Völkischer Beobachter (September 16, 1944)
Grenzenloser deutscher Angriffsgeist schuf:
Sprengboot als neue Waffe
Wieder ein Beispiel der Erfindungsgabe und technischen Wendigkeit unserer Seekriegführung
…
Grenzenloser deutscher Angriffsgeist schuf:
Massenmord und Sklaverei?
Alle Nachkriegspläne der Feinde gipfeln in dem Wunsch, die deutsche Volkssubstanz zu zerstören. Das möchten sie durch Verschickung von Arbeitssklaven und Ausmordung erreichen.
World Review, bekannte US-Zeitschrift, vom 10. Dezember 1942:
Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach bedeutet unser Sieg die Tötung von 500.000 jungen Deutschen, entweder durch ein summarisches Kriegsgericht oder ohne eine solche Zeremonie.
Observer, London, 7. Mai 1944:
Die Sowjetunion hat ihren Plan unterbreitet, die gesamte deutsche Armee als kriegsgefangen zu erklären und zu Arbeitergruppen neu zu organisieren. Diese haben in der Sowjetunion Zwangsarbeit zu leisten. Dieser Plan ist vom Sowjetbotschafter in London, Gusew, in Vorschlag gebracht worden.
Daily Sketch, London 22. August 1944:
Mehrere kleine europäische Emigrantenregierungen folgen jetzt dem Beispiel Moskaus und verlangen Aufnahme der Klausel in den Waffenstillstandsvertrag, daß Deutschland ebenfalls Arbeiter zum Aufbau ihrer Städte zur Verfügung stellt. Die Forderung von vier dieser Exilregierungen allein stellt sich bereits auf 500.000 Mann.
Eugen Vargas, Professor in Moskau, Erklärung, wiedergegeben in der US-Zeitschrift Newsweek, September 1943:
Die Sowjetunion wird verlangen, daß zehn Millionen deutscher Facharbeiter zehn Jahre lang in Rußland Zwangsarbeit leisten.
Das sind keine müßigen Betrachtungen von Außenseitern. Die Sowjets haben 1939 zwei Millionen Polen nach Sibirien verschleppt und größtenteils umgebracht, dazu Hunderttausende von Letten, Litauern und Esten, nachdem sie ungezählte Angehörige der Ostvölker hingemordet hatten. Für England ist die leibliche Vernichtung anderer Völker Tradition, erhärtet durch Hungerblockade und Bombenterror. Die Yankees haben die Indianer ausgerottet. Hinter ihnen allen lauert die jüdische Mordgier.
Im Kampf mit diesen Feinden geht es um Leben und Sterben des deutschen Volkes. Kein Opfer ist zu groß, um diesen Kampf siegreich zu bestehen und die feindlichen Versklavungspläne zuschanden zu machen.
Führer HQ (September 16, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Der Schwerpunkt der Kämpfe im Westen lag gestern im Raum südlich und südöstlich Aachen. Mit zusammengelassen Infanterie- und Panzerkräften versuchte der Feind dort, über Stolberg nach Nordosten durchzubrechen. Nachdem der Gegner unter stärkstem Materialeinsatz zunächst geringen Geländegewinn erzielen konnte, brachten ihn unsere Gegenangriffe zum Stehen. 27 feindliche Panzer wurden dort abgeschossen. Südlich Aachen bis in den Raum südlich Nancy scheiterten zahlreiche, oft mehrfach wiederholte feindliche Angriffe. Besonders erfolgreich waren unsere Abwehrkämpfe im Raum von Vesoul, wo der Feind bei seinen vergeblichen Angriffen hohe Verluste erlitt.
In dem völlig zerstörten Brest leistet unsere tapfere Besatzung trotz schwersten feindlichen Feuers und andauernder Luftangriffe dem immer wieder anrennenden Gegner verbissenen Widerstand.
Die Hafenstädte an der südenglischen Küste lagen auch am gestrigen Tag ohne Unterbrechung unter dem Feuer unserer Marineküstenbatterien.
Bei dem bereits gestern gemeldeten Angriff britischer Schnellboote, auf ein deutsches Geleit nördlich der westfriesischen Insel Texel wurden nach abschließenden Meldungen Insgesamt drei feindliche Boote versenkt.
An der italienischen Südfront setzte der Feind im Raum nördlich Florenz seine Durchbruchsversuche während des ganzen Tages in verstärktem Maße fort. Gegenüber dem zähen Widerstand unserer Divisionen gewann er nur geringfügig Boden. Die Einbruchsstellen sind abgeriegelt. Auch an der adriatischen Küste verhinderten unsere Truppen erneut den vom Feind erstrebten Durchbruch auf Rimini.
In Südsiebenbürgen warfen deutsche und ungarische Verbände den bei Torenburg und am Mieresch vorgedrungenen Feind zurück. In den Ostkarpaten scheiterten mehrere sowjetische Angriffe.
Bei Sanok und Krosno zerschlugen unsere Divisionen wiederum die mit starken Kräften geführten Durchbruchsversuche der Bolschewisten, 27 sowjetische Panzer wurden abgeschossen.
Nordöstlich Warschau warfen Truppen der Waffen-SS und ungarische Verbände eingebrochenen Feind zurück.
In den Räumen von Bauske, Modohn und Walk setzten die Sowjets, unterstützt durch Panzer und Schlachtfliegergeschwader, ihre heftigen Angriffe fort. Unsere Divisionen vereitelten in erbitterten Kämpfen, Seite an Seite mit lettischen Freiwilligenverbänden und in hervorragender Zusammenarbeit mit starken Kräften der Luftwaffe, alle feindlichen Durchbruchsversuche. Eingebrochener Feind wurde in sofortigen Gegenstößen zurückgeworfen. 87 feindliche Panzer wurden vernichtet, Jäger und Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe brachten 92 sowjetische Flugzeuge zum Absturz.
Im Seegebiet vor der nordnorwegischen Küste wurden durch Marineflak, Sicherungsfahrzeuge und Bordflak eines deutschen Geleits vier feindliche Flugzeuge abgeschossen und ein sowjetisches Schnellboot versenkt.
In der vergangenen Nacht richteten britische Bomber einen Terrorangriff gegen Kiel. Einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge warfen Bomben auf Berlin.
Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Force (September 16, 1944)
Communiqué No. 161
Allied troops are now thrusting eastward along the 500 miles from the SWISS frontier, south of BELFORT, to the Channel Coast around the SCHELDT Estuary.
Near the SWISS border, Allied troops advancing from southern FRANCE have made further progress since contact was established near DIJON with patrols from our forces operating to the north. The enemy is fighting stubbornly from prepared positions to protect the southern hinge of his withdrawal movement towards the BELFORT GAP. Northeast of VESOUL, we have advanced several miles against increasing resistance.
Elements have pushed to the vicinity of FAYS-BILLOT and south of the town an enemy column was attacked and destroyed. Northwest of DIJON we have reached MONTBARD in the BRENNE valley without meeting serious opposition.
CHATENOIS, six miles from NEUFCHÂTEAU, has been captured and units are in the vicinity of MIRECOURT.
In the MOSELLE Valley, our troops have entered NANCY and EPINAL. Fighter-bombers were active against enemy transportation in the MOSELLE Valley.
In northern LUXEMBOURG, east of ST. VITH, our advance has continued against strongly-held pillbox defenses.
Allied troops closing on AACHEN from three sides are meeting stubborn opposition. MAASTRICHT has been liberated and our troops have moved beyond the city.
Fighting continued throughout yesterday in our bridgeheads over the MEUSE–ESCAUT and a number of enemy counterattacks were beaten off. The coastal areas north of the ALBERT CANAL are being steadily cleared of enemy.
Fighter-bombers hit enemy transport in HOLLAND. Ships and shore installations at BRESKENS, FLUSHING and ELLEWOUTSDIJK on the west SCHELDT were attacked by medium and light bombers.
U.S. Navy Department (September 16, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 119
During September 15 (West Longitude Date), U.S. Marines made some additional gains against strong opposition on Peleliu Island and captured the airfield at the southern end. The enemy has launched several strong counterattacks against our positions but has been thrown back each time.
An attack begun by our forces on the early morning of September 15, preceded by aerial bombing and naval gunfire, resulted in steady advances through well-organized defenses in depth. This attack was supported by artillery, tanks, naval gunfire, and bombing. Several enemy tanks were reported destroyed. Our troops had counted more than 1400 enemy dead by nightfall on September 15. Severe fighting continues.
Carrier aircraft continued to give close support to our ground forces throughout September 15. Enemy troop concentrations, gun positions, and supplies were bombed. Carrier planes also bombed airfield installations at Babelthuap, the northernmost island in the Palau Group. Several fires were started by strafing.
Seventy‑two tons of bombs were dropped on Dublon and Moen in the Truk Atoll by Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force on September 14. Five enemy planes intercepted our force and one Liberator was damaged. The enemy planes were driven off with probable damage to one. Anti-aircraft fire was meager. On the same day Mitchell bombers of the 7th Army Air Force bombed Ponape Island in the Carolines.
Paramushiru in the Kurils was bombed by 11th Army Air Force Liberators at night on September 12. Anti-aircraft fire was meager and all of our planes returned. Venturas of Fleet Air Wing Four attacked Paramushiru on September 14, setting fire to several buildings. Intercepting enemy aircraft damaged one Ventura. Two of the interceptors were probably damaged. All of our planes returned.
Pagan Island was attacked on September 14 by Thunderbolts of the 7th Army Air Force. Gun emplacements were hit with rockets and strafed. One plane was damaged by anti-aircraft fire.
Gun emplacements at Wotje Atoll were bombed on September 14 by Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Meager antiaircraft fire was encountered.
A single search plane of Fleet Air Wing Two strafed and damaged two enemy sailboats at Lemotrek Island, east of Woleai, on September 14. Another search plane of Fleet Air Wing Two on routine patrol near Iwo Jima on September 14 sighted two large landing craft escorted by a fighter plane: Both landing craft were strafed and the enemy plane was shot down.
U.S. State Department (September 16, 1944)
Memorandum approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 320/27
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by [to] the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz–northern border of Hessen–Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.
American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.
Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:15 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Roberts | |
| General Marshall | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Admiral King | Brigadier General Everest | |
| General Arnold | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Captain Burrough | |
| Lieutenant General Handy | Captain Fife | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Fairchild | Colonel Benner | |
| Major General Kuter | Commander Clark | |
| Major General Wood | Lieutenant Colonel Pasco | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Graves |
Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Admiral Leahy said that a decision had been reached on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany. He presented a memorandum which he had prepared for presentation to the British. He had outlined the British and United States areas and had included remarks on the necessity for access to northwestern sea ports and passage through the British-controlled area.
General Marshall said that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to specify one port that would be controlled by the United States.
Admiral King concurred.
In response to a question by Admiral Leahy as to the sufficiency of a single port, General Marshall replied that one port would be enough provided the United States had complete control of it and the port had sufficient capacity to handle approximately 10,000 tons of supplies daily.
Admiral King suggested that Bremen and vicinity be proposed for United States control.
General Marshall proposed that an additional paragraph be included in the memorandum as follows: “Control of the port of Bremen and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the commander of the American zone.”
Admiral Leahy suggested that in view of General Marshall’s amendment it would be desirable to insert in the next to the last paragraph the words “in addition” after the word “have” in the first line thereof.
General Arnold felt that some reference to the source of the Soviet area boundaries should be included for identification.
Admiral Leahy said that the question of Soviet boundaries had already been settled by agreement, and mention of it would not be appropriate in this paper.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum proposed by Admiral Leahy, as amended during discussion, and agreed to its presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 320/26)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Situation of the Chinese forces in the China-Burma-India Theater
General Marshall read a message from General Stilwell outlining the military situation in the Chinese areas of operation. The situation appeared to be extremely unfavorable and unless the Chinese took immediate remedial steps, there would be reverses of far-reaching proportions.
General Marshall said he had reported the situation to the President. Pie read a message which he had prepared for the President to dispatch to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek outlining the consequences if immediate steps were not taken to rectify the unfavorable military situation, and requested the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek proposed by General Marshall.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Handy | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Fairchild | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 175th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also approved subject to later minor amendments.
“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater (CCS 684)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 684 (The directive to General Wilson was dispatched as Fan 418).
Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters (CCS 687)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 687 (The message to SCAEF was dispatched as Facs 81).
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany (CCS 320/26)
Admiral Cunningham suggested that any naval disarmament measures for U.S. controlled ports should be under the U.S. naval member of the Central Control Commission.
Admiral King agreed with this proposal. American control of the port of Bremen would have to include American control of a suitable area for disembarkation and staging.
Admiral Cunningham agreed. He suggested that the American area should also include Bremerhaven, some 40 or 50 miles down the river. Bremerhaven was, he understood, the port where large ships had to berth.
General Somervell said that the U.S. troops would probably also have to be supplied through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. It might well be desirable to set up an Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine.
General Marshall suggested that the Combined Administrative Committee might be instructed to work out the logistic details involved in the decision taken with regard to zones and the consequent maintenance of U.S. and British forces in the zones.
Certain minor amendments were then proposed to the statement of policy contained in CCS 320/26. These were accepted.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the proposals in CCS 320/26, subject to the minor amendments agreed in discussion. (The amended paper, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, circulated as CCS 320/27.)
b. Agreed that any naval disarmament measures for Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under the U.S. Naval Commander of the Central Control Commission.
c. Agreed to refer CCS 320/27 to the Combined Administrative Committee for examination of the logistics problems involved.
Situation in China
General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram recently received from General Stilwell. The Japanese were advancing on Kweilin, if indeed they had not already captured it and were therefore only 460 miles from Kunming, the China end of the air route. Further, no Chinese replacements were being provided for the Salween forces and the Generalissimo was threatening to withdraw these forces altogether if the Ledo forces did not advance to Bhamo. The Generalissimo had not yet agreed to place all Chinese forces under the direct control of General Stilwell which he had been pressed to do for some two months.
General Marshall then informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek by the President urging early and vigorous action.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of a telegram read to the meeting by General Marshall, which the President had sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, stressing the need for action to remedy the situation in China in general and on the Salween front in particular.
Communiqué for release to the Press
Sir Hastings Ismay suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might wish to propose to the President and Prime Minister a paragraph dealing with the military points of the Conference for incorporation in the final press release. He presented a draft for consideration.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the text of a short note containing suggestions as to the military substance of any communiqué that the President and the Prime Minister might wish to issue to the Press on OCTAGON.
Concluding remarks
Sir Alan Brooke, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, said he would like to express warm appreciation to the United States Chiefs of Staff for their helpful cooperation in reaching agreement on the problems which had been before them.
Admiral Leahy, in expressing thanks to Sir Alan Brooke, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were most grateful for the helpful attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff in overcoming the minor difficulties which had initially existed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 680/2
Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs Of Staff at the “OCTAGON” Conference
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:
I. Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.
II. Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
III. Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.
e. Continue the offensive against Germany.
f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other cobelligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the enemy Powers in the present war.
i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.
j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.
IV. Execution of the overall strategic concept
DEFEAT OF GERMANY
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe
Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the air forces involved, including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command, passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A directive (CCS 520/6) has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
Operations in Northwest Europe
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has reported (Scaf 78) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.
The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander’s first operation will be to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.
We have approved General Eisenhower’s proposals and drawn his attention (Facs 78):
a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and,
b. To the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.
Operations in Italy
We have examined a report by General Wilson (Naf 774) on operations within his theater. Insofar as the battle in Italy is concerned, he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways:
a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,
b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal; in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.
We have agreed:
a. That no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known;
b. That the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.
c. To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (Fan 415).
Operations in the Balkans
General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line, Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube, will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except:
a. The small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.
b. The small land forces in the Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.
Command of “DRAGOON” forces
Command of the DRAGOON forces operating from southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Facs 76).
Adjustments of the ground and air forces on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.
Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.
Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort
Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow suggested that improvement should be made in the system of military coordination between the USSR, U.S. and the United Kingdom.
We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the USSR and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Tripartite Military Committee consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff.
We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must be military in its character and not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.
In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the United States and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the United States and British sides, the heads of the present missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Overall objective in the war against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
b. Ultimately invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.
Operations in the Pacific Area
We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long-range bomber operations against Japan Proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.
Pursuant to the above, the operations in the Pacific Theater are being conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines and the opening of a seaway to China.
We have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.
British Empire participation in the Pacific
We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.
We have invited the British Chiefs of Staff to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.
Canadian participation is accepted in principle.
Operations in Southeast Asia
We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.
We have approved the following operations:
a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;
b. Operation DRACULA.
We attach the greatest importance to the discharge of the task under paragraph 29 and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945. Our directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia is attached. (See Annex)
Redeployment after the end of the war in Europe
We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.
Duration of the war against Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.
We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
a. The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
b. The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
c. Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.
d. American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British-controlled area.
e. Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.
F D R
W S C
Annex
Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command
Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.
The following are approved operations:
a. The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China.
b. Operation DRACULA.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2a and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.
If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| General Ismay | ||
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis |
McFarland minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Report to the President and Prime Minister
At the request of the President, Admiral Leahy read out the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680/1) paragraph, by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (CCS 680/2).
In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were made as follows:
Operations in Italy
a. Paragraph 11
The Prime Minister suggested that the alternative developments in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson were rather too rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring’s forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11a and b would present a better-balanced estimate if paragraph 11b was amended to read “b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the enemy’s resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until spring 1945.”
b. Paragraph 12
The Prime Minister asked that the precise implication of the statement “that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known” might be made perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 12a was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of the Valley of the Po.
General Marshall said it was his understanding that General Alexander’s present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po.
Admiral Leahy agreed.
c. Paragraph 12c
The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to Admiral King for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against the Istrian Peninsula.
Admiral King said that after taking part in operations in the Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was therefore of the greatest importance that General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required for the Pacific.
The Prime Minister agreed that it was of the utmost importance that the matter be settled promptly.
General Laycock confirmed that the additional craft referred to by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation.
Overall objective for the war against Japan
d. Paragraph 21
The Prime Minister said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, sustained and ever-increasing air bombardment of the Japanese cities might cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some endurable end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward to was the prospect of an ever-increasing weight of explosive on their centers of population.
e. Paragraph 23
With reference to the term “the opening of a seaway to China,” the Prime Minister said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the south, for example, through the Sunda Strait.
Admiral King agreed with the Prime Minister’s interpretation on this point.
f. Paragraph 26
The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions.
It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27)
General Arnold pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics.
g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards CAPITAL**, the Prime Minister** said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945.
h. At this point the Prime Minister read out a note on the provision of forces for Dracula (see Annex I) in amplification of which he made certain suggestions about the timing of the movements of forces from the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General Montgomery’s Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion.
General Marshall undertook to examine the Prime Minister’s proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell was desirous of having an American division assigned him; in fact, he wanted two if he could get them.
i. Continuing, General Marshall said that he had recently learned of an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No United States authorities had advocated any such increase.
At the President’s request, General Marshall outlined certain developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the “Y” Force across the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men. A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility therefor.
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe
j. Paragraph 30
The Prime Minister pointed out that our shipping situation would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports.
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
k. Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on a provisional demarcation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. [An addition to the report which covered this matter (CCS 320/27) was read out and agreed.]
ANNEX I: Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
l. Admiral Mountbatten’s directive was agreed, subject to certain minor amendments.
The Conference: Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to circulate it as an approved document.
Location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany
The President inquired whether any suggestions had been put forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany. Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere?
Mr. Eden said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin seemed to be the best place.
Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
The Prime Minister said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.
The President said that as the communication was purely military in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted.
The President and Prime Minister approved the terms of the communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as set out in Enclosures “A” and “B” respectively of CCS 681/2.
Release of information on “MULBERRY”
The Prime Minister said that it had been suggested to him that the time had now come when information could be released to the press about MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan. The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King’s view and there would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present.
“OCTAGON” Communiqué
The Conference: Agreed on the terms of a communiqué to be issued to the Press that same afternoon (see Annex II).
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 687
Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters
The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the dispatch of the following message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force:
Accelerated operations in the Pacific and prospective plans for SEAC require earliest practicable withdrawal of amphibious craft especially LSTs from European Theater. Having due regard for your requirements for buildup until adequate port facilities become available and considering limitation on the use of these craft in the near future due to weather, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire you review the situation carefully with the object of early release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD. Early report in this matter is desired.
Communiqué to the Press
Quebec, September 16, 1944
The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time, they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific.
The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy.
The British Paymaster-General to the Secretary of the Treasury
Quebec, 16th September 1944
Dear Mr. Secretary, As you suggested, I am sending this note so as to clarify the meaning of the phrase “or sold for profit” in the record of the conversation between the President and the Prime Minister on September 14.
According to my recollection, you explained that it merely meant that our Government should not sell Lend/Lease goods for more than the price at which they are entered in your books plus a reasonable allowance for transport and similar charges. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether this is correct.
Though I do not know whether we are informed about the price at which Lend/Lease goods stand in your books – thanks to your generous desire to keep the dollar sign out of Lend/Lease – I feel sure that we habitually keep well within this limit and that we shall therefore find no difficulty in meeting the President’s wishes in this respect.
May I also take this opportunity of telling you how much I enjoyed seeing you at Quebec and how very grateful I am for all the kindness you showed in your dealings with such a novice as
Yours very sincerely,
CHERWELL
Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
His Majesty’s Government are in full accord with the directive to Admiral Mountbatten which makes him responsible for executing the stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China. Having regard however to the immense losses by sickness (288,000 in six months) which have attended the Burma campaign this year, they are most anxious to limit this class of operation, the burden of which falls almost wholly upon the Imperial armies, to the minimum necessary to achieve the aforesaid indispensable object. For this purpose, they are resolved to strain every nerve to bring on the Operation DRACULA by March 15, as by cutting the Japanese communications the enemy will be forced to divide their forces. Decisive results may be obtained in a battle north of Rangoon, and the pursuit by light forces from the north may be continued without serious cost.
It is essential to provide five or six divisions for DRACULA. The 6th Airborne Division from England and a British-Indian division from Italy will start at the earliest moment irrespective of the state of the European war. It will not however be possible to withdraw any further forces from Europe before the end of organized and coherent German resistance. Admiral Mountbatten hopes by certain adjustments of his reserve divisions to withdraw two or even three divisions from the forces now facing the Japanese on the Burma front, for use in DRACULA. It would be of very great assistance to His Majesty’s Government if the United States could place at their disposal for Operation DRACULA two United States light or ordinary divisions. Whether these divisions should come into action on the northern Burma front or whether they should go straight to the Operation DRACULA is a matter for study in time and logistics, observing that we have six months in hand before DRACULA D-day.
If such a provision were made, we should feel certain of being able to achieve DRACULA in time to limit the wastage to the British Imperial armies in the north and to clean up the Burma situation before the next monsoon. The destruction of the Japanese in Burma would liberate a considerable army, which could immediately attack Japanese objectives across the Bay of Bengal at whatever point or points may be considered to be most beneficial to the common cause and most likely to lead to the rapid wearing-down of Japanese troops and above all air forces.
If on the other hand we are not able to carry out Operation DRACULA, His Majesty’s Government would feel they had been exposed to unnecessary sacrifices through persisting in operations ravaged by disease, and also their whole further deployment from India and Burma against the Japanese in the Malay Peninsula, et cetera, will be set back until 1946. Thus, the averting of a double disaster depends upon the certainty that we can execute DRACULA by March 15 and, having regard to the very heavy losses we have sustained and are liable to sustain, we feel fully entitled to ask for a measure of United States assistance.
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Mr. President. I return the Memorandum you gave me about Italian Colonies.
The Foreign Office would like to treat this as an official communication if you would allow us to keep a copy of it.
It seems that the usual broad and substantial measure of agreement exists between us, but we should like to look into the details more closely.
W S C
16.9.44
740.0011 EW/9-1644: Telegram
The Chargé near the Polish Government-in-Exile to the Secretary of State
London, September 16, 1944
Secret
US urgent
Poles 102. Premier Mikołajczyk has requested me to transmit the following appeal of the Council of National Unity in Warsaw addressed to the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, dated September 15th and received in London today:
On the forty-fifth day of the struggle of the people of Warsaw for the freedom of the capital and of Poland, witnessing the first signs of effective assistance in the form of air cover and dropping of arms and food, the Council of National Unity affirm that this has brought great relief to Warsaw.
The Council of National Unity stress the inflexible will of the people of Warsaw and of Poland to fight the Germans unto the end for the freedom and independence of Poland. To carry on this fight it is indispensable to supply the soldiers of the home army. The Council of National Unity therefore fervently appeal for continuous dropping of arms, ammunition and food, for permanent air cover to be organized and for the bombing of German concentrations and military objectives. The enemy is attacking the city with continuously reinforced formations. The lack of quick and effective succor may cause a catastrophe.
Mr. Mikołajczyk indicated that he was conscious that the arrangements made for lending assistance to Warsaw through the American shuttle service and through British planes from Italy had been impeded by weather conditions recently but felt he must underline the continued urgency of assistance as reflected in the foregoing message.
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin
Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Priority
Number 66, top secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.
In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.
Operations in North West Europe
It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.
Operations in Italy
As a result of our present operations in Italy
a) Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or
b) Kesselring’s army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.
Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.
Operations in the Balkans
Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.
Operations against Japan
We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.
Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang
Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Priority
Number 68, from Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.
-
First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.
-
Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in north Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.
-
Third: Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to prepare a large-scale amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.
-
Fourth: We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
Priority
WH Number 64, from the President for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
After reading the last reports on the situation in China my Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your “Y” forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore, any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten’s coming offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not provide manpower for your Divisions in North Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.
I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant air attack, reducing the hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.
Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise, political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.
The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only thing you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce jour Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I trust that your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.
ROOSEVELT