America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

6584 
[Enclosure--Extract]

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The conduct of the war with Japan
With the great needs of rehabilitation both domestically and abroad facing us, we still find ourselves engaged in war with a major Pacific power. The length and limitation upon our lines of communications to the Pacific combat areas aggravate the strains upon our resources which the wastes of war always impose. The Japanese soldier has proved himself capable of a suicidal, last-ditch defense; and will no doubt continue to display such a defense on his homeland. Yet we have enormous factors in our favor and any step which can be taken to translate those advantages into a prompt and successful conclusion of the war should be taken. I have already indicated in my memorandum to you of 2 July 1945, the reasons which impel me to urge that warnings be delivered to Japan, designed to bring about her capitulation as quickly as possible. While that war is going on, it will be most difficult politically and economically to make substantial contributions to the reestablishment of stable conditions abroad. The longer that war progresses, the smaller will our surpluses become, and the more our overall resources will be strained.

Warning to Japan
It seems to me that we are at the psychological moment to commence our warnings to Japan. The great marshalling of our new air and land forces in the combat area in the midst of the ever greater blows she is receiving from the naval and already established Army forces, is bound to provoke thought even among their military leaders. Added to this is the effect induced by this Conference and the impending threat of Russia’s participation, which it accentuates.

Moreover, the recent news of attempted approaches on the part of Japan to Russia, impels me to urge prompt delivery of our warning. I would therefore urge that we formulate a warning to Japan to be delivered during the course of this Conference, and rather earlier than later, along the lines of the draft prepared by the War Department and now approved, I understand, by both the State and Navy Departments. In the meantime our tactical plans should continue to operate without let up, and if the Japanese persist, the full force of our newer weapons should be brought to bear in the course of which a renewed and even heavier warning, backed by the power of the new forces and possibly the actual entrance of the Russians in the war, should be delivered.

Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

6585

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

CCS 193rd Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson
General Somervell General Ismay
Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant-General Macready
Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock
Major General Norstad Major-General Hollis
Captain McDill
Captain Oster
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Program and Procedure for the Conference (CCS 880/9 and 880/10)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 880/10.

Estimate of the Enemy Situation (CCS 643/3)

Sir Alan Brooke referred to the last sentence on page 10 of the paper where the survival of the institution of the Emperor was mentioned. He asked whether the United States Chiefs of Staff had given any thought to the question of the interpretation of the term “unconditional surrender.” From the military point of view, it seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff that there might be some advantage in trying to explain this term to the Japanese in a manner which would ensure that the war was not unduly prolonged in outlying areas. If, for instance, an interpretation could be found and communicated to the Japanese which did not involve the dissolution of the Imperial institution, the Emperor would be in a position to order the ceasefire in outlying areas whereas, if the dynasty were destroyed, the outlying garrisons might continue to fight for many months or years. If an interpretation on these lines could be found an opportune moment to make it clear to the Japanese might be shortly after a Russian entry into the war.

The United States Chiefs of Staff explained that considerable thought had been given to this subject on the political level. One suggestion was that some form of agreed ultimatum might be issued at the correct psychological moment, for example, on Russian entry into the war, the idea being to explain what the term “unconditional surrender” did not mean rather than what it did mean.

Admiral Leahy suggested that as the matter was clearly a political one primarily, it would be very useful if the Prime Minister put forward to the President his views and suggestions as to how the term “unconditional surrender” might be explained to the Japanese.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the estimate of the enemy situation in CCS 643/3.

b. Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of asking the Prime Minister to raise with the President the matter of unconditional surrender of Japan.

Progress Reports on Operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command (CCS 892 and 893)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the only area not dealt with in these two reports was the China Theater. The British Chiefs of Staff would welcome a report of progress in this theater.

General Marshall described certain features of the operations in the China Theater, particularly as to the effectiveness of Chinese troops when properly equipped. He further stated that a report of operations in the China Theater would be prepared and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. Of the progress report on operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command in CCS 892 and CCS 893.
b. That the United States Chiefs of Staff would submit later a report on operations in China.

Development of Operations in the Pacific (CCS 880/4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the memorandum on the development of operations in the Pacific in CCS 880/4.

Report on Army Air Operations in the War Against Japan (CCS 894)

General Arnold commented in detail on certain aspects of the report.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report on Army air operations in the war against Japan in CCS 894, and of General Arnold’s explanatory remarks.

6586 
740.00119 EW/7-1645

U.S. Delegation Working Paper

[Babelsberg, July 16, 1945]

Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

  1. The authority of the Control Council to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole shall be paramount in Germany, and those plans and decisions shall be carried out in each zone of occupation by the national Commander-in-Chief concerned.

  2. In its work the Control Council will be guided by the Crimea Declaration, by the Declaration of June 5, 1945, on the Defeat of Germany, and by the provisions of the Agreement on Additional Requirements which is in the final stage of negotiation in the European Advisory Commission. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief will apply the additional agreed political and economic principles set forth below in this Agreement.

Political Principles

  1. War criminals, including those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes, shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

  2. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Those Germans who are permitted to remain in, or are appointed to, official posts (e.g. in the police or the administration) should understand that they hold office only during good behavior.

  3. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the development of democratic ideas.

  4. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:
    (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany through elective councils.
    (ii) anti-Nazi political parties together with freedom of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany.
    (iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant.
    (iv) For the time being no central German Political Government shall be established.

  5. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. The Control Council will supervise the dissemination of public information in Germany.

  6. The Commander-in-Chief will assure the representatives of United Nations and neutral news-gathering agencies all reasonable facilities for the collection and transmission of news material.

Economic Principles

  1. The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present, excessive concentration of economic power. To the extent required for carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the Control Council shall permit or secure the establishment of central controls.

  2. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities shall to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls.

  3. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary:
    (a) to carry out programs of military and industrial disarmament;
    (b) to carry out programs of reparation and rehabilitation of devastated areas;
    (c) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to prevent starvation, disease or civil unrest;
    (d) to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones;

  4. The production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, including all types of aircraft and ocean-going ships, shall be prohibited and prevented, and specialized facilities for the manufacture of these articles shall be held for removal or destruction. Production of synthetic oil and rubber, and of aluminum and magnesium shall also be prohibited and the productive facilities held for removal or destruction. Production of other metals, chemicals (including synthetic nitrogen) and machinery shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to minimum, peacetime needs. Excess facilities shall be held for removal or destruction.

  5. The principles agreed upon or under negotiation in the Reparation Commission at Moscow to govern the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex 16 to this agreement.

  6. To secure the fulfillment of immediate economic objectives, the Control Council will undertake the formulation and prompt execution of uniform programs in the following fields:

    a) Development of exports for the purpose of
    (i) Meeting a reparation program as formulated by the Reparations Commission.
    (ii) Meeting urgent external needs for relief and reconstruction.
    (iii) Providing means of payment for Germany’s minimum imports.

    Immediate attention should be given to the export of coal and to transfers of railroad rolling stock and livestock for purposes of reparation and economic restoration of Allied countries.

    b) Formulation of a single program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole and determination of basis for sharing procurement and financing responsibility.

    c) Establishment of machinery to assure equitable distribution of available supplies within Germany.

    d) Establishment of uniform ration scales within Germany.

    e) Formulation of immediate steps to secure adequate agricultural and coal output, essential repair of internal transport and emergency repair of housing, electric power and other utilities.

    f) Formulation of initial measures for curtailment of metal, chemical and machinery industries to conform to minimum, peacetime needs, and elimination of selected, key industries in these fields.

    g) Uniform regulation and control of currency, credit and public finance.

    h) Uniform controls of Germany’s international frontiers and recording of movements of persons and goods.

    i) Integrated controls and operation of transport and communications.

  7. The Control Council is charged with the practical implementation of the basic policies agreed between the occupying powers in the agreements listed in Article 2 above and in the present agreement. The Commander[s]-in-Chief will refer to their respective governments any proposals for modifications of or additions to the basic principles and objectives set forth herein.

  8. This agreement does not apply to Austria.

6587 
740.0011 EW/7-1645

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State

[Babelsberg,] July 16, 1945

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Because reparations must include all transfers of property within the whole of the German Reich as its boundaries existed at the end of the year 1937, the relationship between reparations and ceded German territory has been given considerable study by our delegation.

Upon this subject, I attach a memorandum embodying four provisions which I strongly recommend be included as a part of any agreement entered into by the United States confirming the ceding of any portion of Germany to other nations.

Respectfully,
EDWIN W. PAULEY

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the U.S. Section, Allied Commission on Reparations

Re: Relationship between Reparations and ceded German territory

As a part of any agreement confirming the ceding of any portion of Germany as its boundaries existed at the end of 1937, it shall be provided that:

  1. Any property or current production available for removal from any ceded territory shall be first utilized within Germany to whatever extent occupation authorities require to avoid the necessity of imports into Germany;

  2. Thereafter, the value or proceeds of any property or current production from any ceded territory available for delivery outside of Germany shall be first used to pay for approved imports into Germany;

  3. If sufficient funds are available to pay for all such approved imports, the proceeds or value of any assets delivered from any ceded territory shall be treated as a reparations deliveries [delivery] to such nation or nations and in such amounts as may be designated by the Allied Commission on Reparations, or a permanent Reparations Agency to be created;

  4. The value of all property remaining within the boundaries of any territory ceded to any other nation shall be counted as reparations. To the extent that the current production of any such property is required to be delivered for reparations, or, to defray the cost of approved imports into Germany, an appropriate adjustment in the value of such property shall be made.

6588 
800.515/7-1645: Telegram

The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls

Babelsberg, July 16, 1945
Secret
Victory 23

For Oliver ES from Collado.

Please bring us up to date on progress in controlling German external assets especially in Spain since Department’s 5499 of July 6th to London and your memorandum of July 7.

6589 
881.00/2-945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extract]
Secret
us urgent

1200

  1. We have given careful study to the various points raised in your 1475 of July 9, 7 p.m.2 and fully realize that the course which we may be compelled to follow in solving the Tangier problem may result in a deterioration of our relations with Spain and that such deterioration may render more difficult our efforts to use Spain as a source of supply and a base for ATC operations.

  2. We agree that Spain has interests in Tangier which should not be ignored. Nevertheless, we are convinced that if the United States is to discharge its world responsibilities it must take a more, rather than a less, active interest in areas which are a potential source of trouble. If we do not insist just now in appropriate participation in the administration of Tangier, an impression may well be created that we shall not insist upon being consulted in matters of international importance relating to North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Near East. We feel that we must continue actively to interest ourselves in these areas with the primary purpose of preventing developments from taking place in them which might lead to international conflicts involving ourselves. Since clashes of interests originating in the Western Mediterranean might result in conflicts involving the Soviet Union and since as far back as Algeciras Russia was admitted to have a legitimate interest in Tangier, we do not believe that the Soviet Union can be kept out of Tangier without giving it the impression that the Western powers are discriminating against it. We believe that the Soviet Union would continue to insist upon participation in discussions relating to Tangier even though the United States would withdraw from such conversations.

  3. It is possible that Soviet representatives participating in conversations or in conventions relating to Tangier may insist that the present Spanish Government be barred. If they do so we shall make every effort to find a formula which would admit both the Soviet Union and Spain. If that is not possible, we shall be prepared to consult with the British and French Governments with a view to dealing with this situation when we are confronted with it.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GREW

881.00/2-945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extract]
Secret
us urgent

1200…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. We cannot escape the conviction that the Spanish people do not as yet appreciate the weakness of their Government’s international position. It seems clear that the implications of the San Francisco resolution are not adequately appreciated in Spain. We believe that it is going to be increasingly difficult for the interests of Spain and the Spanish people to be adequately represented and recognized in international affairs because of the regime which is governing Spain. All of this is, of course, directly in line with the purport of President Roosevelt’s letter to you in regard to the nature of the relations which must necessarily exist between the United States and Spain so long as the present regime continues in power.

Repeated London as 5815; Paris 3312; Tangier 156.

GREW

6590 
841.24/5-2945

The Secretary of State to the President

[Undated]
Secret

Memorandum for the President

  1. I have had prepared a new draft reply from you to the Prime Minister’s telegram of May 28 regarding Lend-Lease during the Japanese War. It would assure the Prime Minister that it is your intention that deliveries should be made for the prosecution of the war against Japan in accordance with schedules and other terms prepared by Army, Navy, and FEA supply officers in consultation with British representatives last November as modified in the light of changing strategic plans as well as of supply, procurement, and allocation considerations. It would remind the Prime Minister that the British dollar position remains at a reasonable level which should permit some relaxation of the exceedingly tight policy of the British with respect to dollar payments.

  2. The schedules prepared last November and modified continuously in the light of changing circumstances are based solely on the efficient prosecution of the war against Japan and have been so presented to the Congress on three occasions: (1) Last November on the conclusion of the Phase II discussions and prior to the release of a statement by Secretary Morgenthau and Messrs. Stettinius and Crowley in the United States and of an address by the Prime Minister before the House of Commons; (2) Last March and April in hearings on the extension of the Lend-Lease Act; and (3) Three weeks ago in hearings on the Lend-Lease appropriation.

  3. The munitions schedules are in three parts: ground forces, air, and naval. The ground forces schedules and conditions were originally signed on October 23, 1944, by Under Secretary Patterson and Generals Somervell and Clay. The air and fleet air arm schedules and conditions were originally signed on October 31, 1944 by Under Secretary Patterson, Assistant Secretaries Lovett and Gates, General Arnold and Vice-Admiral Fitch. The naval schedules and conditions were originally signed on November 10, 1944, by Vice-Admiral Home. As indicated above, these schedules are constantly subject to strategic and supply decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  4. The non-munitions schedules were worked out by Mr. Crowley with representatives of appropriate civilian and military agencies and are also subject to changing strategic and supply considerations. They include only items for the support of the British civilian population in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan, and in no case items relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction of Britain, nor items for export or export manufacture. The principal items are: (1) food; (2) raw materials (cotton, pulp and paper, timber, and synthetic rubber which is matched by reverse lend-lease of crude rubber); (3) petroleum; and (4) shipping services.

  5. Mr. Crowley in the Jane hearings on the Lend-Lease appropriation spelled out in some detail the non-munitions or FEA schedules, and the Congress appropriated the funds as requested.

  6. I believe that these schedules have been prepared and are being handled in accord with the letter of the Lend-Lease Act and with the intent of the Congress and of yourself that Lend-Lease shall be used only in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Congress has recently had an opportunity to examine the matter in connection with the appropriation bill and has signified its concurrence by making the funds available.

  7. I therefore recommend that Lend-Lease deliveries to the British Commonwealth proceed in accordance with the above, and that you reply to the Prime Minister as suggested in the attached draft memorandum.

6591 
740.0011 PW/7-1645

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
[Extract]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Yalta Agreements
As for the Russian participation [in the war against Japan] and the so-called Yalta Agreements, 1 believe that these agreements, so long as they are interpreted consistently with our traditional policy toward China, should not cause us any concern from a security point of view, assuming always we keep clear our control over the Pacific islands. By our traditional policy toward China I refer, of course, to the Open Door and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.

Manchuria
We can afford to permit Russia to have access to ports in Manchuria, and I interpret the Yalta Agreements as giving her full commercial access to Dairen, with the necessary facilities. Likewise I understand the late President Roosevelt’s willingness to permit the Russians to have what in effect is the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur on the peninsula for a limited time. However no concessions should be made which would permit Russia to control or prohibit trade through Dairen or any other commercial port in Manchuria. In other words I would insist that Manchuria be treated precisely as China proper in this regard, except that Russia be permitted to acquire the facilities necessary to develop and support her trade from and to Russia through the port by her joint control with China of the railway and the normal acquisition of the necessary port facilities. The operation of the railway must be conducted on the usual public carrier basis without discrimination against the trade in Manchuria of any power. I understand Dr. Soong to take this view and I would not hesitate to support China on this, as any other course could constitute an abandonment of one of our longest established and most highly respected American policies. It would also be antagonistic to our clear and growing interests in the orient.

Except for the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur, which in itself is a trend in the wrong direction, no further military rights or control should be granted in the Dairen peninsula or elsewhere in Manchuria.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

6592 
740.0011 PW/7-1645

The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Potsdam, 16 July 1945
Top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the conduct of the war with Japan. It relates to a subject which I think is of supreme importance at the moment, and I would very much like to see the President with you about it at your earliest convenience.

On another matter in which the War Department is greatly interested, namely the administration of Germany, I also have some thoughts which I should like to submit to you and the President. They will be in written form the first thing in the morning.

Faithfully yours,
HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure--Extract]

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The conduct of the war with Japan
With the great needs of rehabilitation both domestically and abroad facing us, we still find ourselves engaged in war with a major Pacific power. The length and limitation upon our lines of communications to the Pacific combat areas aggravate the strains upon our resources which the wastes of war always impose. The Japanese soldier has proved himself capable of a suicidal, last ditch defense; and will no doubt continue to display such a defense on his homeland. Yet we have enormous factors in our favor and any step which can be taken to translate those advantages into a prompt and successful conclusion of the war should be taken. I have already indicated in my memorandum to you of 2 July 1945, the reasons which impel me to urge that warnings be delivered to Japan, designed to bring about her capitulation as quickly as possible. While that war is going on, it will be most difficult politically and economically to make substantial contributions to the reestablishment of stable conditions abroad. The longer that war progresses, the smaller will our surpluses become, and the more our over-all resources will be strained.

Warning to Japan
It seems to me that we are at the psychological moment to commence our warnings to Japan. The great marshalling of our new air and land forces in the combat area in the midst of the ever greater blows she is receiving from the naval and already established Army forces, is bound to provoke thought even among their military leaders. Added to this is the effect induced by this Conference and the impending threat of Russia’s participation, which it accentuates.

Moreover, the recent news of attempted approaches on the part of Japan to Russia, impels me to urge prompt delivery of our warning. I would therefore urge that we formulate a warning to Japan to be delivered during the course of this Conference, and rather earlier than later, along the lines of the draft prepared by the War Department and now approved, I understand, by both the State and Navy Departments. In the meantime, our tactical plans should continue to operate without let up, and if the Japanese persist, the full force of our newer weapons should be brought to bear in the course of which a renewed and even heavier warning, backed by the power of the new forces and possibly the actual entrance of the Russians in the war, should be delivered.

Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HENRY L STIMSON

6593 
740.0011 PW (Peace)/7-1645: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] July 16, 1945
Top secret
31

Mr. Hull asks me to send you the following comments on the draft statement calling on Japan to surrender:

To James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State – Confidential.

I refer to entire document, and especially to paragraph 12. Its support by the heads of War and Navy and by the Under Secretary of State calls for the most serious consideration. The central point calculated to create serious difference is in paragraph 12 and relates to a proposed declaration by the allies now that the Emperor and his monarchy will be preserved in event of allied victory. I am stating this rather broadly but as the general public will doubtless construe it. The proponents believe that this step might shorten the war and save allied lives. The theory is that somehow the influences and persons who listen to the Emperor and his religion would fight and resist less hard and so save allied lives and shorten the war, et cetera, et cetera. Undoubtedly, if this undertaking should prove successful it would be still more appealing. The other side is that no person knows how the proposal would work out. The militarists would try hard to interfere. Also should it fail the Japs would be encouraged while terrible political repercussions would follow in the U.S. Would it be well first to await the climax of allied bombing and Russia’s entry into the war? HULL

[GREW]

6594 
740.0011 PW/7-1645

The Secretary of War to the President

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
[Extracts]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war.

The Yalta Agreements
As for the Russian participation and the so-called Yalta Agreements, I believe that these agreements, so long as they are interpreted consistently with our traditional policy toward China, should not cause us any concern from a security point of view, assuming always we keep clear our control over the Pacific islands. By our traditional policy toward China I refer, of course, to the Open Door and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Allied occupation of the main Japanese islands
I would hope that our occupation of the Japanese islands would not involve the government of the country as a whole in any such manner as we are committed in Germany. I am afraid we would make a hash of it if we tried. The Japanese are an oriental people with an oriental mind and religion. Our occupation should be limited to that necessary to (a) impress the Japanese, and the orient as a whole, with the fact of Japanese defeat, (b) demilitarize the country, and (c) punish war criminals, including those responsible for the perfidy of Pearl Harbor.

If the Russians seek joint occupation after a creditable participation in the conquest of Japan, I do not see how we could refuse at least a token occupation. I feel, however, that no prolonged occupation by the Soviet should be approved and, indeed, any occupation by any major ally which exceeds our own, either in the strength of forces employed or in duration. I would approve their occupation of the Kuriles or indeed their cession to Russia, but I do not relish Russian occupation further south. If there is to be occupation of the main islands, the conditions and terms must certainly be determined by us. If the Kuriles are to be ceded to Russia, we should retain permanent landing rights therein, as the islands are located in a great circle route to Japan from the United States, and would substantially shorten our mileage on air voyages following this route.

HENRY L STIMSON

6595

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

Washington [Babelsberg], 16 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the Russian Chiefs of Staff should have the opportunity of holding conversations with the United States Chiefs of Staff as early in the TERMINAL Conference as they may desire. It would be desirable that this opportunity be offered them by the President in the course of his first conversations with Marshal Stalin.

The United States Chiefs of Staff have presented no agenda to the Russians. We have advised them that we would be pleased to discuss with them the exchange of liaison parties and intelligence on the Japanese situation, and that we are ready to discuss any other problems which the Russians may wish to present. In view of this fact, the suggestion of a meeting should properly originate with Marshal Stalin. Failing such suggestion from Marshal Stalin, however, it would be in keeping with our proposed procedure insofar as the Russians are concerned if the President should suggest to Marshal Stalin that his Chiefs of Staff are here and are prepared to discuss these and any other matters which the Russian Chiefs of Staff may wish to present.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

6596

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 895

Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations
There are attached (Enclosure “A”) a memorandum in which the French propose to place a French corps of two infantry divisions under American command in the Pacific war and (Enclosure “B”) a reply proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Since the British Chiefs of Staff may have views as to the areas in which these French troops should be employed, though perhaps not under United States command, their comment or concurrence is requested. General MacArthur proposes, if the French corps is assigned to him, to use it in the main effort against Japan in late spring of 1946.

[Enclosure A]

The Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States to the Chief of Staff, United States Army

Washington, May 29, 1945
Top secret
No. 432/EM

Memorandum for General George C. Marshall

Subject: FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS

During conversations between President Truman and Mr. Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Provisional Government, on the one hand, and President Truman, General Marshall and General Juin on the other, the principle of a French participation in the war against Japan was viewed favorably.

Following these conversations, the French Government puts at the entire disposal of the American command, for operations in the Far East, an army corps comprising two divisions, besides corps-supporting and service units.

This army corps should include:

  1. The 9th Colonial Infantry Division, already well trained, having taken a brilliant part in the French and German campaigns.

    In order to be able to operate in the Pacific war zone, this division would only require certain transfers of personnel (replacement by volunteers of men unfit for overseas duty).

    The above will be ready to be shipped by the end of June.

    It seems advisable that the 9th Division receive its equipment in the theater of operations.

  2. The 1st Colonial Infantry Division of the Far East, planned several months ago. This division, whose colored troops will be replaced by trained European volunteers, from the French 1st Army, will be ready by the end of July, provided it receives its equipment on time.

    It is to be expected that the latter unit, in view of the previous training of its personnel, will be ready for combat duty a month after receipt of its equipment.

    To save time, immediate delivery of its equipment is therefore suggested.

    In case the above is delivered only in the theater of operations, a corresponding delay would be needed by the 1st Division, from the time of receipt of its equipment, to participate in actual combat.

  3. Supporting units and services of the army corps would also be ready by the end of July. Details of its equipping will have to be worked out in accord with the American command.

    This army corps being put at the entire disposal of the American command, it seems logical to the French General Staff to give its units an organization similar to that of corresponding American units in the Far East.

It is therefore requested, in regard to divisions as well as to supporting army corps units and services, that the types of units to be organized, be exactly defined.

It is finally suggested, in order to facilitate further negotiations, that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, be authorized to deal directly with the French command in what concerns details of the matters herewith referred to.

A. M. BROSSIN DE SAINT DIDIER

[Enclosure B]

Draft
Memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States

Top secret

  1. With reference to your memorandum of 29 May 1945 addressed to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the United States Chiefs of Staff accept in principle that portion of your proposal whereby the French Government puts at the entire disposal of the American command a French army corps of two infantry divisions, with corps-supporting and service units on the U.S. scale, for operations in the war against Japan. This acceptance in principle is with the understanding that the agreement on this matter with the French Government will include the following provisions:

    a. This French corps will be, both during the period of hostilities and in the post-hostilities readjustment period until released by the United States, subject to the complete command and control of the United States command in the same manner as a U.S. army corps.

    b. Movement of the corps from France will be contingent upon the French corps having, in the opinion of the United States command, a combat efficiency based on United States standards.

    c. Assurance that adequate trained replacements will be provided by the French Government as necessary.

    d. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs.

    e. The implementation of this agreement including matters such as accompanying supporting and service units, provisions for equipment, and the planning and timing for the movement and employment of the corps will be in accordance with plans and arrangements to be determined by the United States military authorities who will deal directly with the French military authorities.

  2. Pressing requirements for operations in the Pacific during the coming months make certain that it will not be possible to move this corps from France for at least several months after the dates you suggest, and it appears unlikely that this corps will be committed to operations prior to the spring of 1946.

  3. The United States Chiefs of Staff will advise you further in this matter subsequent to the conclusion of a governmental agreement.

6597

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Washington [Babelsberg], 16 July 1945
Top secret
SM-2607

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN LIBERATION OF TIMOR

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be advised as follows:

In reply to the State Department memorandum of 11 June 1945 requesting information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regret that no definite information can be given at this time. A draft letter on this subject, CCS 462/19, for transmission to the Department of State and Foreign Office was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval on 3 January 1945. A copy of the paper was sent to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which advised on 13 January 1945 (JCS 953/9) that the draft letter was considered satisfactory by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy.

The British Chiefs of Staff have deferred action on CCS 462/19 pending the receipt of information from Australia on its ability to accommodate the Portuguese force for training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to revise the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in CCS 462/19 along broader lines which they hope the British Chiefs of Staff will be able to approve without further delay. The British Chiefs of Staff are being urged to take prompt action on this revised paper and it is hoped that the desired information will be forthcoming shortly.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA, Secretary

[Appendix]

The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to Col. John S. Wise, of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff

[Washington,] June 11, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum

An urgent telegram has been received from our Ambassador at Lisbon stating that Dr. Salazar believed that we should submit very soon the details of the plan for Portuguese participation “in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor” to use the language in our Note to him of November 28, 1944. You will recall that the British furnished similar assurances at the same time and that these assurances constituted practically the only consideration given by us in exchange for the facilities at Santa Maria. These facilities have been said by a high military authority to be “of incalculable importance.”

A review of the history of the Santa Maria negotiations suggests that the principal reason for the delay in obtaining the Portuguese assent to the use of Santa Maria was our delay in giving the assurances as to Timor, which were desired by Dr. Salazar. This is mentioned in order to emphasize the vital interest of the Portuguese in this matter.

The Department understand] that active discussions are being held by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the complexity of the shipping, supply and training questions involved is fully appreciated. However, the Department believes that it is highly important to furnish promptly evidence of our good faith in carrying out the plan to which we are committed. This is particularly important, in view of impending negotiations for long term post-war military rights in the Azores. The Department does not feel that it can start such negotiations until the Portuguese are fully satisfied on the question of Timor.

Therefore, the Department hopes that it will be possible to communicate to the Portuguese in the very near future the details of our plans as they now stand for Portuguese participation in any Timor expedition. If for any reason, it is not possible within the next few days to give information of this nature, the Department hopes that it will be given information on which to base an explanation to Dr. Salazar of the present state of the matter and the reasons for the delay in communicating to him the final plans.

PAUL T. CULBERTSON

6598

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 462/25

Staff Conversations with Portugal

Reference: CCS 462 SERIES

  1. The report by the Combined Administrative Committee in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners in CCS 462/19 on the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission (CCS 462/15) relative to proposals for Portuguese participation in Allied operations for the recapture of Timor was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1945. This report recommended that a letter be dispatched to the Department of State and Foreign Office setting forth the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conversations with the Portuguese. Action on CCS 462/19 has been deferred at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result the Department of State and Foreign Office have not as yet been advised of the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conferences held with the Portuguese although these conversations were held some nine months ago. The Department of State is pressing the United States Chiefs of Staff for information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in any operations directed toward liberation of Timor.

  2. The United States Chiefs of Staff understand that the British Chiefs of Staff’s delay in acting on CCS 462/19 is due to lack of information from Australia on that country’s ability to provide accommodations for the Portuguese contingent. The end of the war in Europe makes out of date the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” of CCS 462/19 in two particulars. The United States Chiefs of Staff have therefore revised the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” to CCS 462/19 along broader lines. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office.4 In view of the urgency of the matter, the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate prompt consideration of this paper by the British Chiefs of Staff.

6599

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War

Washington, 16 July 1945
Top secret
urgent

War 32887

For Colonel Kyle’s Eyes Only from Harrison for Mr. Stimson.

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.

6600 
740.00119 EW/7-1645: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy

[Washington,] July 16, 1945
Secret
us urgent

33. (For Collado.)

In telegram 2250 of June 24, Pauley suggested that certain (unspecified) commodities received by Soviet Union on reparation account from satellite countries might be made available to American occupation forces through reverse-lend-lease arrangements. Dept drafted reply to effect that US waived none of its claim to reparations from satellites (though expecting none), that prospects of obtaining commodities from Soviet Union for US forces were so small as to preclude an approach to Soviet Union, and that US interest in exportable surpluses of the satellite countries centered on deliveries to UNRRA beneficiaries for relief of UNRRA and in turn US. This draft was taken by the Secretary.

When reply was drafted, Dept was thinking in terms of agricultural products, including food. It is apparent from later telegrams that Pauley is deeply interested in obtaining oil from Rumania, Hungary and Austria and has corresponded with PAW and SHAEF on this subject. His latest telegram to PAW asks for information on tanker requirements for Anglo-American oil for western and Mediterranean oil requirements from Anglo-American sources, and tanker savings possible if Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian sources could be used.

Suggest you consider asking the Secretary to enlarge the draft reply to 2250 of June 24 to indicate the interest of the US in obtaining oil from this area, and in paying dollars for such oil (if necessary) to Rumania and Hungary rather than USSR with understanding that these dollars be used primarily to satisfy US claims on these countries.

You may recall that Dept has already asked Embassy in Moscow for information on prospects of obtaining oil from Russian sources, or from Rumanian and Hungarian fields dominated by the Soviet Union. A long reply was received from Harriman to the effect that the Soviet Union position in oil continued to show a deficit. This exchange took place before Pauley’s arrival in Moscow.

[GREW]

6601 
881.00/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 16, 1945 — 11 a.m.
Secret

5814

It is not clear from your 6984, July 11, whether British have definitely decided to raise Tangier question at Big Three meeting or whether Hoyer Millar was merely sounding us out on the idea. (Sent London 5814, rptd to Paris 3311, Tangier 155, and Moscow 1615)

Our own feeling is that this should not be done in view of the fact that France will not be represented at the meeting. If the British so desire however we would see no objection to their endeavoring through normal diplomatic channels to ascertain what views the Russians may have for the solution of the Tangier problem.

GREW

6602 
740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1645: Telegram

The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State

Budapest, July 16, 1945 — 6 p.m.
Secret
priority

291

My telegrams 281 and 286, July 13.

Key tells me meeting of ACC is scheduled for tomorrow night when he expects to seek further clarification of Voroshilov’s note regarding changes in ACC procedure. Key does not intend to commit himself to acceptance of Soviet proposal pending further clarification and possible instructions, He is particularly desirous of securing statement from Voroshilov as to meaning of third paragraph of first section of latter’s note July 11 which seems to make directives of ACC on principal questions dependent on agreement with American and British representatives as proposed in your 57, May 28.

Sent Dept repeated to Moscow as No. 26 and London as No. 7.

SCHOENFELD

6603

The Pittsburgh Press (July 16, 1945)

B-29s BURN 4 MORE CITIES
Fleet isolates north Jap island

Superforts carry attack into 42nd day – Halsey still prowls enemy waters

…