Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/26
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 19, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
A meeting of the Joint Steering Committee was held today at Ambassador Gromyko’s request to reach agreement on a number of unsettled items.
a) Voting in the Council
With reference to the section on voting in the Council the Soviet group preferred a general statement rather than an enumeration of the questions requiring unanimous vote. The Soviet group also were agreeable to providing that a permanent member could abstain from voting, but be bound by the decision. The British said emphatically that the voting question was closed at this time and maintained that the matter of voting should be settled as a whole rather than in parts. I suggested the voting question might best be covered by a statement that the matter has been left open.
b) Regional arrangements
The Soviet group withdrew their reservation on regional arrangements, but requested that the clause excepting from the authority of the Security Council action in relation to enemy states be transferred to the chapter on transitional arrangements.
c) Respect for human rights
The British were reluctant to accept our proposal for a provision obligating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Soviet group would accept this principle provided it were coupled with a provision that Fascist or fascist-type states could not be members of the organization.
d) Disarmament and regulation of armaments
The British agreed that the general Assembly might consider disarmament, but maintained their view that the military staff committee should not deal with disarmament.
The Soviet group withdrew objection to empowering the Security Council, assisted by the military staff committee, to formulate plans for regulating armaments.
e) Election of non-permanent Council members
The British agreed to eliminate the qualification that the contribution of members to peace and security be a consideration in filling nonpermanent seats.
f) Settlement of disputes
The Soviet group suggested that the obligation of parties to refer an unresolved dispute to the Security Council state that the Council should in each case decide whether the dispute is a threat to peace and whether the Council should deal with it.
g) Bases and transit facilities
The Soviet group agreed to drop the provision, originally proposed by them, that smaller states should provide transit facilities and sites for bases.
h) International air force corps
The American formula regarding national air force contingents was accepted and the British alternative was dropped.
i) Transitional arrangements
Agreement was reached that until the special agreement or agreements to provide armed forces come into force, the states parties to the Moscow Declaration should consult with one another and, as occasion arises, with other members of the Organization with a view to joint action to maintain peace and security.
500.CC/9–1944: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State
Moscow, September 19, 1944 — 1 p.m.
[Received September 19 — 9:25 a.m.]
3572
Before receiving this morning your personal message No. 2234, September 18, 10 a.m. [p.m.], I had drafted the first part of a message on this subject. I am now sending you this part of the message as background and will follow shortly with more specific answers to the questions which you have raised. Original message follows:
I submit the following for such value as it may have in your consideration of Marshal Stalin’s reply to the President’s message on the question of voting of the permanent members in the Council of the World Security Organization.
The British Ambassador has informed me of his discussion with Molotov on this subject, report of which I assume you have received. Molotov’s reaction followed precisely the same line as Stalin’s message to the President.
From the evidence we have, it would appear that the underlying reason for the position of the Soviets on voting is their unwillingness to allow the Council to deal with any dispute in which the Soviet Government is a party affecting their relations with at least their neighboring countries. Some of the evidence we have in mind is the following:
You will recall that at the Moscow Conference when the question of European problems was discussed Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was prepared to consult with the British and yourselves [ourselves?] on matters relating to all questions except those between the Soviet Government and its immediate western neighbors. On these matters the Soviet Government was prepared to keep us informed but would take no further commitments.
Light on the Soviet Government’s attitude toward small nations was reflected in an informal conversation Mr. Eden and I had at the British Embassy with Litvinov and Maiski in which Litvinov expounded the concept that it was unreasonable to consider that the interests of 30 million Poles should be given equal weight with those of 180 million Russians. Where the interests of the Russians conflicted with those of the Poles, the Poles would have to give way.
Recently Litvinov expounded the same philosophy to the Norwegian Ambassador when he said “The glory of the small nations is past.”
Throughout the year we have seen evidence of the Soviet Government’s intention to prescribe unilaterally the manner in which the Polish political problem should be settled.
Throughout the period of occupation of Iran, the Soviet Government has shown unwillingness to collaborate to any substantial degree with the British and ourselves and in fact has been unwilling to allow our observers to study conditions in northern Iran.
The Soviet Government’s agreement with the Italian Government for the exchange of representatives was reached without consultation.
As soon as the Soviets decided that Turkey’s entry into the war was no longer vital, they took the first pretext to break away unilaterally from their agreement at Moscow and Tehran to work with the British and ourselves for Turkey’s entry into the war.
The Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria without consultation with the British and ourselves, giving us thirty minutes notice. It would appear probable that the reasons for failure to consult were political even if the move itself may have been based on military considerations as well.
Molotov’s attitude in the discussions preceding the Rumanian armistice has been cold to say the least toward real collaboration of British and American political representatives in Rumania. It is of course too early to judge the manner in which the Soviets will use their powers under the armistice.
We have seen an unbending and impatient attitude toward Chiang Kai Shek particularly regarding the difficulties in Sinkiang. Our air force as well as China are being penalized by an unwillingness to allow the use of the overland route through the Soviet Union in order to bring political pressure on the Generalissimo.
I do not attempt to appraise whether the Soviets are right or wrong in their objectives in any one of the above cases. I refer to them only as indicative of their attitude and consistent method of unilateral action in accomplishing their objectives. I believe we have thus sufficient evidence to foresee that if the world organization is established requiring agreement of all permanent members for the consideration of any dispute regardless of whether or not one of them is involved the Soviet Government will ruthlessly block consideration by the Council of any question in which it considers its interests affected and will insist that the matter be settled by the Soviet Union within the other country or countries involved particularly any disputes with their neighbors.
I am convinced that Stalin and his principal advisers place the highest importance on the association of the Soviet Union in a major way with the three great powers in world affairs but have expected that their political and military strength would enable them to dictate the conditions. There is no doubt the Russian people crave peace and have been led to believe that the intimate relationship developed during the war with the British and ourselves will continue after the war and will be a guarantee of a lasting peace. I do not believe Stalin can forego the material as well as the psychological value of this association without causing grave concern among the Russian people. On the other hand, it seems evident that there are powerful groups within his immediate circle who are unwilling to give up right of independent action where Russian’s interests are affected and to see Russia depend solely on an untried world organization with associates none of whom do they fully trust. As Stalin traditionally likes to have two strings to his bow, it has not appeared to him inconsistent to pursue these two methods at the same time to obtain security for the Soviet Union and to advance its national interests as he sees them.
HARRIMAN