.

MR. EDEN noted that the draft paper only suggests that discussions embrace this question and does not ask the Polish Provisional Government to accept a liability in advance.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the matter be referred to a committee to reconcile differences in language, and MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. EDEN felt that the meeting should hear more about remaining points first.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the last words in paragraph 3 regarding the assurance of a livelihood carried an implication which no country could guarantee.

MR. EDEN suggested the words “personal freedom and security.”

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the inclusion of the words “without discrimination.”

MR. MOLOTOV then asked whether the Crimea text could not be used in the last paragraph and suggested that this point and other differences be left to the drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES and MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. BYRNES appointed Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bohlen to serve on the drafting committee.

MR. EDEN appointed Ambassador Clark Kerr and Mr. Allen.

MR. MOLOTOV appointed Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Golunski.

MR. EDEN asked whether it was possible that a draft would be ready for the meeting this afternoon.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would prefer to have the question discussed on July 20 since the matter should not be hurried.

MR. BYRNES then suggested that an effort be made to get a draft today, but if this was not possible it be held over until tomorrow.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

German Economic Problems

MR. EDEN stated that the next item on the agenda was the consideration of German economic problems but that he understood that the drafting committee had no report ready since it had not been possible to meet yesterday. Therefore, neither this meeting nor the meeting of the Heads of States could consider this question today.

MR. EDEN then suggested consideration of an agenda for the meeting of the Heads of States.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that other matters be discussed first. These included the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine, and Spain. A Russian proposal on Spain was distributed at this point. (See attachment 2).

MR. EDEN inquired concerning the disposition of these two matters.

MR. BYRNES stated that he saw no reason why these two subjects should not be put on the agenda for discussion today by the Heads of States.

MR. EDEN stated that it was impossible for him to discuss the German fleet without consultation with naval authorities, who were not now present.

MR. BYRNES reiterated his belief that both questions should be discussed by the Heads of States. He also suggested that the President’s paper on the implementation of the Yalta agreement come up for consideration this afternoon.

MR. EDEN remarked that the President’s paper dealt only with the Balkans and asked for permission to add two items on the British agenda. These are: one paper on Yugoslavia and one on Rumania.

MR. BYRNES agreed that these questions should be added and if not reached on the agenda today should go over until tomorrow.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection.

Agenda for Meeting of Heads of States

MR. EDEN then recapitulated the items agreed upon for discussion by the Heads of States on the afternoon of July 19. These were:

  1. Agreed text on political control of Germany;
  2. Poland;
  3. The German fleet and merchant marine;
  4. Spain;
  5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration;
  6. Yugoslavia;
  7. Rumania.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether there were any drafts available on items 6 and 7.

MR. EDEN promised them by this afternoon.

MR. EDEN, after asking whether there was anything else to come before the meeting, then declared the meeting adjourned.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1945

The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State

Berlin Conference, July 19, 1945

Memorandum

Subject: WORK SHEET ON QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE YALTA DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

  1. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the Yalta formula and the armistice control in the satellite states. In our view Yalta should not be invoked to change the armistice administration, which was set up by specific negotiation and which, much as it needs improvement, should be negotiated ad hoc. This distinction is important at the moment, because the Soviet Government may well try to sidestep the issue of implementing Yalta by referring to their new move to give better treatment to the United States and United Kingdom delegations in the armistice commissions.

    The British proposal for discussing the Rumanian petroleum question at this afternoon’s session suggests that they may expect the Yalta formula to help out in ameliorating United Kingdom and United States positions under the armistice regimes. We consider that the petroleum problem may indeed require negotiation above the level of the ACC, but that it is not germane to the Yalta Declaration.

  2. The British paper on Yalta (their No. 8) favors concluding peace treaties as the first step toward the creation of conditions for the emergence of democratic government. We think that only after some change in the composition of the government in Rumania and Bulgaria should we proceed to normalizing relations. We need not make our demands so rigid as to shut off the means of dealing with an imperfect regime, if we can work out a substantial broadening of the base as a beginning.

  3. The “consultation” proposed in point 2 of our paper might be by our Ambassadors at Moscow, or our political representatives at Bucharest and Sofia, but preferably not by the Control Commissions, for the reasons mentioned above.

  4. The British are proposing adding Yugoslavia to this topic. The Soviet Government would probably object to making a joint “statement” at the conclusion of the conference. Much of the desired effect could be achieved by a joint “message” (not made public) on the basis of which we could exert pressure at Belgrade at appropriate times.

C. W. CANNON