Two-way radio system put in operation by KCS Railroad
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ON THE RECORD —
High comedy will mock Nazi rule on Paris
By Dorothy Thompson
Today it is difficult to recapture the feeling that gripped the world in June 1940 when Paris fell, and with Paris, France, men’s hearts and minds were paralyzed. Even in America, months before this war had become our own, there was anguish, and a terrible fear that as far as continental Europe was concerned, Western civilization had gone.
Militarily, there was no continental counterbalance. Russia stood aloof, neutral, mysterious. There were few who believed Britain could survive, or do more than hold out for a compromise peace. With the fall of Paris, America had become more isolated than in her entire history – a big island, covered only by a little island, rocking under siege.
In a political sense it was the great breakthrough of fascism, that seemed chosen by destiny to rule the world. In Paris, a quick-eyed camera caught a picture of Adolf Hitler in a capering mincing dance of joy.
So overwhelming was the German force, so swift and disastrous the defeat, that it seemed like an act of nature and at the outset was accepted with a kind of fatalism, as something preordained. In that moment the Germans appeared, even to their victims, as supermen. As they marched through the city, tall, clean, superbly clothed, with the shining rivers of their strange, gleaming, irresistible machines, they awakened a reluctant admiration. From Vichy, Pétain’s wavering voice deepened the French feeling of inferiority. Perhaps it was in the logical nature of things that the strong should win and rule.
Thus, a capricious woman, mastered against her will, may feel a certain dependency and security in the strength and desire of her master. There was something of that, for a brief moment, in France. Who knows? It might have lasted – if the master had not started to reeducate her. That is always the German mistake.
And ordinary men do not remain supermen for four years. A parade isa one thing; an occupation is another. Parisians began to see Germans with their boots off. A successful occupation army must understand the country and the people whom it rules. The Germans could not understand Paris. When they ceased to be conquering tourists, they were homesick strangers. Bit by bit they became not only oppressive, but ridiculous.
In the latitude of the spirit, it is farther from Berlin to Paris than from Berlin to Moscow or London.
The spirit of Paris is wiry and tough; the German spirit heavy and brittle. Parisians are conventional but not disciplined; tolerant but exclusive; skeptical but not credulous; witty, not humorous; lucid, and never sentimental.
Paris is the city of Pissarro, Seurat, Utrillo, who convey its beauty in light and vibrancy, a manner of seeing and painting that no German has ever mastered, in art or in life. Despite that it was mental but graceful. Nothing is overblown; everything is in moderation. Moderation is so un-German that the Germans make vices out of their very virtues, committing, as George Bernard Shaw remarked back in 1901, hideous crimes but always and only in the name of duty. The Parisians care little for “order.” But they have equilibrium. Nor is their laugh the belly-howl of farce, but the fine grin of comedy. in Paris, the satyr is a satirist.
Thus, years from now, when the sufferings of these four years are dimmed, I am sure it will be no French tragedian who will immortalize the four years of German occupation, but a new Moliere, making of it a high comedy – the kind of comedy that destroys, forever, with irony.
The crumbling of the German prestige began with the Parisians long before their armies began to disintegrate. Paris continued to belong to the Parisians. The Germans were everywhere and everywhere on the outside. They wanted to be liked. They strutted their stuff. They wooed the already conquered. When that happens, however, a man is lost. Rejected, the Germans resumed the masterly role and shot those who repulsed them. but nothing is more ridiculous than a superman, wavering between presenting bouquets and battering down the door.
I am sure that the Parisian feeling today is, “Thank God the British and Americans are coming to remove these idiotic bores.”
The Germans in Paris have suffered far more than a military defeat. They have suffered a psychological defeat, which in the long run will trouble and confuse them more. Not even defeat will do most to break the German spirit, but defeat coming atop years of unchallenged victory – and victory that proved pure illusion.
Pegler: Debate
By Westbrook Pegler
New York –
A studious observation of the controversies of the last few years in our country bring it home to me that we no longer debate, if we ever did in my time, but confine ourselves to claim, or boast, and accusation. That is to say, in an ancient political phrase, we point with pride and view with alarm. But seldom, even in Congress, are issues actually debated.
A New Deal orator or journalist will say, for example, that President Roosevelt is a great friend of labor and cite the Wagner Act as proof of his militant love for the working man. He presumes that it will be conceded that the Wagner Act is all that he says it is. Other men and women, of contrary opinion, might like to argue that this law is dangerous to labor, meaning the people who work for wages, although a great boon to the professional organizer and union politician and to the New Deal party.
But the question is never debated, head-on. The New Dealer makes his claim in the course of a speech or article and rushes on to insist that therefore Mr. Roosevelt should have the workers’ votes.
The one who insists that the Wagner Act deliberately exposes workers to oppression, exploitation and intimidation by the union and that behind it all is a cunning scheme to hitch labor in chains to Mr. Roosevelt’s chariot, does so in another form, over another hookup or in another publication. The point is that they never meet in public, whether on platform or printed page, and argue the issues in detail, speaking strictly to the subject, as Huey Long used to say.
In that form or oratory which passes for debate, Huey was a master, himself. For that matter, he was a great debater in the true meaning of the word, as good lawyers agreed who heard his argument before the 1932 Democratic Convention. But in speaking to the whole public. Huey actually won over multitudes by showing contempt for their intelligence. Thus, in one oration over the air he got his best effect by smearing Hugh Johnson as a chocolate soldier who had never snapped a cap. This was unfair and irrelevant. It was unfair because everyone who knew Johnson knew he was not a dandy, or chocolate soldier but downright slovenly and that one of the great disappointments of his life in the Army had been his inability to get overseas with a command. But the whole reference had absolutely nothing to do with the subject under discussion.
In one of big Bill Thompson’s campaigns in Chicago, a rather austere opponent who had been sticking to the issues patiently and conscientiously in an effort to arouse the people to intelligent consideration, found all his earnest presentation offset by Thompson’s ribaldry. Thompson said his opponent had egg on his necktie, which may have been true, but still had no bearing on the subject. Finally, Thompson’s opponent let fly with a roar one night that Bill had the hide of a rhinoceros and the brain of a baboon. That wowed them, although it did not win for him. But it touched Thompson more than anything else that had been said of him in the campaign.
I have been told that a Southern Senator first won his seat by campaigning in an old Model-T flivver in misfit clothes and waving at the crowds a bill of fare from one of the expensive Washington hotels which listed such luxuries as caviar at $3 a portion and steak at $8 for four. He would explain that caviar was just nothing but fish eggs and imported from Red Russia at that, and point out that honest, God-fearing people, were lucky to sell a cow, on the hoof, for $8. I am not sure that he was selling out his constituents to “the interests” so as to be able to buy imported fresh eggs at $3 an ounce. The whole idea was one of suggestion. The successful candidate, incidentally, is a man who has been noted for his fastidious dress and luxurious living in Washington in the years since he was first elected.
During the convention of the two big parties in Chicago, many speakers sounded off on many subjects, promising or condemning. But the only possibly way to weigh the opposing claims and charges was to wait until the Democrats were through and then go back over the text in the papers which, of course, nobody did. Not a word was said in defense or answer in either convention. Every speaker just claimed, promised or attacked, with no facilities provided for disproof.
Debate is abandoned in our politics, unless you count those squalling radio forums in which the speakers seldom have a chance to prepare arguments and are subject to hecklement with loaded questions.
West Virginia Senator sees U.S. veering to National Socialism
Chicago, Illinois (AP) –
Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV) said today that “I warn, without excitement, but with fairness, that there are signposts in our own country that point towards National Socialism.”
“That generally finds its growth out of a broken economic structure and a desire by a group to rule over and dictate to the people,” Revercomb asserted in a prepared address before the national encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Declaring that the national debt “threatens to reach the gigantic sum of $267 billion,” Revercomb said that:
There are some who have adopted the philosophy of a government by taxing and spending and regulating.
It appears that there are some who would continue the theory of taxing and spending and regulating, even for the days to come. That is a dangerous course. With some justification, caution was thrown away in spending for war. But that can find no sound basis when war has ended.
Pacific air war tempo increased
Halmahera plastered in 135-ton raid
By the Associated Press
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U.S. raid on oil refineries sets off fierce air battles
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Single off Kurowski’s glove robs Max Lanier of no-hit game
Browns’ lead intact in loss to Niggeling with Yankee assist
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Hull, Dulles meet today
Bipartisan support of world security plan is at stake
Washington (AP) –
The possibility of bipartisan support for current efforts at post-war world security comes to a head today in an unprecedented meeting between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and John Foster Dulles, Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s foreign policy advisor.
Preliminary to his afternoon session with the Secretary (scheduled for 3:30 p.m. ET) Dulles sought the advice of two Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Austin (R-VT) and Vandenberg (R-MI), in morning conferences.
Austin is known as a supporter of American peace organization efforts which culminated in the present Soviet-British-American talks here, and Vandenberg said yesterday that the talks had started under the “happiest possible prospects of good effect.”
The session today moved toward detailed analysis of Russian, American and British plans for organizing the world for peace. All three proposals were presented to yesterday’s meetings and officials familiar with them said they showed broad areas of agreement.
The main problems developed for future discussion were apparently the extent of authority to be proposed for small nations and the kind of commitments for the use of force if and when it is necessary to suppress aggression.
Dulles arrived late yesterday and at a press conference gave some broad indications of possible developments in his talks with Hull. He brought, he said, his own ideas and those of Governor Dewey, the Republican presidential nominee, on organizing world peace.
Expects Hull to report
Depending on how the meeting with Hull develops, he expected to present those ideas to the Secretary and he made it clear that if they were in conflict with the American plan, as already presented at Dumbarton Oaks, he might suggest some eleventh-hour alterations. However, he said he did not know what the plan is and could not say in advance whether changes would be suggested.
Asked whether he intended to remain here for the duration of the Dumbarton conversations he said he would “go very far to comply with any request made by Secretary Hull, subject to keeping in touch with Governor Dewey.
Whether he stays or not, he made it clear, he would expect that Hull would keep him and Dewey constantly informed of the progress of the Dumbarton talks because “I think it would be difficult to cooperate without definite information.”
Cooperation in the sense of Republican support for the peace organization plans worked out under the Democratic administration, Dulles said, does not mean complete removal of the subject from campaign discussion. He said it should not preclude “free public discussion” by political leaders in the months ahead.
Dewey plans talking tour
Two-month drive may take him into most states in union
Albany, New York (AP) –
Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s aides went ahead today with plans for a two-month drive that may take him into a majority of the states of the Union.
The Republican presidential nominee has already announced he will speak in Philadelphia Sept. 7 and Louisville, Kentucky, the following day on what has come to be regarded here as the beginning of a full-fledged campaign swing that may carry him westward to the Pacific Coast later in the month.
Senator Ed H. Moore (R-OK) said after a conference with Dewey yesterday that the GOP nominee would fill a date in Oklahoma City about Sept. 25. Moore added it was his understanding this stop would be made on the return from a West Coast tour.
Thus, the beginning of the active phase of the first wartime campaign since 1864 may find Dewey and his running mate, Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, in full stride while President Roosevelt bides his time. Mr. Roosevelt said when accepting a fourth-term nomination he would not campaign in the usual way, but would be ready to answer any “misstatements” the Republican nominee might make.
Senator Harry S. Truman (D-MO), the Democratic vice-presidential nominee, has complained that Republicans “have nothing to do but throw bricks,” asserting that all of the campaign speechmaking would probably be done by the GOP.
Roosevelt too busy
Truman, who was to address the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago today and who has arranged to speak in Detroit on Labor Day, said President Roosevelt is too busy running the war to campaign and that he himself has a job to do in the Senate. Truman will accept his nomination and speak in Lamar, Missouri, Aug. 31.
If this made any impression on Dewey’s aides, they gave no sign and Herbert Brownell Jr., Republican National Chairman, went ahead with detailed arrangements which are expected to produce a lengthy itinerary soon for both Dewey and Bricker.
The New York Governor has said he would be in Massachusetts before the campaign is over and has been invited to Maine with some indications he might accept. In the Midwest, he has been invited to Indiana, where Bricker will speak at French Lick, on Sept. 9, Ohio, Illinois and Michigan. Governor Harry F. Kelly of Michigan said he was assured Dewey would talk there.
A West Coast trip will take Dewey into an important political battleground, for both sides admit that California is in the doubtful class and neither is sure of winning the Pacific Northwest.
The Pittsburgh Press (August 23, 1944)
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
On the Western Front, France – (by wireless)
You may have wondered how that British pilot happened to be found after lying for eight days unnoticed, trapped in his wrecked plane.
Well, as I told you, a bullet had clipped the balls of his right-hand forefingers, clear to the bone. He had put his cream-colored handkerchief over them to stop the bleeding. As the wound dried, the handkerchief stuck to his fingers, and to pull it off would have been painful. It still stuck to his fingers all through the ordeal of getting him out; It was still elapsed in his hand as the ambulance jeep drove away with him.
To go back, through the days of his waiting he had that handkerchiefed right hand stuck through a little hole in the plane’s side, moving it slowly back and forth.
Just after I had stopped that day to talk to Lt. Ed Sasson in the field, two mechanics from an armored division came down the road in a jeep. They were looking at the wrecked plane as they drove along, and suddenly they saw this slight movement. They stopped and went over to make sure, and they found inside there one of the brave men of this war. That’s when they came running for us.
The two boys to whom this British flight lieutenant owes his life are Sgt. Milton Van Sickel of Brainard, Minnesota, and Cpl. William Schinke of Gresham, Nebraska.
At last, we had the pilot out of the plane and on a stretcher under a wing. The doctor took some scissors and started cutting away his clothes. It must be hot in those cockpits in flight, for the pilot wore nothing but short trousers and a blue shirt.
The doctor cut off the pants and then the shirt. The pilot lay there naked. He was a man of magnificent physique.
The calves of his legs were large and athletic. In the calf of the left leg was a round hole as big as an apple. But to our astonishment, there was no deterioration of flesh around it. The wound was already healing perfectly. The leg wasn’t even burned, as he had told us. What then could it have been that we smelled in the plane?
We turned him over and then we saw. His back was burned by spilled gasoline, from his shoulders to the end of his spine. It was raw and red.
He had been forced to lie on it all the time, unable to move. At last festering had started, and then gangrene. We could see the little blue-green moldy splotches. That was what we had smelled. He didn’t know about that. The odor had developed inside his little cubbyhole so gradually that he hadn’t been aware of it. He was shocked by the smell of fresh air, but he still didn’t know about the other. He had been worried only about his leg.
I don’t know what the doctor really thought. The pilot was obviously in wonderful physical shape, considering such an ordeal. The doctor told him so. But he looked a long time at that gangrenous back, and then they temporarily bandaged it.
As they were working on him, the doctor asked if the pilot had a wallet or any papers. He said yes, his had been in his hip pocket. The doctor lifted the blood-smeared pants and cut the wallet out with a pair of scissors. From the other pocket he cut a silver cigarette case.
“That’s good, old boy,” the pilot said. "I’m grateful that you found that.”
We asked him if he had a wrist watch. He said yes, but it had fallen off and was probably in the debris where he had been lying. But we couldn’t find it, and finally gave it up.
As he lay on his stomach on the stretcher, they tied a metal splint around his wounded leg. While they were doing this, I bathed his head again in water from a canteen.
A soldier lit another cigarette and gave it to him. It dropped through his fingers onto the wet grass, and became soaked. I lit another one and put it in his fingers.
He took a long, deep drag, and put his head down on the litter and closed his eyes. The morphine finally was making him groggy, but it never did put him out.
The cigarette burned up almost to his fingers. An officer said, “It’s going to burn him,” and started to pull it from between his fingers. But the pilot heard and lazily opened his eyes, took another puff, and with his thumb pushed the cigarette farther out in his fingers. Then he closed his eyes again. He lay there for a few minutes like that.
Then again, he rolled those great eyes up and said to me:
“What date did you say this was?” I told him.
“That’s wonderful,” he said. “My wedding anniversary is just three days away. I guess I’ll be back in England for it yet.”
The medics were all through. They covered the naked pilot with a blanket and carried him to the road. Everybody in our little crowd loved the man who had the heart to be so wonderful.
As they put the stretcher down in the gravel road, waiting for the jeep to turn around, one of the armored division soldiers leaned over the stretcher and said with rough emotion:
If you’d been a damn German, you’da been dead five days ago. Christ, but you British have go guts!
Völkischer Beobachter (August 24, 1944)
Tschiangkaischek drängt zur Entscheidung
USA fürchten Japans starke Festlandsstellung
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Die Absetzbewegung im Westen
vb. Berlin, 23. August –
Die Schlacht in Frankreich wandert langsam weiter nach Osten. Die deutschen Verbände, die sich durch den Sperrriegel zwischen Argentan und Falaise durchgekämpft haben, konnten sich inzwischen mit dem Gros der Heeresgruppe Rommel wieder zusammenschließen, die sich fechtend nach Osten zurückzieht. Der Feind drängt scharf nach und versucht gleichzeitig von Süden her, die linke Flanke unserer Truppen anzugreifen.
Es lassen sich beim Gegner in Nordwestfrankreich zurzeit drei Hauptstoßrichtungen unterscheiden. Die eine geht aus dem Raum zwischen Lisieux und L’Aigle nach Osten, die zweite zwischen Breteuil und Saint-Andrè nach Norden und die dritte zwischen Pacy und Vernon nach Nordwesten. Der gegenwärtige Hauptkampfraum kann etwa als ein Viereck angesehen werden. Die eine, die schmälste Seite, wird von einem Stück Kanalküste gebildet, eine zweite Seite des Rechtecks von der Seine und die beiden anderen von den eigentlichen Kampffronten.
Das bedeutet nicht, daß nicht auch außerhalb dieses Hauptkampfraumes gefochten würde. Von beträchtlicher Wichtigkeit sind dabei zunächst die Vorgänge bei Mantes. Hier sind die Amerikaner bereits vor einigen Tagen über die Seine gesetzt und haben beträchtliche Kräfte auf das nördliche Seineufer schaffen können. Das Ziel dieser Bewegung liegt auf der Hand. Der Gegner wollte auf dem nördlichen Seineufer möglichst schnell vorankommen und hier den deutschen Truppen die Straße nach dem Osten verlegen. Diesem Versuch ist ein deutscher Angriff entgegengetreten. Die Nordamerikaner sind hier auf den Fluss zurückgeworfen worden.
Vorstöße schneller amerikanischer Truppen sind nicht nur nordwestlich, sondern auch südlich von der französischen Hauptstadt zu beobachten. Auch hier hat der Feind die Seine erreicht. Am weitesten ist er noch weiter südlich vorgedrungen, wo er in der Gegend von Sens die Yonne erreicht hat. Es sind vor allem die Amerikaner und nicht die Engländer, die von der Gegenseite aus dem schnellen Bewegungskrieg führen. Ein Urteil darüber ist erst möglich, wenn nähere Umstände bekannt sind. Auf jeden Fall ist es unwahrscheinlich, daß man in London diese Tatsache mit großem Vergnügen sieht.
Ganz im Süden drängen die gegnerischen Invasionstruppen immer mehr nach Westen zu. Ohne Zweifel haben sie die Absicht, in das Rhonetal zu gelangen und von hier aus längs dem Lauf des Flusses nach Norden vorzudringen, mit dem Fernziel Lyon. Hier leisten unsere Truppen hinhaltenden Widerstand mit dem militärischen Ziel der Verzögerung.
Es ist deutlich, wieviel Entsagung und zugleich doch wieviel kämpferische Hingabe die gegenwärtige Entwicklung von unseren Truppen im Westen fordert. Sie müssen sich zurückziehen, das wissen sie, aber sie dürfen dem Gegner das Vordringen nicht zu leicht machen. Er muß immer von neuem gezwungen werden, starke Kräfte aufzuwenden und dabei Zeit zu verschwenden. Nur so kann das Ziel der Errichtung einer neuen Kampffront weiter rückwärts erreicht werden. So werfen sich die deutschen Bataillone immer von neuem dem Feind entgegen, so bereiten sie ihm immer von neuen unliebsamen Überraschungen, so helfen sie durch ihren tapferen Kampf den Absichten der obersten Führung.
Das beschleunigte Tempo im Pazifikkrieg –
Zwischen Honolulu und Saipan
Von unserem Marinemitarbeiter
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Innsbrucker Nachrichten (August 24, 1944)
Härteste Abwehrkämpfe in Ost und West
Amerikaner an zwei Punkten über die Seine zurückgeworfen – Sowjetangriffe im mittleren und nördlichen Abschnitt gescheitert
dnb. Aus dem Führerhauptquartier, 24. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:
In der Normandie wiesen unsere Truppen am Touquesabschnitt, im Raum von Lisieux und weiter südlich alle Angriffe des Gegners ab. Eine feindliche Kampfgruppe, die westlich Évreux nach Norden vordrang, wurde von unseren Panzerverbänden angegriffen und zum Stehen gebracht. Schlachtgeschwader unterstützten diese Kämpfe und griffen den feindlichen Übersetzverkehr sowie Panzer- und Fahrzeugkolonnen mit guter Wirkung an. Zwei Seinebrücken wurden durch Bombentreffer zerstört. In Luftkämpfen wurden zwölf feindliche Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
Nordwestlich Mantes warfen unsere Truppen die Nordamerikaner bei La Roche–Goyon unter hohen Verlusten über die Seine zurück und säuberten die Flussschleife südlich dieses Ortes vom Feind.
Nordöstlich Fontainebleau wurden über die Seine übergesetzten feindlichen Kräfte im Gegenangriff auf das Flussufer zurückgeworfen.
In der Nacht führten Kampffliegerverbände einen wirksamen Angriff gegen Évreux. Starke Brände und Explosionen wurden beobachtet.
An der südfranzösischen Küste leisten die Besatzungen von Marseille und Toulon überlegenen feindlichen Kräften verbissenen Widerstand.
Nördlich der Durance sind harte Kämpfe mit feindlichen Kräften im Gange, die versuchen, sich unseren Absetzbewegungen im Rhonetal vorzulegen.
Im französisch-italienischen Alpengebiet dringen unsere Kampfgruppen gegen den zähen Widerstand leistenden Terroristen über die Passstraßen nach Westen vor. Der Maddalenapass ist nach hartem Kampf wieder in unserem Besitz.
London und seine Außenbezirke liegen weiter unter dem schweren Feuer der „V1.“
In Italien fanden außer reger beiderseitiger Aufklärungstätigkeit keine größeren Kampfhandlungen statt.
In der Adria torpedierten Schnellboote auf der Reede von Ancona ein feindliches Torpedoboot.
In der Ägäis versenkte einer unserer Unterseebootjäger zwei feindliche Unterseeboote.
Im Süden der Ostfront drang der Feind mit motorisierten Infanterie- und mit Panzerverbänden bis in den Raum beiderseits des unteren Pruth vor. Auch am mittleren Sereth sind bei Roman heftige Kämpfe im Gange.
Nordöstlich Warschau zerschlugen Verbände der Waffen-SS im harten Kampf zahlreiche Angriffe der Bolschewisten. Zwischen Bug und Narew wurden die starken Angriffe der Sowjets in erbitterten Waldkämpfen zum Stehen gebracht.
Im Einbruchsraum von Modohn wurde der Feind weiter zurückgeworfen. Westlich des Pleskauer Sees scheiterten erneute heftige Angriffe der Bolschewisten. Durchbruchsversuche mehrerer sowjetischer Schützendivisionen in Richtung Dorpat wurden aufgefangen.
Schlachtfliegerverbände vernichteten allein im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront 60 feindliche Panzer, 15 Geschütze und über 100 Fahrzeuge. In heftigen Luftkämpfen wurden an der Ostfront 54 feindliche Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
Bei der Abwehr eines Angriffs sowjetischer Flugzeuge gegen das Gebiet von Petsamo und des Varangarfjords wurden durch Jagdflieger und Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe weitere 29 feindliche Flugzeuge zum Absturz gebracht.
Unterseebootjäger versenkten im Schwarzen Meer östlich Konstantza ein sowjetisches Schnellboot.
Nordamerikanische Bomber griffen mehrere Orte im Großraum von Wien an. Durch Luftverteidigungskräfte wurden 28 feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter 21 viermotorige Bomber, vernichtet.
In der Nacht griffen sowjetische Bomber das Stadtgebiet von Tilsit an.
Einzelne britische Flugzeuge warfen Bomben auf Köln.
Zum heutigen OKW-Bericht wird ergänzend mitgeteilt:
Ein vielfach bewährtes Flakkorps der Luftwaffe unter Führung von Generalleutnant Reimann erzielte in den schweren Abwehrkämpfen im großen Weichselbogen den 3.000. Flugzeugabschuss seit Beginn des Ostfeldzuges. Im gleichen Zeitraum vernichteten Einheiten dieses Korps 2600 sowjetische Panzer. Oberleutnant Hartmann erhöhte am gestrigen Tage mit dem Abschuß von acht Sowjetflugzeugen die Zahl seiner Luftsiege auf 290.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (August 24, 1944)
Communiqué No. 138
Southeast of PARIS, Allied forces have reached the vicinity of CORBEIL and MELUN, and reconnaissance elements are 15 miles east of SENS. Farther south units are east of MONTARGIS, after crossing the LOING River.
The Allied envelope drives toward the Lower SEINE continue.
Units advancing northward have liberated ÉVREUX and are now several miles beyond the city. Other units have reached CONCHES after freeing VERNEUIL.
A thrust northeast from MONNAI progressed about five miles and a drive northeastward from ORBEC reached the village of THIBOUTIERE.
Several bridgeheads have been made across the river TOUQUES. Fighting continued in the area of LISIEUX where the enemy had taken up strong positions dominating the eastern exit from the town. In the PONT-L’ÉVÊQUE area, enemy resistance was stubborn and between there and LISIEUX heavy mortar fire was brought down on our troops crossing the river.
The enemy’s dwindling road, rail and water transport systems were attacked by our aircraft yesterday. Fighter-bombers destroyed more than 500 motor transport in the woods and on the roads in the ELBEUF–LOUVIERS area, and sank 15 river barges at TOURNEDOS-SUR-SEINE.
Both flak and enemy air opposition were encountered along the river, and as far east as SENS where our fighters gave support to the ground forces. Seventeen enemy planes were destroyed in the air in this sector and 12 others damaged. Fifteen of our aircraft are missing.
In the CAMBRAI–LILLE area, railyards and canal barges were attacked effectively and without loss.
Fires resulted from attack be a small force of medium bombers on a fuel dump near ROUEN.
U.S. Navy Department (August 24, 1944)
CINCPAC Press Release No. 528
For Immediate Release
August 24, 1944
Paramushiru Island in the Northern Kurils was bombed by Ventura search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four on August 20 (West Longitude Date). Direct hits were obtained in storage areas, a small vessel offshore was sunk aped another damaged. One of seven intercepting enemy fighters was shot down. Anti-aircraft fire was meager, and all of our aircraft returned.
Yap Island in the Western Carolines was attacked by 7th AAF Liberators on August 22. Bivouac areas and facilities near the airfield were bombed through meager anti-aircraft fire.
Pagan and Rota Islands in the Marianas were attacked by our aircraft on August 21 and 22, and Aguijan Island was hit on August 22.
Ventura search planes of Fleet Air Wing Two bombed Nauru Island on August 21 and 22, concentrating on the airstrips.
Neutralization raids against enemy positions in the Marshalls continued, with Corsair fighters and Dauntless dive bombers of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing striking at Wotje on August 21 and 22 and at Mille Atoll on August 21.
U.S. State Department (August 24, 1944)
862.50/8–2444
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War
Washington, August 24, 1944
My Dear Mr. Secretary: There is enclosed a memorandum entitled “General Objectives of United States Economic Policy with Respect to Germany.” This document was presented by the Department to the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy and on August 4 received the approval of that organization. As you know, the Executive Committee was established by the President and consists of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the United States Tariff Commission, and the Foreign Economic Administration. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson acts as Chairman. In the President’s letter to me it was stated:
The function of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy will be to examine problems and developments affecting the economic foreign policy of the United States and to formulate recommendations in regard thereto for the consideration of the Secretary of State, and, in appropriate cases, of the President.
I am anxious to submit to the President as soon as possible a document on the long-range objectives of the United States with respect to the economic policy towards Germany for the reason that many subsidiary issues now require decision and studies can proceed only to a certain point without clear guidance as to our basic policy. For example, a report on Reparations, Restitution and Property Rights with Respect to Germany has also been approved by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. It is naturally supplemental to the long-range objectives document and as such conforms with the latter. A copy of the summary of the Report on Reparations is also enclosed. Before submitting these documents to the President, I would appreciate having the views of the War Department. A similar letter is being addressed to the Secretary of the Navy.
In view of the importance of this matter and of indications that differences of opinion within the military exist on this subject, I believe it would be desirable if Mr. Acheson could discuss this matter informally with the appropriate officer in your Department.
In conclusion, may I emphasize the urgency of the matter. With the war progressing so favorably it is necessary for this Government to formulate a policy with respect to the economic treatment of Germany. Moreover, it is hoped that informal technical discussions in respect to reparations with representatives of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union will be undertaken within the next three or four weeks.
Very truly yours,
CORDELL HULL
[Enclosure 1]Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy
ECEFP D–36/44 Washington, August 14, 1944Germany: GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY
United States economic policy with respect to Germany envisages the reservation of far-reaching rights of control over the German economy after surrender. It is to be anticipated that the declarations, ordinances and orders to be issued by the occupation authorities will have been agreed upon by the British, Soviet and American Governments and will deal with the control of every important field of German economic life. Irrespective of the final form which these documents will take, the three Governments will, therefore, have final responsibility for determining the basic economic policies that are to prevail in Germany during the occupation period.
Whether the control period proves to be long or short, and whether detailed administrative responsibility is assumed by officers of military government or by German administrators operating under directives of the occupation authorities, these policies should be consistent with and contribute to the achievement of explicitly stated overall objectives directed toward the final goal of world peace and security. Some of these objectives will be of paramount importance immediately upon surrender. Some are of long-run character, affecting not only Germany’s future position in the world economy, but also the peace and security of all the United Nations.
It is, therefore, imperative to formulate promptly the broad objectives of American policy with respect to Germany. Such a formulation cannot prejudge decisions still to be taken with regard to the form, extent and duration of United Nations control of Germany. These decisions, however, should insofar as possible be made within a general frame of reference.
The following statement of the guiding lines of American economic policy with respect to Germany is intended to provide such a frame of reference. It is not intended to sketch in detail, or to take the place of, more specific directives which will be formulated later in each major field of action.
The relation between American economic policy with respect to Germany and the maintenance of peace and security
The basic long-term interest of the United States is peace. Consequently, so far as Germany is concerned, the basic objective of the United States is to see that that country does not again disturb the peace.Security against a renewal of German aggression must for the most part be achieved by means other than economic controls. Economic measures do not, and cannot by their nature, provide a substitute for the general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, and for other measures of security, to which the United States and its principal allies are pledged by the Moscow Declarations of October 1943. American economic policies with respect to Germany, as set forth below, are intended not to take the place of but to buttress the instrumentalities which will have primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security by helping to create conditions in the economic sphere which will remove the danger of future aggression on the part of Germany. On the one hand, they are intended to provide necessary safeguards against resumption by Germany of its pre-war policies of economic preparation for war. On the other hand, they are intended to create conditions under which Germany will contribute to the reconstruction of Europe and the development of a peaceful and expanding world economy in the benefits of which Germany can hope, in due course, to share.
A corollary of the foregoing is that to establish enduring controls over the German economy for punitive purposes or in the search for security would be contrary to the objectives of American policy. In the immediate future – not necessarily confined to the occupation period – there will be occasion for the imposition of special economic restrictions and controls on Germany (as well as on certain other ex-enemy states). An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people, however, would at best be an expensive undertaking and would afford the world little sense of real security. More important still, there exists no convincing reason to anticipate that the victor powers would be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. For the longer run, therefore, only those economic measures should be envisaged which are a part of general arrangements for collective security and which could be applied to each and every major power whose actions were deemed to constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace and security.
General objectives and methods
Within this framework, the overall economic policy of the United States with respect to Germany is directed to the achievement of the following four major objectives:
The performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation required by the United Nations.
The control of Germany’s economic war potential, by the conversion of German economic capacity directed to war purposes, and by rendering vulnerable to outside control the reconversion of Germany into a war economy able to launch and sustain a war of aggression.
The elimination of German economic domination in Europe, which Germany achieved by the systematic exploitation of the so-called “New Order” in Europe and by a series of other practices.
The effectuation in due time of a fundamental change in the organization and conduct of German economic life which will integrate Germany into the type of world economy envisaged by the Atlantic Charter.
In seeking to attain these objectives, the directives of this Government dealing with the major aspects of economic policy with respect to Germany will be designed to provide the framework of a single self-consistent policy. Since, however, a major task confronting the United States and other United Nations at war with Japan after the surrender of Germany will be to achieve the defeat and unconditional surrender of Japan, the development and implementation of economic policy with respect to Germany will, whenever and to the extent that it proves inconsistent with the most effective prosecution of the war against Japan, be subordinated to the achievement of that primary objective.
It is not the policy of this Government that the controls over the German economy established by the occupation authorities should be used solely to force compliance with United Nations demands during the occupation period. The economic policy of this Government with respect to Germany as a whole looks to the future, and the work of the occupation authorities should be so directed as to open up new possibilities for an improvement of the organization of the European economy as a whole and the development of comprehensive international institutions in the economic field. This Government therefore includes among the general objectives of its economic policy with respect to Germany the desire to shape the interim control mechanisms so as to lay the technical groundwork for, or preserve the possibility of, improved international economic cooperation. It is anxious to facilitate the adaptation of these mechanisms to, and their utilization in, any general international functional organizations or controls that may be developed such, for example, as organizations designed to promote unification of European transport, power and communication facilities, to provide for the prohibition, regulation or control of enduring international agreements of a restrictive character between private firms, or to establish a general system of armaments regulation.
Reconstitution or maintenance of a minimum German economy
The objectives just stated cannot be achieved unless the German economy is maintained at, or, if necessary, restored to at least a predetermined minimum level of effectiveness. The state of the German economy at the time of surrender and the attitude of the German people thereafter will have a decisive bearing on the nature and extent of the economic controls and measures which the occupation authorities will be able initially to put in force. Under the most favorable circumstances, economic disruption will be great. It is even possible that a more or less complete economic collapse will occur either before or after surrender. Such a collapse would delay or impair the effective operation of the economic controls proposed below. At least a minimum degree of operating effectiveness in the German economy is especially important not only to facilitate the achievement of the major long-run objectives stated above, but also:
to facilitate an orderly demobilization and absorption of the German Armed Forces into peacetime occupations;
to facilitate the orderly return of Allied prisoners of war, foreign workers and other displaced persons to their countries of origin or choice;
to ensure the maintenance and safeguarding of property in Germany and elsewhere under German control, in which the United Nations, for any reason, have an interest;
to make possible prompt German contributions to the relief and rehabilitation of other countries;
to enforce, as far as possible, the economic rehabilitation of minority groups within Germany which have been systematically despoiled;
to make possible the early beginning of a program of restitution and reparation by Germany to other countries;
to facilitate the administration of the entire German inland transport, communication and power systems in the interests of the European economy as a whole;
to guarantee the prompt reorientation of forces and resources, after the defeat of Germany, from Europe to the Pacific for the defeat of Japan.
It is therefore essential that the occupation authorities should formulate and be in a position to enforce a series of economic and financial policies in Germany adequate to maintain or reconstitute a minimum German economy promptly. For this purpose, Germany should be required initially to retain and place at the orders of the occupation authorities the administrative machinery charged with economic responsibility which may be in existence at the time of surrender. It is, further, essential to orderly reconversion to post-war production that preliminary programs be developed in advance of the military collapse of Germany for reparation deliveries to meet the immediate needs of claimant countries.
A primary responsibility of the occupation authorities will be to carry out as soon as possible a reorganization of this machinery so as to eliminate Nazi Party influence and organization completely from the direction of German economic life. The formal dissolution of the Nazi Party and the elimination of active Nazis from policy-making positions will be only the beginning of this process. Purely party organizations exercising economic control functions should be destroyed, and the occupation authorities should, whenever possible, utilize the basic governmental administrative structure. When and if considerations of military necessity and the immediate requirements of maintaining a functioning economy permit, they should begin to eliminate from the German economic control system those features which are inconsistent with the fundamental aim of adjusting Germany’s international economic relations to the requirements of an integrated world economic system. It may be necessary at first, however, to utilize existing agencies of control, or those which can be restored to effective operation, having regard only to their capacity to hold the economy together.
Restitution and reparation
With regard to restitution, the major policy of this government is to require the return of identifiable stolen property to the governments of the former owners, and the relinquishment of German rights, claims, and controls over property in occupied countries obtained by duress or fraud.The overriding principle with regard to reparation is that reparation policy should conform to the long-range objectives of this government respecting Germany and the world at large. Reparation cannot be regarded as a major means of accomplishing these objectives, but the effects of an unwise reparation settlement may go far toward defeating them. The reparation program must be designed so as to make the maximum contribution to the rehabilitation of the countries injured by German aggression, while at the same time avoiding or minimizing possible harm in other directions.
The main elements of a constructive reparation program are as follows:
The time period should be short (preferably five years but in no event more than ten) in order not to delay unduly a return to normal world trade and finance, and not to prejudice the establishment and maintenance of democratic government in Germany.
The reparation obligation should be heavy (though not crushing), for only in this way can Germany make a substantial contribution to the reconstruction of Europe in a short period of years.
Reparation should be predominantly, though not exclusively, payable in kind, i.e., in the form of scheduled deliveries of goods and services to the claimant countries. This will avoid the anomalous situation wherein countries are unwilling to accept the reparation which they demand, and the exchange disturbances which arise therefrom. Deliveries should not be restricted to a few categories of goods but should include any which Germany is fitted to produce and which may be needed for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the claimant countries.
There should be no extensive rebuilding of German plant and equipment for the purpose of maximizing reparation deliveries. The potential loss involved in such a policy will be outweighed by the relative industrial strengthening of Germany’s neighbors vis-à-vis Germany.
Execution of this program will require the establishment of an interim operating machinery and organization, integrated to the Allied control authority, which will quickly initiate reparation and restitution transfers while the terms of a final reparation settlement are being developed.
Control of German economic war potential
It is the intention of this Government to pursue a policy with regard to German economic war potential which will reinforce and supplement the measures of strictly military disarmament which will be taken by the Allies after the unconditional surrender of Germany and which at the same time will be consistent with the major long-run economic objectives of the United States.It is to be recognized that the pattern of the post-war German economy, and the steps to be taken in shaping it during the control period, will be influenced not only by policies relating to the German economic war potential, but also by policies relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of at least a minimum German economy in the control period, by policies relating to reparation and restitution, and by policies relating to the ultimate integration of Germany into a world economy. This section, which deals with the control of the German economic war potential, must therefore be read in connection with the other related sections of this paper.
Since a multitude of industries contribute to a country’s economic war potential, the destruction, dismantling or conversion of plants producing arms, ammunition, or implements of war will eliminate only one aspect of this economic war potential. These military measures will be buttressed by strengthening the economies of Germany’s neighbors under the program for restitution and reparation, and to eliminate those high-cost industries and agricultural activities which had been established in Germany to make it self-sufficient in terms of the requirements of a war economy.
The leading principles of the policy of control of economic war potential, which are to be implemented during the control period, are:
The control of imports of materials useful in the manufacture of armaments and the regulation of German inventories of such materials.
The conversion rather than the dismantling of industrial plants now serving the war effort of Germany but capable of contributing to the revival of a peace economy in Germany and to the reconstruction of Europe, without prejudice, however, to such dismantling and destruction of plants and facilities used in the production of war materials as the three Governments may agree to be necessary for the effective disarmament of Germany.
One class which might be presumptively earmarked for destruction or dismantlement would be those facilities whose location reflected a military purpose – e.g., underground plants and storage facilities, or facilities uneconomically located with respect to raw materials, labor, markets, etc., for strategic reasons.
The general policy does not envisage indiscriminate demolition or dismantlement of German industrial capacity. The emphasis is upon conversion to peacetime usefulness, rather than upon destruction. It is to the long-range interest of the United States that Germany be prosperous, but that, at the same time, the German economy should not again be directed to war-like purposes. To this end Germany should be forbidden the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war and of other materials directly and exclusively (or for the most part) useful for war purposes. The latter category is most difficult, if not impossible, of definition in general terms and will have to be decided case by case. Germany will, however, be faced with a vast problem of reconversion and in industries where there is excess capacity from the standpoint of sound development of the German economy, it would be desirable from the psychological as well as the economic point of view, to select for scrapping, other things being equal, those plants which have been most directly related to the production of war material.
The maintenance or development in Germany, by trade barriers, direct subsidy or otherwise, of economically unsound productive capacity convertible to war purposes would also be contrary to the long-range interest of the United States. Here again precision of definition of general categories is difficult. Much will depend on technological progress and on the commercial policies not only of Germany but also of the countries which constitute Germany’s sources of supply and markets. Given, however, progress toward a reasonably liberal commercial policy and international monetary arrangements, there would appear to be no justification, other than strategic, in the present state of technology, for the maintenance of synthetic petroleum industries in Germany and their dismantlement or conversion would presumably be indicated by the criteria set forth above. Decision in each instance, however, should be made upon the basis of investigation which proves that these synthetic processes are in fact high-cost ways of producing these commodities.
The removal of certain plants to other countries, consistently with the recommendations on reparations.
The elimination of those forms of industrial and commercial organization within Germany which have been and might again become a threat to peace and security.
It is to the interest of the United States that Germany should not be permitted to use foreign trade or commercial relations as an instrument of nationalistic policy as it did in the past, particularly in the thirties in southeastern Europe and in Latin America.
In the interest of eliminating the social and economic bases of recurrent militarism, it is recommended that this Government approve a program for destroying the privileged positions of the Junker estate owners and of the great financial and industrial monopolies. The problem of the Junkers can be solved in large part by breaking up the large landed estates; the problem of financial and industrial monopoly could be met in part through disestablishing the top financial structures of the great industrial combines and redistributing the ownership of constituent operating companies, and in part through some effective form of public control exercised through a democratic regime. Moreover, this Government should oppose the development of new forms of industrial combinations, whether on a German or international basis, which could contribute to renewed German economic and political aggression in Europe.
It is further the policy of this Government 1) to ensure the control of German inland transport, power and communication facilities during the period of military and civil administration by the occupying powers, and their administration in the interests of Europe as a whole and 2) to require the surrender of German shipping to be used as needed in the economic interests of Europe as a whole or to further the war effort against Japan. This position does not involve any commitment to maintain these controls as permanent measures for the economic disarmament of Germany and is taken without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of these facilities.
Integration of Germany into the world economy and the elimination of German economic domination in Europe
A major objective of this Government with regard to Germany is that the latter must in due course be given the opportunity of finding a permanent place in the world economy, and of making a peaceful and constructive contribution to the development of the community of free nations envisaged by the Atlantic Charter. On the other hand, it is vital to prevent Germany from again becoming a primary focus of restrictive trade and financial practices. German economic self-sufficiency for war must be replaced by an economy which can be integrated into an inter-dependent world economy.The achievement of these objectives will require that as quickly as possible Nazi principles be eliminated from German trade, industry, and finance, and that independent trade unions, cooperatives and similar forms of free economic association be restored. The longer-range elements in the program which this Government considers to be essential to achieve the integration of Germany into the world economy and which should be instituted as soon as this may be done consistently with the reparation and short-range objectives outlined above, include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
The exposure of high-cost industries artificially created for self-sufficiency reasons to the pressure of world competition;
the persistent but orderly reduction of agricultural protection in the shortest possible period;
the elimination of discriminatory trade practices, bilateralism, and multiple currency devices;
the organization and administration of German business and other economic institutions in consonance with such international policies and institutions as may be established for the world economy as a whole, with particular reference to international cartels and combines;
full employment of manpower and resources in the production of those commodities and services of a non-military character for which the German economy is well adapted.
This Government regards the carrying out of such a program as essential for the success of its general economic policies, and also attaches great importance to it as a contribution to international security, because it will tend to 1) prevent Germany from again carrying on trade as a branch of war, 2) increase the vulnerability of Germany to economic sanctions, 3) remove some of the most formidable obstacles to the relaxation of trade barriers and 4) eventually make possible the rising standard of living necessary to reconcile the German people, under new leadership, to the peace settlement.
It is recognized that the accomplishment of the foregoing long-range objectives will require that Germany be afforded opportunity for developing adequate export markets and will also require the maintenance of policies and institutions, by other countries as well as Germany, which will permit the proceeds of German exports to be realized in internationally convertible currencies. It follows therefore that the full realization of such a program is dependent not only on acts by Germany but also on progress toward the general achievement internationally of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter and of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreements. The long-range integration of Germany into a world economy of this type cannot be wholly achieved unless other major countries are also pursuing compatible economic policies for the maximum reduction of the economic significance of frontiers and the development of agencies of international collaboration. It is to the interest of the United States that Germany eventually should participate fully in such international economic organizations and agencies and that the German people be allowed to determine the nature of their economic system, subject to the requirements outlined in this and the foregoing sections, and to the development of democratic institutions in Germany.
It is further recognized that immediate post-hostilities problems may require the temporary pursuit of policies inconsistent with some of the long-range objectives. The immediate need for foodstuffs, for example, may require continuation of measures for the support of agricultural prices and the maintenance of production, even though this production may be of a character which in the long run should be discouraged by the reduction of agricultural protection. The need for the maintenance of industrial production for urgent civilian needs, for reparation, for reconstruction, and possibly even for the prosecution of the war against Japan may similarly condition the treatment of German industry. The need for assuring the minimum import requirements of Germany may, during the early occupation period, require ad hoc trade and payment arrangements not fully compatible with a multilateral system, freedom from quotas, etc. It is nevertheless of importance that the long-range objectives be clearly formulated and clearly kept in view, that transitional expedients of a different character be adopted only after a balancing of emergency need and of long-range policy, and that where such transitional arrangements are adopted they be kept under continuing scrutiny with a view to abolishing them or tapering them off at the earliest practicable moment.